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Abstract 
This thesis is a linguistic/ontological inquiry into narrative dynamics. 
Particular attention is drawn to elucidating the mechanism for recognising 
story events as one reads narrative discourse. 
The overall discussion is a criticism of formal approaches to narrative 
dynamics which tend to make observations on the assumption that there is a 
fixed relation between language form and meaning ( e.g. the distinction 
between events and non-events in narrative circumstances). As two possible 
factors responsible for preventing formal analysts from taking an elastic 
view of story-event structure in narrative, I point out overly metalinguistic 
and metatemporal attitudes held by many narrative poeiticians, grammarians 
and formal semanticists. The recognition of narrative dynamics is primarily 
concerned with our concept of time, so that this thesis focuses a good deal of 
attention on explicating how time can be conceptualised in narrative. The 
basic component of the argument, therefore, is made up of ontological 
observations concerning time, event, and change, which are mainly made in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
This thesis concludes that overly metalinguistic and metatemporal approaches 
to narrative dynamics tend to be fallacious, and that it is the commonsensical 
view that counts in the recognition of the event structure in narrative 
discourse. A hypothetical stance I adopt in constructing a narrative theory 
is the viewpoint of the ordinary reader of narrative fiction who is not 
formally trained, and therefore, does not necessarily respond to narrative 
texts in a highly metalinguistic or metatemporal way. The importance of 
assuming the ordinary reader's viewpoint for the proper recognition of the 
story-event structure of narrative is referred to in many different respects 
throughout the thesis. 
Ill 
Notational conventions 
Italics are used for emphasis (e.g. In order to recognise this, what 
might be termed the downgrading principle will be required). 
' single quotation marks are used for citing sentences, words 
(e.g. Common sense will argue against the view that 'John was handsome' 
contributes to making the reader feel story-event dynamics at work). 
II 
" double quotation marks are used to represent non-literal 
meanings (e.g. On such occasions the story world becomes "transparent" to 
the reader). 
This thesis notationally distinguishes between 'now' and NOW: 'now' is used 
when now as a linguistic form is referred to (e.g. The temporal adverb 
'now' can co-occur with this sentence); whereas NOW is used to represent 
the meanings of presentness (e.g. This state of affairs can be said to constitute 
a significant NOW). 
The following abbreviations are used for speech form and perspectival 
categories: 
<Speech form categories> 
NRSffA 
ID 
Narrative Report of Speechffhought Acts 
Indirect Discourse 
IV 
FlO Free Indirect Discourse 
DO Direct Discourse 






Existential-Perspective Event Description 
Existential-Perspective Deictics 





Chapter 1 On the concept of eventhood in narrative poetics 
1.1 Fabula and sjuzhet 
1.1.1 The traditional dichotomy 
1.1.2 The constituents of fabula 
1.1.3 Fabula in fictional narrative 
1.1.4 Conclusion 
1.2 Bohnheim's 'narrative modes' 
1.2.1 The four-mode system 
1.2.2 Narrative modes and narrative pace 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
1.3 Narrative elements 















1.3.2 Rimmon-Kenan's concept of eventhood 26 
1.3.3 Gerald Prince's 'stative events' vs. active events 28 
1.3.4 Conclusion 29 
Chapter 2 Formal approaches to narrative dynamics 31 
2.1 Reference times 31 
2.1.1 Three temporal entities 31 
2.1.2 Reference time in narrative discourse 34 
2.1.3 The abstract nature of reference time 37 
2.1.4 The counterintuitive aspects of the reference-time approach 42 
2.2 Aspectual types 44 
VI 
2.2.1 V endler's typology 
2.2.2 Sentence-based classifications of aspectual types 
2.2.3 Problems with formalists' systems of aspectual types 
2.3 Aspectual types and time in narrative 
2.3.1 'Narrative time movement' in Dowty's TDIP 
2.3.2 Contingency and autonomacy 
2.3.3 A confusing aspect of the concept of 'narrative time' 
2.4 Cone) us ion 
2.4.1 The concept of eventhood - an orientation 
Chapter 3 Time and eventhood 
3.1 MacTaggart's theory of time 
3.1.1 The temporal series 
3.1 .2 The B-series and change 
3.1.3 The unreality of time 
3.1 .4 The A-series, C-series, and our experience of time 
3.1.5 Conclusion 
3.2 The nature of time 
3.2.1 The reification of time 
3.2.2 The direction of time 
3.2.3 The irreversibility of time 
3.2.4 The continuity of time 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
3.3 Change 
3.3.1 Identity and change 
3.3.2 The elements that change 
































3.4.1 Expressed change vs. recognised change 
3.4.2 Subjectivity, objectivity, and eventhood 
3.4.3 Events as spatio-temporal particulars 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
3.5 The recognition of dynamics 
3.5.1 Focus and periphery 
3.5.2 Events and non-events (objects and states) 
3.5.3 Chronos, kairos and dynamics 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 The narrative act 
4.1 The problem with fabula in fiction 
4.1.1 Narration of historical events 
4.1.2 Narration of fictional events 
4.1.3 Fabula and sjuzhet in reality and fiction 
4.1.4 The confusing aspect of story 
4.1.5 The referentiality of event expressions 
4.1.6 Story's "fluidity" on the generalising scale 
4.1. 7 Fabula and the autonomy of story 
4.1.8 Conclusion 
4.2 The eventhood of narration 
4.2.1 Narratorial perceptibility in event description 
4.2.2 Focalisation as a ne\v version of point of view theory 
4.2.3 Possible relations between voice and vision 
4.2.4 The problem of 'Who sees?' in verbal narrative 
4.2.5 Conclusion 






























4.3.1 Speech as a showing of the story world 
4.3.2 Non-tagged speech 
4.3.3 Tagged speech 
4.3.4 NRSffA 
4.3 5 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 Perspective, aspect and narrative dynamics 
5.1 The two facets of presentness 
5.1.1 A preliminary orientation 
5.1.2 Spurious eventhood 
5.1.3 The relative and absolute nature of the A-series 
5.1.4 The time-point A-series vs. the significant A-series 
5.1.5 Conclusion 
5.2 Narrative perspective and event description 
5.2.1 A parallel between narrative and reality 
5.2.2 Existential perspective 
5.2.3 Existential-perspective event description 
5.2.4 Existential-perspective deictics (EPD) and context 
5.2.5 EPED and coherence 
5.2.6 Tense and aspect of EPED 
5.2.6.1 Present progressive 
5.2.6.2 Simple present 
5.2.6.3 Simple. past 
5 .2.6.4 Present perfect 
5.2.7 Reporting perspective 
5.2.8 Reporting-perspective event description 
5.2.9 The story present 































5.2 I 1 Existentiality, report, and narrativity 213 
5.2.11.1 Existentiality 214 
5.2.11.2 Report 215 
5.2.11.3 Narrativity 218 
5.2.12 Conclusion 221 
5.3 Imperfective event clauses in narrative discourse 222 
5.3.1 Eventhood and the framing effect 222 
5.3.2 The problem with the reference-time approach to narrative 228 
5.3.3 Conclusion 231 
Chapter 6 Event sequencing in narrative fiction 233 
6. I The dynamics of narrative structure 233 
6.1.1 The dual aspect of narrative 233 
6.1.2 The primary characteristic of narrative time 235 
6.1.3 The continuity and irreversibility of narrative time 239 
6.1.4 Conclusion 24I 
6.2 Problems of formal approaches to narrative dynamics 241 
6.2. I Reference time and simultaneity 241 
6.2.2 The limitations of adjacency-minded approaches 246 
6.2.3 The pragmatic relation between narrator, text, and reader 249 
6.2.4 Subordinate clauses and S!f presentation 252 
6.2.5 Conclusion 255 
6.3 Events and non-events in narrative discourse 255 
6.3.1 The "historical" function of context 255 
6.3.2 Boundedness vs. unboundedness 259 
6.3.3 Discoursal environments 263 
6.3.4 Story-line events and background discourse 268 
6.3.5 Conclusion 270 
X 
page 
6.4 Story line and clause boundaries 271 
6.4.1 The abstract nature of story line 271 
6.4.2 Consecutive story-line events - prototypes 273 
6.4.3 Consecutive story-line events - non-prototypes 274 
6.4.4 Non-consecutivity 281 
6.4.5 Unbounded story-line events 282 
6.4.6 Anachronies and story-line events 287 
6.4.7 Ambiguities in graphological sequencing 291 
6.4.8 Conclusion 295 
6.5 The reader's role in story-event recognition 295 
6.5.1 The reader's perspectival adjustment 295 
6.5.2 A presentation of story events in Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' 297 
6.5.3 Event unification by perspectival manipulation 300 
6.5.4 Event unification in speech/thought presentation 304 
6.5.5 Conclusion 307 





'What is story event?' 'What is narrative tilne?' or 'What is narrativity?' -
these are the principal problems to be discussed in the present thesis. One 
will soon recognise that the three questions posited above are all concerned 
with what might be termed 'narrative dynamics'. A possible answer to the 
question: 'What is this thesis about?' would be: 'It is a study of narrative 
dynamics'. 
It seems that in the so-called narrative theories there are many things taken 
for granted. At first glance, the individual items assumed to be true may 
seem to vary according to \Vho you are, a narrative poetician or a formal 
semanticist, a grammarian or a logician, but it often happens that on closer 
examination those seemingly different items turn out to be based upon a 
common set of attitudes or principles. They might be referred to as unduly 
metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to narrative discourse. 
Needless to say, a narrative theory must be a product of metalinguistic and 
metatemporal approaches to narrative discourse, simply because it deals 
with narrative, \Vhich is a particular form of temporal discourse, as the 
subject matter. The present study is no exception, since it looks into 
narrative dynamics. In this respect, one might be able to say that being 
metalinguistic and n1etatemporal is to be taken for granted in the study of 
narrative. 
The present thesis does not dismiss metalinguistic/metatemporal approaches 
to narrative as entirely misleading or useless, but attempts to see how valid 
or invalid such formal vic\vs or narrative can be in recognising or 
explicating narrative dynan1ics properly. The most immediate reason that 
has made me decide to \Vrite this thesis is that I have always had an 
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impression that, with the dynamic structure of narrative, the observations 
made by existing narrative theories tend to be counterintuitive due mainly to 
their overly formal vie\vs of narrative entities. 
Of the t\vo above-mentioned attitudes prevalent in narrative theories about 
the dynamic structure of narrative discourse, the metalinguistic one means 
what might be called 'rigid forrnalism', \Vhich pays perhaps too much 
attention, mainly from a grammatical or semantic point of view, to the 
"structural meaning" of a particular clause or sentence as a discrete syntactic 
unit representing narrative dynamics. What is observable there is a kind of 
mechanical fusion of form (grammar) and content (meaning); the assumed 
princi pie is that a particular grammatical form inherently designates a 
particular structural meaning . To be more specific, formal theorists tend to 
see a strong parallel bet\veen particular formal (syntactic and aspectual) 
characteristics and eventhood/statehood (e.g. the contention that the 
progressive form ( -lNG form) of a verbal predicate designates a state), 
which, as will be discussed later, can fail to identify story events in a 
commonsensical \-vay. Besides, their formal rigidity tends to fall into rigid 
relativism, \vhich is liahle to consider the problem of event-sequence 
dynamics of narrative on the microscopic basis of two adjacent clauses. The 
central aim of this thesis is to argue that such rigid and mechanical 
formalism cannot necessarily capture the dynamics of narrative discourse as 
a linguistic and ontological organism. 
The metatemporal attitude, \Vhich ts intimately associated with the 
metalinguistic one mentioned above, concerns the way in which time IS 
generally conceived of. By referring to the fact that time tends to be reified 
or objectified in our everyday life, it \viii be made clear that the kind of time 
that is principally dealt \Vith in temporal discourse analysis is \Vhat might 
be called 'meta-time' (\vhich I \Viii later call tilne in the tilne-point A-series). 
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Our discussion will reveal the ontological fact that meta-time is quantitative, 
objectively measurable, and abstract in its nature. Meta-time is a kind of 
time that might well be thought of as 'time itselr. It is a time with respect 
to \Vhich mentioning duration (in the physical sense of the term) is most 
immediately relevant, and \vhich is normally discussed in such contexts as 
'time and tense' in linguistic fields or 'time theory' in metaphysical 
circumstances. What is highlighted by doing so is the presence of 'object-
time', as a~other kind of time, that is qualitative, subjective, and 
concrete/substantial in its nature (\vhich will be later called time in the 
sign(ficant A-series ). Perhaps the most salient feature of object-time is its 
existentiality, \vhich is deeply involved with the sense of presentness or 
no\v-ness that we can feel inseparably attached to a particular state of affairs· 
in a significant \vay as \Ve go along in everyday life. 
It is later sho\vn that narrative concepts such as story events, narrative time 
or narrativity arc less concerned with meta-time than with object-time, and 
that this is one of the main reasons \vhy existing narrative theories, which.are 
apt to conceive of narrative dynamics mainly in terms of meta-time, tend to 
make rather counterintuitive observations concerning story-event dynamics 
in narrative discourse. 
Methodologically, the present thesis aims at making a practical blending of 
linguistics and ontology. From a linguistic point of view, what is focused 
upon is the investigation of the relationships between sentential-aspect and 
eventhood/statehood, and from an ontological point of view, special attention 
is drawn to the intrinsic characteristics of time, event or change. When we 
say this thesis is partly an ontological approach to narrative dynamics, we 
mean that, from a general point of vie\V, it deals with time, event or change 
as particular forms of existence in nature. The general orientation of this 
thesis is to\vard mitigating overly formal (grammatical) or ontological views 
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of narrative dynamics. It will be pointed out that ontological literalness can 
be as misleading and dangerous as formal literalness in identifying the 
dynamic structure of narrative, which ts primarily the product of 
particular kinds of discoursal conditions, which might be called 'discoursal 
environments' as an amalgam of semantic, grammatical and pragmatic 
elements. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to reveal the formal characteristics of 
narrative fiction as event description. The reason why fictional narrative, 
rather than historical narrative, is dealt with as the subject matter is that the 
former intrinsicalJy presents a peculiar problem to the reader with respect to 
focalisation or point of view, which to a considerable degree concerns the 
interpretation of event ... sequence dynamics, the investigation of which is the 
principal task of the present study. 
This thesis is a theoretical \Vork on narrative dynamics, which is inevitably 
a metalinguistic or metatemporal product. This means that it contains many 
technical and special terms \Vhich are familiar to formally-trained people 
such as grammarians, semanticists, or stylisticians, but which must be quite 
unfamiliar to the common reader who, for example, reads literary works for 
fun. What is to be stressed here, however, is that this thesis does not try to 
account for \Vhat formally-trained people will intuitively feel is right, by 
employing a lot of technical terms. It will soon be found, as discussion 
develops in the present \Vork, that a good deal of attention is focused on 
making an inquiry into a commonsensical view of narrative dynamics. 
When I refer to the reader of narrative fiction in this thesis, I have no special 
type of reader in mind; my primary concern is to construct a narrative 
theory \vhich can explain, from a commonsensical point of view, the 
ordinary reader's intuitive recognition of narrative dynamics. 




commonsensically - not esoterically - conceptualised entities such as 
story, narrative, story event, and narrative time. This thesis consists of six 
chapters. The content of each chapter is as follo\VS. 
Chapter 1 is intended as a review of some relevant theoretical concepts 
posited by narrative poeticians; the items to be spotlighted are the ontological 
concept of eventhood or story events suggested in the traditional scheme of 
the fabula/sjuzhet dichotomy. The problems of 'narrative modes' and 
'narrative elements' are also discussed. 
Chapter 2 is a revtew of the formal semanticists' conceptualisation of 
eventhood/statehood. The main items to be looked at critically are 
counterintuitive aspects of their metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to 
narrative dynamics. This chapter is a preliminary to Chapters 5 and 6, which 
attempt to emphasise the importance of mildly metalinguistic attitudes and 
object-time approaches for the detection of event dynamics in narrative 
discourse. 
Chapter 3 attempts an ontological discussion of the nature of time, event and 
change. The main purpose of this chapter is to clarify the notion of 
'narrative time' as a simulation of time in the real world. The discussion 
offers a theoretical basis \Vhich will help to avoid the commonly observable 
confusion between linguistics and ontology with respect to the so-called 
"narrative time progression/suspension". And the introduction of the 
contrast between meta-time and object-time will be another theoretical basis 
\vhich \Viii help to explain ho\v narrative dynamics can be properly 
perceived. 
The main concern in Chapter 4 is lo give the right place to fabula in contrast 
to sjuzhet as its counterpart, on the assumption that the fabula-sjuzhet 
5 
scheme is closely associated with the recognition/detection of story events. 
The possibility of regarding fabula in fiction as a mental construct by the 
reader will be suggested. Another important aim of Chapter 4 is to discuss 
the problem of narratorial perceptibility regarding event description in 
narration and speech/thought presentation. I attempt to reformulate the 
traditional scheme of narratorial presence in terms of the \vay in which the 
narrator is perceptible as the event cogniser. 
Chapter 5 is mainly a linguistic investigation of the relation between 
perspective, aspect, and the event/non-event distinction. Particular attention 
is paid to the problem of narrative perspective or narrativity; temporal 
immediacy and distance as perspectival values will be concentrated upon. In 
this chapter the theoretical drawbacks of meta-time approaches employed by 
formal semanticists will be explicated. 
Chapter 6 contemplates the problem of event-sequence in narrative fiction. 
Both microscopic and macroscopic inquiries are attempted. The central aim 
of this chapter is to see ho\v graphological linearity is related to the sequence 
of story events in narrative discourse. Discoursal criteria will be postulated 
for distinguishing story-line events, which contribute to the plot progression, 
and background discourse, which does not. And by pointing out the 
legitimacy of unifying a chunk of discourse as a particular story event, I 
make it clear that adjacency-minded approaches to narrative dynamics have 
their limitations, and that the proper recognition of narrative dynamics 
requires a more or less macroscopic view of discourse. 
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Chapter 1 On the concept of eventhood in narrative poetics 
This chapter looks into the ways in which story event is generally viewed by 
narrative poeticians. Particular attention will be drawn to the traditional 
dichotomy between fabula and sjuzhet, introduced by Russian formalists. 
Some theoretical problems will be pointed out. 
1.1 Fabula and sjuzhet 
1.1.1 The traditional dichotomy 
Narrative poeticians have traditionally worked with the two domains of 
inquiry, i.e. fabula and sjuzhet, introduced by the Russian formalists (Propp, 
1 968; Tomashevsky, 1965; Shklovsky, 1965 etc.). Their English 
counterparts are story and discourse (Chatman, 1978). Wales (1990: 169) 
defines fabula as 'the DEEP level, the abstracted chronological or logical 
ordering possible of the events', and sjuzhet as 'the SURFACE level with the 
actual sequence of events as narrated'. (The deep-surface contrast between 
fabula and sjuzhet is analogous, as Toolan points out ( 1988: 12), to the 
syntactic distinction bet\veen 'deep structure' and 'surface structure' 
introduced by Chomsky ( 1957, 1965), but Toolan admits the weak point of 
this analogy by saying: 'Here the Chomskyan analogy is weakest, since 
clearly most narrative transformations are not so much transformations as 
elaborations and enrichments, a fleshing-out of the basis story stuff' (Toolan, 
op. cit.: 13)). Danow ( 1986: 248) says that fabula is 'the chronological 
order of material prior to its aesthetic reorganisation', and that sjuzhet is 'the 
writer's redistribution of events and, therefore, the rearrangement of the 
chronological order according to a narrative plan seeking to achieve a series 
of calculated effects'. Culler ( 1981: 171 ), referring to the nature of 
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narrative, remarks almost the same thing as Wales and Danow: 
Narrative reports sequence of events. If narrative is defined as the 
representation of a series of events, then the analyst must be able to 
identify these events, and they come to function as a nondiscoursive, 
nontextual given, something which exists prior to and independently 
of narrative presentation and which the narrative then reports. 
The accounts of fabula and sjuzhet given by Wales, Danow and Culler seem 
to connote the sequential relationship between the two entities. 'And' in 
'fabula and sjuzhet' has a sequential meaning, which is almost the same as 
'then' or 'and then'. Metaphorically speaking, fabula is the raw material to 
be processed~ whereas sjuzhet is the finished product. This theoretical 
dichotomy seems to implicate the impossibility of the reverse order from 
sjuzhet to fabula, just as the "reverse flow" of time does not make any sense 
in the world in which we live. 
The fabula-sjuzhet scheme can be also construed as based upon the dualistic 
distinction between so-called "objectivity" and "subjectivity". According to 
the dualistic view, fabula is an objectively isolatable or specifiable entity, 
whereas sjuzhet is a subjectively tinged or coloured product. Tomashevsky, 
one of the early users of the fabula-sjuzhet distinction, indicates the 
objective-subjective contrast by saying, 'the story is "the action itself," the 
plot, "how the reader learns of the action" '(1965: 67). In his scheme reality 
is also associated with the fabula side and fictionality with the sjuzhet side, 
which is suggested in: 'Real incidents, not fictionalised by an author, may 
make a story. A plot is wholly an artistic creation' (ibid.: 68). Almost the 
same vi.ew is observable in Toolan (op. cit.: I 0) with respect to story (or 
fabula): 
Story seems to focus on the pre-artistic, genre- and convention-bound 
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basic event-and-character patterns of narrative, with scarcely any room 
for evaluative contrasts or discriminations - a level at which authorship 
seems an irrelevant concern (italics are mine). 
Rimmon-Kenan's definition of story also seems to recognise the 
objective/subjective dichotomy in fabula and sjuzhet (1983: 3): 'Story 
designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text 
and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants 
in these events'. In the following few sections the nature of such a 
theoretical stance implicated by the fabula-sjuzhet scheme will be looked at 
rather critically. 
1.1.2 The constituents of fabula 
This section starts by asking - 'Exactly what are the constituents of fabula?' 
and 'In what manner do they exist?' The status of fabula as a theoretical 
construct is, as we will see, not as stable as it looks. One common view is 
that fabula consists of events. Wales (1990), as we saw in the last section, 
refers to the existence of events on the two different levels, i.e. deep (fabula) 
and surface (sjuzhet). Culler (1981) and Danow (1986) can be said to share 
almost the same view. Toolan (1988) and Rimmon-Kenan (1983) can be 
distinguished from the three people mentioned above in that they are 
considered to have a different assumption \Vith regard to the possible 
contents of fabula. Toolan defines fabula as: 
a basic description of the fundamental events of a story, in their natural 
chronological order, \Vith an accompanying and equally skeletal 
inventory of the roles of the characters in that story (1 988: 9). 
In a different place in the same work he argues: 'Story is the basic unshaped 
story material and (with qualifications) comprises events, characters and 
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settings' (italics are mine). Rimmon-Kenan also refers to the existence of 
'participants' as distinct from 'events' at the level of fabula (1983: 6), but 
her idea of the constituents of fabula seems to be slightly confusing when she 
mentions participants some\vhere else as if they are a part of story events: 
'Story designates the narrated events ... together \Vith the participants in these 
events' (ibid.: 3). 
As shown above, the make-up of fabula is not necessarily defined in a clear-
cut way, but what is unclear is not only the make-up but the nature of the 
alleged constituents. By the term 'basic description' Toolan suggests a 
certain embryonic level of verbalisation that is considered to be present at 
the stage of fabula. Chatman ( 1978) can be taken as claiming more 
evidently a certain level of verbalisation in fabula. He is another fabula-
sjuzhet dualist, and the most salient feature of his story-discourse dichotomy 
is that temporal features such as order, duration and frequency are 
encapsulated into the story side. What is confusing in Chatman's 
schematisation is that he refers to 'summary', which is one aspect of 
duration, in his 'discourse' side as \Veil. As referred to in the previous 
section, Culler might contrast rather markedly \Vith Toolan or Chatman in 
that he implies that the non-vcrbalised, objectively identifiable story events 
exist prior to narrative presentation. 
It might be argued that this sort of fuzziness that is almost invariably 
observable in the discussion of fabula is inevitable simply because what is 
directly available to the reader is only the "finished" product, that is, sjuzhet 
or discourse. Normally, the reader has no definite way of inferring exactly 
ho\v events or other story elements \Vere described at the level of fabula - if 
any description \vas ever made. 
One underlying concept held by most fabula-sjuzhet dualists s~ems to be a 
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fixed direction from simple to complex, or from brief to lengthy, which 
ought to he recognised in the sequential ordering of the two entities. Fabula 
is 'unshaped, uncrafted. "unaesthcticised" stufr (Toolan, op. cit.: 12), 
w·hereas sjuzhet is reckoned to be a result of narrative transformations of 
fabula. Or more precisely, \Vhat sjuzhet represents are 'elaborations and 
enrichments, a fleshing-out of the basic story stufr (ibid.: 13). One typical 
example illustrating the job of extracting fabula from the narrative discourse 
is Propp's morphology of Russian fairy tales. In his famous study (Propp, 
1968: org. published in Russian: 1928), Propp gave an inventory of all the 
fundamental events (which he calls 'functions' ) in 115 Russian fairy tales 
(e.g. (1) 'One of the members of a family absents himself from home' (2) 
'An interdiction is addressed to the hero' (3) 'The interdiction is violated'). 
It Would be legitimate to say that what can be perceived as a common 
characteristic in his 'functions' or fairytale-developing actions is a kind of 
perspectival neutrality or perspective-free quality. 
If we understand fabula as in such terms, then it is very likely that the 
expression 'An apparition emerges from the chimney' might have good 
reason to be interpreted as a fabula \vhen the expression 'A disgusting 
apparition was no\v emerging from the half-broken chimney' is given as the 
sjuzhet; the first expression may \veil be reckoned as a simplified, thus more 
"basic" version of the second one. But one might have difficulty vouching 
for the basic, unshaped and objectively specifiable quality of fabula when one 
is obliged to interpret the expression 'John gave a warning to Rachel' as the 
fabula for the follo\ving sjuzhet 'John said to Rachel, "Look, if you go on 
like this, and if it \vas made public, you'll lose everything - your money, 
fame, and life"'. In this particular case, ho\v should and can a "basic, 
perspectivally neutral" version of this speech event be retrieved or identified 
in the form of fabula? It sccrns rcasonahle to offer any of 'Someone gives a 
vvarntng to someone else' or 'So1neone threatens someone else' or 'Someone 
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reprimands someone else' as an equally suitable fabula for the sjuzhet given 
above. The question that arises here is: How can the basic, objective nature 
of fahula as the predecessor (~{ .\:ju:het he guaranteed or identified? Or 
should we think that as far as speech/thought events are concerned, the 
characters' direct versions \V hich are not filtered through the narratorial 
voice can be interpreted as part of the fabulas? Then it follows that fabula 
can show itself, totally intact, on the level of sjuzhet, because in narrative 
discourse there occur many direct or free direct speeches /thoughts. If so, 
the theoretical basis of the traditional scheme, which is suggestive of the 
"temporal sequence" from the ra\v material to the finished product, will be 
considerably weakened or virtually collapse. Free presentations of 
speech/thought events in narrative seem to offer us a good reason to 
reconsider the theoretical validity of fahula heing prior to sjuzhet in 
traditional schemes of narrative poetics. ( In Chapter 4 I assume the 
possibility of thinking in the opposite direction, i.e. from sjuzhet to fabula, 
taking into account actual and practical situations of narrative writing and 
reading; what \viii be emphasised is some practical value of attempting to 
form fabula as a \vay of contributing to making story-event typologies.) 
This section discussed the fuzzy nature of fabula in comparison with sjuzhet, 
which looks more stahle due to the fact that it is presented to the reader as 
something directly available. The point of our discussion was, as mentioned 
above, that the theoretical difficulty recognisable in the fabu)a-sjuzhet 
scheme lies in the implicated temporal sequence from fabula to sjuzhet. 
The next section looks into ho\v fahula under this scheme can be in the 
darkness in fictional narrative. 
1.1.3 Fa hula in fictional narrative 
· The revte\V of the fabula-sjuzhct dichotomy in the last two sections has shed 
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light on some underlying notions \Vhich can be abstracted from many 
scholars' mildly discrepant views of the t\vo opposite entities. They can be 
schematised as follo\vs: 
Fabula I story 
Events 
non-narrated (considered to exist before sjuzhet) 
basic (perspective-free and specifiable as irreducible facts) 
objective (authorship is irrelevant) 
·chronologically ordered 
Sjuzhet I discourse 
narrated 
Events -enriched (embroidered and perspectivally coloured) 
-subjective (authorship is relevant) 
not necessarily chronologically ordered 
Figure 1.1 
One thing we can learn from this schematisation is a semantic peculiarity that 
is perceptible in the relationship bet\veen the t\vo entities; they are not 
opposite to each other in exactly the same way as 'true' and 'false' are. 
'True' and 'false', like 'married' and 'untnarried', make binary antony1ns (or 
contrasts) (Hurford & Heasley, 1983; Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1976, etc.). The 
sense of one item in binary antonyms is totally dependent upon that of the 
other; 'True' cannot make sense (or exist) unless there is 'false'. In the case 
of fabula-sjuzhet pair, ho\vever, there is no such relation. It seems likely 
that sjuzhet cannot exist \Vithout fabula~ but not vice versa. This is because 
fabula, i.e. the aggregate of core. irreducible events, is generally construed 
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as preceding sjuzhet in temporal terms. 
It should be noted that this dichotomous concept was advanced as a part of 
the theoretical framework intended to account for the structure of narrative 
fiction. It might not be \Vholly unreasonable to infer that the relation 
bet\veen ourselves and the \Vorld must have \Vorked as a model based upon 
which to speculate about the interconnection between narrative and the 
narrated. 
When \Ve talk about \vhat happened in the real world, we usually know that 
there occurred some events, and that talking about them means verbalising or 
narrating them from a subjective point of vie\v. In other words, we talk in 
our own way about "objectively identifiable events". This is the general 
picture that we think \Ve have in our mind about the linkage between 
narrative and the narrated events in the actual world. With this in mind, we 
can have a closer look at the nature of fabula in fictional narrative. 
From a pragmatic point of vic\v, fictional narrative presents the reader with 
a peculiar problem. To the reader of fiction the starting point should be to 
accept a kind of "as if" situation in which fictional discourse pragmatically 
places itself. Needless to say, in fiction nothing actually happens; nothing is 
real about the discourse the reader encounters. The narrative convention 
demands that the reader take the story events as if they had actually occurred 
(this holds particularly when the narrative is rendered by what is called an 
omniscient narrator). Because of this peculiarity with respect to the truth-
value of things told in fictional narrative, it sometimes happens that the 
reader, in the process of reading, is led to become metanarrative-conscious 
and \viii find the job of identifying the fabula impossible. This peculiarity of 
fictional discourse is \veil exemplified in Muriel Spark's 'Miss Pinkerton's 
Apocalypse'. 
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This short story is characterised by a kind of opaque authenticity concerning 
the story events or the fabula. As Black points out (1989: 281-292), in this 
story the centre of authority in the narrative suddenly disappears when the 
"omniscient" narrator is supplanted by the first-person narrator in the final 
paragraph and the reader is led to feel that what is there is narrative only and 
that no event described in that story is credible. 
The general plot of the story is as follo\vs: One evening Miss Pinkerton and 
Mr Lake experience a flying saucer's visit. At this point the fabula seems 
stable and identifiable because the event is represented in what Stanzel (1969) 
call~ 'figural narration' (the narration responsible for the representation of 
the event is a hetero-diegetic, and extra-diegetic one). But the eventhood 
concerning the visit of the flying saucer becomes far less credible when the 
two protagonists offer incompatible views of \Vhat they think happened. 
Miss Pinkerton insists that the saucer was driven by a pilot, and Mr Lake 
denies the fact. The point in this particular case is, as Black mentions (ibid.: 
283), that the reference to the presence of the pilot was not made by the 
narrator but by one of the characters, \Vho, as long as they describe what 
happened, serve as the 1-narrators \vho are fallible human beings. 
From the vie\vpoint of narrative conventions the opacity attached to this 
situation can be explained in terms of \Vho speaks. When physical events like 
'David whipped Mary' are rendered by omniscient narrators, the reader is 
induced to feel as if he \vere actually on the scene, looking at what happened 
or is happening \Vith his O\Vn eyes; the authenticity of what is narrated is not 
to be doubted. On the other hand, \Vhen a character presents an event in his 
speech or thought, the narrated or described event is inevitably opaque in its 
credibility. Metaphorically put, the reader, confronted with such an opaque 
event, might have an impression that he is looking through a coloured piece 
of cellophane at what the character says happened; the reader will naturally 
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think that the eve·nt presented in such a way might not belong to the real 
world, just as he might feel the \vorld seen through that coloured piece of 
cellophane will have a doubtful status as a real image of the world as it is. 
This sort of opacity of eventhood invariably occurs when an event is given 
only through the character's speech/thought presentation, and it is not 
vouched for by the framing narrator. One good example is Gretta Conroy's 
encounter \vith Michael Furey in 'The Dead' by James Joyce. There is no 
good discoursal evidence \Vhich will convince the reader that her meeting or 
affair with that young lad is authenticated by the authoritative narrator in 
that story (Gretta's story-telling about Michael Furey can be interpreted as 
an example of 'character-motivated secondary /STORY LINE/'. See 6.4.6) 
The reader, feeling suspended to some extent, might think that since Gretta 
says so, so it must he believed. Note that in that story Miss Morkan's 
annual dance, for instance, contrasts markedly with the alleged encounter of 
Gretta \Vith Michel Furey in terms of the reliability of fabula. 
Back to 'Miss Pinkerton's Apocalypse', the opacity of the credibility of the 
eventhood about the pilot driving the saucer is dramatically enhanced when 
the conflicting v ievvs of the event are presented by the two protagonists. If, 
as the omniscient narrator, the framing narrator had authenticated either of 
the conflicting vie\vs, then the reader, in the light of narrative conventions, 
would have no difficulty identifying fahula in the story. But the reader is 
completely puzzled when in the final paragraph an 1-narrator appears. If 
this 1-narrator is postulated as the same person with the first narrator the 
\Vhole discourse in this story can be felt to be a product of a fallible person 
subject to hallucination. Then the authenticity of the fabula will be gone and 




We conclude the discussion about the fabula-sjuzhet scheme by pointing out 
the theoretical problem involved in the traditional scheme. 
As observed so far, compared \Vith sjuzhet, \vhich seems stable enough, 
fabula tends to be fuzzy and vague as a theoretical construct. The problems 
with fabula can be summarised as follo\vs. 1) In fictional narrative, an 
ontological problem may arise when fabula is assumed to be "events 
themselves" as non-verbalised, objectively identifiable entities that exist prior 
to narrative presentation (cf. Culler, 1981), because in fiction no events 
actually happen. 2) When fabula is theorised as a basic, embryonic event 
description made by the author/narrator, which comes before sjuzhet (cf. 
Toolan, 1988), the problem of its availability will almost always arise, since, 
normally, what is directly available to the reader is only sjuzhet as the 
"finished" product. 
The ontological aspect of the fuzzy nature of fabula is well exemplified in 
Spark's 'Miss Pinkerton's Apocalypse', as we discussed in the last section. 
If that story was classifiable as a so-called 'historical narrative', which deals 
with events that actually happened in the real world, and the events were 
known to the reader in an objective and off-narrative way, then the reader 
could safely assume that the narrative as a whole is nothing but a particular 
recount of the objectively identifiable events which are familiar to him in 
real terms, despite the conflicting and confusing presentation of the events as 
a narrative-telling skill. But Spark's technique as a fictional writer has an 
effect of making the reader realise the implausibility of setting up fabula as 
"objective events" in fiction. 
With 2), it is not necessarily realistic to believe that every writer goes 
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through the process of organising fabula first, then turning to writing sjuzhet 
as a "polished" and "aesthetised" product. There may well be some writers 
who make it a principle to start \Vith sjuzhet-writing, skipping the 
preparatory phase of thinking up "basic events" in their minds. ·This suggests 
that there is no theoretical necessity to set up fabula in the sense of 2) as 
against sjuzhet in narrative-telling. 
It seems that \V hat counts in fictional narrative is that narrative is . Of vital 
importance is the fact that it is narrative discourse that the reader directly 
and immediately comes across. Rased upon the review of the fabula-sjuzhet 
scheme in this chapter, Chapter 4 will attempt to reformulate the traditional 
scheme; in the ne\v system fabula in fiction will lose its status as a theoretical 
necessity as against sjuzhet; instead, it will acquire a new status as a 
perspective-free variety of story-event abstraction, which can be made by the 
reader as \Veil as by the narrator. 
1.2 Bonheim's 'narrative modes' 
1.2.1 The four-mode system 
1.2.1 and 1.2.2 single out Bonheim's typology of narrative modes (1982) as a 
typical example of the mode-chopping taxonomy in narrative studies, and see 
how linguistically and ontologically confusing a mode-distinguishing 
philosophy can he particularly in the light of comprehending story events or 
narrative time properly. 
Bonheim claims that there can be recognised four different modes in 
narrative discourse: description, report, speech and comment. Description, 
according to him, is a presentation of something perceived by the five senses. 
Report is characterised by the use of action verbs, normally in the past tense. 
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Speech can be most easily identified because it is usually equipped with the 
following markers: 1) the verba dicendi; 2) quotation marks; 3) the present 
or continuous tenses; 4) the use of the first or second person; 5) incidental 
mode-switching indicators such as ne\v paragraphs, the use of ·capital letters, 
italics, dialects, expletives; 6) shift of perspective, tone or style register. 
And finally, comment is identifiable \Vhen a particular discourse contains 
evaluative modifiers, generalisations not ascribable to fictional characters 
or judgements \Vith a high level of abstraction. 
Bonheim's typology is characterised by the following two points: 1) the four 
modes can be embedded into one another; 2) a clear dichotomous distinction 
can be made with respect to the presence/absence of the temporality and the 
spatiality in them. Concerning 1 ), report, for example, can include 
description, comment and speech. Bohnheim schematises this as follows 
(1982: 16): 
Rep {Des, Com, Sp} 
He cites an excerpt from E.A. Poe's 'The Fall of the House of Usher' (ibid.: 
16): 
Upon my entrance, Usher arose from the sofa on which he had been lying 
at full length, and greeted me with a vivacious wannth which had much 
in it, I at first thought, of an overdone cordiality .... 
He classifies 'at full length' and 'vivacious' as description, and 'overdone' as 
comment. It is not difficult to see behind this mosaic view of narrative 
texture the assumption that at the level of discourse report, which represents 
action itself in a neutral \vay, can be embellished with different, individually 
coloured, modes of expression. It is to be noted that such a multi-mode 
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conceptualisation concerning narrative discourse has a strong resemblance to 
the dualistic view reflected in the fabula-sjuzhet theory. 
With respect to 2) Bonheirn's scheme is sho\vn as follows (ibid.: 12): 
ti1ne space 





Bonheim's typology, \Vhich is intended as a tool for the analysis of the 
discoursal mode in narrative, has some problems. First of all, the distinction 
among the four different modes is not clear enough. Particularly, the 
borderline between report, description and comment seems extremely 
arbitrary and nebulous, \Vhich can be noticed in his remark on the element of 
volition as a possible indicator of report. He argues that the depiction of 
waves on the seashore should be a description, whereas the same action, if 
recognisable as the wrath of Neptune, will be classified as a report because 
volition is involved there (ibid.: 22). According to this criterion, the non-.. 
volitional clause 'The door opened by itself' is a description, whereas, the 
volitional clause 'John opened the door' is to be classified as a report. 
Commonsensically, the two clauses equally depict some action, so that both 
of them can be labelled as story events if employed as 'superordinate 
narrative clauses' (cf. 5.2.9}. Therefore, it is virtually nonsensical to 
distinguish between the hvo clauses, one as a description , and the other as a 
report. And the description-comment distinction is also very vague. One 
would have much difficulty understanding the reason why 'vivacious' is a 
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description and 'overdone' is a comment in the example given at p.l9. 
The second problem concerns his concept of temporality and spatiality in 
narrative. Figure 1.2 suggests the irrelevance of spatiality in speech, but 
considering the ontological fact that speech is a variety of event, which takes 
place somewhere and sometime, it is not acceptable to assume that space is 
irrelevant to speech. And one would have to wonder what kind of time he 
has in mind when in Figure 1.2 he indicates the irrelevance of temporality in 
his 'descriptio·n'; for example, the depiction of waves on the seashore, which 
he calls description, must have something to do \Vith temporality of a certain 
kind. 
The third problem with Bonheim's mode-chopping is its .grammatical 
arbitrariness. According to his system, perhaps report and speech are to be 
considered on the sentence/clause basis, whereas description and comment 
may be realised in the form of sentence/clause or phrase, or word. Thus the 
expression 'John hesitatingly played the violin ' might be thought of as an 
example which comprises a report 'John played the violin' and perhaps a 
comment 'hesitatingly'. A very awkward and counterintuitive aspect about 
such a grammatically messy, Bonheimian analysis of narrative modes is that 
one will have to say that narrative time "moves forward" in 'John played the 
violin', but it stops at 'hesitatingly'. One would wonder why narrative time 
does not stop at 'John' or 'the violin' as well, if it is suspended at 
'hesitati"ngly', since the "meanings" of these words are equally not concerned 
with temporality. Or a more fundamental question that will arise is: 'What 
kind of time is it, moving for\vard and stopping that way? Is it time at all?' 
All these questions might lead one to ask \Vhether such a confusing mode-
chopping is really appropriate for the proper recognition of narrative 
dynamics or story-event structure. 
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1.2.2 Narrative modes and narrative pace 
. Bonheim, w~o· i~ ·obyiously musicall~ inclined, attempts a stop-and-go type of 
·.,analysis of an ·excerpt from D.H. Lawrence's short story: 'The Horse 
·Dealer's Daughter' .. · It is represented as follo'rvs (ibid.: 45-6): 
·~.. . . . 
..... 
,.• 
.. ; . 
. :: ·! .•• 
• ,. ,l 




text .,~ · · 
"Well, Mabel, and what arc you 
going to do with yourself?."· 
a~.~edjoe, 
' : : with. foolish flippancy. . 
• He felt quite safe himself. .' · 
slower· .l. Wit~o·ut listening for an an.swer, 
·~~~-~~~~ed aside, 
.worked a grain of toba¢co : 
to. the tip of his tongue, 
. ; ·_'anq spat it out. . . .. 
stopped = He did not care about anything~. · 
: ·.·:: since he felt safe himself: · · . 
fairly .. l· ... The t'hree brothers and the 
fast · ·stster sat round the desolate 
: ~·reakfast table, : 
atterhpt'ing some sort of . 
· desultory conversation .... 
'· .... 
\'cry .. · :~:·.for·.~lonths, l\.1abel had been . 
fast .... ·. :·se.~~n .. t less in the big house!. 
·. .k~cp~ng the home together 1n 
~. · p,cnory for her ineffectual .. 
. . b{othcrs. . . 
. \,· 



















/J;'his representa~iq_n seems to e~~ibit. so.me enigmatic elements about the 
(relationship betw,·een mode and pace .. fifst, it is difficult to understand why ··;.:·· . . . ·. . . .. 
:;#ffie is considere·<t= ·to move fast.'(s.igni.fied in the vertical solid line) in the 
,.~Iausal seque~c~b~tWeen the direct speech at the top and the reporting clause . · .. · .• , . . . . . . 
··~ . . 
... ·.: .4 
. r ·' 
,·. . ... 
. .•. 
:.·:·.· 
· .. · 
'asked Joe'. It is clear that there is no temporal sequence perceivable 
between the two clauses. The term 'direct speech' normally presupposes the 
presence of a reporting clause or a tag, so that claiming that the first three 
lines consist of two different modes, i.e. direct speech and. report is not 
acceptable in terms of narrative terminologies. Secondly, why is time 
'slow' in 'with foolish flippancy', \Vhich is labelled as comment that ought to 
be timeless? Thirdly, \vhat is responsible for the differences between 'slow' 
and 'slower' in lines 4 and 6? And it is not clear what is meant by 
'description leading into report' concerning the discourse starting with 'The 
three brothers and the sisters sat round the desolate breakfast table .... ' 
Finally, with the last part of this excerpt beginning with 'For months, Mabel 
had been servantless ... ' one would have difficulty identifying exactly which 
discourse is 'some embedded description'. And \Vhy is the pace 'very fast' if 
description, which is timeless and does not contribute to the progression of 
narrative time in his systcrn, is embedded there? 
1.2.3 Conclusion 
Bonheim's observations \Vith respect to narrative modes and narrative time, 
as shown above are not convincing enough, and this is because such a mode-
mosaic kind of analysis of narrative discourse, which is not uncommon in 
narrative poetics, seems to stem from a misconception of time or narrative 
time and from the improper understanding of the pragmatic relationship 
between narrator, text, the represented \vorld, and reader. These problems 
will be returned to in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
1.3 Narrative clements 
1.3.1 Characters, settings and events 
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In 1.1.2 \Ve looked briefly at the possible constituents of fabula, and found 
that they are not necessarily defined clearly. This section is a further 
argument of the same problem, but this time not concentrating on the fabula-
sjuzhet distinction, but taking narrative as the supracategory. The main 
concern is to see ho\v events arc treated as opposed to other elements or 
constituents of narrative. 
Chatman ( 1978) posits a division of story events into two items: existents (the 
characters and the atmosphere) and events (happenings and actions). As we 
observed in 1.1.2, Toolan (1988) gives events, characters and settings as the 
constituents of story. Almost the same items are postulated by Rimmon-
Kenan (1983), \vho thinks of events and characters (or participants) as the 
ingredients of story. Perhaps the most numerous elements of narrative are 
posited by Bal ( 1985): the content of her 'fabula' comprises events, actors 
time and locations. 
It would be possible to discuss from t\vo different perspectives the 
fundamental concepts underlying the chopping-up of narrative into such 
elements as sho\vn above. One is a genre-conscious perspective. It should 
be noted that event is inevitably taken as the indispensable element in 
narrative. The weight given to event, \Vhich can be recognised in the way in 
which it is always a part of the narrative elements in any narrative analysts' 
idea of narrative constituents, may imply that event is generally assumed to 
be the essential ingredient of narrative as a genre. The other perspective is 
an ontological one. What seems to be presupposed is a contrast between 
objects and events; the former are primarily to be perceived, while the latter 
should primarily be cognised. This dichotomy is deeply associated with the 
so-called 'first-order entity' and 'second-order entity' (Lyons, 1977). (We 
\Vill turn to this problem in Chapter 3.) 
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A general propensity that is observable in theories or principles of narrative 
discourse is the attitude to\vard excessive subdivisions or segmentations of 
narrative it~ms, 'rVhich very frequently results in producing unnecessary, 
ontologically problematic, dichotomies or trichotomies. With· respect to the 
genre-conscious handling of event, the greatest problem is its nebulous 
quality. In most cases events are merely treated paratactically with other 
elements such as characters and settings. Each of these elements is given an 
equal status as far as the \vay they are treated in the schematisation of 
narrative elements is concerned. llnder such circumstances the essentiality 
of event without which a particular discourse cannot be classified as a 
narrative cannot theoretically be ackno,vledged, however emphatically events 
are referred to as the predominant clements of narrative. To put it another 
way, the para tactical treatment of narrative elements such as events, 
characters and settings presents no theoretical basis upon· which the 
distinctive features of narrative discourse as a genre ought to be fully 
accounted for. 
As far as the second perspective, i.e. an ontological aspect, is concerned, the 
problem is more serious. Constituents or ingredients of something - no 
matter what it is - can properly be called such if and only if they are 
incompatible \Vith, or exclusive or independent of, each other. For example, 
when a building is made up of \vood and stone, these elements do not 
presuppose or entail each other; they are independent items, so that they 
are justifiably called the constituents of the building. But what about 
narrative elements? Are they incompatible with each other? It could be . 
acknow I edged that characters and settings are two different elements; they do 
not presuppose each other. But is it possible to isolate an event itself from 
characters or settings, i.e. the situation in \vhich it occurs? The answer must 
be negative. No event can occur in a vacuum; there can be no event itself. 
An event is unthinkable if it does not involve characters or settings. If one 
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says that narrative consists of characters, settings and events, it is almost 
tantamount to saying that the sentence 'John returned' is made up of a noun 
and a verb, and subject & predicate. 
1.3.2 Rimmon-Kenan's concept of eventhood 
The last section \Vas a brief survey of an ontological problem about 
eventhood, which is perceivable in the notion of narrative elements. In the 
present section we look into the concept of eventhood posited by Rimmon-
Kenan (1983); the reason for singling it out for discussion here is that 
there can be observed an unhappy mixture of two different dimensions, i.e. 
ontology and linguistics (sentence grammar in particular) with respect to the 
treatment of story event. 
Ritnmon-Kenan, like Chatman (1978), refers to an event as a change of state; 
she argues that an event is 'a change from one state of affairs to another' 
(ibid.: 15). But she rejects the idea of state and event (stasis and process) 
making up a story, as postulated by Chatman, in favour of the idea that an 
event can be assumed to be made up of intermediary states. She writes (loc. 
cit.): 
I do not insist on an opposition between state and event (or stasis and 
process), because it seems to me that an account of an event may be 
broken down into an infinite number of intermediary states. 
Then she gives the follo\ving as an example of a succession of states implying 
a succession of events: 'He was rich, then he was poor, then he was rich 
again' (foe. cit.) (italics are mine). It is noteworthy that she assumes that an 
event can be divided into states. l'his, it might be argued, is a good example 
illustrating a confusion of the level of cognition and that of linguistic 
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materialisation. The focal matter of interest in the present thesis is to 
attempt a theory of time and event \vhich is capable of identifying the second 
and third clauses in the italicised example cited above as a form of discoursa) 
realisation of story events. The fundamental argument this thesis puts 
forward is that the event-state distinction is to be made on the semantic 
level rather than on the Rfalntnatica/ level. One important implication of 
this is that the event-state distinction is most directly concerned with the 
presence or absence of change, which is basically a semantic phenomenon, 
and that event cognition and state cognition are to be conceived of as two 
distinct cognitive activities. Presumably, the immediate reason why 
Rimmon-Kenan argues that some intermediary states can be the constituents 
of an event is that the three clauses she gave as an example are what are often 
called statives in grammatical terms. This is \vhere linguistics and ontology 
can be mingled with each other in an awk\Vard and confusing way. 
Rimmon-Kenan's view of event and state well exemplifies a theoretical 
drawback commonly observable in overly metalinguistic approaches to 
narrative dynamics, as \Ve \Viii further discuss in Chapter 2. Here we will 
confine ourselves to claiming that a proper way of looking at the example 
given by Rimmon-Kenan is to try to see that the narrator's event recognition 
happened to be linguistically realised in the sequence of main clauses 
(excluding the first one) \Vhich are Rrcunmatically labelled as statives; it 
would be misleading to argue that an event can be turned into, or expressed 
by means of, a state or states. 
Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic of Rimmon-Kenan's notion of 
eventhood is that she suggests event recognition on a macroscopic level. She 
claims (and I feel she does so justifiably) that a great number of events in a 
particular story can he taken up together and construed as a single event (e.g. 
The Fall of the Roman En1pire), and she refers to the difficulty of drawing a 
clear distinction bet\veen event and succession of events (loc. cit.). To my 
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mind, such a notion of eventhood is the most macroscopic and perhaps the 
most elastic one ever presented by narrative theorists. But the problem is 
that she never attempts to give a theoretical basis upon which such a 
macroscopic vie\v of story event hecomes possible. Chapter 6 will discuss 
the possibilities of the macroscopic appreciation of story event under the 
rubric of 'event unification'. 
1.3.3 Gerald Prince's 'stative events' vs. 'active events' 
One extreme view of story event can be observed in the taxonomy posited by 
Gerald Prince ( 1982). He has encapsulated clauses normally classified as 
state or description into the event side. He argues that events are divided into 
two kinds: 'stative' and 'active'. A stative event, he claims, is a state, as can 
be paraphrased by a sentence of the form NP's V -ing (NP) A UX be a state 
(e.g. a stative event 'John is learning Japanese' can be paraphrased by 'John's 
learning (Japanese) is a state': 'John's' can be formulated as 'NP's', 'learning 
(Japanese)', as 'V-ing (NP)', and 'is', as 'AUX be'), and an active event 
represents an action and cannot be expressed by a sentence with the form 
denoting 'state' as above ( 1982: 62). According to him, 'John was 
handsome' or 'The sun \Vas shining' are classifiable as stative events, and 
'Peter ate an apple' or 'The cat jumped on the table' as action events. He 
does not give any reason for thinking that way; he only says: 'I am not 
making distinctions bet\veen states and processes, happenings and actions, 
etc., because such distinctions are not relevant to my discussion' (ibid.: 168). 
Prince's peculiar concept of story event implicates that the sentence/clause 
boundary \Viii automatically be taken as the event boundary, which virtually 
means: 'So many sentences, so many events in a particular story'. He argues: 
There is no upper limit to the number of events that may be recounted in 
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a given narrative: one tale may relate fifty events, another one five 
hundred, still another one ten thousand and so on (ibid.: 63). 
This sort of overgeneralisation can be said to be counterintuitive mainly 
from an ontological point of vie\v. Common sense will argue against the 
view that 'John was handsome' and 'Peter ate an apple' equally contribute to 
making the reader of narrative feel story-event dynamics at work. Prince's 
extremely sentence/clause-bound vie\v of story event has some serious 
problems. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the examples tend to be 
discussed in a fairly decontextualised manner, and this may be thought of as a 
rather unfair treatment of narrative discourse. Needless to say, in narrative 
a kaleidoscopic change of what is called point of view, perspective 
or focalisation is quite frequent. It is very likely that even 'John was 
handsome', which might be regarded as a typical state clause in terms of 
sentence grammar, will have good reason to be interpreted as an event 
(someone's cognising activity) when context indicates that it is focalised by a 
character, and actually textualised as in: 'John was handsome!' (The relation 
between eventhood and focalisation \Viii be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.) 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
The general intention of 1.3 \Vas to suggest the two aspects to be attended to 
in the study of narrative: one is the narrative world as a represented world, 
and the other is the narrative discourse as the linguistic medium through 
which the narrative \vorld is represented. When someone claims that 
narrative elements comprise characters, settings and events, his attention is 
being directed to\vard the narrative \vorld, whereas, if someone says that 
. , narrative is made up of stative events and active events, th~n he may be 
attending to the narrative discourse in a metalinguistic way. One will easily 
perceive a kind of discrepancy between the first and the second types of 
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people. But the problem is that the term 'events' appears in both cases. This 
seems to implicate the fact that event tends to be confusingly conceptualised 
both on the semantic and grammatical bases. In order to avoid such an 
ontological/linguistic confusion, it wi II be necessary to try to distinguish 
between event and event description; the former is to be conceived of 
primarily in terms of ontology , and the latter is inevitably involved with 
linguistics, since what matters will be how events are given linguistic 
expression. 
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the ontological discussion of eventhood to 
clarify the semantic aspect of event, and it is mainly in Chapters 5 and 6 that 
we will argue the problem of event description with a view to explicating 
narrative dynamics. 
Before doing that, In Chapter 2 we rev1ew the formal semanticists' 
conceptualisation of eventhood/statehood as another example of confusion 
between linguistics and ontology. We critically look at counterintuitive 
aspects of their metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to narrative 
dynamics. 
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Chapter 2 Formal approaches to narrative dynamics 
In the preceding chapter \Ve took a general look at how eventhood in 
narrative is conceived of rnainly by literary analysts and referred to some 
confusion resulting fron1 the failure to recognise properly the relationship 
bet\veen event recognition and its linguistic materialisation in narrative. In 
this chapter \Ve turn to what n1ight be called 'grammatical notions of 
eventhood', as against the narrative poeticians' theoretical constructs such as 
fabula and sjuzhet. l'he main objective is to examine basic concepts 
underlying the formal semanticists' treatment of events/states in narrative 
discourse. Particular attention is dra\vn to formalists' 1netatemporal and 
metalinguistic approaches to narrative dynamics. As good examples of 
their metatemporal and mctalinguistic attitudes \Ve spotlight 'reference time' 
and 'aspectual types' respectively. 
2.1 Reference times 
2.1.1 Three temporal entities 
When reading a narrative the reader \viii inevitably recognise the temporal 
sequentiality of states of affairs· that are being narrated. In other words, it 
must be impossible for the reader to engage in reading narrative without 
being aware of the temporal ordering of story events. One could say that a 
narrative, whether historical or fictional, is so presented that the reader will 
get the impression of the story time "moving forward". One important 
contribution to giving a linguistic account for such an intuitive reaction of 
the reader was originally made by Reichenbach (1947), who distinguished 
three times associated \V ith each utterance of a tensed sentence. In this 
section \Ve attempt an overall revie\v of his temporal scheme. 
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The three different times can be accounted for as follows (Taylor, 1977: 
203): 
(i) The point of speech, i.e. the time at which the utterance is made. 
(ii) The point of the event, i.e. the tin1e at \vhich the speaker asserts 
the event (or state) descrihcd in the sentence to occur (or obtain) 
(iii) The point of reference, i.e. the temporal standpoint from which 
the speaker invites his audience to consider the occurrence of the 
event (or the obtaining of the state). 
Of the three times mentioned above, (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory: they 
are 'speech time' and 'event time' respectively. What is to be noted here is 
(iii), i.e. 'reference time', \Vhich corresponds to the notion of 'the time that is 
being talked about'. 
Reference times can be specified by means of time adverbials as in: 
[21-1 That accident occurred at 4 o'clock on Septen1ber 20. 
[2 )-2 By the end r~f'.June the \Vhole situation had completely changed. 
Or they can be co-textually or contextually given \Vith no time adverbials as 
In: 
[2)-3 (John stepped into the roorn) and turned on the light. 
In [2 )-1 the reference tirnc coincides \vith the event time, and in [2]-2 the 
referencet time follo\vs the event time. Particular attention must be paid to 
the reference time \vith respect to the event 'John's turning on the light' in 
[2 )-3. It is \vorth noting that the reference time needed for the reading of 
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the event is considered to be located right after the parenthesised event (i.e. 
John's stepping into the room). This means that the reference time for 
John's turning on the light can be reckoned as immediately consequent upon 
the event time, i.e. the time the event 'John turned on the light'"occurred. 
It is to be recognised that there is a strong parallel between the three 
temporal entities (i.e. speech time, event time and reference time) and the so-
called 'clock time' or 'calendar time'. As a matter of fact, the times we have 
been discussing \Vith respect to the three examples given above can 
reasonably be expressed in the form of clock time or calendar time. Let us 
consider (2-)-3, for instance. Supposing the speech time is the present time as 
deictic centre, then the past tense of the two event clauses suggests that they 
happened ·before that time (e.g. John's stepping into the room occurred , say, 
30 minutes ago, and the event is followed by the subsequent event, i.e. John's 
turning on the light \vhich occurred, say, 29 minutes ago). And? as we have 
seen, the event time of a simple-past clause coincides with the reference time 
of it. This means that the reference times of those two event clauses are the 
same as those specifically given times. 
One important thing to be noted about the concept of speech time in 
Reichenbach's three temporal entities is that setting up speech time as against 
event time and reference time is feasible in deictic situations. What we 
mean by deictic situations is intimately associated with the concept of 
'absolute tense' by Comrie ( 1985: 36). Absolute tense is a tense system 
whereby one locates a situation relative to the present moment. This means 
that mentioning speech time in contrast to event time and reference time can 
be said to be relevant only in event descriptions in actual situations (e.g. the 
report of \Vhat happened yesterday) or in historical narrative. Crucial is the 
fact that in fictional narrative, mentioning speech time is generally 
irrelevant, since the tense system in fictional narrative is a relative (or non-
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deictic) one (foe. cit.) in which the reference point for location of a situation 
is some point in time given by the context. 
For the immediate purpose of the present thesis \Vhich attempts to study the 
temporal dynamics of prose fiction, \Ve can concentrate on event time and 
reference time in terms of relative tense, virtually neglecting speech time as 
a product of the deictic tense system. 
In the next section \Ve look into the way reference time is generally 
considered to operate in narrative clauses. By looking at Partee's system we 
contemplate formal semanticists' view of narrative dynamics. 
2.1.2 Reference time in narrative discourse 
It is generally assumed that the important function of Reichenbach's 
reference time can be clearly understood \Vhen we see it employed to account 
for the so-called "forward movement of narrative time". Partee (1984), one 
of those formal semanticists \vho claim the crucial role of the reference time 
in updating the narrative time, discusses the notion of 'just after', or the 
anaphoric nature of tense, referring to the function of reference time: 
'Intuitively the reference time introduced by an event-sentence is located 
"just after" that event' (Partee, 1984: 254). Another important thing Partee 
refers to about the relation bet\veen events and reference time is that, 
follo\ving Hinrichs, she suggests that events are included in reference times 
(foe. cit.). She illustrates the \vay in \vhich the narrative time moves forward 
by using an example cited by Hinrichs ( 1981: 66): 
f2l-4 Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully, and switched 
el e2 e3 
off the light. It \Vas pitch dark around him, because the Venetian 
sl s2 
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blinds were closed. 
(n~tation: e = event; s = state) 
According to Partee's system, narrative time progression/suspension in ·f2l-4 
can be accounted for as follo\vs. For the reading of e 1 a past given 
reference time r 0 as the starting point is supposed, and el occurs within r 0. 
This can be explained in a more lucid, everyday manner, employing the 
notion of clock/calendar time. Concerning the occurrence of e 1 a particular 
time point or some duration of time such as from 5:50 to 5:51 on a 
particular day may be assumed as the reference time r 0. It could be said that 
e 1 took place during that time; this is tantamount to saying that e 1 is 
included in that time. And then e 1, by consuming some length of time from 
the beginning to the end, introduces a new, ensuing reference time, say, 5:52 
or 5:52-53 as r 1, which in turn \viii be employed as the reference time to 
interpret e2. Similarly, e2 introduces a new reference time r2 for the 
interpretation of e3. Up to e3 narrative time is considered to move 
forward because of the rene\val of reference times. But when the narrative 
comes to sl, narrative time is construed as being suspended, since there is no 
renewal of the reference time. This situation can be explained as follows. 
If the time when e3 finished taking place was at 5:55, then the event 
triggers a new reference time r 3 for the reading of the following situation. 
But s 1 can be interpreted as a static situation that holds at r 3. This means 
that r3 is included ins 1, i.e. the time s 1 is assumed to hold. If one uses the 
clock-time wording, one could say that s 1 is a static situation at a particular 
time point after 5:55, say, 5:56 (r 3), and that s 1 itself does not introduce a 
ne\v reference time for the reading of the ensuing narrative situation. 
The "forward movement of narrative time" concerning [2]-4 will be shown 
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(Notation: ~· stands for the relation of temporal inclusion (e.g. 'el s rO' can 
be read as: e I is included in rO); <represents the just after' relation (e.g. 
el < rl can be read as: just after el rl is introduced).) 
This kind of formal analysis of narrative discourse, using the reference time 
as the key concept, seems to make conspicuous the anaphoric nature of tense 
in a convincing \Yay. Bauerle (1979) and Hinrichs (1986) claim that it is not 
tense itself that is interpreted anaphorically but the reference time of tense .. 
It is to be noted that the fundamental attitude underlying such an analytical 
approach to narrative dynamics tends to be highly metatemporal and at the 
same time metalinguistic. The metatemporal feature of reference time can 
be understood by contemplating its abstractness, which can be conceived of 
independent of the states of affairs \Vhich are referred to as events or states 
in the discoursal sequence in narrative. And the metalinguistic characteristic 
is clear in that the temporal structure (or event structure) of narrative is 
considered on the basis of consecutive main clauses as discrete syntactic 
units; the reference-time approach can be said to be remarkably 
sensitive to clausal boundaries in detecting the temporal dynamics of 
narrative. In the next section \Ve have a closer look at the metatemporal 
feature of reference time. 
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2.1.3 The abstract nature of reference time 
The aim of this section is to argue that there can be observed an interesting 
parallel between reference time and "abstract" time. What I mean by 
abstract time is the meta-time \vhich seems to be taken for granted when one 
attempts to make an ans\ver to abstract or metaphysical questions such as: 
'Ho\v durative is the present or no\v?'. 
It is not very easy to understand the temporality of reference time. When 
Reichenbach ( 1947: 290) graphically introduced the notion of reference time 
in relation to the other t\vo temporal entities, i.e. speech time and event time, 
reference time \Vas conceptualised as a punctual entity (Notation: E = event 
time; R = reference time; S =speech time): 
Silnple past: I sa\v John 
R,E s 
Present: I see John 
S,R,E 
Figure 2.2 
But \Vorld knowledge tells us that the event 'I see John' is usually not 
punctual; it can be durative enough (it may have lasted for a couple of 
hours). This sort of obscurity as to \vhether reference time is a durable or 
atomistic, durationless entity can be observed in Partee, when she argues that 
the reference time introduced by an event is located just after that event (see 
·· ~ 2.1.2), \vhich seems to implicate the intrinsic punctuality of reference time, 
But she also seems to suggest the durativity of reference time by indicating 
the temporal-inclusion relation behveen events and reference times. If 
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reference times include events, then it might be feasible to take it that 
reference time can be slightly more durative than the time that an event 
takes. But when the reference time comes to a state clause, it behaves rather 
differently; it appears to get punctual. 
By postulating the distinction bet\veen asserted reference time and assu1ned 
reference fi1ne Do\vty's interval semantics (1986} seems to try to explain 
that reference times can be durative, and punctual as well. Dowty contrived 
-
the two-fold notion of reference times as an argument against the 
Reichenbachian concept of reference time which tends to interpret reference 
times too punctually. He claims that the temporal ordering the reader 
perceives in a narrative is not merely a consequence of the times at which 
sentences are asserted to he true, but also of the times at which we assume 
they obtain. 
Dowty's t\vo-fold notion of reference times is based on his three defining 
criteria for the three aspectual types ( 1986: 42): 
(a) A sentence a is a stative iff it follows from the truth of a at an 
interval of I that a is true at all subintervals of I (e.g. John \Vas ill 
from 2 to 4). 
(b) A sentence a is an activity iff it follows from the truth of a at an 
interval of I that a is true of all subintervals of I down to a certain 
limit in size (e.g. John played in the meadow from 2 to 4). 
{c) A sentence a is an accomplishment/achievement iff it follows from 
the truth of a at an interval I that a is false at all subintervals of I. 
(e.g. I listened to a Beethoven's piano sonata from 2 to 2:30). 
The punctuality of asserted reference time seems to be hinted by the phrase 
'from the truth of a at an interval if I' in each of (a), (b) and (c), whereas 
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the durativity of assumed reference time seems to be observable from 'a is 
true at all subintervals of I' in (a) and from 'a is true of all subintervals of I 
down to a certain limit in size' in (b). 
Presumably it is Caenepeel's notion of 'symmetrical and asymmetrical 
referential centres (RC)' ( 1989: 68-73) that claims in the most clear-cut way 
that reference times can be atomic intervals, which suggests the possibility 
that reference times can be minimally durative, i.e. punctual. Her system 
tries to account for the durativity and the punctuality of reference times, 
employing Dowty's asserted and assumed reference times. Her 
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In Figure 2.3, [ r·) is asserted reference time, and [r'], assumed reference 
time. PP is 'preparatory period', designating a period leading up to the 
change of state, and Cons is 'consequence', designating a period ensuing after 
this change of state. Figure 2.3 corresponds to Dowty's aspectual type (c): 
the punctuality of asserted reference time r r] coincides with that of assumed 
··· reference time r r' 1, so that the referential centre is symmetrical. 
And in the so-called 'state clauses' RC is asymmetrical. One examp~e: 
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~/1///////////////// r' //////////////////////~ 
(P.) 
I r I 
Example: He \Vas tired. 
Type: non-contingent states, also referred to simply as states. 
Figure 2.4 
Figure 2.4 corresponds to Do\vty's aspectual types (a). The notation [P] 
designates 'point' (a particular time point), which introduces a punctual 
asserted reference time I r ]. And the duarativity of r' implicates, for 
example, that a fe\v minutes before the time point the proposition 'He was 
tired' was true, and a fe\v minutes after the time point the same proposition 
was still true. Thus, the referential centre is asymmetrical. 
The possibility that reference times can be punctual, t.e. virtually 
durationless, seems to he hinted at in Partee's temporal system (see Figure 
2.1 ), which says that state clauses surround or include reference times, but it 
is Caenepeel's system that insists that the asserted reference time becomes 
punctual when it is applied to statives. She explains as follows this peculiar 
behaviour of her asserted reference time \Vhen it is combined \Vith a 
progressive, a variety of her 'state clauses' (ibid.: 122): 
... a progressive takes as its input a process, and it describes this process 
as ongoing or in progress at a particular point of time, by compressing 
its asserted re.ference tin1e into an atotnic interval. (italics are mine). 
''·From a formal point of vie\v, a significant impllcation of applying the notion 
of reference times to the analysis of temporal dynamics of narrative 
discourse can be summarised as follo\VS. Reference times "behave" 
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differently according to the temporality exhibited by a particular (main) 
clause. That is to say, hy seeing the behaviour of reference times one can 
distinguish between event clauses and state clauses in a rather clear-cut way. 
It can be pointed out that the temporal discrepancy illustrated in the 
asymmetrical RC by Caenepecl is virtually identical with what has 
traditionally been referred to as the framing effect. Leech (1971: 17) 
explains the temporal frarnc due to the progressive aspect as follows: 
The Progressive Aspect generally has the effect of surrounding a 
particular event or moment by a "temporal frame", which can be 
diagrammed simply: ~ . That is, \Vithin the flow.of 
time, there is some point of reference from \Vhich the temporary 
eventuality indicated by the verb can be seen as stretching into the 
future and into the past. With the Progressive Present, the point 
of orientation is normally identical with "no\v", the present moment 
of real time. But in the Progressive Past, some other definite point 
of reference must he assumed. 
It is evident that the umbrella and the point in the above diagram correspond 
to Do,vty/Caenepeel's assumed reference time and asserted reference time 
respectively. Particular attention should be drawn to the abstract nature of 
the asserted reference tirne. Leech says that in the present tense, for 
example, the point in the diagram should be looked upon as 'now', the 
present moment of real time. The question that can be posited here is: 'What 
temporality is suggested by that 'no\v'? ' One could easily recognise that this 
sort of time or presentness is abstract enough to be susceptible to 
metaphysical contemplation; for example, one may be inclined to ask exactly 
ho\v long or durative that 'no\v' can be in physical terms. The abstract 
nature of that 'no\v' is clear in that it is not the tilne of the progressivised 
state of affairs in relation to \Vhich that 'now' is being referred to; that 'now' 
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is something that can stand on its own, as it were, (the speaker's 'now' or 
something), separable from the progressivised state of affairs. And such 
abstractness seems to be reflected upon the assumed reference time, as well, 
which is no\v assumed to be made up of the three temporal characteristics, 
.i.e. past, present and future, as Leech suggests above by saying 'the 
temporary eventuality indicated by the verb can be seen as stretching 
into the future and into the past'. 
It is of ontological interest to kno\v that the peculiar nature of reference 
time, which seems to be perceived in ·the past-present-future scheme when 
applied to state clauses, looks irrelevant when it is applied to event clauses. 
Neither Partee's system (Figure 2. I) nor Caenepeel's symmetrical structure 
of RC implies the validity or necessity to conceive of reference time in the 
past-present-future frame\vork of time \Vith respect to event clauses. 
One important aim of the present thesis is to argue that the reference-time 
approach, due mainly to its meta-time orientedness, is not appropriate for the 
proper understanding of narrative dynamics, i.e. the dynamics of story-event 
structure in narrative discourse. In the next section brief reference will be 
made to theoretical problems \vith the reference-time approach to the 
temporal structure of narrative. 
2.1.4 The counterintuitive aspect of the reference-time approach 
In the preceding sections \Ve have ohserved that in formal terms it is 
generally supposed that by looki·ng at ho\v the reference time "behaves" in a 
particular (main) clause, one can judge \Vhether it is an event clause or a state 
~· ..... ·. 
:clause. This section atten1pts to suggest that such a formal and mechanical 
event-state differentiation can be counterintuitive and non-commonsensical in 
the light of story-event detection/recognition. 
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Consider the follo\ving exarnple: 
(2)-5 (a) John opened the door (h) and came into the room. (c) He was 
depressed. (d) l-Ie lay do\vn on the sofa. 
One serious theoretical problem \vith formal semanticists' approaches to 
narrative discourse 1s that cited examples tend to be highly 
decontextualised. 121-5 can be counted as one of those decontextualised 
examples. According to a rather mechanical analysis employing the 
reference-time scheme, the reference time \Viii be updated in (a), (b) and (d), 
but it will be suspended at (c); the formal interpretation will say that in (c) 
the atomised asserted reference time is surrounded by the state verbalised as 
'He was depressed'. Thus, the narrative discourse f2l-5 can be said to consist 
of three events and one state. l,his analysis, however, will not sound as 
convincing as it looks if another situation \Vas textualised as 'John was very 
happy' some\vhere before [21-5, and the reader comes to (c) with 'John was 
very happy' in mind. In that case the reader \viii naturally be able to detect 
some change implicated in (c), \vhich is grammatically (aspectually) labelled 
as a state, so that he might feel he can construct a typical event clause 'John 
got depressed' (though not kno\ving exactly \Vhen it was) out of the state 
clause. 
The problem with the reference-time approaches to narrative is that the 
formal stance employed as the fundarnental principle may dismiss the 
reader's intuitive reaction of that kind as invalid or groundless, since their 
principle requires that the reader attend to the formal characteristics of 
discourse and the behaviour of reference times. In other words, formal 
· ~pproaches to narrative dynamics expect the reader to be highly 
metalinguistic and metaternporal. 
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I acknowledge that it is a serious theoretical fault if a particular narrative 
theory cannot identify the eventhood implicated in (c) in a well-
contextualised situation as mentioned above. One of the focal matters of 
interest in the present thesis is to contrive a theory which can be supported 
by commonsensical views of story events - a theory which can explain the 
eventhood of clauses like (c) in a contextualised situation. For this purpose 
the following chapters \Viii concentrate upon the investigation of time, 
change, the event/state distinction, presentness, tense and aspect, and 
narrative perspective. 
Another problem with the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics 
concerns the fact that, \Vith respect to the detection of eventhood of 
speech/thought presentation, the reference-time approach is not necessarily 
useful and effective. As \Ve \viii discuss in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, 
as a showing of the narrative world, speech/thought presentation ('non-
tagged speech' in particular) presents the reader \Vith a peculiar problem 
concerning the event sequence or segmentation as a meaningful and discrete 
graphological unit. It is quite normal that a narrative fiction comprises the 
so-called narration and speech/thought presentation, but traditionally, when 
formal analysts research into the temporal structure of narrative discourse, 
they attend mostly to narration, paying very little attention to the dynamicity 
of speech/thought presentation. This thesis is going to study the eventhood 
detectable in speech forms as well as narration. 
2.2 Aspectual types 
2.2.1 V endler' s typology 
Our discussion in 2. I has revealed the hvo aspects that can be observed in the 
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formal semanticists' notion of narrative dynamics: 1) reference time is 
generally considered to play a very important role in the reading of temporal 
ordering in narrative; 2) a close interrelation can be perceived between the 
function or the behaviour of the reference time and the aspectual 
characteristics of main clauses, which can be roughly divided into two 
different types, i.e. event clauses and state clauses. (Partee's theoretical 
system illustrated in 2.1.2 has some technical problems; a major one is the 
rather irrelevant nature of ~peech tifne labelled rs with respect to narrative 
fiction. This problem will be referred to in Chapter 5). It is about time to 
shift our attention to the aspectual types which, in terms of the formal 
analysts' theoretical stance, concern the schematisation of the internal 
structure of event. The present section looks into Vendler's typology 
(1967), which can be taken as the most influential one among similar 
typologies proposed over the years by a number of people like Ryle (1949), 
Kenny (1963), Allen (1966), Bach (1981), Rescher and Urquhart (1971). 
The most salient feature of Vendler's typology is that it attempts to see the 
aspectual characteristics inherent in the lexical structure of verbal predicates. 
He sets up 'processes' as the supracategory, and the processes are subdivided 
into accomplishments, achievements, activities and states. 
Verbal predicates like 'build a house' or 'read a book' are classified as 
accomplishments; they denote heterogeneous processes with successive phases 
with a natural end point; the end point of an accomplishment is distinct from 
its other points, so it is heterogeneous. 
Achievements are defined as verbal predicates denoting punctual processes; 
they have neither successive phases nor intrinsic duration, thus they realise a 
culmination point. Verbs like 'die', 'start', 'hiccough', 'find' are typical 
examples. 
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The verbal predicates labelled as activities are characterised by their 
homogeneous processes which have successive phases with no culmination 
point or end point. The homogeneity of activities can be explained by the 
nature of any part of the process being the same as that of the whole. Verbs 
such as 'walk', 'run', 'speak' can be classified as activities. 
Finally, states designate processes \vithout successive phases. States resemble 
activities in that they are also homogeneous, and like activities, they stretch 
over an undemarcated time line, thus an end point or culmination is 
irrelevant to states. But states should be distinguished from activities, 
Vendler argues (ihid.: 1 06), in that they do not denote any dynamics. Some 
examples of states are 'know', 'be tall', '\vant', 'love'. 
Vendler's original classification will be schematised as follows: 
processes with successive phases processes without successive phases 
homogeneous heterogeneous punctual period 
activities accomplishments achievements states 
run, walk run a mile find, Win a love, know 
speak write a letter race want 
This familiar Vendler's scheme of verb-types has been criticised by many 
scholars for its lexis-orientedness. Caenepeel (op. cit.: 65), for example, 
points out that it is misleading to classify different classes of verbal 
predicates on the basis of the aspectual characteristics which are considered 
inherent to their lexical structure, and argues for the necessity of the 
-· 
gratntnaticalisation of aspectual distinctions. Mourelatos ( 1978: 419), one 
of those who claim the need for the grammaticalisation of aspectual 
distinctions, explains how the verb 'know', which is classified as a state in 
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Vendler's system, can be encoded as an achievement when grammaticalised 
as 'And then suddenly I knew'; he speaks of the insight sense denoted by 
'knew' in this sentence. 
2.2.3 attempts a general criticism of the grammar-oriented aspectual 
distinctions, as \Veil as the texis-oriented ones, but before doing that, in 
the next section we take a look at a more dynamic postulation of aspectual 
types - a grammaticalised version of aspectual distinctions - which attempts 
to interpret the dynamic structure of temporal discourse on the basis of the 
interaction of the inherent aspectual qualities of the main verb with a 
number of 'operators'. 
2.2.2 Sentence-based classifications of aspectual types 
Dowty's interval semantics ( 1986) can be construed as offering a theoretical 
basis upon which aspectual types of contextualised main clauses, which are 
supposed to be more dynamic than Vendler's texis-oriented classification, 
have recently been put forward. Interval semantics was originally proposed 
by Taylor ( 1977) and extended by Do\vty ( 1979). This theory mainly 
concerns the notion of the truth-value of a sentence with respect to an 
interval of time. As sho\vn in 2.1.3, Dowty introduced three defining 
criteria for the three aspectual type~ in connection with the notion of the 
truth of a sentence cconcerning a time interval. The schematisation postulated 
by Dowty may well be construed as asserting that aspectual types should be 
a classification not of verb meanings but of sentence meanings. This 
naturally leads to the view that various sorts of 'operators' (Caenepeel, op. 
cit.: 65) should be taken into account to determine the aspectual 
class an expression belongs to. Operators can include auxiliaries, certain 
temporal and aspectual adverbials, and other complements (loc.·:cit.). In 
addition to these, context also functions as an operator. According to this 
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dynamic scheme of aspect conceptualised on the basis of.the structural 
meaning/function of main clauses, a proposition 'John· .. play;!.'tennis' can b.e 
realised as an accomplishment when it is rendered as 'John piayed tennis', 
whereas the same proposition ought to be interpreted as a state when it is 
expressed as 'John was playing tennis'. 
The fluidity of aspectual features of main sentences/clauses i_s· well portrayed 
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This figure is an attempt to show that· alrri_?st. any verb can :.oc?ur as almost 
any category. Take 'PROCESS-- CULMINATED PROCE~S';tfansition, for 
instance. According to Moens, the transit~ oil from a pr<?ce~·s like 'run' to a 
culminated process like 'run a mile in less·..th~n. -:1- minutes'.: add.s.·a culminatio-n 
. . . .· . . 
point to the original process, and when s"u<?h a culminatio~·~point is added, 
. . 
there can be perceived possible consequt!n·ces .. ·. He also.~rgu~~: that moving 
. . 
up from process to culminated process means moving from the· category '-
.··. 
! . 
consequences' to '+ consequences' (Joe. cit.). Conversely, he argues that 
with the sentence 'John played the sonata for about eight hours' the 
culminated process expression 'play the sonata' is here turned into a process 
of 'repeatedly playing the sonata, so that there is a move from the category 
'+ consequences' to '- consequences' (ibid.: 46). A more dynamic move 
from one category to another, and to still another seems to be meant with 
respect to 'point' verbs such as 'hiccough'. 1,his network would claim that 
the sentence 'John hiccoughed' belongs to POINT in terms of category, and 
that the category will change into PROCESS when 'hiccough' is iteratively 
realised· as in 'John used to hiccough', and that the category will further 
change into PROGRESSIVE STATE when the verb appears in dynamic 
sentences such as 'John \Vas hiccoughing' 
Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Moen's transition network is the 
contrast between 'basic propositions' and 'expanded propositions' ( cf. Lys 
& Mommer, 1986; Caenepeel, 1986). In Figure 2.5, the starting point of 
an arro\v is assumed to signify the basic proposition, and the ending point of 
the arrow, the expanded proposition. Thus .. the verb 'run', for instance, 
will be described hasically as a process verb, as Moens says (op. cit.: 46), 
which stretches over an interval of time and occurs freely with a for-
adverbial. But when it is combined with an object like 'a mile' or with an in-
interval, it will belong to a different category called culminated process, 
which is considered an expanded realisation of 'run'. (Moens and Caenepeel 
refer to such transitions from basic to expanded forms as 'coercion'; in this 
particular case, a process ('run' ) is coerced into a culminated process ('run a 
mile'). ) 
,_The fundamental attitude underlying this typology is a highly metalinguistic 
one toward the schematisation of eventhood and statehood. This typology is 
a 'classification of how people describe the world, rather than how the 
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world itself is' (ihid.: 43); it is not intended as a typology of 'real world 
events', as Moens puts it. What this saying implicates is a kind of strong and 
rigid connection \vhich he believes exists between particular lexico-
grammatical properties and event/state meanings. One ontological problem 
with such a vie\V is that it may well be thought of as suggesting the 
"existence" of linguistic/grammatical events or states, besides real world 
events or states. It should be part of \Vorld knowledge that events or states 
are the phenomena that happen or exist in the \Vorld. Moens' argument is 
misleading in that it implicates the possible existence of a closed and specific 
world in which linguistic events or states "exist". The next section spotlights 
the ontological and linguistic problems with formalists' views of aspectual 
types. 
2.2.3 Problems with formalists' systems of aspectual types 
In 2.2.1 we looked at Vendler1s texis-oriented typology of aspectual types, 
and in 2.2.2, as an argument against texico-semantic schemes of aspectual 
types we observed grammar-oriented aspectual distinctions. What this 
section intends to do is to point out some fallacious elements that can be ' 
generally recognised in the \vay in \Vhich formalists conceive of the relation 
between aspectual types, which are primarily setnantic items, and language 
form (both lexical and grammatical). 
What is most noticeable about the formalists' view of aspectual types is the 
misleading metalinguistic consciousness which is concerned with the 
problems of language jornz and language use. It could be said that, for 
example, when Vendler classified 1kno\v' as a state, he was metalinguistic-
conscious in a fallacious \vay. A normal metalinguistic reaction to the verb 
form must have been: 1 "Kno\v" is an English verb'. And another normal 
one must have been: 1 "Kno\v", \vhich is an English verb, can be used so as to 
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designate a state, depending on the linguistic circumstances', Vendler's 
mistake was that in making the taxonomy of aspectual types he assumed that 
there is an inherent parallel· between the lexical form and the meaning. 
Wittgenstein (1953: I 28) suggests that meaning is language use. We could 
take it that language has no "meaning" if it is not used. The aspectual 
distinctions such as achievement, accomplishment, or state can be considered 
semantic phenomena, i.e. meanings. Note that these meanings are only to be 
differentiated from each other; ontologically, it should have no meaning to 
speak of the hasic or inherent meaning of a particular linguistic form, 
which may suggest the validity of mentioning the expanded or developed 
meaning of the same linguistic form. The ontological problem with 
Vendler's thinking \Vas that he failed to notice that he actually used the 
English verb 'know' in a particular way (a kind of mental use) when he 
labelled it as a state in his system, and that he assumed that the verb 
'know' basically or inherently denotes a state. He should have realised 
that the notion of hasic-ness can be relevant not to language meaning (use) 
but to language form. 
This ontological/linguistic confusion can be also observed in those who 
criticised Vendler's lexis-oriented typology and attempted grammar-oriented 
systems. At first blush, grammar-oriented approaches to aspectual types may 
seem to emphasise the importance of language use, since they claim that the 
same verbal predicate can ex hi bit different aspectual characteristics, 
depending on how it is used. But the following remark by Caenepeel (op. 
cit.: 65) well illustrates grammar-oriented people's confusion between form 
and meaning: 'Vendler's taxonomy essentially classifies different classes of 
verbal predicates on the hasis of the aspectual characteristics inherent to their 
lexical structure' (italics are mine). This saying seems to presuppose or 
take it for granted that a particular lcxis (verb form) can have a basic or 
.... -.,..._ 
inherent aspectual feature. 
One good example of grammatical fallacy of this kind is Moens' 'transition 
network' (see Figure 2.5). Take t\vo verbal forms 'run' and 'run a mile' 
for instance (cf. Moens, 1989: 46). What can be observed in his system is 
the confusing parallelism between the formal transition from plain (or basic) 
to complex and the meaning varieties such as process and culminated process. 
He argues that the verb 'run' basically designates a process, but when it is 
combined with an object phrase 'a mile' it expandedly designates a 
culminated process. But I \Vander whether one has to think that way. It 
may be meaningful to say that 'run' is a plain jor1n and that 'run a mile' is 
an expanded jor1n in terms of language form, but it is ontologically 
illegitimate to contend that the basic meaning of the verb 'run' is a process, 
and that the same verb can designate a culminated process in an expanded 
way, according to the grammatical circumstances, i.e. depending on how it 
is used. My argument is that \vhen one says that 'run' is a process, and 'run 
a mile' is a culminated process, the two "meanings" are equal in status (the 
two expressions 'run' and 'run a mile' are equally used in an equally 
distinct way) and that one should have no ontological reason to think that 
there is a transitional relation from basic to expanded in the meanings of the 
two expressions. 
It \Vould be useful and helpful to contemplate this situation metaphorically. 
The English verb 'RUN' can be compared to a postage stamp before use. At 
this level, one might be purely metalinguistic, thinking, for example, that the 
verb consists of three letters. ( It i·s to be noted that the fact that the verb 
'RUN' comprises three letters is not a part of the 1neaning of the verb). But 
when one claims that 'run' is a process, he has actually used it; he described a 
particular state of affairs (belonging to his imaginary world) using the 




postmarked. At this level, the stamp can be said to be connected to the world 
in a practical \vny. That is, the verb 'RUN'. hy being used to denote a 
process, is connected to the \Vorld (whether fictional or real). That the verb 
has no hasic meaning inherent to it can be understood by reasoning that 
when one thinks of the meaning of 'run' one cannot abstract the meaning of 
'run' itself \Vith no-one, no-entity, no-\vhere involved in it; the meaning of 
'run' is inevitably linked \Vith some concrete or specific items in the world, 
however nebulous or vague they are as mental constructs (even when one in 
an abstract \vay tries to think of the meaning of 'run' as a process, some 
ghostly entity \Viii "run" in one's mind). And when one argues that 'run a 
mile' is a culminated process, one has used the English verb in just another 
way; the postage stamp called 'RUN' is postmarked in a different way. 
Again, the meaning of 'run a mile' is ontologically unthinkable without some 
specific world-entities involved in it. In short, the meaning contrast 
between ' run' as a process and 'run a mile' as a culminated process 
is comparable to a postmark contrast imprinted on t\vo postage stamps called 
-!RUN'. Under such circumstances one will find it illogical to say that 
one postmark (the after-use sign) is a basic one compared with another. 
In another metaphorical situation, on the metalinguistic level the verb 'RUN' 
is comparable to a musical score, for example. When one insists that 'run' 
is basically a process, and that it can expandedly be a culminated process 
when it is combined with objects such as 'a mile', it is tantamount to saying 
that Ne\v York Philhamonic Orchestra's playing of Beethoven's Eroica 
sytnphony conducted by Leonard Bernstein is a basic performance, and 
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra's playing of the same music conducted by 
Herbert von Karajan is an expanded one. Obviously, such saying is almost 
nonsensical and does not accord with our intuitions. 
Thus, the -illusory and fallacious nature of Moens' transition network of 
aspectual types is made clear from a linguistic/ontological point of view. If 
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.it is feasible to point out the misleading tendency in Vendler's lexis-oriented 
typology to see a parallel ism between the lexical form and the meaning ( the 
aspectual property), then it is also possible to refer to the similarly 
misleading propensity in grammar-oriented systems to see· a co-relation 
between the grammatical form and the meaning. A typical example is the 
notion of 'progressive state' in Moens' system (see Figure 2.5). The 
principle reflected in the term is that the progressive as an aspectual property 
inherently denotes a state. Here \Ve can perceive a misleading metalinguistic 
attitude in the recognition of the relation between language form and 
language meaning (use). A hidden assumption underlying such a mistaken 
attitude is that semantic items such as events or states are primarily formal 
phenomena. 
One of the focal matters of interest in this thesis ts to make an 
linguistic/ontological inquiry into the nature of story event in narrative 
fiction. In the course of our discussion it will be clarified that the 
fundamental criterion for a particular discourse to be identified as a story 
event is whether it can be considered to indicate some change as a part of its 
"meaning". In Chapters 5 and 6 the change-indication as a semantic test to 
detect the eventhood of a particular discourse will be applied to a number of 
differently contextualised progressive expressions as story-event candidates, 
as well as to other grammatical forms. 
2.3 Aspectual types and time in narrative 
2.3.1 "Narrative time movctncnt" in Dowty's TDIP 
....... ;iF~' 
fccording to Partee ( 1984), \Vho, follo\ving Hinrichs (1986) and Bach 
{1981, 1986), sets up three different aspectual types of sentences, i.e. events, 
processes and states (Partee's 'events' correspond to Vendler's 'achievements' 
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and 'accomplishments', and her 'processes' and 'states', respectively to 
Vendler's 'activities' and 'states'), event clauses update the "narrative time", 
while process/state clauses do not, but her theory is not necessarily well 
accepted as accounting for the relationship between the aspectual features of 
clauses and the temporal ordering in narrative discourse. In this section, by 
taking up Do\vty's idea of narrative dynamics we shed light upon a 
problematic facet of the relation hetween aspectual types of clauses and the 
so-called "narrative time progression". 
· Dowty's TDIP (Temporal Discourse Interpretation Principle) (1986) argues 
that reference times are normally to be updated even after his 'statives' and 
'activities' (which correspond respectively to Partee's 'states' and 
'processes'). Do\vty's TDIP is closely associated \Vith his interval semantics, 
which, by emphasising the notion of the truth of a sentence with respect to an 
interval of time, distinguishes t\vo kinds of reference times, i.e. the ass~rted 
and assumed reference times, as already observed in 2.1.3. According to 
him, the asserted reference time is updated after each clause in the following 
example: 
[21-6 (1) Mary entered the president's office. (2) A copy of the budget 
was on the president's desk. (3) The president's financial advisor 
stood beside the copy. (4) The president sat regarding both 
admiringly. (5) The advisor spoke. (Dowty, 1986: 49) 
Dowty explains the te1nporal ordering of clauses in [2]~6 as follows. 
Sentences (2) - (4) are statives, \Vhich one will expect to be true not only at 
the asserted reference ti mcs but also beyond them; they are assumed to hold 
------before and after both ( 1) and (5), \V hich can be classified as event sentences. 
pne can account for the updating of asserted reference times after each of 
these five sentences hy arguing that the asserted reference times of the stative 
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sentences are to be reckoned as the time it would take for a hypothetical 
observer to get these visual pieces of information. Put differently, the 
observation Dowty makes concerning temporal ordering in narrative is that a 
portion- of time is considered to be consumed even in statives, because of the 
conscious effort made by some perceiving entity, and that is why after each 
sentence the (asserted) reference time is to be updated. 
Discussing the eventhood/statehood of the so-called statives such as (2), (3) 
and (4) in 12-1-6 is one of the important aims of the present thesis, and we will 
attempt to take a closer look at the linguistic and ontological characteristics 
of statives in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Here it \Viii suffice to point out some 
problematic aspects of Dowty's argument. His contention that narrative 
time moves forward even after statives can be controversial in that it fails to 
pay proper attention to the problem of focalisation, i.e. the narrative 
problem of 'Who sees?'. A danger lies in his S\veeping generalisation with 
respect to the temporal feature of statives. As will be argued later, as far as 
the quoted example is concerned, it seems likely that the three statives in 
question are event expressions; a reasonable \vay of viewing them would be 
to assume that each of (2)~ (3) and (4) in 12]-6 includes a matrix clause 'She 
saw' or 'She realised' at the immanent level. But Dowty neglects other 
narrative circumstances in \vhich there can be statives for which speaking of 
. the involvement of the character as a character-focaliser is irrelevant. One 
example: 
f2)-7 The village of Marlatt lay amid the north-eastern undulations of 
the beautiful Vale of Blackmore aforesaid, an engirdled and 
secluded region .... (Hardy, Tess of the d'Urbervilles : 48) 
[2]-7 may \Veil be construed as a description of setting, which has no bearing 
upon the character-focaliser's cognitive act as an internal event (see 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6), so that there can be perceived no narrative time 
progression there. 
And another problem with Dowty's concept of temporal· dynamics in 
narrative discourse concerns the way in \Vhich he cites examples. A general 
tendency perceivable in the formalists' analysis of temporal discourse is a 
microscopic and decontexualised \vay of giving examples. In the course of 
discussion in this thesis it \Viii be sho\vn that the fundamental criterion for a 
.particular discourse to he recognised as a story event is whether the 
discourse can be considered to represent a change of some kind or not, and 
that the eventhood of a particular discourse is not necessarily to be identified 
on the microscopic basis of consecutive clauses. This means that the task of 
story-event recognition tends to require a more or less macroscopic reading 
of narrative text. In this respect, the above example given by Dowty is 
unfair because of the paucity of context. 
2.3.2 Contingency and autonomacy 
A counter-argument against Oo\vty and Partee can be found in Caenepeel 
(1989). Her theory of temporal ordering in narrative is characterised by 
the exhaustive observations of the ways in which consecutive main clauses 
·relate to each other. Her conclusion can be summarised as follows: the 
reader's impression of the narrative time progression depends on the 
presence or absence of 'contingent relations' between two consecutive main 
clauses. By contingent relations Caenepeel means not merely temporal 
sequentiality but also what she calls 'atemporal factors' such as causality and 
enablements (Caenepeel, 1989: I 19). According to her, the aspectual 
~--· 
· distinctions such as event, process or state are not directly concerned with the 
temporal ordering in narrative. An example she gives illustrates this (ibid.: 
83): 
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[21-8 Beyond the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. 
(Lively, Moon 7/ger: 207) 
Caenepeel gives it as an example of her E (event) + NCE (Non-Contingent 
Event) sequences. She claims that no update of the reference time can be 
observed here; in this particular case two event structures are arranged 
sequentially, but the relation between the two main clauses is not contingent 
but 'topical'. By contrast, she argues that in the following example the 
consecutive arrangement of two state clauses invokes the impression of 
temporal update because of the contingent relationship between the two 
clauses (ibid.: 88): 
[21-9 She was nearer to him nO\V r ... ). She was level with him, passing 
him. (Gordimer~ Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet? : 
1 9) 
Caenepeel's system, \vhich emphasises contingency or sequentiality as a key 
factor contributing to the fonvard movement of narrative time, is not 
without problems. 
One problem is a counterintuitive observation concerning the contextual 
change (or coercion ) of aspectual features of propositions. According to 
· Caenepeel (ibid.: 72), the aspectual type of the proposition: 
f2l-l 0 He hiccoughed 
is 'point'; in this proposition both asserted and assumed reference times are 
~tatomic, but the asserted reference time is not a culmination, so that [2]-1 0 
does not evoke a contingency structure. This aspectual observation seems to 
suggest that point clauses like 121-10 is irrelevant to the update of 
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narrative time. Caenepcel would claim, however, that narrative time moves 
forward in the clausal sequence as in: 
[2)-1 I He hiccoughed, and laughed. 
·Her system would explain that in [2)-11 the first clause is coerced into a 
culmination as it is followed by a clause which is contingently related to it. 
But one might \Vonder whether it is reasonable to try to account for the 
temporal ordering bet\vcen the two clauses in [2]-11 by assuming the 
contextual change of the aspectual type of the first clause. It seems that the 
proposition 'He hiccoughed' in 121-11, due to its aspectual boundedness, 
autono1nous/y represents a change (event) by itself, which can contribute to 
the reader's impression of narrative time progression. It is very difficult to 
find an ontological reason \vhy one must say that the aspectual change of the 
first clause in (2 )-11 from point to culmination is the immediate cause of the 
update of narrative time. 
Another problem \Vith formal systems like Caenepeel's is that they tend to 
emphasise the formal characteristics of discourse at the apparent level, so 
that the immanent eventhood represented by focalised state clauses such as 
those examples given hy Dowty (see [2]-4) is likely to be neglected. 
According to the theoretical schemes postulated by Partee, Caenepeel, the 
~econd clause in. the follo\ving example would not update the narrative: 
' 
f2]-12 John looked out of the \Vindow. There was a dog lying on the 
grass . 
. ..,. 1t'hat counts with respect to f21-12 in terms of event recognition is that one 
Sannot deny the possibility that the second clause may be interpreted as 
ttnplicating an internal event \Vith John as the cogniser/perceiver. If it is 
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I ,. feasible to speak of such internality of eventhood, then one wiJl be justified 
in assuming that the narrative updates at the second clause in [2]-12, despite 
the formal feature of the clause which is generally supposed to represent a 
state. 
In order to dismiss the counterintuitive view that the second clause in [2]-12 
does not concern the progression of narrative time, one will have to take 
the problem of focalisation, i.e. the problem of 'Who sees?', into account. 
We wiJI turn to the problem in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
2.3.3 A confusing aspect of the concept of narrative time 
·This section points out an ontological problem concerning the concept of 
'narrative time', which is usually to be taken as something that moves, stops 
or reverses in narrative studies . 
. Moens (1987: 92) suggests that narrative time stops at a stative clause by 
saying: 
·>f; As a result, time does not move fonvard in a narrative with static clauses, 
n1· since the stative point that they add to the overall event structure of the 
discourse cannot become a new temporal focus 
. .. 'J'L 
,.;He also suggests the reversing of narrative time by saying: 'Time seems to be 
. moving backward here' as an explanation of the event structure of the 
sentences: 'John fell. Mary pushed him' (lac. cit. ) 
: __ , .... ;I;t,ere we understand that narrative time is conceptualised as some entity 
.:Fapable of moving, stopping, and reversing. Assuming that n~rrative is 
' ' .. ~ 
. jptrinsically a representation of a world (a simulation of the real world in 
'>: • I . 
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spatia-temporal terms) by means of narration, one will be able to recognise 
the danger of taking too literally the idea that narrative time behaves like a 
vehicle - sometimes moving forward, sometimes stationary, and sometimes 
going backward, since it is ontologically to be acknowledged that time in the 
world never behaves like a vehicle. My argument is that time in narrative 
time is to be assumed to he time in the represented \Vorld. It could be said 
that those who treat narrative time as if it \Vere a car or a bus fail to 
(fistinguish in a proper \vay bet\veen narrative-telling and the represented 
world. 
The dual aspect of narrative as an amalgam of narration (discourse) and the 
represented \Vorld \V ill be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and before that in 
Chapter 3 we are going to attempt an ontological discussion of the nature of 
time, event and change in order to avoid a confusion stemming from the 
mixing up of I inguistics and ontology. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The general atm of Chapter 2 \Vas to look at the way in which formal 
analysts conceive of temporal structure of narrative discourse in a 
metatemporal and at the same time metalinguistic way. 
Their metatemporal attitude to\vard narrative dynamics is well exemplified 
by the reference-time approach. The peculiarity of the behaviour of 
reference time can be metaphorically described as follows. When the 
reference time is involved with an event clause it behaves like a fisherman; it 
throws a net to capture the event clause (theoretically the event time is 
-~ .. SUpposed to be in the reference time), whereas, when it is concerned with a 
state clause it behaves like a mathematical point - an extentionless entity; it 
shrinks to a kind of durationless time. An interesting aspect of reference 
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time is that, when it acts upon an event clause, speaking of the past-present-
·future division of the event time seems irrelevant, whereas, when it is 
involved with a state clause, one can refer to it in the past-present-future 
framework (as far as the assumed reference time is concerned). It appears 
that the abstract nature of reference time is clearly felt particularly when it is 
referred to in relation to state clauses. In Chapter 5 the metatemporal nature 
of reference time \Viii be contrasted with the concrete and significant 
nature of object-time. 
The metalinguistic consciousness of formalists can be recognised in their 
general assumption that there is an inherent parallelism between the lexical/ 
grammatical form of language and aspectual types as meaning varieties. As 
we observed, such a formal assumption is somewhat connected with the 
metatemporal nature of reference time frequently employed as a test to know 
whether a particular discourse is an event or a state. In grammar-oriented 
taxonomies of aspectual types particular formal (grammatical) features tend 
to be associated with the presence or absence of temporal dynamics, i.e. the 
event-state distinction. It \viii be sho\vn in the course of discussion in the 
present thesis that such formal rigidity does not lend itself to the proper 
recognition of story events in narrative discourse. 
Formal approaches to narrative dynrnics tend to fail to pay enough attention 
to the problem of foca/i.\·ation, \vhich can be considered to be an important 
element particularly when it is necessary to judge \Vhether or not a particular 
clause, which is grammatically labelled as a stative, represents an internal 
event (some focaliser's perceiving act). Moreover, a theoretical problem 
with the grammar-conscious analysis of narrative discourse is that it fails to 
.-.· .. ~·~ 
· perceive the eventhood of a particular discourse, which is grammatically a 
stative, and for \Vhich contemplating internal eventhood is irrelevant. In 
terms of story-event detection. the importance of the recognition of such 
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eventhood will be emphasised in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In the next chapter the nature of time, event and change will be discussed 
mainly from an ontological point of vie\v. The main purpose of Chapter 3 
is to offer a theoretical basis which will help to avoid the commonly 
observable confusion bct\veen linguistics and ontology concerning the so-
called "narrative time progression/suspension". 
Before proceeding to C~hapter 3 \Ve attempt to give an overview of the 
concept of event hood \V hich is employed -in this thesis as one of the vital1y 
important items with which to explain a commonsensical view of narrative 
dynamics. 
2.4.1 The concept of cvcnthood - an orientation 
The present thesis conceives of event as change of state. This can be 
accounted for as follo\vs. For example, an event description 1): 'A silence 
fell' can be taken as representing a change from a state in which 1) does not 
hold to a state in which I) holds. As will be observed in Chapter 3, this 
concept of event, which is concerned with the truth value of a proposition in 
the lapse of time, attends to the occurrence of change, but is not necessarily 
· interested in identifying the item that undergoes change. Considering the 
. ontological nature of event (or change of state) as a spatia-temporal 
particular, it is evident that a change is inevitably a change in some particular 
entity, either real or fictional. I claim that what changes when an event 
occurs will be clearly understood if one assumes a property-oriented view of 
event. Take I) for example. If it takes place in a narrative world, then one ... -........ :..:....;~ 
can speak of a change of the world by looking upon 1) as a new fact, i.e. a 
"new property" added to the world, since the narrative world with 1) added 
as a ne\v property is to be ontologically differentiated from that without it. 
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It is to be noted that the notion of event as change of state outlined above 
should be distinguished from its "grammatical" versions such as postulated 
by Fillmore (1970 b: 125), who labels verbs like 'break' and 'bend' as 
'change-of-state verbs', and verhs like 'hit' and 'slap' as 'surface-contact' 
verbs. According to Fillmore, in sentences like 2): 'I broke the window with 
a hammer' the object ('the window' in this particular case) undergoes some 
kind of change of state after the event symbolised by the verb occurred, 
. whereas in sentences like 3): 'I hit the window with a hammer' it can be 
uncertain, from the use of the verb, whether the object has undergone any 
essential change or change of state. If one takes the meaning of 'change of 
state' in a "grammatical" sense as postulated by Fillmore, and assumes that 
event is equivalent to change of state, then sentences involving what Fillmore 
calls 'change-of state verhs' describe events, \Vhile those involving what he 
calls 'surface-contact verbs' may or may not describe events. Our criterion 
of eventhood, ho\vever, claims that, even if the window suffered no damage . 
in 3), one could refer to a change of state with respect to 3) by attending to 
the fact of someone called 'I' hitting the \Vindow as a property which was 
newly added to the state in \vhich 3) did not hold. And as for what 
changed, all the items that are within the spatia-temporal frame in which 3) 
occurred can be construed as possible candidates for undergoing change . 
. · We assume that the concept of eventhood we adopt in this thesis well 
accounts for a commonsensical - not necessarily grammatical - notion of 
event or change of state. 
Another thing to be emphasised IS that the so-called aspectual-type 
distinctions are not directly relevant to the non-grammatical view of event. 
. Lyons (op. cit.: 483) subdivides his 'dynamic situation' into event and 
·.~ ····-'IJII! 
process by saying: 'If a dynamic situation is extended in time, it is a process; 
jf it is momentary, it is an event'. There seems to be no significant reason 
to make such a distinction~ considering the vagueness of the criterion, i.e. 
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the length of time taken by the act. And, as discussion goes on in the 
following chapters, it \Viii be understood that, with dynamic situations 
concerned with eventhood, the Vendlerian categories of aspectual types 
such as 'accomplishments', 'achievernents' and 'activities'-, or aspectual 
types observable in Moens' typology ( 1987) such as 'points', 'culminations' 
or 'culminated processes' are not necessarily relevant to our discussion 
of the recognttton of narrative dynamics. A commonsensical stance 
we employ in this thesis suggests that, \Vith things as spatio-temporal 
particulars in the \Vorld (either real or fictional), they either come into being 
or are there fronz the he~-: inning, and that there is no other alternative. 
Of these t\vo situations the former concerns occurrence or temporal 
dynamics (eventhood), and the latter concerns existence or temporal non-
dynamics (statehood). This is why we think it is ontologically enough to 
posit event and state as t\vo distinct entities when we discuss the mechanism 
of dynamics in narrative fiction, \vhich is considered to represent a world as 
a spatio-temporal particular. 
Lastly, one of the most important aims of a narrative theory in this thesis is 
to clarify the mechanism for perceiving eventhood in the so-called 'statives' 
such as (c) in the following example: 
[2]-13 (a) She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bed-rail 
(b) and fell into a revery. (c) There was no longer any 
perturhation visihle on her face. (Joyce, 'The Boarding House': 
75) (italics are mine) 
·--·-Arguing that (c) in (2.1-13 can be construed as a story-event description, 
contributing to the plot progression (or "narrative time movement"), will 




approaches often employed by formal analysts of narrative discourse. In 
order to claim eventhood represented in narrative clauses like (c) in [2]-13, 
we will place a good deal of focus on the investigation of the two facets of 
presentness in later chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Time and eventhood 
This chapter is an attempt at an ontological discussion of the nature of time, 
event, and change. Its immediate purpose is to give an ontological basis for 
describing narrative dynamics in the following chapters, so that reference to 
the relation bet\veen the human recognition of dynamics and the linguistic 
expressions will be \Vithheld as much as possible, since we think it is 
important to focus on ontological contemplation first, in order to avoid the 
confusing account of dynamics recognition that tends to arise from an 
unhappy mixture of ontology and linguistics (formal awareness). What our 
discussion attempts to elucidate are: 1) the intrinsic relation between time and 
change (event); 2) the ontological nature of narrative (story) time as a 
simulation of time in the real world; 3) the dual aspect of human 
consciousness of time, \Vhich might be conceptualised in the chronos-kairos 
contrast. 
3.1 MacTaggart's theory of time 
3.1.1 The temporal series 
MacTaggart ( 1927) discusses the nature of time employing the untque 
concept of 'temporal series'. In this section we take a general look at his 
theory of time which is said to have made a great contribution to the 
foundation of tense-logic. Particular attention is drawn to what MacTaggart 
means hy chanf?e in its relation to time . 
. One of the most important presuppositions of MacTaggart's discussion is that 
there is an intrinsic relationship between time and change. He says: 'It 
would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change' (1927: 
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11 ). With this presupposition in mind he posits the following three series: 
the A-series, the 8-series and the C-series. The A-series is a series in which 
positions in time are either Past, Present or Future. In the B-series each 
position is Earlier than some and Later than some of the other positions; the 
relation of earlier than, and the relation of later than are transitive and 
asymmetrical. And the C-series is a non-temporal series where things are 
ordered in a certain \Vay, but with no directionality: one good example will 
be letters in alphabetical order. 
It should be obvious that the C-series is not temporal: the numerals from I to 
10 do not reflect any temporal ordering. No change can be perceived 
between, say, 5 and 6, unless the numerals are used in connection with some 
states of affairs, like the age of a particular child. Note that what will be 
changed in that situation is the age of the child, not the numerals themselves. 
Compared \Vith the C-series, the B-series seems temporal enough, but 
MacTaggart argues that it is not suitable to encapsulate change. He writes: 
'If N is ever earlier than 0 and later than M, it will always be, and has 
always been, earlier than 0 and later than M, since the relations of earlier 
and. later are permanent' (ibid.: 1 2) (N, M and 0 designate events). 
According to this permanent scheme, a particular event will never cease to 
be that event, so that no change \viii occur. It is to be noted that there is a 
strong resemblance bet \Veen the notion of the B-series and Newton's 
'absolute time' and Bergson's 'spatialiscd time'. Bergson says (1910: 101): 
..... We set our states of consciousnesss side by side in such a way as to 
perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside 
"· .. -;;:-.one another; in a \Vord, we project time into space, we express duration 
' in terms of externity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous 
! : line or a chain, the parts of \Vhich touch without penetrating one another. 
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Bergson's notion of spatialised time is not necessarily clear about the 
relationship between time and change, and that is where it should be 
differentiated from Mac'faggart's 8-series, which adamantly rejects the 
notion of change. As a matter of fact, the B-series is not easy to understand 
for· a couple of reasons. Perhaps the strongest reason is that MacTaggart 
assumes that it is event that changes. When he talks about change he 
invariably refers to the change of events such as 'the death of Queen Anne' 
(ibid.: 13). For MacTaggart, what changes with respect to 'the death of 
Queen Anne' is its characteristics, i.e. pastness, presentness and futurity. 
Such a rather queer concept of change contrasts markedly with a normal, 
more commonsensical idea that change is to be referred to as the change of 
things or objects, not of events. It is not difficult to see that MacTaggart's 
notion of change is associated with a classic, metaphysical problem of unity 
and separability of substance and form. The point is whether the pastness, 
for example, which is construed as the property or characteristic of the event 
'the death of Queen Anne', is separable from the event itself, just as Mr 
Keddy's car is isolatablc from Mr Keddy himself. It is quite clear that 
MacTaggart's standpoint is a dualistic one which allows for the separation of 
the form from the substance as a rule. Some critical remarks will be made 
about such a strong dualism in 3.4. 
Another factor contributing to the difficulty of the B-series is that it lacks 
~·independency as distinct from the other two series, i.e. the A-series and the 
C-series. As MacTaggart acknowledges (ibid.: 30), the B-series can be 
conceived of only when paratactically, non-temporally arranged terms in the 
C-series are combined with the A-series which gives to them the 
directionality from past, present and future, and the notion of change . ............ 
Presumably, what is most baffling about the B-series is that we have to 
. ~struggle liard to separate the concepts earlier than and later than with no 
~ change involved from the most familiar, everyday notion of change deeply 
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connected with the past-present-future direction that is quintessential in the 
A-series. For the purpose of the present thesis it seems very meaningful to 
know the difference between the A-series and the 8-series, in order to 
recognise properly the nature of the meanings of time, change, and event, so 
that we will go on to discuss the nature of the temporal series further. 
3.1.2 The B-series and change 
To understand the 8-series, the following pictorial representation will be 
helpful: 
a dog a l1orsc 
A B 
Figure 3.1 
Now let us assume that Figure 3.1 represents a spatial situation. A dog and 
a horse are located at two different spatial points A and 8 (the solid straight 
line can be taken as a particular road of some length). The isotropic nature 
of space tells us that the two animals exist simultaneously in two different 
places, and \-Ve know that under such circumstances it does not make any 
sense to say that the dog has changed into the horse; the dog and the horse 
are there in their places without disappearing as long as they stay there. 
Now all we have to do to get a clear picture of MacTaggart's 8-series is to 
ass_ume the two spatial points A and 8 as the two different temporal points, 
and think of the solid straight line as symbolising something temporal '¥vhich 
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indicates that A is earlier than 8 and that 8 is later than A. And what 
matters here is to keep looking at the two animals in the spatial, isotropic 
sense. rrhe idea that the dog has changed into the horse must be totally 
dismissed. 
No\v it is is important to have a clear idea about the notion of change. 
Russell, in his Principles of Mathetnatics ( 1903), says: 
Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood. between a 
proposition concerning an entity and the time T, and a proposition 
concerning the same entity and the time T ', provided that these 
propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T' 
occurs in the other. 
This definition of change by Russell may well be thought of as a formal 
account of our commonsensical view of change (there will be more to be said 
about the nature of change; we discuss the problem in more detail in 3.3). It 
is to be noted that such a notion of change is concerned with transiency 
which can be recognised only by a knowing subject or a subject-of-
consciousness that looks upon some entity as existent, perceivable at a 
particular point of time, and looks upon the same entity as non-existent. and 
only recollectable at a different time. At this point, it is rather easy to 
recognise that the notion of change best fits the A-series in which only 
present is reckoned to be real and perceptible. (This is partly responsible 
for MacTaggart's dismissal of the A-series, time and change as unreal; this 
problem will be discussed in the next section) . 
.. ,.{f we apply the truth value theory about change postulated by Russell to the 
dog-and-horse situation being referred to in the present section, we realise 
that the temporal nature of the 8-series requires us to see that the proposition 
'X is a dog' is true at the temporal point A, and that the proposition 'Y is a 
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horse' is true at the temporal point B, and that it is wrong and irrelevant to 
claim that the proposition 'X is a dog' is false at the temporal point B. 
Considering that the concepts earlier than and later than are after all 
derived from the past-present-future scheme of the A-series, it could be 
argued that the B-series is ambiguous in that it is a queer blending of a 
physical and "objective" vie\v of time on the one hand, and a psychological 
and "subjective" vie\v of time on the other. Maybe we can find parallel 
situations in scientific \vritings which are intended as purely physical and 
mathematical descriptions of entities such as the orbit of the earth rotating 
around the sun, but which \vill inevitably employ expressions of perception 
when some visual description is required. 
The discussion in this section suggests that the notion of change is alien to the 
B-series, \V hich is a kind of physical concept of time, and that it is congenial 
to the A-series, which seems to presuppose the existence of some entity that 
is capable of perception. In the next section we look into how MacTaggart, 
who claims that change is essential to time, ended up arguing against the 
existence of time. We \Vill find his controversial arguments spotlight some 
psychological quality ascribable to the notion of change. 
3.1.3 The unreality of time 
. The most notable feature of MacTaggart's theory of time is that he claims the 
unreality or non-existence of time. He argues that time is unreal for the 
following two reasons: 1) The A-series, the only one in which change as the 
essence of time is possible, lacks independence as a theoretical construct; 2) 
~ ............ The characteristics of the A-series, i.e. pastness, presentness, and futurity, 
which are apparently incompatible, are in fact compatible with each other. 
What is it that MacTaggart means hy the lack of independence with regard 
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to 1 )? He claims that change must be recognised in such circumstances as 
the following (op. cit.: 13): 
It (the death of Queen Anne) was once an event in the far future. It 
became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was 
present. Then it became past, and will always remain past, though 
every moment it becomes further and further past. (my parenthesis) 
With this saying MacTaggart suggests an inevitable involvement of some 
focaliser or viewer of things from a fixed temporal axis which is 
quintessential in the A-series. This can be known from what he says in 
.connection with the existence of consciousness on the past-present-future 
series: 'If there were no consciousness, there would be events which were 
. earlier and later than others, but nothing would be in any sense past, present, 
.or future' (ibid.: 14). 
MacTaggart casts doubt on the status of the A-series as the "objective" and 
real existence due to its dependence upon a ter1n outside the time-series. 
Concerning the term he only says: 'To find such a term would not be easy, 
· and yet such a term must be found, if the A-series is to be real' (ibid.: 20). 
From context, ho\vever, \Vhat he means by the term might be identified with 
what he calls 'consciousness'. It seems clear that such consciousness is 
intimately associated with \Vhat Russell refers to as 'egocentric particulars' 
(1940: I 08); he gives the \Vords 'this', 'that', '1', 'you', 'here', 'there', 'now', 
'then', 'past', 'present', 'future' as those of which the denotation is relative to 
the speaker. Obviously, they resemble what linguists call 'deictics' (Lyons, 
1977; Levinson, 1983; Fillmore, 1966, 1970 a; Hjelmslev, 1937; Jakobson, 
····~· 
. 1957, etc. ). (MacTaggart's contention that the A-series can be thought of as 
. real only in its relation to something else, something outside of the time-
series, might be very controversial from a metaphysical point of view, since 
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it suggests a kind of transcendental self which stands outside time; it seems 
to me that such an existence is not agreeable with our commonsensical idea 
that everything in the \Vorld has no choice but to occur or exist in time and 
space). 
The second point of his argument about the lack of independence, or the 
contradiction, of the A-series is concerned with the compatibility of pastness, 
presentness, and futurity. He writes: 'If M is past, it has been present and 
future. If it is future, it \V ill be present and past. If it is present it has been 
future, and will be past. Thus all the three characteristics belong to each 
event' (ibid.: 20) According to him, this is a contradiction because the three 
determinations are not exclusive of each other. Whether it is a real 
contradiction or not is very controversial again, because what MacTaggart 
refers to as a contradiction here presupposes a movement of point of view. 
The three characteristics, as MacTaggart himself points out (ibid.: 21 ), are 
incompatible when they are simultaneous. Moreover, he indicates the lack 
of independence of each determination in the A -series by arguing that we 
cannot know the meaning of, say, past ness if we have no knowledge of 
presentness or futurity (ibid.: 20). Apart from a great many discussions and 
debates that have so far been triggered by what MacTaggart referred to as 
the contradictory qualities of the A-series, he made a conclusive remark on 
the unreality of time as follo\vs: 
The reality of the A-series, then leads to a contradiction, and must be 
rejected. And, since \Ve have seen that change and time requires the 
A-series, the reality of change and time must be rejected. And so must 
the reality of the B-series, since that requires time. Nothing is really 
present, past, or future. Nothing is really earlier or later than anything 
else or temporally simultaneous \Vith it. Nothing really changes. And 
nothing is really in time. (ibid.: 22) 
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Reviewing MacTaggart's contention that time is unreal is not necessarily the 
immediate purpose of this section. Our intention has been to shed light on a 
vitally important aspect of time and change - which might be described as 
intrinsically psychological or subjective - by taking an overall view of 
MacTaggart's discussions. The follo\ving section will have a look at what 
MacTaggart says about the relationship between the A-series and the C-
series, and by so doing the enigmatic nature of time, \vhich seems to reject 
being referred to merely as something illusory, subjective or psychological, 
will be revealed. 
3.1.4 The A-series, the C-series, and our experience of time 
MacTaggart reached the conclusion that time is unreal because of the 
contradictory nature of the A-series, but it is noteworthy that he did not 
reject all the elements in our experience of time as unreal or illusory. He 
writes (ibid.: 30): 'It is possible that, whenever we have an illusory 
experience of a time-series, \Ve are observing a real series, and that all that is 
illusory is the appearance that it is a time series'. The real time-series, 
'Which MacTaggart suggests, is the C-series, and according to him, our 
illusory experience of time comes only \vhen the subjective and psychological 
A-series is combined \vith the C-series - a series in which the terms are 
~onnected by permanent relations (foe. cit.). What he means to say is that 
~he C-series, which is intrinsically non-temporal, will appear as a time-series 
when some other element acts upon it and makes it plausible as the past-
present-future entity. And that element is a knowing subject, as referred to 
in the previous section . 
. lt is quite natural, it seems to me, that MacTaggart tries to see some 
~'objectivity" or reality about time underlying our experience of time. As he 
FlCknowledges (foe. cit.), it is very difficult to suppose that all the elements 
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that we experience are illusory, and I think that this is particularly true of 
our experience of time. Apart from the \vay time really is, its directionality 
is an undeniable psychological fact for us human beings. This is not to be 
dismissed merely as "subjective". Let us think about a situation: one could 
say that time is subjective enough in that each of us can set up a particular 
point of time as his or her NOW; this means: 'So many people (or 
focalisers), so many NOWs'. But if a particular point of time, A.D. 1800, 
for example, is singled out as NOW for every individual, then A.D.1700 is 
absolutely the past for everyone, and similarly, A.D. 1900 is absolutely the 
future, again, for everyone. This is due to the anisotropic nature of time, 
and there is no room for personal choices or preferences. The situation will 
be totally different \Vhen a particular group of people go to a concert and 
listen to Mozart's Jupiter Sy1nphony and then they are asked how they liked 
it; their impressions can he genuinely subjective and vary from one person to 
another. If it is feasible and reasonable to reserve real subjectivity only for 
situations like that, we cannot help thinking that subjectivity in time or in our 
experience of time lacks authenticity or genuineness. 
3.1.5 Conclusion 
In 3.1, by looking into MacTaggart's theory of time, we observed that the 
notion of change is alien to the earlier-later scheme of the B-series, which 
· intrinsically has no room for the recognition of transiency, and that it is in 
the past-present-future scheme of the A-series that change can be spoken of, 
since the A-series presupposes the existence of some entity capable of 
perception. We found that MacTaggart's notion of temporal series can be a 
'~heoretical basis for claiming that the notion of change is closely associated . 
with the existence of some conscious being. But this does not necessarily 
tnean that time is our subjective and psychological phenomenon; as discussed 
in 3 .1.4, time has some enigmatic aspect as a queer hybrid of subjectivity and 
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objectivity. With such peculiar characteristics of time in mind, we go on to 
discuss the nature of time in 3.2, paying particular attention to its 
directionality, continuity, and irreversibility. 
3.2 The nature of time 
3.2.1 The reification of time 
Wittgenstein says that philosophical proble.ms are likely to anse when 
'language goes on holiday' ( 1953: 19), and this seems to be particularly true 
of time, which has been one of the most controversial issues in philosophy 
for over two thousand years. This section brings into focus the general 
tendency that time is metaphorised in language, and points out a confusing 
and misleading situation in \Vhich linguistic meanings attached to the Word 
'time' tend to stand out on their own, alienated from our intuitive knowledge 
of time. 
As Lakoff and Johnson say (1980: 42), time in English has a marked 
tendency to be metaphorised as A MOVING OBJECT, as illustrated in 
~xamples such as: 'The time will come when ... '; 'The time for action has 
hrrived'. It is noteworthy that these examples imply a particular direction 
· of time from the future to the present. The reification of time can be 
~etected in the following examples as \veil: 'Time flies'; 'Time rushes by'; 
fWe cross the river of time.' From these we understand that time is 
bonceptualised as something that moves, flows, or flies. A natural question 
fhat will arise here is: if time is such a mobile object, then how· fast does it 
~ .fitove, and in \Vhat direction? It is well known that Newton proposed the 
fdea of 'absolute time' as characterised by its constant flow, unaffected by 
human conception. He says: 'All motions may be accelerated or retarded, 
but the flowing of absolute time is not liable to change' (196?: 8). Here, 
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,,~ a possible question that \Vill be posited is: if time is, as Newton says, a 
constant flow, how can we know its constancy? From experience we know 
that, unlike the flow of the river, the flow of time - if ever there is such a 
thing - is not visible. 
The following example might be taken as illustrating that the flow of time is 
ontologically not verifiable. Suppose there are two invisible rivers of time: 
a swift river A, and a slo\v river B; a canoe running down the river A at 40 
IJlph will look as fast as a motorboat running down the river B at the same 
~peed. This tells us that we cannot know the real speed of the rivers by 
merely comparing the apparent movements of the objects running down 
them. 
Another problem concerned \Vith the idea that time moves, flows or flies is 
that time can be also conceptualised as something that will stop or reverse, 
simply because our knowledge of the world leads us to assume that if time is 
·capable of such movements, then it ought to behave just like ·our familiar 
objects like cars, trains or planes. So we tend to feel that it makes sense to 
say that time stops or moves backward. In 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 we will discuss 
fhis problem and the illogicality or the impossibility of such behaviour of 
Hme will be revealed. 
e:: , 
1
• . ~aques (1982: 61-62) argues that the flow or flux of time is a peculiarly 
p~ychological directionality, resulting from a fusion of past, present and 
future, and he tries to sho\v how the impression of the "time arrow" can be 
Weakened by observing what happens when an arrow is shot. His points of 
,d., .w-gument can be summarised as follows. When the arrow moves from the 
~ow toward the target, the sense of direction felt by the viewer is literally 
... 
spatial, not temporal; it is the arrow that moved, not time; the arrow left the 
Abw at a time A and reached the target a few seconds later at a time B, and 
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these earlier and later recordings of time is static; in the viewer's mind all 
that happened is in the present. Jaques claims: 
.. 
We have a sense of the coexistence and interaction of past, present and 
and future because memory, perception, and desire exist as a unified 
field of force. It is from this unified field of force that we get our sense 
of temporal direction just as surely as a pointing arrow gives a sense of 
spatial direction. (ibid.: 62) 
Griinbaum (1963: 663) refers to the fusion of past and present responsible 
for the flux of time: 
... 
The flux of time consists in the instantaneous awareness of both the 
temporal order and the diversity of the membership of the set of the 
remembered (recorded) or forgotten events, awarenesses in each of 
p: ~which the instant of its own occurrence constitutes a distinguished 
element. 
It could be argued that time, when it is reified, is so confusing that it is 
difficult for us to grasp its nature. If we shake off the linguistically 
eontaminated meanings given to the word 'time' in our everyday life and try 
h~rd to see what it is really like, then we might be able to get nearer to its a· 
· essence. As Kant says ( 1967: 38), time may well be construed as the form of 
fnner sense given a priori, which is a necessary representation that underlies 
all intuitions. Ontologically speaking, it is to be recognised that time, as 
well as space, is the form of the world only in which existence and 
movement of things and objects are possible. 
: ., ... ~ , ... 
3.2.2 The direction of time 
~he last section discussed the awk\vardness of contemplating time using a 
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metaphor of spatial movement, by focusing on the ontological problem of the 
rate or the speed of time when it is assumed to be some entity capable of 
moving or flowing itself. The present section concentrates on the problem 
of the direction of time as a moving object. The main purpose of the 
discussion is to spotlight the ambiguity of time moving either from past to 
present, and to future, or from future to present, and to past. 
As pointed out in the previous section, the idea that time moves or flows is 
institutionalised in the structure of language so deeply that it is by no means 
easy to dismiss it as invalid. This seems to suggest that time as a mobile 
entity, however psychological it is, is intimately associated with the way we 
understand the world. A question that arises when we think of time as 
capable of moving or flowing is: In what direction? Is it from past to 
future, or from future to past? Many people have speculated on the 
problem of the direction of time employing either one of them. We will 
take a quick look at this problem by referring to Bergson and Heidegger as 
tvvO polarising philosophers about the direction of time. 
yYe can find a typical example of the past-to-future type in Bergson (1911: 
_l96-197). Bergson's theory of time is characterised by its memory-oriented 
t 
approach, and he illustrates the past-present-future flow of time by the 





. With regard to this figure, Bergson makes ·the following comment: 
If I represent by a cone SAB the totality of the recollections accumulated 
in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, 
while the summitS, which indicates at all times my present; moves 
forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P 
of my actual representation of the universe . 
.. In Bergson's temporal scheme the movement of time is conceptualised as MY 
PRESENT going toward the future continuously. One of the very 
important philosophical implications involved here is that the past is 
regarded as something motionless upon which we canno( positively act, 
:'whereas the present is to be taken as something flexible and dynamic through 
~ ~hich we act upon things and objects around us. 
· Heidegger contrasts with Bergson in that he .contemplates time as coming 
from the future. Heidegger's metaphysical stance concerning time is 
.expounded in Being and Tilne. According to him, Dasein (human life) 'can 
rriove toward itself in the mode of the "future" only by moving backwards its 
past at the same time' (1949: 93) (my parenthesis). For Heidegger the 
h'\ 
present is withheld, and it is the future that comes to the present. 
(·.r 
'h:· 
.Which is the right direction of time? From past to future or vice versa? 
.ftt. . 
As a matter of fact, this problem was worked out by MacTaggart. His 
'l} ~ 
': .. theory of temporal series practically evaporated this metaphysical riddle. 
He shows (1927: 10-11) that the past-present-future movement of time 
: ~ccurs when we take the A-series as sliding along a fixed B-series. This can 
--Jl&~ ·illustrated as: 
Ja1. 
Past Present Future 
() 
A-series ) >r 
(1) Earlier Later 
B-series 
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By contrast, the future-present-past rnoverncnt of time occurs \vhen we take 
the B-series as sliding along a fixed A-series. 'l'his can be shown as: 
Earlier Later 
B-series 
(2) Past Present Future 
A-series 
Figure 3.3 
Obviously, ( 1) represents Bergson's idea of temporal movement. In ( 1 ), the 
movement of the present into the future is the movement of time; the 
knowing subject travels into the future in the car called time. On the other 
hand, in (2), which is thought of as complying with Heidegger's temporal 
scheme, the knowing subject is fixed in the present, not moving at all, and 
cars called time, coming from the future, pass by one after another. 
Thus, the directional ambiguity of the temporal movement can be 
successfully accounted for by applying the idea of temporal series postulated 
by MacTaggart. It is no\v clear that when we think of time as a moving 
entity there are two possible directions; both may be right or wrong. But 
what is to be noted is that, apart from the problem of \Vhether time itself 
·flows or not, both (1) and (2) in Figure 3.3 tell us one and the same thing 
··about the nature of time. That is, the direction is from NEW to OLD. In 
(1) where the present slides from left to right, presentness is constantly 
renewed, and the old present is labelled as the past. And the same thing 
. ...Jlappens in (2) in which 'Later' slides from right to left; there we can see 
laterness constantly renewed, and the old laterness becomes earlier to the 
renewed laterness coming from the right. This relation between NEW to 
OLD does not flow or move. This relation itself is the direction of time. 
82 
As a conclusion, it could be said that time lapses - if not moves or flows -
and the lapse of time can be sensed in the fixed order of states of affairs 
from NEW to OLD ('NEW' can be taken as corresponding to presentness or 
laterness, and 'OLD', pastness or earlierness). 
3.2.3 The irreversibility of time 
Wittgenstein (1922) claims that one cannot think of illogical things. If so, 
the reversion of time is undoubtedly one of those things. In the previous 
section we recognised that time is a fixed relationship observable in the order 
of states of affairs in the \vorld. l'he present section argues that time as such 
does not move back\vard. (The discussion in this section is mainly based on 
Ohmori (1976: 287-294).) 
In the world in \vhich \Ve live, there are two possible reversals. One is a 
spatial reversal in which two pedestrians M and N, for instance, walking in 
that order at a particular time, are \Valking in the reversed order N M at a 
different time. The other one is what might be termed reversion of 
process(es), which can be observed in the reversing of a film. The former 
is concerned with the local differences of two (or more) objects, which has 
no problem because it is a spatial reversion. It is the latter that needs 
careful attention, for when people speak of "the reversion of time"' they 
usually refer to the latter kind of reversion ( we call it process reversion for 
convenience). 
MacTaggart's B-series tells us that it is part of world knowledge that if Event 
.... r;A precedes Event B, it never happens that the order reverses at a later time. 
Therefore, what can be done in the process of reversal in the backward flow 
Of a film is to offer the audience Events A' and B' which, though resembling 
Events A and 8 that occurred (either historically or fictionally) some time 
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earlier, are m fact totally different in content. And those reversed events 
belong to totally different times. There can be recognised no backward 
movement of time. Some people might object to this view and argue that 
one can be justified in assuming that time moves backward as far as the 
reversed world is concerned - even if it is a film world. But we have to 
draw attention to the fact that what is reversed is the order of events or states 
of affairs, not the directionality from NEW to OLD. 
Now let us consider this problem in the world of fiction, where apparently 
nothing is impossible. It is well known that the time traveller "goes 
backward" in time. But we have to note that if he goes back to A.D. 1600 to 
meet Elizabeth I in London, he does so from, say, April 1st in 1993 on. 
And his encounter with the English Queen occurs definitely after the time 
when he started his journey. 
As far as the process of reversal in the world of science fiction is concerned, 
two situations can be conceived of. One is a case in which the process of the 
reversing film, familiar to us in our world, is actually going on. That is, 
originally there occurred a certain· number of events in the normal order in 
that world, and some time later the order reversed. In that case, the 
situation is quite similar to the reversing of a film in the world we know. 
The events occurring in the reversed order are totally different from those 
that originally took place before in that those reversed events are occurring 
after the original events, and that the processes are reversed. The other 
situation is that in that \Vorld events happen in the reversed order from the 
beginning, It is to be noted that it is some entity outside {presumably the 
narrator or the reader looking at the world from a normal point of view) 
who recognises the order of events is reversed there, since to the inhabitants 
that is a normal world. In such a world, events that ought to be verbalised 
on the earth as in: 'John got the bullet in the left leg and fell' might be 
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described as: 'John got up and the bullet left his left leg'. That is a world 
where there is no cause-and-effect relationship that is the norm in our world. 
In that world dead people become alive, and debris are put together into an 
old building, which gradually become new. From our point of view, 
everything is reversed there, but the direction is from NEW to OLD. And 
what matters is that 'NEW' or 'OLD' has nothing to do with the materialistic 
quality of objects. 
The point of our argument is that the reversing of the order of events does 
not affect the directionality of time from NEW to OLD. In a situation: '(a) 
John got the bullet in the left leg, (b) and fell,' (a) was new before (b) 
happened, and \Vhen (b) happened and new-ness was renewed, then (a) 
became· old . Similarly, in the reversed situation: '(c) John got up, (d) and 
the bullet left his left leg', (c) \Vas new before (d) occurred, and then the 
newcomer (d) pushed (c) back to the past. This shows that when· we focus 
on a particular event in relation tq oncoming events, the focused event has no 
alternative but to turn from NEW to OLD. In no sense the reversion of 
time is possible. 
In Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass, when the White Queen says 
that what she remembers best is the things that happened the week after next, 
she is just talking about her anticipation that belongs to her present. And 
\vhen she screams before pricking her finger, she does so because she feels 
pain in her present. 
If \Ve talk about time using the past-present-future scheme, we must say that 
in any possible \Vorld the past is invariably the present that was gone, i.e. the 
ex-present. Speaking of time reversing is speaking of the ex-present 
becoming the present. This is tantamount to saying that old is new, small is 







without making a logical contradiction. 
3.2.4 The continuity of time 
What do we imagine when we try to mean something meaningful by thinking 
or saying that titne stops ? Usually it is a scene in which every object in it 
has ceased to move, just like a "frozen scene" in a film. It is evident that 
such an image of temporal suspension is intimately connected with our 
everyday, familiar experiences in which vehicles such as cars and trains stop 
moving. 
In the preceding three sections it has been argued that time is to be 
regognised not as some concrete entity capable of moving or reversing itself, 
but as representing a relation between events, so that it must be contended 
here that time does not stop, since it is not a mobile entity. The movement 
or stoppage of something - whatever it is - makes sense only in time , and we 
cannot make any sense out of the stoppage of time itself. 
As Poincare claims (1952: 93), \Ve cannot picture empty space. Similarly, 
we cannot imagine the void of time; time is always there both "objectively" 
and "subjectively". This enigmatic nature of time, already pointed out in 
3.1.4, is hinted also by Kant (1967: 56): 
Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is indeed 
objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual consciousness, 
the representation of time, like every other, is given only in connection 
with perception. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
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of time. Investigating the ways in which time is reified in linguistic 
expressions, we made an attempt to argue against the idea that time flows, or 
moves. We revealed unreasonable aspects resulting from the river-of-time 
metaphor, such as the direction or speed or rate of time. In connection with 
the misleading aspect perceivable in the image of time as a moving entity, we 
accounted for the absurd and illogical nature of the idea that time moves 
backward. 
Based on the ontological understanding of the nature of time, the focal point 
of discussion in 3.3 and 3.4 \Vill be the relationship between time and 
consciousness with respect to the recognition of change and eventhood. 
3.3 Change 
3.3.1 Identity and change 
The aim of this section is to clarify that change -is closely connected with the 
concept of identity of things and objects. 
People often use an expression 'one and the same thing' in a linguistic 
environment in which an entity is described as looking different or behaving 
differently on different occasions. I~ such cases \Ve know that the entity 
referred to as 'one and the same thing' is supposed to survive the changes 
that happen to it. That such an idea of identity of things or objects is 
quintessential to our conceptualisation of change can be known from a 
definition of change as in: 
An object x, changes if and only if 
.(i) there is a property, P 
(ii) there is an object, x 
(iii) There are distinct times t and t', and 
(iv) x has Pat t and fails to have Pat t' (or vice versa) 
87 
1 • 
This is what Lombard ( 1982: 80) calls 'the Ancient Criterion of Change', 
held by ancient Greek Philosophers. Russell gives another definition of 
change as follows: 
Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a 
proposition concerning an entity and the time T and a proposition 
concerning the same entity and the time T ', provided that these 
propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T' 
occurs in the other. (see 3.1.2) 
In these definitions expressions 'an object x' or 'an entity' can be identified as 
one and the same thing that does not change itself but survive the change. It 
wi II soon be understood that such an idea of identity conjures up the 
metaphysical ghost that has been haunting philosophy since ancient times, i.e. 
the problem of essence and attributes. Suppose what happened to a rose, 
which was red at 3 o'clock, turned into a white one at 4 o'clock. Of course 
a change can be perceived there, but could we argue that what changed was 
the colour, namely, an attribute, but not the essence (the rose-ness?)? As 
Berkeley· points out ( 1972: 73), it is impossible to conceive colour without 
visible extension, the .for1n; if the colour vanishes, then the rose \Viii 
inevitably disappear. 
Normally we do not take these two roses existing at two different times as 
different entities. Then how can we identify the two different-coloured 
roses as one and the same thing after all? It seems evident that in order to 
recognise the change that occurred to the same rose in the one-hour lapse of 
time, we need a concept of identity concerning the rose in question. It is· a 
notable fact that the structure of language is felt to help us keep the 'one and 
the same thing' or the essence intact from the change. We would say that 
the rose \Vas red at 3 and it \Vas white at 4. However fictitious the subject-
predicate structure of the language may look, only then can we notify 
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ourselves that there was a change. Discussing the essence-attribute problem 
in detail is not directly relevant to the purpose of the present thesis. What 
we are inclined to suggest is that, apart from the problem of whether there is 
something that can be termed 'essence' or not, the identity-seeking human 
cognition a priori tends to label the red rose and ·the white rose as the two 
different appearances of the same rose enduring at least between the two 
distinct times, rather than as two totally different entities present at two 
different times. 
It is worth mentioning that in the so-called transformation the identity of an 
object x changes at the same time with the transformation. For example, 
when a caterpillar becomes a butterfly the identity of the former will be lost 
the moment it turns into the latter. However, the identity of the caterpillar 
will endure until it becomes the butterfly, and after that human cognition 
will try to see in the butterfly a specious kind of identity of the caterpillar as 
the "transformed caterpillar"; otherwise no change can be perceived. (This 
sort of change labelled as transformation could not be well explained by the 
Ancient Criterion of Change, in which an entity X's acquisition or losing of 
P (property) is emphasised as the necessary condition of change, for it is 
difficult to assume that some change in the property of the caterpillar was 
responsible for its turning into the butterfly.) 
It is a complicated task to define exactly what the property is, but we must 
acknowledge that the property is to be thought of as a flexible item, as will 
be discussed in 3.3.3. Here it will be enough to point out that properties can 
be abstract as well as concrete. This will be understood by contemplating a 
situation in which a particular person dies. When a person named Ted dies, 
it will be normal to think that a great change (perhaps the greatest change) 
occurred to Ted. But how is it possible to talk about change in Ted, who, at 
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Unlike the caterpillar's case we cannot mention the "transformed Ted", 
because he is gone. One might argue that his bones or· ashes can be 
identified as Ted, though drastically transformed. If that is a reasonable 
idea, then it can be interpreted as just another case of transformation. But 
we can conceive of this situation differently. It does not seem entirely 
illogical to assume that when Ted dies, a property is either lost or gained; if 
we think of his life as P, then X, i.e. Ted, loses P, whereas, if we regard his 
death as P, then X gains P at the time of death. Assuming that the identity 
of Ted will continue somehow or other even after his death (this might sound 
reasonable if we believe that Ted "lives" in our memory after dying), this 
property-oriented view of change can be considered to give a convincing 
account for our ordinary, natural recognition of change associated with the 
death of a particular person. 
The maintenance of identity in a lapse of time between two distinct time 
points involving change will become problematic in a coming-into-being 
situation. For example, when cancer developed in the pancreas of a person 
named John, how can we construe this as a change? If we pay attention to 
the cancer, we will recognise that it had no identity before it came into 
being. Perhaps this is why it is very awkward to say that the cancer has 
changed. The situation is quite different from the case of Ted's death, in 
which it was impossible to refer to the enduring identity of Ted. Here we 
must note that as long as we focus on the cancer that came into being, we 
cannot speak of change properly, or we cannot identify exactly what 
changed. In order to recognise cases like this as a change, what might be 
termed the downgrading principle will be required. What I mean by this 
term is that when a new entity is brought into ~eing, it must be downgraded 
to a property P of a larger entity X, to which the new P is supposed to 
belong. In the case of the example in question, the newly-developed cancer, 
the moment it is "born", will be deprived of the independent status as an 
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entity X, and will be downgraded to a property of John, now concei.vable as 
X of which the cancer is a property. Only then can we recognise that there 
occurred a change, and besides, it is possible to identify exactly what 
happened. Undoubtedly, the immediate element that has undergone a change 
is the pancreas, which can be referred to as the possessor of the new 
property, i.e. the cancer. It is evident that the continuing identity of the 
pancreas can be perceived during the time involving the change. 
It has been thus revealed that there is an intrinsic relation between change 
and identity. The intrinsic relation can be summarised as follows: If an 
object or entity X undergoes some change, X must not cease to be X at least 
before it experiences the change. So far \ve have concentrated on the 
property-oriented view of change, and we have not paid much attention to 
the truth-value view, exemplified by Russell. The main reason for this is 
that the Russellian view of change is not necessarily interested in identifying 
exactly what changed. Take the cancer's case for .instance: when one says 
that the proposition 'The cancer \Vas not existent' is true at T, but it is false at 
T' when the cancer developed, so that there \Vas a change, then we will 
understand that there occurred a change, but this truth-value view of change 
is not directly concerned \Vith mentioning exactly \Vhat changed. It could be 
argued that both the property-oriented and the truth-value views of change 
are formal accounts of our commonsensical notion of change; the only 
difference is that the former is primarily concerned with identifying the item 
that underwent change, \V here as the latter attends to temporal sequentiality, 
i.e. that change did occur. 
In the next section, the problem of \Vhat changes \viii be brought into focus. 
It will be shown through the discussion that the downgrading principle and 
the property-oriented vie\v of change play a very significant role in 
identifying the elements that undergo change(s), and that, as we already 
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observed in the discussion of MacTaggart's temporal series, the recognition 
of change is after all suhjective and psychological rather than objective and 
physical. 
3.3.2 The elements that change 
Concerning the notion of what changes, there can be observed two polarising 
views. One is a rather limited, phy~ical view, and the other is a 
comprehensive and psychological vie\v. A typical example of the former 
can be found in Mellor ( 1981: 1 07). He claims that change in a particular 
item does not mean the automatic change of everything related to it, and 
illustrates his point of argument by saying that if someone ceases to be 
famous unawares, that is a change not in that person but in the attitudes of 
other people. Almost the same, constrained vie\v of change is offered by 
Moens (1989: 117), who says: 'When an event occurs or an action is 
performed, only one element in the situation changes; in a newly created 
situation a large set of facts \Viii remain unaffected'. By contrast, it is 
MacTaggart who represents a comprehensive view of the elements that 
change. Without making any further comments, he just describes change in 
an enigmatic way: 
And if anything changes, then· all other things change with it. For its 
change must change some of their relation to it, and so their relational 
qualities. The fall of a sand-tastle on the English coast changes the 
nature of the Great Pyramid ( 1927: II- I 2). 
The main objective of this section is to show that either view of change can 
be correct. In the course of discussion it will be made clear that the 
downgrading principle, introduced in the last section, can play a very 
important role in identifying \Vhat changes. 
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In order to explain the mechanism of the change recognitllSn we suppose a 
particular situation in \vhich a car got involved in an accident and its bonnet 
was completely crushed. People with limited views of change would claim 
that it is the bonnet that has changed; the bonnet is the immediately, and 
physically, affected area, but the rest remains intact. That is a reasonable 
idea, but wouldn't it he equally reasonable to say that the car has. changed? 
The difference bet\veen the t\vo vie\vs is deeply concerned with the activation 
of the downgrading principle. If we· apply the X(entity)-P(property) 
scheme to this situation, \VC will find that identifying the element(s) that 
change(s) is greatly influenced by the \Vay in \Vhich X is conceived of. 
When one restricts the area of X to \vhat can be said to be immediately 
affected environment, then there is no need for the downgrading principle to 
be activated. This sort of restriction of X might be called 'the fixation of 
X'. And this fixation of X may lead to the limited view of change. By 
contrast, the comprehensive view of change results from what might be 
referred to as 'the fluidification of X'. This means the theoretically infinite 
enlargement of X from the immediately affected area to a larger area. It is 
to be recognised that then the do\vngrading principle \Vorks. A smaller X is 
downgraded to P of a larger X, \vhich in turn \viii be downgraded to P of a 
still larger X. 
From the vie\vpoint of the fixed X, the bonnet is X, and P (perhaps the 
normal function of the bonnet) is lost, or P (perhaps the abnormal function ~ 
of the bonnet) is gained; thus one could say that the bonnet (X) has changed. 
From the viewpoint of the fluid X, however, the situation will be different. 
One could argue that the car has changed if one, the moment one sees the 
bonnet (X), the immediately affected area, downgrades it to P of the car, a 
larger X to which the bonnet belongs. In that case, the car is considered to 
have either lost P (perhaps the bonnet itself), or gained P (perhaps the 
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crushed bonnet), so that it is possible to say that it is the car that has changed. 
Now let us think about an example of the maximal enlargement of X. 
Suppose an extremely dog-loving British woman has lost her beloved dog. 
She might think that the dog changed, if she takes the dog as X, and the dog's 
life as P. And she might also think that it is herself that changed because of 
the dog's death, if the dog is downgraded to P of a larger X, that is, herself. 
Another possibility is that she might feel that the \Vhole family, of which she 
is a member, i.e. a property, has changed, if she downgrades herself to P; the 
change in P (herself) causes the change in X (the family). And this X can be 
also downgraded to P, if a larger X (perhaps the street where the family 
live) is set up. In that case, the whole street may change. If this process 
continues, finally the whole world will change. This may sound extreme 
and absurd, but no-one can deny this possibility, and such a downgrading 
process seems to account for our everyday experiences very well. We often . 
hear people say things like: 'When my husband died, everything changed.' 
Here we must note that the graphological sequence given above to explain the 
downgrading process docs not imply that the process of downgrading occurs 
sequentially in that order. Actually there is no segmentation in the process. 
The downgrading process happens all at once. The size or volume of X will 
be determined by manifold factors such as circumstances, emotion, or 
interest. In other words, where to stop is entirely up to the subject of 
consciousness that is in a position to recognise change. 
It is an empirical fact that the activation of the downgrading principle is very 
common and frequent in our everyday recognition of change. One example 
is reading a literary text. It is our ordinary experience that if a particular 
expression is replaced by some other expression, then the whole text can look 
different. In Joyce's 'Eveline', for example, a climactic speech or thought 
presentation can be observed toward the end of the story: 'No! No! No! It 
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was impossible'. If we supplant it with a direct speech: '"No, I can't do 
that", she said'. then we would have to say that this rather noticeable stylistic 
modification can change at least our stylistic evaluation of the whole story. 
It is obvious that the downgrading principle is working in ·that case; the 
original expression is deprived of its status as X, and is downgraded to p of a 
larger entity X, that is, the whole text. If we adopt the limited view of 
change and take the original expression as fixed X, then we would claim that 
it is the re-written part that has changed, thinking that X has lost p (a freer 
representation of speech), and that the change has nothing to do with the rest 
of the text. It is to be acknowledged that such a limited view of change is 
far from instructive, particularly in terms of reading and interpreting 
literature; or we could go so far as to say that it is an entirely inappropriate 
approach to literature. 
One might suppose that, from the way in which the limited and 
comprehensive views of change has been contrasted with each other, the 
limited view is physical and "objective", whereas the comprehensive view is 
psychological and "subjective". What we intend to do in the next section is 
to dismiss such a strong contrast as illusory. 
3.3.3 The change of the world 
In the last section we have seen that adopting the downgrading principle can 
lead one to the recognition of the change of the whole world. In this section 
it \Viii be sho\vn that the limited view of change can equally do the same 
thing. 
In referring to the \Vorld, \Ve have so far tended to regard it as a physical 
entity which contains objects such as dogs, human beings, literary texts. But 
as Vendler points out ( 1967: 143-145), facts, as well as objects, are in the 
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world. A fact-oriented view of the world is represented by Wiltgenstein: 
'The world is the totality of the facts, not of things' (1922: 31). It is not the 
immediate purpose of this section to look into the difference between objects 
and facts, but it would be useful to give it some thought here.. The point is 
that, as far as the nature of human understanding is concerned, the cognition 
(or perception) of objects and that of facts are not as distant from each other 
as one might suppose. It is often said that objects can be seen, whereas facts 
cannot (cf. Vendler, op. cit.: 141 ). But one will understand that this 
contrast is too strong if one reflects what happens when we actually see 
objects. For example, if someone sees (on the conscious level) a crashed car 
on the road, of course he can claim that he is looking at an object, not a fact. 
But it must be agreed that in order to cognise or perceive the object as such 
he must know the fact that there was a car crash or the fact that the car had 
crashed. (The fact recognition mentioned here is actually the event 
recognition; in my understanding the latter is to be subsumed under the 
former). It would be empirically reasonable to say that when we notice 
something (this can imply some sort of inner speech) we see not oniy objects 
but also facts. Thus .. perception and cognition is intertwined in an 
inseparable way. As \Ve see in 3.5, hurnan cognition of some entity, either 
an object or a fact, is largely dependent upon the cognitive focus of a 
particular person in a particular situation. 
Getting back to the discussion of change and the world, it should be 
recognised that if we conceive of the \vorld (X) as made up of facts (Ps), 
then the limited view of change can encompass the change of the world. 
Now the world, as an identical entity, is the fixed X, and the peculiarity of 
this X is that its properties, i.e. facts, arc ev~r increasing in number. If Mr 
Smith's dog died, that (P) \Viii automatically change the world (X). The 
world with the ne\v P is to be distinguished from the world without it only in 
terms of the addition of the ne\v property. (One controversial problem 
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concerned will be whether the two worlds are totally different from each 
other; it could be claimed that, in the light of the intrinsic relation between 
identity and change in the fixed-X type of change recognition, some identity 
of X (something like the world-ness) will endure and survive ever-occurring 
changes.) Note that facts that change the world are new events or new 
changes, not already existing facts such as: 'J.F. Kennedy was assassinated.' 
Through the discussion in this s~ction it has been made clear that the limited 
view of change, as \Veil as the comprehensive one in which the downgrading 
principle is the key element, can also lead one to recognise the change of the 
world. We now understand that the physical-psychological contrast, which 
seems valid enough with respect to the limited and comprehensive views of 
change, is not as convincing as it looks. 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
In 3.3 we observed that one can recognise change when one· attends to the 
behaviour of P in the X (entity)-P (property) scheme, and perceives any loss 
or acquisition of P that occurs in a lapse of time. We also observed that 
there are two different views of change, i.e. the limited view, and the 
comprehensive view, and that the mechanism of the latter can be explained 
by the downgrading principle. An attempt was made to mitigate the clear-
cut contrast between the limited view which appears physical and objective, 
and the comprehensive view which seems psychological and subjective, by 
showing that through the manipulation of X the limited view can reach the 
same view of change as \Vi II be reached by the comprehensive view. 
3.4 Eventhood 
3.4.1 Expressed change vs. recognised change 
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In 3.3 we argued about the nature of change, and it is now to be understood 
that by referring to change, or change of state, we have been actually talking 
about events. So far we have discussed our dynamic recognition of 
entities in the world as spatia-temporal particulars. This means that we have 
discussed the nature of events. An event can be defined as a recognised 
change of state. The reason \vhy an event is defined that way is that we think 
it is important and significant to distinguish linguistic expressions such as (A) 
'The weather changes' (generic) from ones such as (B) 'The weather 
changed' (specific). In (A), a change is expressed, but no change as a spatia-
temporal particular is recognised. On the other hand, in {B), a particular 
change of state is not only expressed but also recognised. The relationship 
between linguistic expressions and event recognition will be discussed in 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6, but at the present stage it will be meaningful to 
differentiate (B) as a recognised change, i.e. an event, from (A) as a merely 
ex pressed change. 
3.4.2 Subjectivity, objectivity and eventhood 
The main aim of this section is to attempt an ontological discussion of the 
objectivity of events and the subjectivity of event descriptions by conscious 
beings. 
In the preceding sections, \vhen \Ve looked into the nature of time or the 
nature of our recognition of time, we understood that time is related to 
change in an intrinsic \vay in the past-present-future scheme, and that the 
recognition of change entails consciousness. In the last section we defined 
an event as a recognised change of state, and it should be acknowledged that 
when we speak of change in relation to time we always refer to the 
recognised change, i.e. event. Therefore, for the purpose of the present 
thesis, we will hereafter employ the t\vo terms 'change' and' event' in the 
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same sense. 
An ontological question that is likely to be posited here is: If event or change 
entails consciousness, then is event impossible where there is no 
consciousness? The answer to this question is yes and no. The point is how 
we take the meaning of existence. I have no intention of going into an 
ontological labyrinth path concerning the problem of existence· what 1 would 
. ' 
like to clarify is the objectivity of events in a commonsensical way. 
If there is someone who takes an extreme view and associates the meaning of 
existence only with his own consciousness, then a plane crash that takes place 
in some place he cannot be conscious of would not "exist" for him, at least at 
the time when the event happens. That is to say, this extremist believes that 
things that he cannot directly perceive do not exist; he assumes that the world 
will cease to exist when he dies. But if he is capable of showing a kind of 
philosophical flexibility, he \Viii have to acknowledge that the event actually 
and objectively happened where his consciousness was not involved. 
Generally .speaking, it is through perception that reality can be most 
convincingly verified. If it is true that the person was unconscious of that 
plane crash, so that the event did not "exist" for him, he would be able to 
confirm that the event is an objective entity by actually going to see or feel 
the crashed plane (if it is possible). There he could experience the change 
that occurred to the plane by seeing the debris scattered around. (World 
knowledge will lead him to see a history of the plane that must have been 
intact before that. The event-recognition with respect to the plane will 
become possible in the contrast behveen the perceptibility of the crashed 
plane and the conceivability of the intact plane. In this particular case, the 
change (event) in the plane can be mentioned by thinking of the plane as the 
fixed X, and its crashing, as P (an acquired fact)). In other words, by doing 
so he can verify the "existence" of the event. Such confirmation by 
99 
perception will be the best possible way of knowing the objectivity of events, 
which is an empirical truth in our everyday life. In short, the 
commonsensical view of the world will tell us that events can be objective 
entities. 
Compared with the tactile or perceivable objectivity of physical events such 
as a plane crash, or a murder of someone, the objectivity of thought events 
can be problematic. In our everyday life, it often happens that someone 
else's thinking is not verifiable in an objective way, unless he declares 
himself that he is (was) involved in such and such thinking, or unless the fact 
that the thought event happened to him is traceable in some way or other. 
When a person named Ted insists that a person named Jack, whom Ted has 
never seen, must have, as an objective fact, engaged in some thought at least 
once in his life - though the content of the thought event cannot be identified, 
it could be said that an ontological metaphor concerning Self and Others is . 
operating. The metaphor, based on our empirical beliefs and concerned 
with our 1nental otnnipresence, can be described as 'I am he'. Ted's belief 
in Jack's th~ught event(s) as an objective fact may derive from a kind of 
subjunctive situation in \Vhich Ted thinks that, as two human beings capable 
of thinking, if he \Vere Jack, he \Vould do some thinking, just as he himself 
actually does, so that the objectivity of Jack's thought event can be 
empirically guaranteed. 
In contrast to the ontologically problematic objectivity of events, the 
subjectivity of event description will be far less controversial. Event 
descriptions, as \veil as other descriptive activities by human agents, are 
subjective, as can be recognised in the following examples: 
(a) The HAL computer becomes operational in 1992. 
(b) The weird, man-killer computer. \Vhich \Vas actually the brightest 
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one ever produced, was born in 1992. 
Compared with (b), (a) sounds "objective" and neutral, but the impression of 
the objectivity is concerned \Vith the choice of register, which itself could be 
construed as a perspectival choice by an individual or individuals. 
Ontologically speaking, the subjectivity of the two expressions is clear, since 
they make no difference in that they both are event descriptions reflecting 
the speaker's attitudes. (In narratological terms, however, it is considered 
meaningful to make a distinction between (a) and (b) by arguing that the 
objective-sounding \Vording in (a) is a comparatively perspective-free event 
description, whereas the emotionally charged, and tensed phrasing in (b) is 
classifiable as a perspectivally-situated event description. The problem of 
perspectival distinction \viii be discussed in Chapter 6.) 
3.4.3 Events as spatio-temporal particulars 
We would like to start this section by quoting a passage from Lewis Carroll's 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: 
'All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly; beginning 
·with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some 
time after the rest of it had gone. 
The Cheshire-Cat's grin \Vithout its face is one of the nonsense examples 
packed in that story. If Alice sa\v such a grin, she must have experienced an 
impossible event. In the preceding two sections it was elucidated that we 
cannot conceive of an event save by reference to its spatia-temporal 
particularity, and that the recognition of eventhood is the matter of cognitive 
involvement of some conscious being. The present section is going to make 
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90111e further comments on the nature of events as spatio-temporal 
particulars. 
In 1.3.1 we made an observation that no event can occur in a vacuum (see 
!.3.1). In that section we critically looked at the trichotomous nature of 
what are usually termed 'story elements' - events, characters and settings, 
which are often seen in the literature of narrative studies. The point of the 
review was to reject the idea of event itself, as independent of particular 
things and objects, in the recognition of dynamics. From the argument we 
have made so far \Vith respect to change and event, there should be no doubt 
about the contention that no event can occur in a vacuum. An event, because 
of its spatial-temporal particularity, is totally unthinkable without some 
particular thing or objects involved in it. It is impossible to separate from 
the event of the Cheshirc-Cat's grin the face of the cat, or the whole body of 
the cat. And in terms of the spatial particularity of the event, the bough of a 
tree, on \vhich the cat \vas sitting, can be said to be closely related to the eat's 
grin; so, the two expressions 'The cat grinned' ·and 'The cat grinned on a 
bough of a tree' will make no difference in that they are both event 
descriptions. From a pragmatic point of view, (as we will refer to in 
Chapter 5), the temporal particularity in fiction may have a different 
feature from that in reality, but there is a parallel between the two in that in 
both an event has no alternative but to be .the matter of temporal relativity; 
an event never fails to occur before and after some other events. In other 
words, the temporal location of an event is determinable in relation to those 
of other events. It could be argued that in that sense an event is a temporal 
particular both in fiction and reality. 
As Hacker rightly points out ( 1982: 480), unlike objects, which are directly 
related to space, it is \Vith time that events are immediately associated. So 




rather irrelevant, such as the decrease of the value of the sterling, or the 
expiration of copyrights. If we look at those events macroscopically, 
however, we might be justified in speaking of the spatiality of even such 
events; it is an undeniable fact that they occur somewhere in the universe, 
either real or fictional. 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
Our discussion in 3.4 attempted to look into ontological characteristics of 
events and of event descriptions. The main points of discussion were: 1) that 
the idea of event itself is impossible; as a spatia-temporal particular, an 
event entails some particular things and objects; 2) that the objectivity of 
events (physical events in particular) is to be guaranteed mainly by the 
perceptibility (in reality) and by the empirical fact that events (more exactly, 
world-entities \Vhich \Viii be identified as events if directly experienced by 
conscious beings: e.g. the explosion of a star millions of light years away 
from the earth) can occur when and \Vhere one cannot be conscious of them; 
3) that event qescri ption, no matter how neutral or objective it may sound, is 
ontologically subjective due to the reflection of the speaker's point of view in 
it, but it will be of narratological interest to try to differentiate objective-
sounding, perspective-free, event descriptions from subjective-sounding, 
perspectively-situated ones. 
3.5 The recognition of dynamics 
3.5.1 Focus and periphery 
The general aim of 3.5 is to contemplate the differences in recognition 
between events and non-events (states and objects), from amalgamated 
viewpoints of ontology 
1 
epistemology and psychology. The discussion will 
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focus on: 1) the selective aspect of human consciousness; 2) the way in 
which the so-called action or dynamics is concerned with our cognitive acts; 
3) the importance of acquired or lost Ps (properties) of the X (entity)·P 
(property) scheme in connection \Vith events. In the present section an 
emphasis is placed upon discussing the selective nature of human 
consciousness. 
It is a well-kno\vn psychological fact that human consciousness is inherently 
selective. One cannot experience more than one item in conscious focus at a 
time. This is \Veil exempt ified by the famous reversing face~ vase figure, 
which is frequently employed in the literature of gestalt psychology to 
illustrate the selectivity of human cognition as well as the ambiguity 
observable in things and objects (Gross, I 987: 96): 
Figure 3.4 
When we see the faces as figure, the vase has disappeared into the 
background and vice versa; they cannot be focalised together. A similar 
example can be found in Wittgenstein ( 1953: 194): 
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Figure 3.5 
When we see the figure as a rabbit's head, a duck's head clicks out of focus 
and vice versa. The reversing face-vase figure and the Jastrow's duck-
rabbit given above well illustrate the cognitive fact that when we focus on a 
particular thing, all the others become peripheral. As Jaques writes (1982: 
55), when someone attends to the motion of the pen with which he is writing 
something, its permanent qualities as a thing fall into the background, 
whereas, if he notes its shape, its thing-ness \Viii be brought into focus, and 
a11 the others, including its motion, will be temporarily inhibited and held 
out of the centre of attention. 
It is evident that such a cognitive selectivity is intimately associated with the 
discriminating nature of consciousness. Psychological observations such as 
made by Freud (I 923) tell us that consciousness, as against unconsciousness, 
does correspond to the \vord-presentations. There should be no doubt about 
the nature of language that pin things down; language seems to have a 
remarkable effect of making continuous things look discontinuous. When 
someone notices a rose in the vase and says to himself, 'What a beautiful 
rose!', then, the object recognition by rpeans of verbalisation has 
distinguished the particular rose from all the other objects in the world. It 
is worth noting that such a discriminating, discontinuity-making nature of 
language lends itself to a static view of the world. In a purely physical 
world, in which molecules are incessantly dancing, and elementary particles 
are continuously changing their locations, there will be nothing but dynamics 
in a genuinely continuous situation, but language, as it were, kills it. It 
would be argued that once someone makes a linguistic expression about 
something, and attends to its meaning and form, his metalinguistic 
consciousness might lead him to take an overly stative view of the world. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 we are going to refer to the misleading aspect of such a 
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non-dynamic view of the world that tends to be observed In formal 
approaches to narrative dynamics. 
3.5.2 Events and non-events (objects and states) 
This section makes an attempt to see ho~ the three cognitive activities, i.e. 
objects, states, and events can be accounted for by the focus-periphery 
framework we referred to in the last section. Particular attention will be 
drawn to the \vays in \V hich events are to be distinguished from non-events, 
i.e. objects and states. 
Let us illustrate by the follo,ving situation. Suppose there is a grandfather 
clock ticking in a room. The pendulum is swinging all the time, and 
someone comes in (he has never been in that room before). 
Presumably, the first thing he \viii do, when he attends to the clock, is to 
identify it as a grandfather clock. That is the recognition of an object. At 
this stage, he is matter-conscious, and the thing-ness of the clock is focused 
on, and the rest is all backgrounded (this does not mean that all the other 
things have entirely gone from his mind; they are just existent as 
peripheries). The object recognition like this can be said to serve as an 
answer to the question: lVhat is that? 
And then if his attention shifts from the object as a spatial entity to the 
condition or quality of the object, that is, to the state of the clock, he 
becomes state-conscious~ and its quality, condition or relation to other things 
will be his main concern: if he thinks: 'This clock looks monstrous' or 'This 
clock is similar to the one I sa\v in John's house', the thing-ness of the clock 
has fallen into the background, and its state has come to the top of the layer 
of his consciousness. More importantly, the situation will be the same if his 
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attention goes to the action or dynamics of the pendulum. The pendulum is 
swinging regularly, and it should be noted that the regular swinging of tbe 
pendulum can be reckoned as a quality or property of the pendulum or the 
clock. So here again, the action of the pendulum may well be recognised as 
a state. Virtually no recognition of change takes place. It is also to be 
noted that the state recognition can be taken as functioning as an answe~ to 
the question: What is it like? 
When we go on to the third entity, i.e. events, \Ve have to admit that under 
this particular circumstance it is rather difficult to speak of events. But if 
we think of a forced situation, eventhood seems just possible. If the person 
watching the clock pays particular attention to an individual swing of the 
pendulum that occurred during a particular span of time, then he will be 
change-conscious. To him, the swing of the pendulum from left to right 
was a particular one distinguishable from all the other similar but again 
individual swings. The regular, constant motion of the pendulum as a state 
has been held out of the centre of attention, and the recognition of a change 
will be spotlighted in his consciousness. It is evident that events can be taken 
as a possible answer to the question: What happened? But it will be agreed 
that such eventhood squeezed out of this "eventless" situation sounds quite 
unnatural. Here we must recognise that with respect to the relation between 
eventhood and action/dynamics there are some important aspects to be 
scrutinised. This \Vill be argued in the next section. 
As far as eventhood is concerned, there is still another point to consider. As 
a matter of fact, it is not utterly impossible to speak of eventhood concerning 
all the situations \Ve have observed so far about the grandfather clock. If the 
person's focus of attention is upon his own cognitive behaviour, rather than 
upon the externality of the situation, reflectively he might assume that he has 
experienced a cognitive sort of event each time he -recognised ·something; 
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when he recognised the grandfather clock as such, he might have thought: 'I 
recognised that it is a grandfather clock', and the same can be applied to his 
state and event recognition. Under such circumstances his recognising acts 
are fore grounded, and can be counted as events. Needless to say, it is not 
acceptable to try to perceive such events as pure and objectless events due to 
their cognitive nature. As we already confirmed in the preceding sections, 
perceiving an event is a cognitive activity, and it is totally impossible to sever 
from eventhood some specific objects or things involved. As far as the case 
in question is concerned~ \Vhen the recognising acts themselves are conceived 
of as events, they are impossible without the recognised external items 
concerned with those events. 
We have observed four different cases with regard to the grandfather clock 
situation. In order to clarify the distinctive feature of events, as against 
objects and states, it \Vould be meaningful to apply the X-P scheme, 
introduced in 3.3, to each case and attempt to see the way in which P 
(property) or P's behaviour can be perceived. 
First of all, in the object recognition it is X itself that is brought into focus. 
The structure of the recognition will be formalised as: 'X is a grandfather 
clock.' Making reference to the acquisition or loss of P is irrelevant in this 
case. 
In the state recognition, on the other hand, reference to P makes sense. 
With the first example 'This clock looks monstrous', the clock's 'monstrous 
looks' can be singled out as P, and with the second example 'This clock is 
similar to the one I saw in John's house', it would be reasonable to pick out 
as P the similarity of the clock to the one possessed by John. And the 
situation will be formalised as: 'X has P'·. Note that P mentioned in the state 
recognition can be considered to be already in X \vhen it was focalised. 
108 
In contrast to objects and states, events are clearly concerned with the 
acquisition or loss of P. When we look at the case of the pendulum, its 
individual swing will have good reason to be viewed as an acquired P. The 
p in this case is a particular movement of the pendulum (X) that was not 
possessed by X before. As \Ve observed in 3.3.1, the nature of p can be 
flexible, either concrete or abstract. The formal structure of the recognition 
here will be: 'X has acquired P'. 
The same can be said about the other kind of events, i.e. what might be 
termed internal events (any event recognition is intrinsically internal 
because it is, as repeatedly pointed out, a cognitive act, but what I mean by 
internal events here are those in which the subject-of-consciousness becomes 
particularly self-reflective, and his attention goes to the dynamics of the 
cognising act itself rather than to the dynamics of the cognised things or 
objects). When the person saw the clock, and recognised it as such, he 
might be able to single out his perception or cognition as a new P added to 
the catalogue of the totality of his perceptive or cognitive acts (X). Thus we 
can speak of eventhood in this kind of cognitive behaviour. 
Through the discussion concentrating on the contrast between objects, states, 
and events it is now partially made clear how dynamics or the recognition of 
dynamics is related to those cognitive activities. In the next section more 
stress will be placed upon investigating how dynamics - both physical and 
non-physical - is associated with the three cognitive activities. 
3.5.3 Chronos, kairos, and dynamics 
The main concern in this section is to make art in·quiry into how objects, 
states, and events are distinguishable from each other in terms of the 
recognition of dynamics. The discussion will reveal an epistemological fact 
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that dynamics or the recognition of dynamics is related to each of the three 
cognitive activities in a distinct way. 
It is the way in which dynamics is involved in states and events that will be 
the centre of our attention, but before proceeding to it, \Ve are going to make 
a brief reference to the connection between the object recognition and 
dynamics. In terms of the selectivity of human consciousness, it is quite 
noticeable that in recognising an entity as an object the presence or absence 
of dynamics is irrelevant. Let us think about the pendulum case in the last 
section. We have to acknowledge that we can recognise it as an object even 
when it is swinging, if we attend to its thing-ness, putting all the others to the 
background. Note that what is captured on the conscious level in this case is 
the thing-ness only, and that the rest, including the motion that is to be 
identified as swinging on the conscious level, is entirely overshadowed by the 
focalisation. This cognitive situation will be formalised as: 'There is X'. 
This grammatical form implicates that no dynamics is recognised. 
In discussing the problem of dynamics in relation to states and events it will 
be useful to familiarise ourselves with chronos and kairos, introduced by 
Aristotle. Jaques (1982: 14) explains the two temporal notions as follows: 
. In brief, the distinction between these two terms is that of chronological, 
seriatim time of succession, measurable by clocks or chronometers -
chronos ~ and that of seasonal time, the time of episodes with a beginning, 
a middle, and an end, the human and living time of intentions and goals -
kairos. 
Marsh ( 1952: 19) refers to chronos as 'time as chronological' and kairos as 
'time as opportunity'. It is our contention that dynamics or non-dynamics 
recognisable as states mainly concerns chronos and dynamics that can be 
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labelled as events is primarily related to kairos. 
When we contemplate the \vay in which we recognise dynamics we will find 
that a certain kind of action or motion does not lend itself to the recognition 
of change. The constant S\Vinging of a pendulum is a good example. Its 
swinging is homogeneous, regular and repetitive; it is normally difficult to 
see' a beginning, a middle or an end in it. It is a typically chronos-type 
action, and as long as our attention is tied to the constant dynamics, we will 
be unable to recognise eventhood or change there. We should note that the 
action of the pendulum - swinging - can be construed as part of the 
distinctive features of a pendulum; it is part of the "meaning" of the 
instrument. So it sounds quite reasonable to take the swinging as a quality, 
or an equipped property of the pendulum. Almost the same is true of the 
constant turning of the wheels of a car, or of the incessantly moving 
elementary particles in the microscopic, physical world. They can normally 
be considered properties of the entities. Physicists might argue that· the 
physical world is genuinely eventful because molecules and particles are 
constantly dancing. They are correct if they conceive of every local 
movement of molecules as spatia-temporal particulars. In that case, each 
movement of the molecule might be recognised as a change, but it must be 
admitted that such recognition is a very forced one. Our experience tells us 
that far-fetched sorts of change recognition like that, paradoxically enough, 
tends to fall into the recognition of non-change or state. 
The situation might be slightly different, but there is a very strong parallel 
between the cases given above and the successive events that are repetitive in 
our everyday life and are felt as daily routine. If someone goes to work at 
9, eats lunch at noon and leaves the office at 5, and he repeats this regular 
cycle every day, it must be difficult for him to experience them events or 
changes. By repetition eventhood will fade away, and those activities will be 
1 1 1 
felt as part of his qualities. Attempting to see eventhood by focusing on a 
particular succession of those activities on a particular day is as unnatural as 
trying to label a particular movement of the constantly swinging pendulum as 
an eTent. 
Now we turn to the relation between events and dynamics. Dynamics 
peculiar to the recognition of events is characterised by its kairos-type 
feature. It can be meaningful; it can suggest it got started at a particular 
time and ended at another particular time, even if the duration is so short as 
to be called point. The constant spin of the car's wheel is amenable to the 
state recognition, but if we attend to a spatial shift of the car, as can be 
described: 'The car ran down the hill', then we can recognise it as an event. 
It is to be noted that the movement of the car is a spatio-temporal particular 
which can theoretically be definable~.as a ~ewly attained P {property) of the 
car. The ·length of the span may vary, but temporality seems to be a key 
element of eventhood. (What is meant by temporality here is a relative 
concept; even a state of affairs that lasted one hundred years can be an event 
because of its temporariness in a macroscopic span of millions of years). 
We cannot conclude that repetition, or habituality of any kind is alien to 
events (for example, the expression 'John often complained' can be 
interpreted as an event description, since it is possible to assume that John's 
complaining acts are particulars that occurred during a certain period of 
time), but it could be argued that, generally speaking, an event favours a· 
one-off act or movement - whether physical or non-physical. 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
In 3.5 we were mainly concerned with the selectivity of human cognition. 
We investigated the discriminating tendency of our consciousness to single 
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out one aspect of things and put all the rest into background. With such 
peculiarity of consciousness in mind, we attempted to distinguish events from 
objects and states, drawing particular attention to the loss or acquisition of p 
(property) in the X-P scheme. And by introducing the two temporal 
concepts chronos and ka.iros, we pointed out that the recognition of 
dynamics of a certain kind may be congenial to statehood but not to 
eventhood, due to the difficulty of perceiving any loss or gain of P. 
In Chapter 5 we are going to argue that chronos is virtually identifiable as 
what might be called 'meta-time', i.e. abstract and objectively measurable 
time, \Vhich may well be referred to as 'time itself, whereas ka.iros can be 
intimately associated with what might be called 'object-time', i.e. significant 
and subjective time, which is intrinsically event (change)-oriented. One of 
the most important aims of this thesis is to show that narrative time, which is 
a kind of eventful time, is more directly concerned \Vith kairos, i.e. object-
time than with chronos, i.e. meta-time, and that a proper recognition of 
narrative dynamics requires the reader to pay enough attention to the time of 
kui ros type. 
Before doing that, in Chapter 4 we will take a general look, mainly in the 
light of narrative poetics, at the relationships between events, language, and 
narrative discourse. Chapter 4 will serve as a kind of bridge between the 
ontological discussion of eventhood in the present chapter and the 
grammatical (both sentential and discoursal) discussion of story events that 
will be made in Chapters 5 and 6. 
1 1 3 
Chapter 4 rl'hc narrative act 
As a preliminary to the linguistic/ontological discussion of story events in 
narrative that we are going to make in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter 
attempts a general discussion of the relationships between events, language 
and narrative discourse. Our discussion will be centred around the following 
two points. Firstly, on the assumption that the fabula-sjuzhet scheme is 
intimately associated \Vith the recognition/detection of story events we will 
reconsider the traditional fabula-sjuzhet dualism; one of the important aims 
of our discussion is to give the right place to fabula. Secondly, we go on to 
the problem of narratorial perceptibility in story-event description. With the 
eventhood of narration, we attempt to clarify the relationship between 
focalisation and story-event detection. In the course of discussion the 
inherent ambibuity regarding the problem of 'Who sees?' in narrative will be 
revealed. With the eventhood of speech/thought presentation, \Ve will 
postulate a new scheme of narratorial presence in terms of the way in which 
the narrator is perceptible as the event cogniser. 
4.1 The problem with fabula 1n fiction 
4.1.1 Narration of historical events 
The present section attempts to illustrate the mechanism of narration 
regarding immediately experienced events in the real world. The aim is 
twofold. One is to clarify the ways in \Vhich encoding, decoding, and text 
are generally related to each other in historical narrative, which concerns 
rendering story events that took place in the real world. And the other is to 
make the mechanism of fictional narration, \Vhich \Viii be discussed in the 
next section. stand out in clear relief in contrast to that of historical 
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narration. 
We can set up a particular narrative situation, in \vhich a ten-year-old boy 
goes to the zoo and he later tells his father about what he experienced there. 
The important point is that there is a temporal gap between the event time 
and the telling time. The gap must be such that if the telling time is the 
present , then the event time is the past. As \VC \viii argue in Chapter 5, such 
a temporal gap is normally a necessary condition for a particular 
verbal act to be classified as a narrative. The narrative mechanism of the 
above-mentioned situation can be pictorially presented as follows,: 




Narrator Zoo Reader 
/ 
(2) (4) 
" I - --<---------- 1--I 
I 
(1) I (5) I 
........ (-- - - - - - ·- - - -) - - -) / 
Figure 4.1 
First of all, it is to be acknowledged that in this particular case the 
narrator's zoo experience makes up the story world, and that the story world 
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belongs to the real world. Now, what the numbered arrows are supposed to 
signify can be accounted for as follows. 
The solid arrow ( 1) designates the narrator's immediate experience of the 
zoo _ a world entity. It is an entity or a group of entities to be sensed 
' perceived, and cognised. 
The solid arrow (2) signifies the encoding process by the narrator; the 
encoding is to meet the formal requirements of narrative discourse, either 
oral or written. That is, the general form of the discourse is expected to be 
that of event description (as for the formal features of event description see 
Chapter 5). There are two things to be noted concerning the arrow (2). 
First, (2) normally follows ( 1) in temporal terms; this means that the 
narrator's rendering of his experience should have the form of report if it is 
to be referred to as a narrative. The temporal perspective of what is 
reported is a past one. The narrator is expected to know how things started 
and ended; the knowledge of the beginning and the end of what he is going to 
tell is a vitally important part of story telling, i.e. narrative. Second, the 
direction of the arrow(2) should not be taken as indicating 'from Zoo to 
Narrator'. Note that (2) is a continuation of (1), and that the direction of 
the arrow (2) means that the narrator verbalises what he experienced in the 
zoo. Another implication of the arrow being oriented toward the narrator is 
that the narrator himself can be a recipient or a reader as his narration or 
encoding goes on. 
The solid arrow (3) indicates the direction of narration from the narrator to 
the reader. There are t\vo possibilities with respect to the relation between 
(2) ·and (3). One is that there is no temporal discrepancy between (2) and 
(3), and in that case, the narrator's rendering in (2) and (3) are practically 
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the same. Put differently, (2) and {3) can represent a single sjuzhet told at 
some time after (I). Another possibility is that there is some gap of time 
between (2) and (3). It seems likely that on some occasions the narrator tells 
himself the story events as a trial before he completes a final version to be 
rendered to the reader. The trial will be a kind of skeletal telling to be 
"polished" or "aesthetised" afterwards, and the narrator may repeat the 
polishing process more than once, \Vith the intention of improving upon the 
previous one. Under such circumstances, (2) and (3) are considered to be 
different sjuzhets performed at different times. 
What is indicated by the arro\v (4) is the reader's decoding process. The 
broken line of (4) is suggestive of the indirectness of the reader's experience 
of the zoo - the story \Vorld. The event-oriented world conjured up by the 
narrative act of the narrator is a represented one. It is a kind of medium-
through world, so that it is not a \Vorld directly perceivable. It is in this 
respect that (4) is to be differentiated from (1), which indicates the directness 
of the \Vorld experience. Strictly speaking, ho\vever, it might be possible to 
mention a medi urn-through nature of (I) as well, particularly from a 
physiological point of vie\v. When we see things, for example, we are in 
fact looking through our eyeballs, which are "spectacles", as it were. Physics 
will tell us that the \Vorld \Ve see or experience is one perceived through our 
five senses, and that the purely physical and objective world does not belong 
to the world of our perception, which functions as a medium through which 
we experience reality. But this physiological nature of mediacy should not 
be ~verrated in terms of the authenticity of the indirectness of the reader's 
experience of the world involved in the verbal representation of the story 
events in a narrative situation. In summing up, if it is feasible to refer to 
(1) as indicative of the narrator's direct experience of a perceived world, 
(4) can be said to designate the reader's indirect experience. of a conceived 
world .. 
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Particular attention should be drawn to the broken arrow {5). What is to be 
noted is the active role of the reader as a potential detector or recogniser of 
story events. It will be rather easy to see a parallel between (5) and (2); 
both concern the cognitive feedback involving the process of verbalisation on 
the part of the narrator and the reader respectively. As already pointed out, 
the indirectness of the reader's contact with the story world is due to the fact 
that the world is presented to him by means of language. In his 
Philosophical Investigations ( 1953) Wittgenstein claims that the so-called 
"meaning" of language is its use. In the zoo situation we have been 
discussing, the use of language can be accounted for as follows. In (2) 
and/or (3), the narrator uses language in such a way that he can successfully 
conjure up an event-oriented world in the reader's mind. In order to do this, 
he has to know how to use language in that particular situation, i.e. the 
formal characteristics \V hich are supposed to be appropriate for event 
description in narrative. Whether the ten-year-old narrator is clearly genre-
conscious or not, he is expected to know that sentences like: 
[4}-1 A lion came close and roared at me 
are more appropriate than generic sentences conveying no spatio-temporal 
particularity such as 'A lion is a huge animal', if he wants to tell his father 
what happened to him at the zoo. Then, if the narrator's intended image 
. signifying something that happened to the narrator is evoked in the reader's 
mind, it means that the reader knows the use of the language. Here we must 
recognise the irresistible force of language as a conjuror of some entity of 
the world. When the event description f4l-l is made the reader has no choice 
but to have an image of a lion which came close and roared at the narrator, 
exactly as is told, as long as the reader's attention goes to the represented 
world, and not to the speech itself (the eventhood of the speech itself will be 
discussed in 4.3). Such a high degree of receptivity on the reader's part can 
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be construed as good evidence that he knows the language. At this point, the 
reader has two options open to him. One is to recognise the story events 
exactly as the narrator encoded them. And the other is to attempt his own 
event description by making a kind of deviation from the original encoder's 
linguistic choices of various kinds such as lexico-grammatical features, 
including sequencing and segmentation, and the choices of register, and point 
of view (focalisation), etc.. The sentence [ 4 ]-1 may be considered as 
describing two events grammatically, but it might be reasonable for the 
reader to interpret it as expressing one event which can be rendered as 
'Something scary happened to my son', or 'He went to the zoo' in a more 
macroscopic way. The point in this case is that there should normally be 
some temporal gap between (4) and {5). The reader interprets (5) on the 
basis of the indirectly experienced world of narrated events indicated by (4). 
But the interpretation is not compulsory; · the optional nature of (5) is 
indicated by the parenthesis in Figure 4.1. This active function of the 
reader as the event recogniser will be also referred to in the next section. 
4.1.2 Narration of fictional events 
This secti0n aims at illustrating the encoding-decoding mechanism considered 
to be involved in story-telling in narrative fiction. By so doing, the contrast 
with the narration of historical events will be spotlighted. 
Important material which can be taken as an example suggestive of how 
writers actually engage themselves in producing narrative fiction is The 
Notebook of Henry James ( 1947), which, by introducing the note-taking-
habit of Henry James, shows how he developed ideas for stories. The 
following is a part of a general sketch of story events which were to be 
ripened into What Maisie Knew: 
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[4J-2 A child (boy or girl would do, but I sec a girl, which would make 
it different from The Pupil ) was divided by its parents in 
consequence of their being di vorccd. The court, for some 
reason, didn't, as it might have done, give the child exclusively 
to her parent, but decreed that it was to spend its time equally 
with each - that is alternately. Each parent married again, and 
the child went to them a month, or three months, about - finding 
with the one a new mother and with the other a new father. (De 
Vere Gardens, W., November 12th, 1892) 
Needless to say, [4]-2 does not correspond to reality; the events described 
there are fictional, produced in the author's mind. One significant 
implication of [4]-2 is that there are no world entities to be perceived first, 
and then verbalised as events. It appears that the first thing the author does 
is to use language in a particular way so that a story world, i.e. an eventful 
world is created. This is where narration of fictional events essentially 
differs from that of historical events. A pictorial presentation of the 
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Figure 4.2 
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The most remarkable feature of Figure 4.2, in contrast to Figure 4.1, lies in 
the imaginary production of a spatio-temporal world by means of language, 
which comes at the very first stage of this narrative act. Therefore, nothing 
told belongs to reality, i.e. the \Vorld one can perceive. This means that, if 
an event description 'The lion roared' is made in this narrative scheme, the 
state of affairs recognisable as an event does not correspond to any 
objectively identifiable \vorld entity. What is implied by 'objectively 
identifiable world entity' is the decibel level of the lion's roaring, for 
example. In reality, the entity \vhich can be lexically materialised as 'roa~ed' 
in a proposition 'The lion roared' is real enough (if the truthfulness of the 
proposition is guaranteed), and anyone could have measured its decibel level, 
if he had wanted to. The measurable decibel level, it could be argued, is 
something that "objectively" exists in the physical world in which we live, 
irrespective of \Vhether it is recognised as an event or a state, depending 
upon how its temporality can be assessed. By contrast, no such thing is 
possible in a world of fiction; in this respect fiction or the world of fictional 
events can be said to be highly "subjective". This is why in ·Figure 4.2 'The 
story world' is demarcated by the broken line, and is encapsulated in 
'Narrator'; this implicates that the story world is a subjective product of the 
author's imagination (for the purpose of this thesis no distinction is made 
between author and narrator), and, therefore, there is no direct connection 
between 'The real world' and 'The story \Vorld'. 
Now let us account for the functions of the four different arrows in Figure 
4.2. To begin with, the solid arrow (1 )' should be contrasted with the two 
solid arrows (I) and (2) in Figure 4.1. The direction of (1)' designates the 
direction in \vhich the narrator's verbal act goes to create a fictional version 
of WOrld entities. It is \VOrth noting that it is very likely that the narrator 
performs this process repetitively before he finally becomes satisfied with his 
writing. So, the initial version may \Veil be more or less similar to [4]-2, 
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which sounds remarkably skeletal, summational, and general. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, whether the writing at this stage can be called 
narrative or not depends upon the way in which event descriptions are 
structured in it. 
Supposing ( 1 )' signifies the final version to be published or presented to 
the reader, then (1 )' and (2)' are identical \Vith each other in terms of 
content. What is to be remembered is that the narrator in Figure 4.2, just 
like in (2) of Figure 4.1' is the speaker, and at the same time the hearer of 
the·narrative discourse he is "polishing" or has completed. The solid arrow 
(2)' corresponds to (3) in Figure 4.1. The narrative discourse is directed to 
the reader. It is normal that in fictional writing there is some time gap 
between (1)' and (2)'. 
' 
The arrow (3)', equivalent to (4) in Figure 4.1, is indicated by a broken line 
which is suggestive of the intrinsic indirectness of the reader's experience of 
the story world. At the stage of (3)' the reading of the graphological 
product which the reader has set before his eyes can be compared to the 
reading of a piece of music. Someone with a perfect knowledge of how to 
read music will have difficulty not reading a particular set of musical notes ... 
For instance, if .he is given three quavers followed by a crotchet, he will read 
them as such. The same goes for narrative discourse and its reading. If the 
reader has a good or perfect know ledge of the language, the narratorial 
voice which goes 'The wolf howled at me' will conjure up in the reader's 
mind a particular image the discourse represents. When given this event 
description, the reader will have enormous difficulty acting against the 
adamant force of the graphological sequence as an image conjuror, unless his 
concern is primarily a metalinguistic one. (In this respect, reading narrative 
as such, not as a set of pass\vords, for example, is a matter intimately 
associated with a pragmatic relation behveen narrator, text, and reader.) 
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. Naturally, the visual or auditory characteristics which the reader experiences 
when the discourse 'The \Volf howled at me' is given will differ from those 
the narrator imagined in the process of encoding. When the narrated events 
or situations are real ones, as in historical narrative, those characteristics can 
be objectively identifiable. In fictional narrative, however, things get started 
with language, not the experience of the \Vorld in real terms, so that a 
certain kind of vagueness concerning the details of the represented world is 
an inevitable accompaniment for both the narrator and the reader. 
The broken line (4)' in Figure 4.2 is a fictional version of (5) in figure 4.1. 
Contemplating the reader's event-recognising process involved in (4)', as 
well as (5), means contemplating the problem of 'What is story event?' or 
'What happened in the story?', and it is closely related to the problem of how 
graphological sequencing in narrative discourse can be decoded in terms of 
event detection. Here, \Ve \Viii confine ourselves to saying that in recognising 
story events the reader need not stick to the linguistic characteristics 
materialised by the original encoder (narrator); it \vould be misleading to 
assume in a rigid manner that there is a noticeable parallel between formal 
features of linguistic expressions and the event-state distinction. Chapters 5 
and 6 will be devoted to a rigorous inquiry into the relation between 
textualisation in narrative discourse and event recognition. 
4.1.3 Fabula and sjuzhet in reality and fiction 
When contrastively vie\ved, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 seem to tell us some 
important aspects of the fabula-sjuzhet scheme in reality and fiction. In this 
section we attempt to summarise them. 
We observed in Chapter 1 that in narrative poetics, compared with sjuzhet, 
fabula cannot necessarily be defined in a clear-cutway. · But roughly 
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speaking, there are two different notions of fabula: one is that fabulas are 
non-verbalised, objectively identifiable events that exist prior to narrative 
presentation ( cf. Culler' 1981 : 171 ); and the other is that fabula is concerned 
with some embryonic level of verbalisation of story events (cf. Toolan, 
1988: 9). 
Now, when we apply the former notion of fabula to Figures 4.1 and 4.2, 
which represent historical narration and fictional narration respectively, we 
understand that in 4.1 the fabula-sjuzhet scheme holds good, whereas in 4.2 
it does not; what is to be noted in fiction is that there occur no events that 
should be prior to the event-telling in the .form of narrative. It is when we 
try. to apply the latter notion of fabula that we feel we are confronted with a 
theoretical problem. One \Vould recognise the difficulty of finding a 
theoretical necessity to set up fabula as against sjuzhet if fabula is considered 
to be a kind of skeletal description of story events. Whether historical or 
fictional, a narrative docs not have to entail any embryonic, unaesthetised 
level of event description as a preliminary to sjuzhet; under certain 
circumstances. a \Vriter might engage from the beginning in a sjuzhet 
production - a fully embroidered ~nd aesthetised story-event description. 
This seems to suggest a fuzzy status of fabula in the na.rrative act; one will 
have to admit that there is no good reason to think of fabula in the latter 
sense as a necessary element in story-telling. 
It is now made clear that fabula in the latter sense is not to be taken as a 
necessary predecessor of sjuzhet, but we have no intention of dismissing as 
entirely useless the notion of fabula as a form of basic, skeletal story-event 
description. In the follo\ving few sections we attempt to discuss the 
significance of fabula as a perspective-free story-event description, which is 
closely associated with our commonsensical concept of story's autonomy. 
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1 4 The confusing aspect of story 4 •• 
Narrative poeticians have been haunted by a certain set of tantalising 
questions such as 'What is story? or 'What is narrative?' or 'Are story and 
narrative the same or not? ' In this section \Ve take a brief look at how 
'story' has been vaguely conceived of in the literature of narrative poetics. 
The definition \York of story sounds almost always mystifying and 
frustrating. Wales ( 1990: 431) writes, 'In ordinary usage (story) refers to a 
NARRATIVE, whether fact or FICTION, which is regarded noteworthy of 
being told' (parenthesis is mine). According to this definition, story is 
practically the same with narrative discourse, i.e. text. 
Such an ordinary and synthetic concept of story will be challenged by a 
peculiarly analytic attitude shared by a number of narrative theorists. In 
contrast with the traditional dichotomy, i.e. fabula (story) and sjuzhet 
(discourse), in recent years the three-level, more complicated analysis of 
narrative has been launched by some scholars such as Genette (1980), Bal 
(1985) and Rimmon-Kenan ( 1983). The two systems proposed by Rimmon-
Kenan and Bal can be sho\vn respectively as follows: 
Story- Text- Narration (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983) 
Fabula - Story - Text (Bal, 1985) 
In her system Rimmon-Kenan (op. cit.: 6) defines story as 'the narrated 
events and participants in abstraction from the text'. This definition seems to 
emphasise the abstract nature of story, but it is not clearly shown how and in 
what form the abstractness of the story is available to the author/narrator and 
the reader. And it is very difficult to understand how her 'story' is to be 
differentiated from her 'text' and 'narration' when she refers to text as 
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•what we read' and narration as 'the act or process of production' (ibid.: J). 
More mystifying is Bal's scheme. She explains her three-layer system in the 
reverse order by starting from her 'text' (op. cit.: 5): 'A narrative text is a 
text in which an agent relates a narrative. A story is a .fabula that is 
presented in a certain manner. A fabula is a series of logically and 
chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors'. By 
saying this Bal seems to suggest that at the level of story some sort of 
verbalisation is involved, but, like Rimmon-Kenan, she also fails to clarify 
what it is like, if verbalisation or speech of some kind is ever involved. 
It would be plausible to point out hvo theoretical problems concerning such 
analytic concepts of narrative. One is that they are fallacious in that they 
tend to forget the fact that in fiction the directly available item is text 
(sjuzhet) only, and regard other items as equally necessary elements in 
narrative. The other is that they exemplify a general tendency observable in 
the theorising work by literary analysts to move in the direction of excessive 
and unnecessary subdivisions or bifurcations of narrative items without 
clarifying the concepts of those fragmented elements. 
Narrative theorists who postulate multi-layered systems concerning the 
structure of narrative may argue that the ordinary, commonsensical view of 
story, such as Wales refers. to, which identifies story with narrative, should 
not be taken literally , because we know from experience that, when a 
particular narrative is faithfully translated into another language, or retold 
for children, again .faithfully, \Ve are able to recognise the identity or. the 
sameness of the story intact at the immanent level, despite the difference of 
discourse at the apparent level. Arguments like this seem to contribute to 
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fortifying at least the solid dichotomy between fabula/story and 
sjuzhet/discourse, apart from the trichotomous systems such as advanced by 
Bal and Rimmon-Kenan. With a view to explaining that the impression of 
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story as solid and intact at the immanerit level can stem mainly from the 
reader's generalisation of story events, in the next section we turn to the 
problem of specific/general varieties of event expressions. 
4.1.5 The referentiality of event expressions 
The item which is focused upon in this section is the relationship between the 
spatia-temporal particularity of events and the referentiality of linguistic 
expressions. Our argument intends to clarify the reasons why the 
fabulalstory side is nebulous in the dichotomous narrative system mentioned 
in the last section by pointing out that such a dualistic view of narrative 
elements fails to attend to possible differences in the referentiality of event 
expressions. 
It will be universally acknowledged that the primary characteristic of 
language is its generality. This peculiarity of language comes from a fact 
that we have no alternative but to use a limited number of words to refer to 
an infinite number of particular situations or states of affairs. For the 
immediate purpose of this section, we will concentrate upon the way in 
which the generality of language is related to the particularity of events. 
In this thesis the ontological nature of events as spatio-temporal particulars 
has been repeatedly pointed out. An event is a world entity which takes place 
in Borne particular place at some particular time. But the situation can be 
slightly or considerably difficult when one attempts to describe the event in 
language. The point is that when one tries to make an event description one 
will find that one has a considerably wide range of wording at one's disposal 
from highly general to highly particular. Consider the following example: 
f4l-3 Earthquake destroys whole city 
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A rather high level of generality of this expression will be explicated as 
follows. Obviously, if someone (a newspaper reporter, for instance) intends 
to refer to a particular event with [4]-3, ('a particular event' sounds 
tautological because every event must be particular, but we will use it for the 
moment for convenience of discussion) he can perfectly perform the job; a 
prag·matic situation involved in the writing and reading of a newspaper will 
convince the reader that a particular event is referred to by [4]-3, especially 
· when it is headlined. But it will soon be understood that this particular 
expression is not specifically tied to that particular event. The same 
expression, it must be noted, has a potentiality of being used to refer to some 
other event of the same kind, if it ceases to refer to the event reported in the 
newspaper. This can be thought of as a general account which could apply 
to many particular incidents. 
Though language expressions are essentially generic-oriented, it does not . 
follow that there is no way of making a particular expression refer to a 
single, specific event in an exclusive manner. It will be possible if one 
attempts to use definite, specific expressions instead of indefinite, non-
specific ones, and adopt proper nouns rather than common nouns. Thus;· the 
eventhood which corresponds to f4l-3 can be far more specifically 
represented as in: 
f4l-3' A very severe earthquake (6.4 on the Richter scale) destroyed the 
whole city of lzu, Japan, on the 12th of October, 1993. 
On the phrasal level, generality can still be observed; the noun phrase 'A 
very severe earthquake', the verb phrase 'destroyed the whole city' can refer 
to other entities. But on the sentence level, i.e. when viewed as a 
proposition, [4]-3' can be said to refer uniquely to a single, particular event. 
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The particularity and generality of event expressions can be pictorially 
represented as follows: 
<Genuine particularity (uniqueness)> < Generality > 
Event expression 
Event 1 Events 1, 2, 3, 4 ..... n ·: 
Figure 4.3 
It is to be noted that particularity and generality are gradable concepts. This 
means that the more general an event expression sounds, the more entities it 
·can refer to. For example, if [4]-3 is re-written as 'Natural disaster destroys 
the whole city', then it will have far more entities as candidates to be 
referred to. Conversely, if the subject is turned into 'Earthquake (7.0 on the 
Richter scale)', a more specific one, then corresponding entities will be 
. severely restricted. 
Reflecting upon the relation~hip between the referential functions of 
language and the level of abstractness of individual expressions will lead us 
to the understanding of our ordinary sense of identity or sa1neness, and it 
will become also possible to grasp the meaning of difference or change, 
which, together with the former two, consists of the two sides of the sam¢ 
coin. By shedding light upon these, we will argue in the nex~ section that the 
so-called autonomy of story is entirely dependent upon the level of 
particularity /generality of the event expressions one will employ to ·refer to 
particular events, and that it is narratologically meaningful to set up fabula as 
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a form of event description the generality of which is so high that it can 
commonsensically be called perspective-free event description. 
4,1.6 Story's "fluidity" on the generalising scale 
The main purpose of this section is to argue from a commonsensical 
viewpoint that, as a kind of gradable construct, story can be captured either 
on the high-generalisation level, which might lead one to take a kind of 
dualistic view regarding story as distinguishable from discourse, or on the 
low-generalisation level, which, by contrast, might induce one to take a 
monistic view identifying story with discourse. We attempt to argue that 
either view is possible, and that it is counterintuitive to insist that only one of 
them is true and theoretically valid. 
The starting point of our discussion ts to point out the somewhat 
counterintuitive English distinction betweeen story and discourse (text). 
Perhaps the biggest problem with this dualistic scheme is that the 
presupposition· that story cannot be discourse itself seems to be taken for 
granted, and that it \viii automatically reject a monistic view which tends to 
identify story \Vith discourse. 
With resp~ct to. the abstract nature of story supposed to be existent at the 
. immanent level of discourse, Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 6) says, 'Being an 
abstraction, a construct, the story is not directly avaiiable to the reader'. 
Such an abstract form of the story, she argues (ibid: 1), is something that is 
identifiable when a narrative is retold or represented in another medium. 
But a draw back of such a theoretically rigid notion will be understood by 
considering the following discourse: 
[41-4 One day a young tnan found a very big diamond in the woods. He 
sold it in the to\vn, and became a millionaire. 
130 
, The discussion of the formal characteristics of narrative is not intended in 
the present chapter (it will be made in Chapter 5), but one will intuitively 
acknowledge that [4]-4 is a narrative, telling a succession of past events. 
According to the story-discourse scheme, there must be a story at the 
immanent or "deep" level of this discourse. But what is it like? If the story 
is something abstracted from the discourse, it has to be something general. 
But our observation in the last section of the level of particularity/generality 
in language expressions \Viii lead us to believe that event expressions in [4]-4, 
though referring to particular events, exhibit a high level of generality, and 
that it is not necessarily practical enough to try to conceive of a further form 
of abstraction \vith respect to those narrated events. Perhaps the most 
general form of event expression imaginable concerning [4]-4 will be 
'Something happens to someone'. No-one would deny the absurdity of 
arguing that such an extremely abstract event expression is a form of the 
story to be fleshed out and aesthetised in the form of discourse afterwards. 
Our claim is that, when intuitively viewed, [4]-4 is a narrative discourse, and 
at the same time a story. In [4]-4, both the story and the discourse are 
directly available to the reader. Or more exactly speaking, as far as [4]-4 is 
concerned, it will suffice to say that it is a narrative. There is no· practical · 
need for setting up an illusory construct as distinct fro~ the discourse 
(narrative) itself. 
Our argument about [4]-4 may seem to suggest that we are from a monistic 
point of view insisting upon the identity of discourse with story.- But we are 
not. Our intention is to point out that those people who believe in the 
story-discourse dualism did not realise, in setting up the theoretical system, 
that they had failed to think of a possibilitY that there can be highly general-
sounding narratives like [4]-4, for which it does not make much sense to 
squeeze out further abstracted, or less particular, event expressions as the 
story. 
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In discussing f4-)-4 we considered a particular situation in which taking a 
"monistic" vie\v can he looked upon as a practical and commonsensical 
choice. But we are not insisting upon a strong and rigid monism, which 
seems to be well exemplified by Todorov's following remark:. 
Meaning does not exist before being articulated and perceived .... there do 
not exist t\vo utterances of identical meaning if their articulation has 
followed a different discourse. (1967: 20. Ron's translation, quoted in 
Rimmon-Kenan (op. cit.: 8)) 
This monistic vte\v is clearly based upon the assumption that story is 
inseparable from discourse, and is dependent upon the medium, i.e. 
language. According to such an extremely strict concept of story, different 
wording of any kind might mean a different story-telling (discourse). Take 
[4-)-4 for instance, a pure monist would claim that the following discourse 
represents a different story from [4]-4: 
[41-4' One day an old 1nan found a very big diamond in the woods. He 
sold ·it in the to\vn, and became a millionaire. 
Compared with 141-4, there can be observed a phrasal difference; in [4]-4' 
'an old man' is used for 'a young man' in [4]-4. One could argue that 
monists who insist that 141-4 and [4]-4' are different stories because of the 
· phrasal difference conceive of story on the least generalised, or the most 
particularised level. One could imagine that their response to narrative texts 
is likely to be a highly metalinguistic one. And such a strictly monistic view 
of narrative structure might reject the so-called translatability; when 
confronted with a translated version of a particular narrative, pure monists 
may react in a markedly metalinguistic way and maintain that a translated 




such a monistic vtew of story and discourse may be just possible, but 
common sense will tell us that it is not the only way of looking at narrative. 
If one believes in story's fluidity on the generalising scale, and conceives of 
story on a highly generalised level, one will feel it is a practical choice to 
claim that the following two discourses represent the same story despite the 
differences in content: 
[4]-5 (a) One summer day a young man bumped into an old witch on 
the road. The witch said to him, 'I'm so thirsty.' The young 
man gave her a can of beer that he had. She drank it and 
said, 'You're a very fine young man. I'll give you this 
inexhaustible can of beer in return.' The witch's gift made 
the young man very rich. 
(b) One winter day an old man came across a young witch in the 
meadow. The witch told him that she was terribly hungry. 
The old man gave her a sandwich that he was about to eat. She 
devoured it. After the meal, she told him how kind he was, 
and gave him a magical lunch box which offers him any food 
he wishes. 
Perhaps it is when a particular narrative is compared with another one that 
making a dualistic distinction between story and discourse can be felt to be a 
practical and reasonable choice. We already r~ferred to a monistic view 
according to which [4]-5 (a) and (b) are taken as totally different stories. 
Now we contemplate a situation in which the two narratives given above can 
be viewed as representing the same story. Generally speaking, it could be 
argued that as the reader goes more and more general, the identity of a story 
among different tellings will be more easily recognised, and that, conversely, 
as the reader sticks to minute particularities more and more, his criteria for 
recognising the identity will be more strict. If we try to think of the story 
structure of [4]-5 (a) and (b) on a highly generalised level, then it will be 
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possible to abstract the same story events out of the two narratives as follows: . 
A man sees some supernatural being in trouble. Then the man shows a 
small kindness to the entity at its request. Then it appreciates his kindness 
and gives hiln good luck in return. It is to be acknowledged that when the 
story structure is abstracted on such a highly generalised level as exhibited in 
the italicised wording, one can be convinced that the two narratives in [4]-5 
represent the same story. 
In the next section we make an argument for the narratological significance of 
refering to the highly generalised story-event descriptions such as the 
italicised one above as fabula - a concept of story at a certain level of 
abstraction. 
4.1.7 Fabula and the autonomy of story 
The discussion in this section will be focused upon the following three points: 
1) When we contemplate the relationship between. story and discourse, we can 
grasp story at a more or less general and abstract level in contrast to 
discourse, which can be said to be uniquely particularised; 2) But this doesn't 
mean that as two different entities story and discourse are to be distinguished 
, from each other in a dualistic way: if story is conceived of at the maximally 
particularised (unique) level, then it coincides with _discourse; 3) fabula can be 
, construed as a highly generalised, perspective-free variety of story. 
With those three points of argument mentioned above in mind, we consider 
the following pictorial presentation of the structure of story/discourse which 
is intended as an alternative to the multi-layered schemes postulated by Bal or 
Rimmon-Kenan (see 4.1.4): 
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The structure of story/discourse 
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Figure 4.4 
What is most noticeable in this presentation of story/discourse is that story 
is not conceptualised as against discourse. The implied presupposition is that 
a particular narrative discourse is invariably a particular story, which is 
indicated by 'Discourse = Story' on the right hand side. Note that this does 
not necessarily reflect a monistic attitude as a dogmatic stance. The point is 
that in terms of narrative convention the reader will intuitively acknowledge 
that a narrative discourse (text) is a story. 
The fundamental philosophical message underlying Figure 4.4 is that as far 
as the relationship between narrative discourse and story is concerned it is not 
commonsensical to try to contemplate it from a dogmatic point of view -
whether ·monistic or dualistic. In this respect, the exceptional and extreme 
case is the pure monism. As already observed, a pure monist, who 
dogmatically identifies discourse with story, would take it that any change in a 
discourse, no matter how minor it is, will make the story different. The 
monism naturally rejects the idea of story's autonomy, which means the 
' stuvival of the identity (or the sameness) of a story among different versions 




nonsensical, since there are actually some people (cf. Todorov) who take 
things in a monistic \vay, but it could be said that it is not ,a normal and 
commonsensical viewpoint of the discourse-story relationship. This is why in 
Figure 4.4 the monism, which does not accept story's autonomy, is encircled 
by the broken line indicative of exceptionality or optionality. 
Concerning story's autonomy, it is \Vorth noting that it ought to be acceptable 
even on the right hand side, i.e. right under 'Discourse = Story'. This 
situation can be explained as follo\vs. Provided that identifying discourse 
with story is conventionally or intuitively acceptable as a normal stance, such 
a commonsensical vie\v of narrative is to be distinguished from strong 
monism. This means that the concept of discourse being the same as story 
is compatible \Vith the concept of story's autonomy. In an ordinary situation, 
a reader with such a normal vie\v of narrative structure would not feel the 
story is different if, in a retold or abridged version, the discourse somewhat 
changed, and the· change is felt to be so minor that it virtually has no effect 
upon the overall structure of the narrative (story). But this is not to be 
recognised as dualism .in a strong sense of the term. Of crucial importance is 
that commonsensically it is irrelevant to adopt a purely dualistic view 
according to \vhich, as substantial entities, discourse is a kind of finished 
product and story, a kind of ra\v material. Such a commonsensical stance is 
indicated by '(Story)', which, as a kind of mental construct optionally created 
by the reader, is supposed to "slide" on the particularity/generality scale in 
either direction, depending on the situation. 
Concerning story, 'Story' and '(Story)' can be distinguished from each other 
by the vertical solid line in Figure 4.4. Compared with the uniqueness 
(maximum particularity) of 'Story' identical with 'Discourse' ('Story' is not 
parenthesised because it is as suhstantial as 'Discourse'), '(Story)' is more or 
less generalised, and such generalisation tends to be activated by the reader 
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particularly when he compares a narrative with another one, or when he 
compares the original discourse \Vith its different versions, to see whether 
they are the same or not. It is to be recognised that the impression of the 
sameness of the stories tends to depend upon the level of 
generality/particularity of event expressions which the reader may attempt on 
his own. Suppose there nrc three narratives A, B, and Cas follows: 
[4)-6 A. One day an old wonzan went to the town and did some shopping. 
B. One day a young wo1nan went to the town and did some 
shopping. 
C. One day an old tnan \Vent to the town and did some shopping. 
If we attend to A and B, \VC understand that in order to recognise that the 
two narratives are the same stories \Ve \Viii have to generalise 'an old woman' 
in A and 'a young \Voman' in B and obtain 'a woman' as a generalised 
expression. By· so doing \Ve can regard A and B as the same stories, but that 
level of generalisation does not enable us to see A, B and C as identical with 
each other, since between AlB and C the difference of sex is there. It is clear 
that if we want to look upon the three discourses as the same stories, a higher 
level of generalisation \Viii be required for the italicised expressions in them. 
Presumably expressions like 'someone' \vill be needed for such a high level 
of generalisation. Only then \Vill the three narratives in [4]-6 be regarded as 
the same stories. 
Now it would be meaningful to make some reference to '(Fabula )' in Figure 
4.4. Practically speaking, one determining factor of the degree of 
particularity or generality of '(Story)' must be its length in graphological 
terms; the shorter it is, the more general (or less particular) it will be.. It 
would not be very easy to define exactly how general '(Fabula)' is, but 




As one example of fabula, we would like to give the italicised discourse 
which was abstracted out of (4)-5 (a) and (b). That discourse can be said to 
be characterised hy its neutral/objective-sounding wording, which may well 
be reckoned as perspective-free; there can be observed no particular word 
which might be assumed to reflect some particular agent's point of view or 
focalisation, whether literal or psychological. (Ontologically speaking, any 
event description is a product of the verbalising act of some conscious 
agent whose point of vie\v must be subjective, but narratologically, such a 
purely ontological view need not be taken literally.) 
Perhaps the most important narratological significance of fabula is that it can 
contribute to making typologies of story events in narrative. One typical 
example of story-event typology can be found in Russian formalist Propp's 
The Morpho lORY r~f the Folktale ( 1968: originally published in Russian in 
1928). What he calls 'functions' in it are highly generalised, 
neutral/objective-sounding event descriptions which may well be referred to 
as fabulas (e.g. 'The villain makes an attempt at reconnaissance' 'The villain 
receives information about the victim' ). The following remark by 
Bremond, according to \vhom what Propp did in that work was a study of an 
autonomous layer of meaning, can be suggestive of what fabula as a mental 
construct is like: 
The subject of a tale may serve as an argument for a ballet, that of a 
novel may be carried over to the stage or to the screen, a movie may be 
told to those who have not seen it. It is words one reads, it is images one 
sees, it is gestures one deciphers, but through them it is a story one 
follows; and it may be the same story. (Bremond, 1964: 4. Ron's 
translation, quoted in Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 7)) 
One important implication of this remark will be that conceiving of story 
events at such a highly generalised level of verbalisation as to be called 
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fabula necessitates the loose conceptualisation of identity or sameness, which 
will be of vital importance, for example, to the contrasive or comparative 
studY of narratives on a cross-cultural basis. 
4.1.8 Conclusion 
Our discussion tn 4.1 concentrated upon the fallacious aspects of the 
narratological dualism \vhich ideologically distinguishes fabula/story from 
sjuzhet /discourse. The points of our discussion can be summarised as 
follows. 
When fabula is taken as events, and sjuzhet, as event descriptions in narrative 
the fabula-sjuzhet dichotomy holds in historical narrative, but not in fictional 
narrative, since in the latter no events actually occur. What is available in 
fictional narrative is sjuzhet (discourse) only. 
The hypothetical argument that fabula can be assumed to be some embryonic 
event description as a predecessor of .sjuzhet as the finished product is not 
necessarily theoretically acceptable. l'he main reason is that no-one can 
deny a possibility that in the actual process of writing narrative the author-
narrator will skip the fabula-\vriting and engage from the beginning tn 
producing sjuzhet. 
The story-discourse dichotomy as the English version of the fabula-sjuzhet 
scheme may be looked upon as an example of an unhappy choice of 
expressions, because the theoretical implication t~at discourse is to be 
differentiated from story is counterintuitive, thus not commonsensically 
acknowledgeable. 
What counts tn contemplating the structure of narrative fiction ts to 
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recognise that taking a strong philosophical stance (e.g. monism or dualism) 
can be misleading and impractical. This \Vill be understood by the fact that a 
commonsensical and perhaps a monistic view that discourse is story ( the idea 
that a particular narrative discourse is a particular story) is compatible with 
a kind of dualistic vie\v that story can be autonomous ( the idea that the 
. identity of a particular story can survive discoursal varieties). 
When one thinks of the story structure (story-event sequence) of a particular 
narrative discourse, one \Viii find that at the most particularised (unique) 
level the story structure coincides with the original discourse; the story event 
sequence that one recognises is exactly what is textually realised in the 
original discourse. And at the same time, trying to keep the sameness of 
the story, one can think of the story structure at a more or less generalised 
level, and in that case one will be attempting one's own story-telling as a 
mental construct. 
In terms of story-event recognition, t.e. story recognition, it will be of 
narratological interest to set up fabula as a form of story-event description at 
a highly generalised, perspective-free level. Setting up fabula is concerned 
with the considerably loose conceptualisation of identity or sameness. One 
narratological significance of making fabula will be that it contributes to 
seeing similarities among apparent discoursal dissimilarities in narratives; 
fabula-making will enable one to make typologies of story events in 
narrative. 
Lastly, story-event recognttton, i.e. story recognition at a more or less 
generalised level has a lot of bearing upon the reader's involvement with 
event unification, which \Viii be focused upon in Chapter 6. 
4.2 The eventhood of narration 
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4.2.1 N arratorial perceptibility in event description 
Chatman ( 1978: 45) gives useful classifications of story events. According 
to him, there are four kinds of events in narrative discourse: ·1) non-verbal 
physical acts (e.g. 'John \Val ked through the park'); 2) speeches (e.g. 'John 
. said, "I'm hungry"' or 'John said that he was hungry'); 3) thoughts (men~al 
verbal articulations, e.g. 'John thought, "I must go"'); 4) feelings, 
perceptions, and sensations (which are articulated in words, e.g. 'John felt 
uneasy', or 'John saw the man lying dead') For the immediate purpose of 
the present thesis, however, it would be meaningful .to unite 1) and 4) under 
the rubric of non-verbal events and 2) and 3), verbal events. 
In this section \Ve take a general look at the problem of narratorial 
perceptibility with respect to the discoursal presentation of non-verbal events 
by the narrator, which has traditionally been referred to as diegesis. Our 
observation in this section will be contrasted with that in 4.3 where we are 
going to contemplate narratorial perceptibility in verbal events in narrative· 
discourse, i.e. speech/thought presentation (or mimesis). 
Identifying the ontological/linguistic nature of story events is one of the most 
immediate concerns in the present thesis, and, as will be clarified in Chapters 
5 and 6, story events can reasonably be taken as phenomena of discoursal 
circumstances in narrative. Our general argument is that in order to see 
whether a particular discourse is a story event or not one will have to look at 
it in the discoursal environment in which it finds itself, and· that the 
eventhood of a particular discourse is not to be thought of only in terms of 
the lexico-grammatical features (including aspectual choices) it has on its 
own. 




. might be termed 'in~ernal-event discourse'. When we discussed Dowty's 
TDIP (Temporal Dtscourse Interpretation Principle) in Chapter 2 we 
observed his claim that narrative time updates even after the so-called state 
clauses. We reproduce the example given by l)owty for ease of reference: 
[41-7 (a) Mary entere? the, president's office. \h) A copy of the budget 
was on the prestdent s desk. (c) The prestdent1's financial advisor 
stood beside the copy. (d) The president sat regarding both 
admiringly. (c) T'he advisor spoke. (Dowty, 1986: 49) 
Our discussion in 2.3.1 suggested that the statives from (b) to (d) in [41-7, 
which may well be interpreted as focalised sentences, following (a) as a 
focalising clause or a window opener (cf. Fehr (1938), Brinton (1980)), 
are to be distinguished from other statives which do not contribute to the 
update of narrative time. Let us reproduce Hardy's example, which we gave 
in Chapter 2, as one such genuine stative discourse: 
f4)-8 The village of Marlatt lay amid the north-eastern undulations of 
the beautiful vale of Blakemore aforesaid, an engirdled and 
secluded region .... (Hardy, Tess of the d'Urbervilles: 48) 
In terms of temporal dynamics, the difference between (b), (c), (d) in [4]-7 
and f4)-8 is that while the former can be thought of as implicating internal 
events, i.e. some internal perceiver's cognising acts the verbal presentation of 
which will be 'She saw', 'She recognised', etc., while the latter has nothing to 
do with such eventhood of internal focalisation. 
The context-dependent nature of internal eventhood is clear in that it is an 
event which tends to he identified as such only in its relation to the 
neighbouring discoursal environments. Compare the following examples: 
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[4]-9 John kicked the ball. 
f4]-l 0 The door was painted red. 
As argued in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.3), it can be misleading to assume that some 
texico-grammatical characteristics inherently represent eventhood or 
statehood, but one will acknowledge that the dynamicity recognisable in the 
verbal predicate 'kicked the ball' in [4]-9 will work as a kind of magnetism 
inducing the reader to contextualise it primarily in a one-off situation and 
, read it as an event description; one will find it a marked reading to. 
contextualise it in an iterative or habitual situation in which it is difficult to 
see eventhood ( cf. 3.5). By contrast, the lack of dynamicity discernible from 
the verbal predicate \vas painted red' in [4]-10 will normally lead one to 
contextualise it primarily in a static situation (some might argue that·the 
stative reading of r 4]-1 0 is to be called decontextualised reading, but in our 
understanding, it is not decontextualised particularly from an ontological 
point of view; the fact is that, if someone says that, when looked at in a 
decontextualised situation, [41-1 0 is a state clause representing no eventhood, 
he is actually reading it in a particular context in which thinking of internal 
eventhood is irrelevant). And it could be said that reading it as representing 
an internal event, implying some internal viewer's perceiving/cognising act, 
will require a marked contextualisation. 
Now supposing that in [4)-9 and 10 the voice can be attributed to the narrator 
in a particular narrative, and that [4]-9 represents a prototypical one-off 
event, and ("4)-1 0 implicates an internal event (an one-off event) despite the 
static structure at the grammatically apparent level, one will realise that the 
distinction between the two clauses is somewhat similar to the distinction 
between tagged and non-tagged speech forms (for the detailed discussion of 
tagged and non-tagged speech presentations see 4.3). By tagged speech we 
mean examples as follo\vs: 
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[4]-11 (a) John said, 'I'm terribly hungry'. 
(b) John said that he \Vas terribly hungry. 
In the above examples, the narratorial voice 'John said' operates as a clear 
event-indicator, which can be a direct ans\ver to the question 'What 
happened?' These clauses have traditionally been classified as Direct Speech 
and Indirect Speech respectively. And by non-tagged speech we mean 
examples as follows: 
[4]-12 (a) I'm terribly hungry. 
(b) He was terribly hungry. 
Speech forms such as the clauses in (41-12 have traditionally been referred 
to as Free Direct Speech and Free Indirect Speech respectively. These 
speech forms are characterised by the lack of reporting clauses, i.e. the tag . 
such as 'He said' or 'He thought', clearly indicative of the presence of the 
narrator as the event cogniser. 
As will be discussed in 4.3, in terms of event description in narrative 
discourse narratorial perceptibility in (41-11 is generally more explicit (or 
less implicit) than in (4)- I 2 . 
. Now back to f4)-9 and 10, \Vhich are examples of narration, one could refer 
to the corresponding difference of degree in narratorial perceptibility with 
respect to the two clauses. 141-9 is comparable to the two clauses in [4]-11; 
both in [41-9 and (41-11 the narrator as the event describer is rather explicit. 
Whereas [4]-1 0 is comparable to the two examples in [4]-12 in that in them 
the narrator as the event describer is implicit. 
The problem of internal eventhood is closely connected with focalisation, i.e. 
144 
.. ;; the problem of 'Who sees?' in narrative discourse. In the next three sections 
we )ook at some peculiarities of this narrative phenomenon. 
4.2.2 Focalisation as a new version of point of view. theory 
The term 'focalisation' \Vas introduced in Genette (1980) as an attempt to 
separate vision from voice. Genette refers to the theoretical drawback of 
most studies of point of vic\v: 
... most of the theoretical \Vorks on this subject (which are mainly 
classifications) suffer from a regrettable confusion between what I call 
mood and voice, a confusion behveen the question who is the character 
whose point (~{view orients the narrative perspective? and the very 
different question w!Jo i.\· the narrator? - or, more simply, the question 
who sees? and the question ~vho speaks? (1980: 186) 
One typical example of a confusing point-of-view discussion can be found in 
Booth (1967: 91), who refers to the "effect" of the The Ambassadors by 
James: ' ... Strether in large parts "narrates" his own story, even though he is 
always referred to in the third person'. Here he is obviously paying no 
attention to distinguishing between point of view and voice. Bal, who, as 
well as Genette, claims the validity of the separation of vision ·from voice, 
severely criticises Booth; she argues that it is absurd to claim that in The 
Ambassadors it is Strether \vho is telling his O\Vn story, though it is a third 
person narrative; she explains the absurdity by referring to the following 
sentence ( 1985: 101 ): 
Elizabeth sa\v him lie there, pale and lost in thought. 
Bal says that it does not rnakc sense to claim that the _phrase 'pale and lost in 
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thought' in the above example is spoken by the character Elizabeth, though 
Elizabeth is clearly the bearer of perceptual point of view. 
It could be said that the greatest difference between focalisation theorists 
such as Genette ( 1980). Bal ( 1985) and critics such as Friedman (1967), 
Booth (1967) is that the former think of point of view as distinct from the 
act of telling, i.e. narration. Chatman (1978) does not employ the term 
focalisation , but he also emphasises the importance of distinguishing point of 
view from voice. 'Point of view', Chatman argues, 'does not mean 
expression; it only means the perspective in terms of which the expression is 
made' (foe. cit.). It is very easy to see a strong parallelism between 
Rimmon-Kenan, who elaborately exploited the idea of focalisation and 
Chatman, in what they say respectively: 'In principle, focalisation and 
narration are distinct activities (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983: 73); 'The perspective 
and expression need not he lodged in the same person' (Chatman, op. cit:: 
153). 
As we will argue in 4.2.4, in verbal narrative the problem of who is the 
bearer of perceptual (optical) point of view or who literally sees can be 
more controversial than the problem of who p.\ychologically sees, and in my 
understanding the narratological significance of focalisation theory which 
emphasises the importance of separating vision from voice ought to be 
properly appreciated \Vhen one takes the meaning of vision primarily in the 
psychological sense. 
4.2.3 Possible relations between voice and vision 
The central notion of focalisation is. as \Ve have seen, 'who sees?' as distinct 
from 'who speaks?'. When Genette says that the question 'who sees?' is the 
question 'who is the character \Vhose point of view orients the narrative 
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•. perspective (op. cit.: 186), he evidently thinks of the character as the seer (or 
focatiser). . Bal. ho\vcvcr. does not necessarily stick to the character-
focaliser (1985: 104): 'The suhjcct of focalisation, the jocaliser, is the point 
from which the elements arc viewed. That point can lie with a character 
(i.e. an element of fabula), or outside it'. This implies a possible distinction 
between internal and external focalisations. Genette's concept of focalisation 
appears to be narrower than Hal's in that the former does not encapsulate the 
possibility of the narrator~j'oca/iser in its scope. It seems to me, however, 
that as far as the meaning of vision is psychologically taken, thinking. of the 
possibility of the narrator-focaliser, as \Veil as that of the character-focaliser, 
ought to be of narratological interest. 
Now, a comprehensive vie\v of focalisation will lead us to schematise 
relations of voice and vision (psychological) as follows: 
<Discrepant I coincident relations bet\veen voice and vision> 
Voice Vision (psychological) 
Type 1 Character Character 
Type 2 Narrator Character 
Type 3 Character Ill Character [2] 
Type 4 Character Narrator 
Type 5 Narrator Narrator 
Type 6 N arrato riC haracter Character 
Figure 4.5 
Attempting an elaborate discussion of the five types of focalisation varieties 
shown above by finding corresponding examples is beyond the scope of the 
present thesis; \Ve \viii confine ourselves to referring to what can be 
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considered to be most relevant to the topic under discussion, 
eventhood of narration. 
I.e. the 
Toward the end of the last section reference was made to the primary 
significance of vision in the psychological sense in verbal narrative, and this 
will be verified by thinking of the theoretical awkwardness of applying the 
notion of perceptual (optical) vision to Figure 4.5. With Type 1, for 
example, it is physiologically acknowledgeable that when the voice is 
attributable to the character the physical vision can automatically be ascribed 
to him or her unless his or her eyes are closed, so that it will be of very little 
narratological importance to set up Type 1 as a variety of focalisation (it 
would not matter whether the discourse is visually-oriented or not). And 
with Type 3, the i mpossi hi I ity of Character f I)'s physical vision coinciding 
with Character I 21's is obvious. 
In terms of the relation between focalisation and story events, in the 
discussion of the present section we concentrate upon Type 2, and there are 
three reasons for this. One is that, generally speaking, discre.pancy-types 
(Types 2, 3, 4, and 6) should be of more narratological interest than 
coincidence-types (Types 1 and 5). The second reason is that of the six 
types, Types I , 3, 4, and 6 (rype 6 corresponds to Free Indirect Discourse, 
which is characterised by the dual voice: see 4.3.2) concern speech/thought 
presentation, which is not immediately relevant to our present discussion, 
and with respect to \vhich eventhood holds irrespective of the involvement of 
some entity's focalising act. And the third reason is that, ·as will be 
discussed later, \vhen vision is thought of in perceptual (optical) terms, 
whether or not the narratorial voice can be considered to reflect the 
character's perceiving act, that is, whether a particular discourse is 
classifiable as Type 2 or not.. is of great importance in the light of story-
event detection. 
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Now, let us consider the relation between focalisation (psychological and 
perceptual ) and eventhood by looking at two examples. The aim of our 
discussion is to suggest that in terms of story-event recognition perceptual 
focalisation is more directly relevant than psychological focalisation .. 
Compare the following t\vo examples: 
[41-13 (a) The matron had given her leave to go out as soon as the 
women's tea \Vas over (b) and Maria looked forward to her 
evening out. (c) The kitchen was spick and span: (d) the cook 
said you could see yourself in the big copper boilers. (e) The 
fire was nice and hriRhf (f) and on one of the sidetables were 
very big barmbracks. (Joyce, 'Clay': 11 0) (italics are mine) 
f4]-14 (a) With the maid holding the umbrella over her, she. walked 
along the gravel path until she was under their window. (b) 
The tahle was there, lvashed hright green in the rain, (c) but the 
cat was gone. (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 315) (italics are 
mine) 
Presumably, those who are familiar with Joyce's 'Clay' will agree that (c) 
and (e) in (4]-13 may \veil be interpreted as reflecting the protagonist 
Maria's point of view or vision in the psychological sense. The two clauses 
would most reasonably he reckoned as a part of 'description of setting' (cf. 
Chatman, 1978: 220-52), so that the voice is ascribable ~o the narrator. 
They are clear cases in \vhich there is a discrepancy between the speaker and 
the bearer of the vision, i.e. the seer. What is to be noted in terms of story-
event recognition is that._ though (c) and (e) in l41-13 express some visual 
(optical) piece of information, the discoursal environment does not l~ad the 
reader to take it that the character is working as the internal perceiver 
(focaliser), namely, as the cogniser of an internal event. To put it another 




internal focaliser as a bearer of a particular angle of vision (in optical 
terms), so that, with them, thinking of internal cventhood is irrelevant. 
By contrast, the clause (h) in 141-14 seems to be non-focalised·in the light of 
psychological vision; it would be difficult to assume that the protagonist's 
psycological point of view is clearly reflected in it. In terms of physical 
vision, however, it \Viii probably be labelled as Type 2, if it is feasible to 
assume that the last part of the sentence (a) 'until she was under their 
window' is a window opener or a focalising discourse. If so, the clause (b) 
can be taken as an example of implicit narratorial perceptibility in terms of 
story-event description. 
The ongoing discussion \Viii lead to a general observation that, as far as the 
relation between focal isation and eventhood in narrative discourse is 
concerned, it is the presence or absence of internal focalisation in the optical 
sense that is immediately relevant to the detection of story events as some 
internal cognisers' perceiving acts. This seems to suggest that focalisation in 
the psychological sense is not a determining factor in the recognition of 
story events. 
Before leaving this section, it would be \Vorth pointing out a kind of 
ambiguity one will feel \Vhen coming acrOSS clauses SUCh as [4]-14 (b). 
When the reader comes to 14.)-14 (b), he will for the moment be left unsure 
about whether the state clause represents an internal event or not; it is not 
necessarily easy to kno\v whether the discourse is a description of setting by 
the narrator for which speaking of a focalising (optical) act by the character 
is irrelevant or a grammatically implicit version of 'She recognised/observed 
that the table was there, \Vashed bright green in the rain' One must 
recognise that such ambiguity stems from two factors: one is the lack of 




act such as 'She saw' or 'She recognised'; and the other is that the vague and 
nebulous presentation of point of view in physical terms is the intrinsic weak 
point of verbal narrative. 
In the next section, we make brief observations concerning some typical 
problems with focalisation. Particular attention will be drawn to the 
contrast between filmic narrative and verbal narrative in the way in which 
angle of vision is available to the audience/reader. 
4.2.4 The problem of 'Who sees?' in verbal narrative 
No-one ,will deny that the literal meaning of 'Who sees?' is: 'Who obtains 
visual pieces of information?'. In this section we focus our attention upon 
how the literal sense of seeinR can and should be considered in relation to 
the medium-through representation of story-world entities in narrative 
discourse. Our discussion \Viii shed light upon some ambiguous aspects of 
internal eventhood which \Ve outlined in the preceding sections. 
The non-visual characteristic of verbal narrative IS well i11ustrated In 
Chatman ( 1978: 101 ): 
In verbal narrative, story-space is doubly removed from the reader, since 
there is not the icon or analogy provided by photographed images on a 
screen. Existents and their space, if "seen" at all, are seen in the 
imagination, transformed from words into mental projection. There is 
no "standard vision" of existents as there is in the movies. 
As Chatman suggests, the indirectness of our visual experience in verbal 
narrative is due to the fact that the story world which is set before us when 
we read narrative is nothing but a represented world. In the light of visual 
clarity, a conceived \Vorld differs from a perceived world in that in the 
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former, unlike in the latter, items concerned with vision, such as shape, 
colour, distance, or angle of vision, are all characterised by their physical 
indistinctness. Take ant-:le (~{vision, for instance. When we see a film we 
can tell exactly from what angle a particular scene is shot; in a film, it could 
be said, almost every scene is shot from a particular, and uniquely 
identifiable angle - a camera must have been located at a particular place 
which must have automatically made the angle of vision for the ·camera. By 
contrast, in a scenic \Vorld conjured up by \vritten or oral discourse the 
reader has no way of physically identifying a spatial locus from which the 
character or the narrator is observing things. 
Literary/linguistic concepts such as point of vie\V, perspective, or focalisation 
have been discussed in a very extensive way in the twentieth-century 
criticism of literary works. Attempting an overall review of those 
theoretical constructs is not the immediate concern in this section. What we 
are going to do is to have a quick look at some dangerous aspects of the 
assumption that angle of vision in the literal sense of the term can make sense 
in verbal narrative, as \Veil as in visual arts like a film. 
There are some linguists \Vho attempt to see a parallel between linguistic 
forms and camera angles in the physical sense. Kuno (1987: 205)) argues 
that" the sentence 'Bill \vas hit by John' does not correspond to a visual 
situation in which the camera is placed closer to 'John'. The same sort of 
discussion can be found in Kuno and Kaburaki (1975), in which they claim 
that in the sentence 'John hit Mary' the camera can be said to be placed at 
some point equidistant from both 'John' and 'Mary'. One must acknowledge 
that there is no necessary cot:~nection between the "meanings" of these 
sentences and the spatial position of the camera; if one was asked to make ·a 
filmic version of them one could choose any place to set the camera. 
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A more elaborate theoretical construct can be observed in Uspensky (1973) 
and Lanser ( 1981 ). They distinguish hvo different spatial ordinations, i.e. 
'suprapersonal' and 'intrapersonal'. In the suprapersonal spatial ordination, 
'the author accompanies the character· but does not merge with him' 
(Uspensky, op. cit.: 58), \V hereas in the intrapersonal spatial ordination the 
narrator's optical locus is completely adjusted to that of the character, and 
there is no distance in bet\veen (Lanser, op. cit.: 198) . One will soon realise 
that these optically-oriented distinctions are purely physical, and most 
congenial to visual arts in \Vhich point of view holds in a most authentic and 
prototypical way. Summing up~ there is no intrinsic relationship between the 
visually presented world and the verbally presented world in terms of optical 
angles from which items are considered to be shown or described. A film 
director could employ any particular camera angle to produce a visual 
version of a particular verbal expression. 
It could be argued that, generally speaking, it is not 'who literally sees?' but 
'who psychologically sees?' that is congenial to verbal narrative, whereas, the 
opposite might be true with filmic narrative. In verbal narrative there will 
be three conventional ways of identifying 'who literally sees?': 
1) Verbal predicates representing some internal focaliser's perceiving act 
are explicitly given in narration (e.g. 'he saw', 'she recognised'). 
2) A particular visually-oriented discourse can be read as a perceptually 
focalised one if it is reasonable to assume that it is preceded by a window 
opener or a focalising discourse. 
3) .In a certain discoursal environment in \Vhich a particular discourse can be 
interpreted as exhibiting some individual flavour that is ascribable to the 
character one can take it that the discourse reflects a perceptual 
' 
focalisation hy some i nte_rnal focaliser. 
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The three criteria postulated above are all concerned with narratorial 
description of internal events (perceiving acts by the character). The· 
problem is, however, that they are not as stable as they look. Apart from 
1), 2) and 3) can be ambiguous, since it is not always easy to identify 
linguistic features of windo\v openers or individually-flavoured expressions. 
In [4]-14, for example, the subordinate clause 'until she was under their 
window' might be taken as a window opener, and if so, (b) in [4]-14 will be 
an example of 2). In that case~ the internal eventhood of (b) can be said to 
be confirmable without having to decide whether the expression 'bright 
green' in the clause (b) rrrhe table was there, washed bright green in the r~in' 
reflects some personal point of view (figurative) of the protagonist. But if 
one thinks that the status of the subordinate clause 'until she was under their 
window' is doubtful as a \Vindow opener, then one will have to go to the 
criterion 3) to see if the following discourse represents an internal event or 
not, and in that case, one \viii have difficulty, as already mentioned, deciding 
whether the clause (b) includes any linguistic signs considered to be 
indicative of the protagonist's personal viewpoint in the figurative sense. 
Ambiguity of this kind is closely associated with the intrinsic nature of 
language as a "common property". The relation between the generality of 
language and point of view or focalisation can be recounted as follows. As 
already discussed in 4.1.5, the primary characteristic of language lies in its 
generality. This means that the phraseological choice, whatever it is, is .not 
as powerful as optically presented angles of vision in visual arts as a device 
showing the uniqueness of the spatial locus. No matter how idiosyncratic an 
expression may sound, it is not necessarily to be ascribed to one single, 
uniquely identifiable person. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
In 4.2 we had a general look at the problem of the eventhood of narration, 
154 
spotlighting the relationship hctween focalisation and eventhood. Our 
observations can be sumrnarised as follo\vs. 
In terms of narratorial perceptibility in narration, it is· not entirely 
impossible to posit a certain kind of visually-oriented stative discourse in 
· which the narrator as the event describer can be considered perceptible at the 
implicit (immanent) level. The eventhood of such discourse is characterised 
by its internality, I.e. a character's perceiving act, and by its context-
boundedness. 
The most salient feature of focalisation theory postulated by some scholars is 
its claim that voice is separable from vision. But it is to be noted that the 
intrinsic nature of verhal narrative as a linguistic form which represents a 
conceived world, not a perceived one, \Viii naturally lead one to assume that, 
in verbal narrative, 'who psychologically sees?' should make more sense than 
'who literally sees?' 
In principle, internal evcnthood is primarily concerned with 'who literally 
sees?', and a problematic and confusing situation in verbal narrative is .that 
in some cases one will find it necessary to decide whether or not a particular 
discourse reflects a psychological point of view held by some internal 
focaliser in order to see if it represents an internal event. This is why the 
meaning of '\vho sees?' tends to be ambiguous and "contaminated" in verbal 
narrative. Considering the ontological fact that vision in optical terms is 
less relevant in verbal narrative than in filmic narrative, whether a particular 
discourse can be considered to represent an internal event or not tends to be 
indeterminable. 
4.3 The eventhood of speech/thought presentation 
4.3.1 Speech as a showing of the story world 
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Narrative does not always consist only of narration, i.e. the narrator's 
telling. Rather, it is quite usual that a considerable part of a narrative is the 
character's speech/thought presentation. In the field of literary criticism the 
two modes of narrative discourse have traditionally been referred to as 
diegesis (narration) and mimesis (speech/thought presentation) respectively. 
· The aim of the present section is to outline the general feature of 
speech/thought presentation as a way of sho\ving the story world directly to 
the reader. 
It is possible to postulate a number of varieties of speech/thought 
presentation (hereafter S/T presentation) according to· the degree of 
narratorial presence or perceptibility. A traditional system of SIT 
presentation (e.g. Leech & Short, 1981; Short, 1982) can be shown as: 
NRSffA ID FlO DD FDD 
~~----------------------------~ 
Maximum <narratorial presence> Minimum · 
(NRSff A = Narrative Report of Speechffhought Acts; ID = Indirect 
Discourse; FID =Free Indirect Discourse; DD =Direct Discourse 
FDD = Free Direct J)iscourse) 
Figure 4.6 
The most noticeable aspect of Sff presentation is that it makes sense to speak 
of directness and indirectness in the way in which the character's verbal acts 
are presented. l'his peculiarity of srr presentation can be contrasted with 
the intrinsic i-ndirectness of narration. What we mean by the intrinsic 
indirectness of narration is the narrator's medium-through presentation of 
the story world entities. It \Vould he feasible to divide the constituents of the 
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storY world into two di ffcrcnt groups: non-verbal and verbal entities. 
Crucial is the fact that it is non-verbal entities that have no choice but to be 
presented to the reader hy means of a medi urn, i.e. language. Only through 
the narratorial voice will the reader kno\v about entities such as the crash of 
a car, the sound of the blowing wind, the killing of an old woman. In 
reality, one can experience those physical, non-verbal entities with no 
language involved. It could he said that in such real situations one is directly · 
related to the world. In narration, however, such non-verbal entities are 
given to the reader as entities represented by means of language; they are 
encoded in some lexical and syntactic form. In that sense, the reader's 
experience of the non-verbal entities is inevitably indirect, so that it makes 
little sense to speak of the indirectness involved in the narration of non-
verbal entities, since the indirectness is self-evident. This means that, as far 
as narration of non-verbal entities is concerned, discussing the direct-indirect 
contrast is almost meaningless. 
By contrast, verbal entities, i.e. linguistic acts performed by the characters 
do not have to be filtered through the narratorial voice; they can be "shown" 
to the reader. Here a question might be posed with respect to the quality of 
the directness of SIT presentation. Some might argue that in narrative 
discourse the narrator's presence is ubiquitous, since every bit of discourse, 
including the character's speech, is after all written by the narrator. To 
counter such an excessively reality-conscious stance, one can say that holding 
that extreme view of narrative might mean· dismissing a useful fictitious 
concept as insignificant. Take Free Direct Discourse, for example. It is true 
that in narrative what is presented as an FDD is not direct in the strict sense 
of the word; the reader can hear no phonetic sound of the original speaker, 
and the graphological sequence realised in the form of discourse can be taken 
as the narrator's "translation" of the original speaker's phonetic products. 
But it must be emphasised that making a distinction between directness and 
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: I indirectness in srr presentation is useful and meaningful in that language is 
mediated by language. It should be quite normal and realistic for the reader 
to feel as if he were listening to the playback mode of a taperecorder when 
he comes across FDD, namely, a non-filtered, direct presentation of the 
character's speech in narrative discourse. 
In the following few sections we turn to the problem of how srr presentation . 
can be assessed in terms of story events. Based upon the perceptibility of 
the narrator as the cognising agent who verbally suggests that a particular 
chunk of discourse be taken as an event, a rearrangement of the traditional 
system \Vill be attempted. 
4.3.2 Non-tagged speech 
As far as srr presentation is concerned, ·the presence or absence of tags or 
reporting clauses can be a crucially important element in the light of the 
explicitness or implicitness of event indication by the narrator. Tags may 
well be counted as the indices of the narrator's recognition of verbal entities 
(the character's speech) as an event or events. When a speech form is 
presented without a tag, it is not an event description itself; the narrator's 
, _ cognising act is indicated at the most implicit level, as far as the eventhood of 
the speech is concerned. Such a speech form may be called non-tagged 
speech (The term 'speech' here includes 'thought' in a generic way.) We 
suggest that FDD and FI D should be the two varieties of non-tagged speech. 
Particular attention must be drawn to the fact that this categorisatjon does not 
correspond to the traditionally accepted concept of narratorial presence. 
FDD is the most free fonn of speech presentation. Look at the following 
example: 
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[4.)-15 'You have everything.' 
'And what do you lack?' 
'Everything but work.' 
'You have everything I have.' (Heming\vay, 'A Clean, Well-
Lighted Place': 3R3) 
With the four clauses sho\vn above, there are no tags found. The reader will 
feel the dialogue is shown verbatim before his eyes with virtually no 
intervention by the narrator unless he is too realistic and becomes sensitive 
' 
for instance, to the quotation marks and the vertical arrangement of these 
clauses which helps the reader to know there \Vas someone who wrote them 
down in this particular way. It is evident that the chunk of discourse given 
in f4]-15 is not the linguistic form appropriate as an answer to the question 
'What happened?' Therefore, none of the four clauses is an event 
description; they are verbal entities shown directly to the reader, just as 
perceptible items like a girl's dancing is seen by someone in real life. It is 
the reader who will have to assess what is going on there. It might be safe 
to say that in presenting FDD the narrator has completely neglected his job 
of conveying to the reader the eventhood of the speech, so that the burden 
of event detecting, as it \Vere, is shifted onto the reader. 
Now we turn our attention to ·FID, the other variety of non-tagged speech. 
From a formal point of view, FII) differs from FDD in that in FID the 
direct words are transmuted in the process of reporting: normally the 
present tense is back-shifted to past; first person and second person pronouns 
become third person. The stylistic effect of FID lies in the blending of the 
character's focalisation and the narrator's voice. Pascal (1977) refers to such 
peculiarity of FID as the 'dual voice'. One example: 
141-16 She must escape! Frank \VOUld save her. He would give her life, 
perhaps love, too. But she \Vanted to live. Why should she be 
unhappy? (Joyce, 'Eveline': 41) 
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Clearly, the narrator's "hand" is more perceptible in FID than in FDD. In I 
[41-16, the third person pronoun 'she' and the back-shifted modal verb 
'would' can be judged to emanate from the narrator, rather than from the 
character. In terms of event description in narrative, however, it is 
important to note that narratorial presence of this kind has almost no bearing 
upon the presence of the narrator as the event teller. As well ·as in [4]-15, 
the, graphological sequence in (4)-16 can not properly be regarded as a 
linguistic realisation of a direct answer to the question 'What happened?', so 
that the sequence itself is not a direct description of story events. 
In short, it can be maintained that chiefly because of the lack of reporting 
clauses FID has good reason to be treated in the same way as FDD. Both 
speech forms share a common characteristic of directly showing the story 
world entities, though the directness differs in degree. They equally exhibit 
the utmost implicitness in terms of event telling; they can be thought of as 
elements out of which the reader might construct the eventhood of what is 
uttered, and how the utterance is made. 
4.3.3 Tagged speech 
The other form of Sff presentation can be categorised as tagged speech. A 
common feature of tagged speech is that it is normally accompanied by a tag, 
Le. a reporting clause. The primary function of a tag can be said to indicate 
that a verbal act was performed by someone in the story. In a traditional 
scheme there are two distinct speech forms with a tag, i.~. DD and ID. In 
this section we contend that, as far as the narrator's involvement as the event 
indicator with verbal entities in the story world is concerned, there is no 
need to distinguish the t\vo forms, and that the traditional concept of 
narratorial presence \vhich has been employed to make that .distinction is 
irrelevant. 
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, Let us start our discussion hy comparing these examples: 
(41-17 John said,' 1 \viii die here today.' 
[4)-18 John said that he \Vould die there that day. 
Normally, the degree of narratorial filtration is considered higher in ID than 
in 00. In 141-18, which is an II), there is a shift of tense, person and 
adverbials from proximity reference to distance, and the shift is ascribable to 
the narrator. But if one attends to the tag attached to each of the two 
sentences and recognises it as an index of the narrator's cognising act which 
can be reckoned as telling the reader what happened, then one will see that 
there is virtually no difference between [4]-17 and [4]-18, and that, in [4]-
18, the way in which the narrator manipulates the original speaker's direct 
words in the embedded clause has hardly any relation to the narratorial trace 
as the event teller which can he observed in the matrix clause. 
What needs our special attention is the semantic feature of the tag. 
Presumably, one of the most common verbs used in a reporting clause will 
be 'say'. One must note the "emptiness" or the marked generality of the 
meaning of this verb. Ho\v general it sounds will be understood by 
imagining a situation in \Vhich someone attempts a very generalised event 
description which goes 'John did something' where the world entity 
perceived by the speaker should more specifically be described as 'John 
murdered Rebecca'. Whether 'John did something' in that particular 
situation can be conceived of as a proper, substantial event description or not 
might be a pragmatic problem, but one must admit that under normal 
circumstances it hardly makes an answer to the question 'What happened?' 
Three significant implications may be pointed out with respect to the formal 
features of tagged speech. Firstly, \Vhen the narrator employs remarkably 
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general verbs in the tag, such as 'say' or 'tell', and the tag consists only of 
the subject and a generic-sounding verb as in 'he said', the degree of 
narratorial involvement or presence as the event teller is almost as low as it 
is in non-tagged speech. Secondly, the degree of narratorial·presence may 
vary according to the suhstantiality of the "meaning" of the tag. Look at the 
following example: 
[41-19 'They told me something,' said Harriet rather hesitatingly. 
(Austen, Enuna: 240) 
In this example, the generic impression of 'said' is considerably mitigated by 
the specific-sounding adverbial phrase 'rather hesitatingly'. In this respect, 
it could be argued, the substantiality of narratorial presence ~s the event 
teller is higher than if the tag had been presented merely as 'said Harriet'. 
Lastly, when the focus is placed upon the extent to which the tag is 
substantialised, it will be found that the traditionally accepted mounting 
order of narratorial presence from DO to ID can be reversed. Compare the 
following examples: 
[41-20 John protested, 'I won't go to work today' 
[4.1-21 John said that he \vouldn't go to work that day. 
Despite the direct showing of the original speaker's words in the reported 
clause in (4.1-20, a noticeably charged verb 'protested' in the tag can be 
reckoned as good evidence that the narrator rather actively performed his 
job as the event teller. On this point, the narrator in [4]-20 is more 
perceptible than he is in (4]-21, where he seems to be more concerned with 
interfering with the character's voice (in a neutral way) than with conveying 
to the reader a meaningful message about what happened. 
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With the embedded clause in an II), there can be a lot of doubt as to how 
faithful the narrator is to the \vording of the original speaker. A classic 
discussion can be found in Quine ( 1976: 185-96), in which the distinction 
between the so-called 'transparent reading' and 'opaque reading' is brought 
into focus. It is true that in the ID sentence 'Oedipus said that his mother 
was not ·his mother' the contradictory content of the embedded clause will 
convince the reader that the narrator's control over the original speaker's 
voice is more than the transformation of proximal reference to distance, but 
in most cases (particularly in fictional situations) there is no way of knowing 
exactly how intervening the narrator is, and the reader will have no 
alternative but to take it that the character's original speech is more or less 
directly (or indirectly) conveyed in the embedded clause. Let us close our 
discussion in this section by confirming that no matter how manipulative the 
narrator is ·in the embedded clause in an ID, it has no direct bearing 
upon how perceptible he is in the tag as the event describer. 
4.3.4 NRS/T A 
When verbal entities in the story \Vorld are presented by the narrator in the 
form of NRSrr A (Narrative Report of Speechrfhought Acts), the reader 
will generally feel that the narrator's filtering process is most conspicuous. 
Consider the follo\ving examples: 
.(4)-22 (Ignatius Gallaher puffed thoughtfully at his cigar) and then, in a 
calm historian's tone, he proceeded to sketch for his friend some 
pictures of the corruption \vhich was rife abroad. (Joyce, 'A 
Jjttle Cloud': 85) 
(4)-23 (Meeting her a third time by accident) he found courage to make 
an appointment.. (Joyce, 'A Painful Case': 122) 
When reading sentences I ike 141-22 and 14)-23, the reader will infer that 
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some speech acts were performed by the characters, but he can not see what 
they were like; the character's original wording is almost completely buried 
under the narrator's filtration, i.e. his cognising act, so that the reader has no 
way of retrieving even a fragment of the original speech. The narrator's 
total involvement with the story world entities, as manifested in NRSff, is 
comparable to the way in which he acts upon non-verbal entities and narrates 
them. When the narrator performs a cognising act and verbalises a certain 
entity as 'John walked', he can be said to be as wholly respon~ible for his 
verbalising act as he is \Vhen he cognises the same entity as 'John lifted his 
left foot two inches off the ground \Vhile swinging it forward and, displacing 
his centre of gravity .... ' 
The traditional schematisation of narratorial presence indicates that the 
narrator is more perceptible in NRSff A than in tagged speech, i.e. DO and 
10. But when the concept of 'narratorial presence' is more specified, or 
narrowed down, and applied to the way in which the narrator is concerned 
with semantic substantialisation of his event telling, it will be found that the 
borderline betwe.en NRS!f A and tagged speech is not necessarily clear-cut. 
In general, the narrator's presence as the event teller may well be higher in 
NRS/T A than in tagged speech, particularly when general-sounding verbs 
like 'say' or 'tell' are the only constituents of the predicates in tags. But as 
already observed, tags can be noticeably "coloured" or substantialised in 
various ways, and when the degree of substantialisation in tags is 
considerably high, as one can see in D.H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers, for 
example, then it might be even possible that the narratorial presence as the 
event teller is higher in tagged speech than in NRSff A. When the reader 
finds a very event-conscious narrator in DD as in: 
f4]-24 'You told her, then?' came the sarcastic answer. (Lawrence, Sons 
and Lovers: 389) 
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then, the narratorial "hand" will be felt to be more conspicuous than when he 
came across a less specific NRSff A version of f4l-18 which goes 'His mother 
said something briefly'. l,his implicates that, as far as the degree of the 
narrator's involvement as the event cogniser is concerned, the well-accepted 
order of narratorial presence can be reversed between tagged speech and 
NRSff A, just as it can he between DD and ID. In that respect, it does not. 
make much sense to draw a clear distinction between tagged speech and 
NRSrf A; a possible reason for making the distinction between the two - if 
there is any - might be that tagged speech is formally characterised by the 
presence of reporting clauses, whereas NRSff A is not. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
Our discussion tn 4.3 \Vas an attempt to reformulate the traditional 
schematisation of narratorial presence in terms of the eventhood of srr 
presentation. The criterion for postulating an alternative scheme was the 
degree of the formally detectable involvement of the narrator as the event 
cogniser. Our new scheme can be shown as follows: 
<Perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser> 
Tagged Speech Non-Tagged· Speech 




" Explicit Implicit Implicit 
Figure 4.7 
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The noticeable characteristic of Figure 4.7 is, as mentioned before, that the 
con·cept of narratorial presence is specifically taken as that of the 
perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser. And Figure 4.7 
contrasts markedly with Figure 4.6, which is a traditional system of srr 
presentation in that the former exhibits a quality gap between Non-Tagged 
Speech and Tagged Speech/NRS!f A, whereas the latter adopt the notion of 
cline in the representation of the mounting order of narratorial presence 
ranging from FDD to NRS/T A. A reasonable explanation of the quality 
gap observable in Figure 4.7 will be as follows. When narratorial presence 
is construed as the perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser, 
Tagged Speech and Non-Tagged Speech are to be differentiated from each 
other in terms of quality, since the reporting clause (or the tag) in the 
former can make a direct answer to the question 'What happened?', whereas 
speech/thought presentation with no tag in the latter can only make an 
implicit answer to the same question. It would ·be reasonable to argue that 
the perceptibility of the narrator as the event teller is higher in Tagged 
Speech in which the narrator describes an event in the form of proposition 
than in Non-Tagged Speech in which the narrator does not refer to what 
happened (e.g. John said) in an explicit way. 
Another important characteristic of Figure 4.7 is that Tagged Speech is 
placed in the same domain as NRS!f A, and the most immediate reason for 
this is that the tag in Tagged Speech (e.g. 'John protested' in 'John protested, 
"I won't work today"') can make a direct answer to the question 'What 
happened?' in exactly the same way that NRSff A (e.g. Lucy complained 
about her small salary) can he a formally appropriate answer to the same 
question. 
Now the individual items in Figure 4.7 can be accounted for as follows. 
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To begin with, the vertical solid line distinguishing between non-tagged 
speech and tagged speech & NRSff A operates as a borderline separating the 
non-gradable domain of implicitness of non-tagged speech from the gradable 
domain of implicitness/explicitness of tagged speech and NRSff A. 
Secondly, the reason why FDD and FIT) are parenthesised on the non-tagged 
speech side is that there can be no practical need to distinguish the two speech 
forms in terms of the perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser. 
The same goes for DD and ID on the tagged speech side. 
Thirdly, the possibility that both tagged speech and NRSffA can be almost 
as implicit as non-tagged speech in the light of the narrator's event cognition 
is designated by the two opposite directing arrows on the left side of the 
figure which suggest that the narratorial involvement can be maximally 
implicit even in tagged speech and NRSrr A. 
Lastly, the co-existence of tagged speech and NRSrr A on the left side of the 
figure suggests that, as far as the implicit/explicit level with respect to. the 
narratorial presence under discussion is concerned, the gradability of the two 
forms can be similar to each other. 
One important implication in our argument in 4.3 is that the reader can play 
a significant role as an event cogniser, particularly when coming across non-
tagged speech, \Vhich can be taken as shown to the reader "unprocessed" by 
the narrator. This is closely related to the problem of event sequencing in 
narrative discourse. The relationship bet\veen the graphological sequence in 
narrative and the event sequence \Viii be the focal point of discussion in 
Chapter 6. 
As a preliminary to Chapter 6, tn C:hapter 5 we attempt a linguistic 
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investigation of the relation between perspective, aspect, and the event/non-
nt distinction mainly on the sentence-grammar basis. One of the focal eve 
matters of interest in Chapter 5 is to reveal the theoretical drawbacks of 
rneta-time approaches employed by formal analysts of narrative discourse. 
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Chapter 5 Perspective, aspect, and narrative dynamics 
This chapter is a linguistic and ontological inquiry into narrativity or 
narrative dynamics. We aim at: 1) showing that, from a formal point of 
view, eventhood in a particular linguistic expression is to be discussed in 
terms of the expression's function as a temporal-sequentiality indicator; 2) 
clarifying that an ontological approach to the relation between eventhood and 
the notion of presentness is crucially important in orde.r to appreciate 
narrative dynamics properly. The discussion will be generally··based upon 
the ontological observations of time, event and change that we made in 
chapter 3. Our fundamental contention is that it is a linguistic/ontological 
mistake to assume particular lexical/grammatical features to be inherently 
associated with eventhood, and that persp~cti~al restrictions (t¢mpora1 ones) 
are responsible for the choice of the aspectual features of con.te.xtualisation in 
determining whether a particular· expression can be interpreted as an event 
or not. With a view to elucidating the nature of temporal perspective that is 
a key element in our discussion, the two facets of presentness will be focused 
upon. .·.:. 
5.1 The two facets of presentness 
5.1.1 A preliminary orientation 
The following dialogue well exemplifies the problem of the grammatical 
approach to events, \vhich \Ve arc going to examine critically in this chapter: 
Ted: John is working now. (People know John is very lazy.) 
Joan: Is he? What a change! What a big event ! 
Alex: No, No, that is a state , not an event. 
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At first glance, there seems to be no important problem involved here, but in 
· fact the discrepant reactions of Joan and Alex to Ted's utterance have highly 
complicated and controversial connotations of linguistic and ontological 
depth. These two differing responses, it could be said, reflect the two 
interlocutors' different views of the world. 
It will be agreed that Joan's reaction is rather normal and commonsensical, 
compared with Alex's, which is highly marked and unusual. It is the Alex-
type point of view that has been shared by most of the formal analysts of · 
narrative dynamics, whose main concern is to contrive a typology of 
"linguistic" events (and states), on the dualistic assumption that it is possible 
and reasonable to set up "linguistic" events as distinct from real world 
events. 
One of the significant implications involved in the dialogue above concerns 
the linguistic and ontological problem of whether it is legitimate to 
acknowledge a certain fixed and stable relation between intrinsically semantic 
features, such as events and states, and the grammatical form of language. 
And another implication is concerned with the way in which the present 
time, or presentness can and should be viewed in terms of the A-series, i.e. 
the past-present-future scheme which, as we discussed in Chapter 3, is 
considered to constitute the human sense of time. 
The main objective in this chapter is t<? prove, on the basis of the ontological 
discussion we made in Chapter 3, that the Alex-type view of the world can in 
no way be justified, and to put forward a theoretical framework that will 
enable the reader of narrative to recognise the eventhood of states of affairs 
such as verbally expressed by Ted's discourse. - What will be emphasised in 
the course of discussion is the flexible and commonsensical role of the reader 
as the event detector in narrative · discourse, which tends to exert a 
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perspectival and grammatical "yoke" upon the reader (particularly upon the 
formally-trained reader) in recognising narrative dynamics. 
5.1.2 Spurious cventhood 
The essential relation between time and change was discussed in Chapter 3. 
our awareness of time depends upon our awareness of change or event. 
No-one will deny this, but one might ask a rather naive question: 'If change 
or event is essential to time, then what happens· to time when there is no 
change, that is, when our consciousness focuses on the statehood or 
objecthood, not on the eventhood, of some entity?' For instance, Moens 
(1987: 43) defines states as follows: 'States are "unbounded", although they 
seem to extend in time - no reference is made to their start and end points.' 
Here it is pointed out that states are also temporal , and we must agree that 
this is an empirical truth~ as everyone knows, duration or the length of time 
is a very important notion when we make reference to temporal phenomena 
in the world. Then ho\v is it possible to account for the temporal 
characteristics of non-events like states? 
The answer to this question seems to lie in what I call spurious eventhood of 
the transition of time points in the clock sense. It is to be noted that the 
notion of 'clock-time' implies the notion of transition or change. We know, 
for example, that 8:30 is followed by 8:31, or that 1993 A.D. is followed by 
1994 A.D.. It appears reasonable to assume that the transition of time points 
like these can be thought of as change or event, because it is possible to claim 
that an identical entity called titne point undergoes change each time the 
point of time "moves". If we accept this as wholly true, then things will 
become contradictory; we \Vill have to say that states are also events, because 
states have some extension of time that is made up of time points in the clock 
sense. But in our understanding, events and states are two distinct 
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cognitive/perceptual activities, and should be differentiated from each other. 
The crucially important point is that time points are construed as 
representing ti1ne itself, and are by no means states of affairs in the normal 
and ordinary sense. The change of time points is not as substantial as the 
change of states of affairs such as someone's facial expressions or the bank 
rate. This is the reason why I call it spurious: it is no proper change or 
event. It must be acknowledged that when we recognise a change in 
something, the change \Ve perceive is the change· that happened to the 
something, not the change that happened to the point of time. Under normal 
circumstances, this spurious eventhood is entirely backgrounded in our 
consciousness, and this explains why we can recognise and say that something 
is in a certain state, with no perceivable change, and that the state will extend 
in time. 
Now getting back to the ontological principle claiming the intrinsic relation 
between time and change, we must pay attention to the fact that by accepting 
the change of time points - as part of our temporal experience - the 
truthfulness of the ontological principle can be confirmed. People often say, 
'Nothing has changed; only time has passed.' At first blush, this saying 
seems to work against the principle that insists upon the essential relation 
between time and change, but we could paraphrase it as: 'No st~te of affairs I 
has changed, but the point of time has changed.' In summing up, it would 
be feasible to argue that, as far as normal events, involving things and 
objects, are concerned, \Ve perceive time in the change that occurred to a 
particular entity (in this case the change of time points is not focused on in 
our consciousness), and that, as far as states are concerned, we perceive time 
in the spurious events consisting of the change of time points. (Note that the 
point of time can be elastically conceptualised such as 'the moment', 'the 
hour', 'the day', 'the year'.) 'fhis means that in any case change is essential 
to time; where there is change, there is time, and vice versa. 
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It is now clear that the ongoing discussion will lead us to the observation that 
the· spurious eventhood we have been mentioning so far is the backbone of 
our awareness of the so-called eternity, permanency, eternal truth of 
mathematics, or objecthood. When we say X is eternal, .it is virtually 
tantamount to saying that X's eternity is guaranteed through the ever-
changing time points. We might be able. to say that it is particularly when 
we think of markedly changeless, ever-stable quality of something that the 
spurious eventhood can be foregrounded in our mind. Semanticists and 
grammarians may label the proposition: 'God is just' as 'eternal truth' (cf. 
Lyons, 1977: 680), but \Vhat is to be remembered is that such labelling is 
supported by the awareness of the spurious eventhood. 
5.1.3 The relative and absolute nature of the A-series 
MacTaggart's theory of time ( 1927) shed light on the ontological nature of 
time. Presumably, one of the greatest observations he made is that change 
entails the cognitive/perceptual activity on the part of a conscious being. 
But his theory is not without problems. Firstly, he refers to events like 'the 
death of Queen Anne' in the B-series. It is an ontological mistake to 
mention events (recognised changes) in the B-series in which things and 
objects are located at fixed points of time in an absolute manner. In our 
understanding an event is impossible without the cognition of change, and 
change is an intrinsic feature peculiar to the A-series. The second problem, 
whi~h is the focal point in the present section and the next, concerns his 
inadequate awareness of the ontological characteristics of each of the three 
determinations, i.e. past, present, and future. What he overlooks are: 1) the 
inherently relative and at the same time absolute nature of the three 
determinations; 2) the active nature of .presentness; 3) the two possible 
varieties of past, present .. and future. In. the present section we concentrate 
on 1) and 2). 
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The discussion of the three points given above will elucidate the 
· t' of 'sto y t' ' h charactens tcs r pres en ' c aracter now', 'narrative time' or 
'reference time', the investigation of which is the immediate purpose of the 
· present thesis. 
MacTaggart rightly pointed out the relative characteristic of the three 
determinations, i.e. past, present. and future by saying that the meaning of 
one of them is entirely dependent upon that of the t\vo (ibid.: 20). But he 
failed to clarify the absolute nature of the A-series. 
What we mean by the absolute nature of the A-series is concerned with its 
regional absoluteness. Once we single out a particular point of time as the 
present, the time before is absolutely the past, and the time after that is 
absolutely the future. And more importantly, once we set up the three 
temporal regions, it becomes irrelevant and pointless to subdivide each 
region into the sub-past, the sub-present, and the sub-future. 
The reason why this is the case might be inferred from the active role of the 
present, as compared with the passivity of the past and the future. The 
focus-carrying nature of the present will be understood when we draw 
attention to the fact that, if \Ve take a particular point of time as the present, 
the past and the future are automatically set up. In other words, the past and 
the future make sense only in relation to the present. This seems to suggest 
that the three determinations arc not equal in status in our minds. Taking 
the consciousness-involving nature of the A-series into account, it would be 
argued that presentness is inexplicably intertwined with what might be 
termed 'the focus' or 'the focalised part' of human concsiousness. This 
will account for the fact . the three temporal determinations are absolute 
entities which reject being subdivided into sub-determinations. The present, 
as distinct from the past and the future, has an absolute function as the 
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focus, so that it is meaningless and irrelevant to make the focus dual by 
decomposing the present into the three sub-determinations. 
5.1.4 The time-point A-series vs. the significant A·series 
With the assumption that the present is the focus or the centre of the past-
present-future series, we will be able to posit two kinds of event series. We 
call them the titne-point A-series and the significant A-series respectively. 
By the time-point A-series \ve mean a temporal series in which the 
movement of time points can be thought of as representing the renewal or 
change of presentness. As we observed in the last section, this is not the 
series of real events; the transition or movement of time points in the 
chronos sense only represents substitutionary eventhood with no 
involvement of the change in substantial states of affairs. 
When St. Augustine referred to the all-at-oneness of past, present, and 
future, saying: 'The present of past things is the memory; the present of , 
present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is 
expectation' (St. Augustine, 1961: 267), he was presumably contemplating 
past, present, and future in the time-point A .. series. When he thought about 
the present, what he had in mind was the perceptible quality of the ever-
fleeting presentness as a punctual point of time (though, I believe, the 
concept of nanoseconds would have made no sense in his days). 
By contrast, the significant A-series is a story-like series of events in which 
the p~esent can be distinguished from the past through the change in states of 
I 
affairs in the world, either real or fictional., The most salient feature of this 
temporal series is that the consciousness of significance of some kind makes 
a temporal distinction between the past and the present. Let us imagine an 
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astronaut staying in outer space for the first time in his life. If he captures 
this situation on the conscious level and gives it a verbal expression like: 'I'm 
now in outer space', it is undoubtedly an event description. Judging from 
the situation or the context in which the expression is given, the eventhood it 
refers to should be clear to the astronaut himself ( 'the character' in a 
narrative sense). And the eventhood should be also clear to those people 
('the reader', again, in a narrative sense) who, with the contextual 
knowledge, hear or read what the astronaut said. Note that the temporal 
adverb 'now' can help both the speaker and the listener to recognise in an 
accentuated way that the situation is different at the present time from what it 
used to be. 
Ontologically speaking, an event is marked by an awareness of te1nporal 
sequentiality. And in the astronaut's case, the temporal sequentiality is to be 
perceived in the contrast of two different phases for the astronaut, i.e. the 
time when he was on earth, and the time when h~ is in outer space; the 
former will be labelled as 'the past' in contrast to the presentness of the 
latter. 
Th~ crucial point to be emphasised concerning the two kinds of presentness, 
one in the time-point A-series and the other in the significant A-series, is 
their difference in dimensional quality. It must be recognised that the 
difference between the two NOWs is not the difference in duration or 
physical length of time. Reference to points of time may seem to suggest the 
punctual and rather atomic nature of the present time in the time-point A-
series, but, as already pointed out in 5.1.2, it need not be atomic. 
Depending upon the situation, the point can vary in length. On the other 
hand, one may have an impression that the ·significant NOW is generally 
lengthy or extended, compared with the time-point NOW, but it can be 
momentary in terms of duration. For example, if someone has finished 
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writing a project, the moment can be perceived as an event that constitutes a 
neW present time for him. What is worth noting is that it is in the time-
point NOW that the notion of duration in the physical sense matters and is 
directly relevant, and that in the significant NOW, duration in the physical 
sense is insignificant and rather irrelevant. And what is peculiar to the 
significant NOW is that the sense of now-ness is squeezed out of one's 
awareness of eventhood in a particular state of affairs as one goes along in 
life; this awareness of eventhood will not presuppose one's being conscious 
of NOW as a time point in the physical sense. 
Lastly, it is to be noted that NOWs in the significant A-series are not 
necessarily linear in their arrangement. Getting back to the astronaut's case, 
we could argue that, though his staying in outer space makes a NOW for him 
in a significant A-series, his seeing a meteor passing by the spaceship, for 
instance, can constitute a new NOW, i.e. a new event for him in another 
significant A-series, without affecting the presentness, or the eventhood, of 
his staying in outer space. Due to the cognitive principle of selectivity that 
we discussed in_ 3.5.1, he cannot perceive the two different NOWs at the 
same time; when he attends to one, the other will be backgrounded. But he 
might be able to assert that (at the time he saw the meteor) the two NOWs, 
though oscillating in mind, "exist" for hiq1. 
One of the most important points of argument in the present thesis is that 
narrative is less associated with the time-point A-series than with the 
significant A-series, and that the inquiry into how to detect story events must 
be made in terms of the temporal series of significant NOWs. With the 
characteristics of the two series of time discussed so far in mind, we look 
into the problem of narrative perspective in 5.2. 
5.1.5 Conclusion 
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S.l was intended as an improvement or elaboration upon the time theory 
· advanced by MacTaggart. In order to describe properly the relation 
between time and event we postulated the two past-present-future schemes, 
i.e. the time-point A-series and the significant A-series. . The former, 
concerned with our awareness of meta-time, or time itself, is the series of 
obj~ctively measurable time points that can be conceptualised independent of 
actual states of affairs in the world, and the latter,i conc~rned with our 
awareness of object-time, is the series of real events responsible for our 
. I 
sense of temporal sequentiality in actual states of affairs·:, ....... The focal point 
of the discussion was that presentness literally occupies the central place in 
the past-present-future scheme, and is to be given priority over the past and 
the future. 
5.2 Narrative perspective and event description . 
5.2.1 A parallel between narrative and reality 
The aim of the present section is to attempt a general discussion of some 
similarities between narrative (or story) and real life as a preliminary to the 
examination of the peculiarities of narrative perspective. 
Culler (1975: 189) refers to the existence of the fundamental convention of 
narrative fiction as follows: 
... For the basic convention which governs the novel- and which, a 
fortiori, governs those novels which set out to violate it- is our 
expectation that the novel will produce a world (italics ar~ mine). 
This observation by Culler bears strong resemblan~e to what John Fowles 
says from a writer's point of view: ' ... we wish to create Worlds as real as, 
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but other than the world that is. Or was' (1972:· 86).· ·Th~· veracity of their 
remarks will be confirmed in the actual process of readi'ng:narrative; the 
reader will .normally be able to see the world, .or the· ~'reaHtyi', of fiction 
unfolded before his eyes. The concreteness of the created world, as a 
spatio-temporal particular, is suggested by Traugott and Pnttt (1980: 248) 
when they define narrative as: 'esse~tially. a way .. of linguistically 
representing past experience, whether real or imagin~d.~. · ..·· N~rrative fiction 
comprises events as "real" as those which actually··o¢cur 'in :the real world. 
And, as Mendilow ( 1952: 35) says, t~is creation_~f.re~lity .or.·a +~al world. is 
made possible only through the" close Cooperation' ·bet\v~en reil.de~ and writer. 
, I: ' ' • 
. ·' 
The story world and the real world in .. which We liv(lo~kvery simil~r to 
each other in·. so far as they are· both ·spati6-tempo~~l cons.tru.¢ts{·. Howeve.r, 
the· illusory. nature of narrative, as the inedi.utrt ~.repr~~~~·t1t1g.: ~· world,· has 
often been pointed out. Mendilow (op: 'cit;, 81) referS ·to· 'the illusiOn-
. . . ..·. . . 
creating function of language in narrative as rrih~~s: ... · ·.· .. · ·. 
' •' I ·, 
. .~ • •• • • • .• ,. • •• ! 
Language cannot convey non-verb~Lexpeii~nc~: bei~g sU~c.~ssi~e a.nd 
linear, it cannot express simultaneous experienceS; ~eing/~~inposed of· .. ·:: 
separate and divisible units, whether of W9rd·~··hr.'gi:oup~,.·.of·~Q*ds,·it :_~ ··. · 
cannot .rev·eal the unbroken flow of the proce.ss ·:o( liv~ng:-.:: :Reality:.:. · '· · ·.· ...... 
cannot be expressed or conveyed~ oniy ~he';illusion=o(it_·: :: .:··, <· ..... ·. · .. 
:. • : •• •••• : • • • 0 ' ·, • • • • .. ~ • 
I ~ ' ' •: 1 -. I ' 0' , , ; .· ,' : .· ·.·: .· 
Wales (1990: 300) also mentions the illusorY'·qu3Jit; ofil~rrittiVe: 'That 
literature can give a ref! ecti on of lift: is o~i y.' aii ·tlli.tsi On.' Si~·ce ~ Oi:dS mUSt 
replace the actions.' What both MendiloW arld'Wales ttni>h~iseis the gap 
or discrepancy between a symbolised ·re.pre~.entatidil' of t~e ·world thr()ugh 
linguistic signs and the world itself .. · ·, . · , · '· ·' ' ~.;, '{ •·· .· . . 
: ~ ' . . . .'·:"'-: ;.; ; ..:.' ~: . :: ...: ~ . . <. ~ .. ~ . ' . 
•. 
..· ... 
It is true that the graphological seqoenceoflinguiSt.ic Sign~ that ccin~titutes 
narrative is not the world itself; ·-itju~t,tepre$e~ts·.;a~w~rld~.: In narrative~ 
... · .. . . 
. · ... . ,· 




, . ,• 
~.' 
nothing is perceptib~e, tactile, .or· tangi?,le, 4uite unlike the real world. On 
this p~int ~e mus~ ackn~wledge thatrWales is right. But what Mendilow 
says seems t~ deser~e careful consideration. Our contention is that narrative 
reflects a very important aspect ·of reali~y or fictional reality, and that it is 
not to be' dismissed merely as an ill~siori .. of life. 
The tendency .to try to ,see a cl~ar-put contrast between narrative and reality 
can be.also observed in the following rema~k by Mendilow (op. cit.: 42) with 
respect to wh~t he c~lls the artistic economy of narrative: ' ... all the 
longue~rs, the heterogeneity and the irrelevances of life, the casual as distinct 
from the causal events, are eliminated in accordance \Vith the principle of 
artistic economy'. The lack of artistic economy in real life is referred to as 
follows: 'Real life' is ~ kind of chance-medley, consisting of many 
unconnected scenes' (Baubauld, 1810: 55, quoted in Mendilow, ibid.: 47). 
The discrepancies bet~een 'narrative and real life, as mentioned above, 
should not be overrated i{ ~e call our attention to the consecutivity, 
discontinuity, or selectivi~y of ·pur verbal behaviour that can be best 
' . 
simulated or represented .... by the graphological linearity in narra.tive 
discourse. Reality .is, the world we experience, and our experience consists 
0 I 0 
of sensation, perception and co·gnition. Among these three, only sensation .. I 
concerns simultaneitY or cont~mporaneousness of our experience; it is our 
common experi~nce that more than one item can come into our eyes at the 
same time wh~n, we see a particula·r area, a garden, for example. But when 
it comes to perception or cognition, the principle of 'one thing at a time' 
governs, as we obs~rved in Chapter 3 where the selectivity of human 
perc~pti on -~as ·>brought into f~cus., ·'"'1Per.cepti on', Gross (1987: ~~) says, 'is 
an: ·active process which involves selection, inference and orgaqisation.' If 
. . . ' \ . 
so, we would be justified in clai.ming that perception is closely related to our 
verbalising act in that it helps to make the world discontinuous both spatially 
' . 
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and temporally. (On this point it must be admitted that perception and 
cognition, wh~ch concern our awareness of objects and facts respectively, 
are not as disttnct from each other as one might suppose). From this we can 
conclude that as a mirror of reality as something to be experienced on the 
level of sensation, narrative is nothing but a poor instrument (narrative does 
not lend itself to expressing what Banfield (1982) calls 'non-reflective 
consciousness' simply because things are verbally expressed), but that 
narrative, viewed differently, can be reckoned as reflecting real life with a 
high fidelity because of its graphological, unidirectional presentation that 
simulates non-simultaneous, consecutive verbal activities of human beings. 
Mendilow places a great deal of emphasis upon the artistic economy of 
narrative in comparison with the irrelevancies-ridden aspect of real life. 
But this gap should not be too accentuated, either. Sperber and Wilson 
(1986: 119) argue that people's intuitions of relevance make them distinguish . 
relevant from irrelevant information. Assuming that real life consists of the 
co-relation between the external world and ourselves, we could argue that 
when our consciousness acts upon the world, the relevance-seeking mind 
operates, and that to the extent that the mind works, the world tends to be 
captured as something connected; significant, homogeneous, and causal but 
not casual. ·Of course such mental behaviour is not necessarily. artistic (this 
is where real life greatly differs from narrative in which perspectival choices 
of various kinds, made by the author-narrator, can contribute to making the 
text sound artistic), but real life, seen froni that perspective, will come close 
to narrative in that both have a common attitude toward seeing a kind of 
unity or coherence in states of affairs. It is possible to observe a parallel 
between real life and narrative \vhen Fo\vler (1986: 64) says: ' ... texts tend to 
be cohesive, to stay on the same topic.' What Fowler says is in line with 
Friedman's remark ( 1967: 131 ): ' ... the very act of writing is a process of 
abstraction, selection, omission., and arrangement.' Any narrative, as a text, 
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tends to stick to the same topic in a particular spatio-temporal framework, 
and it might be argued that real life, as far as our discontinuity-oriented, 
relevance-minded consciousness operates, tends to be on the same topic, 
similarly in a particular spatia-temporal framework in which we live. 
5.2.2 Existential perspective 
In the preceding section we discussed some similarities between narrative 
and real life. In this section we turn our attention to the problem of 
perspective as another aspect of resemblance between the story world and the 
real world. Putting aside the problem ofperspective in narrative, which we 
are going to examine later, in the present section \Ve discuss what might be 
termed existential perspective, which designates our live and on-the-spot 
point of view in real life from which we describe events we notice in and 
around ourselves. 
In real life we are inherently tied to HERE and NOW. Both 'here' and 
'now' are deictics, so that they actually designate different spatio-temporal 
loci as we go along in life. Jespersen (1924: 258) points out that NOW need 
not be a mathematical point; it can have some duration, just as HERE can 
vary in size· according to circumstances. When referring to the possibility 
that NOW can be extended in time, Jespersen must have had no clear 
distinction in mind between the presentness in the time-point A-series and 
that in the significant A-series, which we discussed in 5.1.4. Presumably he 
was alluding to the durational variety of what we call the time-point NOW. 
Whether the presentness we feel is a time-point one or a significant one, and 
whether i'ts duration is atomic or extended, we have no alternative but to live 
with our NOW until \Ve die. Of course ·we are not always event-conscious 
in our life. This means \VC do not recognise renewed now-ness or 
eventhood all the time, and this is because we do not always consciously act 
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upon the world. As we observed in Chapter 3, one's event recognition is 
closely related to the working of the mind conscious enough to verbalise 
things. Therefore, on the preconscious or unconscious level no clear notion 
of present as against past or future would be possible. In other words, our 
sense of time is backgrounded on the preconscious or unconscious level. 
But as tong as we become event-conscious, time is with us. What we mean 
by existential perspective is a point of view from which we feel NOW 
synchronously in real tertns. This perspective excludes the retrospective 
sense of NOW which is now the past, such as in: 'At that time the event 
made a new NOW for me.' And needless to say, such synchronous now-ness 
_ entails a spatial counterpart, i.e. the here-ness. This now-ness is the intrinsic 
temporal perspective that is inseparable from our life, our existence, so that 
it is existential for us. 
If one attempts to find a narrative version of existential perspective, one may 
feel that it is almost identical with what narrative theorists call 'internal 
perspective' (Fowler, 1977), 'synchronous point of view' (Uspensky, 1973), 
or 'internal focalisation' (Rimmon-Kenan, ;1983). One important difference 
between existential perspective and those narrative concepts is that the 
former is a variety of one's temporal stance in event description, whereas the 
latter are concerned not only with temporal perspective but also with what 
Chatman (1978: 151-152) calls 'figurative point of view' such as ideology 
and conceptual systems (the difference between the two will be referred to 
again in 5.3.1 ). Existential perspective is a temporal perspective of someone 
actually living, and this is where it greatly differs from narrative concepts 
like internal perspective or internal focalisation. Being genuinely 
synchronous, and not retrospective, existential perspective is the dynamics-
oriented awareness of the present time that is renewable each time a new 
event is recognised. 
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s.2.3 Existential-perspective event description 
Existential perspective is a temporally immediate point of view from which 
to describe an event constituting the synchronous now-ness for the describer. 
Its linguistic/ontological characteristics will be generalised as follows: 
(a) The temporal immediacy of Existential-Perspective Event 
Description (hereafter EPED) entails Existential-Perspective Deictics 
(hereafter EPD) such as 'now' or 'just now' which, either explicitly 
expressed or just implied, indicate the describer's awareness of 
transiency or temporal sequentiality that is quintessential to 
eventhood. 
(b) EPED has an absolute nature as a linguistic expression. This 
means that on the intra-/extra-sentential level EPED does not lend 
itself to achronological or panchronic representation. This is 
because the temporal immediacy of EPED normally does· not give the 
describer the time to edit in a retrospective way the event(s) he is 
rendering. 
Of the two charact~ristics mentioned above, (a) is mainly concerned with the 
sentence-based linguistic/ontological features of EPED, and (b) is focusing 
upon its discoursal nature. In the following few sections we will look into 
(a) and (b). The focal point of argument is that contextualisation is a 
necessary condition for a particular linguistic form to be recognised as an 
event description, and that there can be perceived a co-relation between the 
series of now-ness in EPED on the discourse level and the series of story 
present in narrative discourse. We will invest~gate the characteristics of 
EPED on the assumption that doing so will help to elucidate the nature of 
narrativity or narrative dynamics, which is our immediate _purp·ose in the 
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present thesis. 
5.2.4 Existential-perspective deictics (EPD) and context 
The aim of this section is to show that a sentence can be taken as an EPED 
' 
irrespective of whether the now-ness implied in that sentence is to be counted 
as a time-point NOW or a significant NOW, depending upon the context. 
(For the purpose of the thesis, we will concentrate upon 'now' of the 'here-
and-now' of EPED, since the spatial deictics are less relevant than temporal 
ones in terms of event detection). 
To begin with, let us make a general comment on the relation between EPED 
and EPD. As far as the relation between the two items introduced in (a) in 
5.2.3 is concerned, what matters is whether one recognises a particular state 
of affairs as temporal enough to allow the interpretation of EPD such as 
'now' or 'just now' being implicated. What is meant by temporal is the 
describer's (and consequently the reader's) awareness of temporal 
sequentiality, i.e. the sense of some new situation being initiated, continuing, 
or terminated. Crucial is the fact that being temporal does not necessarily 
mean being temporary. Temporariness is closely associated with the notion 
of boundedness, which means that something has comparatively short 
duration, starting and ending at relatively precise points in time. In our 
understanding, however, boundedness is not a necessary condition for a 
particular state of affairs to be .labelled as an event. Eventhood holds when 
it is recognised that a new situation is started or ongoing. This is because 
the awareness of something new is going on will lead to the awareness of a 
change of state. Another important thing to be noted is that both the time-
point and significant NOW s are responsible for the sense of a particular state 
of affairs being temporal. Now we look into the relation between EPD and 
context more elaborately. 
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Let us first think of a situation ln which 'now' as an EPD can be reek<>tted as 
belonging to the significant A·series, As will be discussed in more detail in 
S.2.7, the present progressive has good reason to be 'thought of as a 
prototypical or superordinate grammatical form realising an EPED in terms 
of tense and aspect. One example: 
[5]-1 I'm (now) eating lunch in the kitchen. 
If the now-ness felt by the describer called ·•r is a significant one, there are 
two important characteristics to be attended to. One is the lack of the so-
called framing effect, and the other is the irrelevance of distinguishing 
between speech time and event time. The framing effect of the progressive, 
as we will observe later, concerns the time-point A-series, i.e. the 
consciousness of time as the series of objectively measurable points of time. 
· In [5]-1 the whole situation of eating lunch constitutes the sense of now-ness 
for the describer, which automatically distinguishes itself from the past 
situation in which the eating of lunch had not occurred. The second point is 
that in the significant A-series it makes no sense to distinguish between 
speech time and event time. It is when NOW is conceived of in the time-
point sense that conceiving of the two times as distinct entities will be 
meaningfuL Agairi, the notion of speech time is intimately associated with 
that of the framing effect of the progressive and oth~r grammatical forms 
generally considered to function like the progressive. Let us leave our 
discussion of [5]-1 as a case in which contextually NOW is a significant one 
by confirming that the eventhood implicated in that sentence is "objectively" 
clear to us. 
Secondly, we contemplate a case in .which 'now' as an EPD is contextually 
considered to belong to the time-point A-series. As a rather spe~ial context, 
one can imagine a situation in which [ 5]-1 is an answer to the question by 
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someone who made a phone call to the describer: 'It's half past twelve now. 
What are you doing now, John?'. Obviously, 'now' that appears twice here 
is a time-point NOW; in the questioner's mind the NOW as a time point is 
foregrounded. Then, what is the 'now' in [5]-1 like as an answer to the 
question? It is likely that, as a kind of discoursal inertia, the describer of 
[5]-1 will respond in terms of the time-point A-series. In that case, the so-
called 'framing effect' will be perceived; the describer's eating lunch can be 
taken as a situation stretching into the past and the future. But what is 
important is that his awareness of the time-point NOW does not prevent [5]-1 
from being labelled as an event. This is simply because the whole situation 
is interpreted as temporary enough to be described using 'now' as an EPD. 
If there is contextually a good reason for 'now'( either time-point or 
significant) to be explicitly employed, then the 'now' is clearly working as a 
temporal-sequentiality indicator, i.e. an event marker. 
It is to be noted that the awareness of NOW as a spurious event concerned 
with the change of time points lends itself to the awareness of speech time 
and event time as two distinct entities. One can easily notice a co-relation 
between this and the notion of ~raming effect of the progressive construction. 
The framing effect of the progressive has been referred to by many 
grammarian~ and linguists (cf. Jespersen, 1931: 180; Leech, 1971: 17). 
Jespersen, for example, illustrates the temporal frame of the progressive as 
follows (loc. cit. ): 
[5 J-2 He is writing 
(he has begun writing ) 
It is clear that 'NOW' in the diagram is a NOW as a spurious event, i.e. a 
time point around which the situation 'he is writing' stretches into the past 
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and the future as a frame. The time-point nature of this NOW conceived of 
in connection with the framing effect of the progressive will be clearly 
understood if we dravv' attention to the "active role" of the present as 
compared with the past or the future, as we discussed in 5.1.3. The most 
salient characteristic of the past-present-future scheme is that the past and the 
future make sense only when the present is regionally demarcated. This 
ontological fact accounts for the priority of NOW in the schematisation of 
[5]-2. In [5]-2 the state of affairs represented in the progressive is looked 
upon as attendant circumstances which stretch into the past and the future 
with the NOW as a kind of core or centre in the describer's mind. 
·ontologically speaking, the 'NOW' in [5]-2 is a temporal entity which is, as it 
were, standing by itself independent of the progressivised state of affairs. 
Such presentness can be virtually identified with that of speech time. It will 
be pointed out later that the formal notion that the progressive is generally to 
be classified as a state or a process, as distinct from an event, results from a 
well-accepted but rigid and unrealistic view of presentness which tends to 
take the time-point NOW, i.e. the "objective", clock-sense NOW, as the only 
presentness that is empirically verifiable. 
The problem with the schematisation shown in [5]-2 is that it fails to attend to 
the possibility that ·the progressivised state of affairs can constitute a 
significant NOW, i.e. an event in the proper sense of the term. Then, how 
are two varieties of now-ness ontologically connected with each other? The 
relation between the time-point and significant NOW s can be accounted for 
in the light of the focus-periphery theory (see 3.5.1). As far as the 
recognition of a change in a particular state of affairs, i.e. an event, is 
concerned, the two NOWs are not entirely exclusive of each other. When 
the significant NOW is focused upon in mind, the time-point NOW is held 
out of the centre of attention because it belongs to a different dimension. By 
contrast, due to the authenticity of the significant NOW attached to EPED, 
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even when the time-point NOW is contextually foregrounded, it does not 
mean that the significant NOW is entirely gone; it is, as it were, waiting to be 
recalled, replacing the time-point NOW. The point is that the two NOWs 
" . t" . It I . cannot exts stmu aneous y, owtng to the one-thing-at-a-time principle of 
human perception/cognition. 
Qntologically speaking, the greatest difference between the two NOWs is as 
follows: with the time-point NOW, setting up of a particular time point as 
the present is of utmost importance; only then would it be applied to the state 
of affairs - whatever it is - which then becomes recognisable as consisting of 
past, present and future; whereas, with the significant NOW, the recognition 
of change in some substantial item in the world, namely, an event, comes 
first, and then comes the recognition that the event constitutes a new NOW. 
Lastly, let us think up a context in which [5]-1 cannot be interpreted as an 
EPED: 
[5]-1' I'm eating lunch in the kitchen. 
If the context gives a situation in which [5]-1' is an answer to the question: 
'What are you doing at half past hvelve every day?', then no eventhood can 
be perceived; no temporal sequentiality is implicated. In order for a 
particular state of affairs to be perceived as an event it must be a spatia-
temporal particular. [5]-1' denotes iterativity or habituality, and no 
dynamicity is involved. In short, [5]-1' is atetnporal as against [5]-1, which 
is temporal. Using EPD like 'no\v' or 'at the moment' for [5]-1' is 
contextually inappropriate and irrelevant. What is implied in [5]-1' is the 
describer's constant conQition or state, so that it is to be recognised as a state 
description. (The ontological fallacy of event detection will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.) 
189 
5.2.5 EPED and coherence 
In this section we discuss the ways in \vhich our sense of now .. ness is related 
to the linguistic and logical problem of coherence. This will spotlight some 
characteristics of EPED on the discourse level. 
The starting point of our discussion is to remember the ontological fact that a 
temporal series is intrinsically coherent; otherwise it could not possibly be 
called a series. Our main interest in this section is to see, from the 
viewpoint of EPED, how this fact concerns the two different temporal series, 
i.e. the time-point and significant A-series. 
As we confirmed in the preceding section, the most important feature of the 
now-ness in the time-point A-series is that it can stand by itself, the now-
ness as a time point can be recognised as such without being related to a 
particular state of affairs in the \Vorld, and that when the now-ness is spoken 
of in relation to a state of affairs the recognition of the now-ness comes first, 
and then it is brought as a time point with respect to which the state of affairs 
is singled out as a topic. It goes without saying that, despite its spurious 
nature in terms of eventhood, this temporal series is so coherent that it can 
make a past-present-future scheme. For example, it is coherent enough to 
set up a series of May, June, and July in 1994 with June as the existential-
perspective pres.ent time. Linguistically speaking, one interesting fact about 
the time-point series of oo\v-ness is that, as long as coherence is maintained 
in terms of the series of time points as NOWs, no coherence is needed for the 
states of affairs to be chosen as topics to refer to in relation to the time 
points. The following example will illustrate this: 
[51-3 (7:30) John is oo\V eating breakfast. (8:30) A helicopter is now 
flying. (9:30) A young lady is now walking toward the Castle. 
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Under normal circumstances it is very difficult to see coherence between the 
three event descriptions in [5]-3. This example exhibits the intrinsic nature 
of the time-point NOW type of EPED \Vhich, on the discourse level, does not 
concern topical unity of the states of affairs to be referred to. .(This does not 
exclude the possibility of the time-point NOW type of EPED being combined 
with some topical unity of states of affairs. For instance, in the case of 
broadcasting at regular intervals the status quo of an erupting volcano, a 
possible rendering will be as follows: 'It's ten o'clock now. The volcano is 
very active at the moment. The next report will be at noon.' The crucial 
point is that in the case of the time-point NOW type of EPED the recognition 
of the time point is given top priority.) 
By contrast, the significant NOW type of EPED is characterised by the 
topical unity or coherence of some kind that is perceivable in the sequence of 
event expressions. One example: 
[5]-4 John is no\v getting dressed. He is no\v going downstairs. And 
now, he is eating breakfast. 
The significant no\v-ness differs from the time-point one in that in the 
former the f~eling of no\v-ness does not precede an event; it is invariably an 
event that comes first, and then it is recognised as constituting the significant 
NOW for the describer and the described. The story-like nature of the 
series of significant NOWs (cf. 5.1.4) requires some kind of topical unity in 
the sequence of EPED. In 15]-4 the topical unity might be termed 'a 
morning of the everyday life of a person called John'. In [5]-4 there is a 
grammatical unity in the choice of the sentence subject of each sentence, but 
that is just one possibility. Look at the following example: 
[5]-5 A middle-aged guy is now passing by. And a Ford is now 
turning toward Capel Street. Now a baby is on the road. 
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Because of the fact that each of the three. sentences in [51_5 has a 
grammatically· different subject it is rather difficult to assume that each 
'now' is a significant NOW for each different subject, but one can easily 
detect a topical unity mainly from the linguistically cohesive ties, say, 
between 'street' and 'road'. This discourse gives an impression that the 
describer is viewing a street from a fixed place. Therefore, it is possible to 
single out 'a series of scenes in a particular street' as the topical unity 
concerning which a series of the significant NOWs are represented. 
It is worth noting that [51-5 suggests the essential characteristic of the 
significant A-series; a series of significant NOWs is possible only if the 
sequence of event descriptions is considered to have some coherence or some 
unity in topical terms. This observation leads us to recognise the possible 
multiplicity of the significant A-series. Consider the following example: 
[5]-6 (a) I'm now living in Edinburgh. 
(b) I'm now \Vorking on a project. 
(c) I'm now staying at home. 
(d) I'm now combing my hair. 
It is obvious that when these four sentences are horizontally arranged so that 
they will make a graphological sequence they do not make a single A-series; 
they cannot produce topical coherence of any kind (this is a good example in 
which the linguistically cohesive tie, i.e. the sequence of personal pronoun 
'I' does not contribute to making coherence). This is because each of them 
can be construed as belonging to a different series of significant NOWs. 
The signi.ficance of NOW in [51-6 (a) to (d) is different in each case. It 
should be recognised that each of the four EPEDs in J5]-6 has the potentiality 
of becoming a part of the story-like discourse or the story-line if it is linked 
with another EPED \Vhich makes a renewed NOW in the same 
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significant A-series. [5]-6 (d), for instance, will be felt to be a part of a 
story if it is followed by 'And I'm now shaving my beard'. We must note 
that even if the presentness is renewed in [5]-6 (d), as exemplified above, the 
presentness of other significant series is never affected, simply because they 
have different significance. In real life, we experience very frequent input 
of a new significant A-series such as 'The Japanese economy is (now) 
slowing down' or 'John Major is (now) rapidly losing support from the 
general public'; they make a multiple layer of NOWs waiting to be renewed 
by a development or progression in our perception/recognition. 
5.2.6 Tense and aspect of EPED 
This section looks into the relation between EPED and grammaticality, 
paying particular attention to its characteristics in terms of tense and aspect. 
Our discussion will shed light on the context-dependent, thus grammatically 
"elastic", nature of EPED. 
. Existential pers~ective is not to be counted as completely identical with the 
so-called internal focalisation or synchronous point of view in narrative 
terms. Its characteristic will be better understood when it is later contrasted 
with the other two kinds of perspective, i.e. reporting perspective and 
narrative perspective (see 5.2.7-10). Here it will suffice to say that the 
most salient feature of existential perspective is its dynamicity, or 
dynamicity-orientedness. EPED is solely concerned with our sense of now-
ness, either time-point or significant. As we observed in Chapter 3 (see 
3.2.2), the core of our concept of time is made up of our sense of 'NEW to 
OLD', which we perceive in the dynamic relation between events. The 
perspectival focus of EPED absolutely lies in our NOW as an EPD. Our 
NOW is our present, which is continuously showing the impetus to recede 
into the past by waiting for a new NOW to replace it. · This intrinsic 
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dynamicity of existential perspective will be well appreciated if we compare 
the following examples: 
r.5J-7 Max is (now) \Val king to the station. 
f5)-8 Max \Valked to the station. 
[5)-7 is an EPED, and 'no\v' literally exhibits ongoingness or existentiality of 
a living person. We feel the entire situation of [5)-7 is on the move, and that 
it must be continuously linked \vith some preceding situation (an ex-NOW) 
and some following situation (a renewed NOW). In other words, [5]-7 
strongly induces us to detect some implicated impetus or dynamicity that 
might be termed now-renewal i1npetus. On the other hand, in [5]-8 we do 
not feel such dynamics; \Ve feel that a past event is just described in a 
fossilised way. There is no existentiality or temporal immediacy 
perceivable in rsJ-8. It could he said that (5)-7 is perspectivally situated, 
whereas '(5)-8 is perspectivally non-situated. As we will see later, event 
expressions like (5)-8 exhihit prototypical perspectival stance peculiar to 
reporting-perspective event description. Now we turn to the problem of 
tense and aspect of EPED. 
5.2.6.1 Present progressive 
In view of the intrinsically ongoing and dynamic nature of our now-ness, the 
present progressive \Vill have good reason to be taken up as the superordinate 
candidate for EPEI): 
(5)-9 John is \Vorking for IBM. 
We already pointed out in 5.2.4 that houndedness is not a necessary condition 
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for a particular state of affairs to be labelled as an event. Eventhood holds 
when it is recognised from context that a new situation is started or ongoing. 
With [51-9, if it is contextually clear that EPD like 'now' or 'at the moment' 
are implicated, the eventhood can be perceived, whether the EPD is used in 
the time-point or significant sense. By contrast, if context does not allow us 
to detect any temporal sequentiality, that is, if it is contextually difficult to 
assume that some EPD is implicated, then [5 )-9 is atemporal, and irrelevant 
to eventhood. It is not an EPED; it is to be classified as a description of a 
state or condition. 
5.2.6.2 Simple present 
The perspectival focus of EPED is prototypically upon the ongoingness of a 
state of affairs. Taking this into account we find the simple present with be-
verb, as well as the present progressive, seems to be a very suitable 
grammatical form for EPED: 
[5]-1 0 Rachel is happy. 
Grammarians will classify 151-10 as a state (cf. Anderson, 1973: 5; Comrie, 
1976: 104), but our vie\v of dynamics will construe [5]-10 as an event if it is 
contextually feasible to assume that EPD like 'now' or 'at the moment' can be 
part of the meaning of 151-10. This is because EPD are suggestive of 
temporal sequentiality that can be verbalised as follows, stressing the 
inchoative aspect: 'Rachel started being happy'. However, if [5]-1 0 is 
contextualised like: 'Rachel is happy. She is a happy girl. She is happy with 
everything in the world'_ then it should be interpreted as atemporal, i.e. a 
state or condition; EPI) arc irrelevant under such circumstances. 
Compared with 151-10, 151-11 may normally sound atemporal because of 
its unrestrictive feature: 
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[51--11 Alex is a tall hoy. 
But, if it is used in a rat her special context as in 'Alex is a tall· boy, but he 
was extremely short until very recently', then its eventhood will become 
clear. 
A predictable argument against such context-oriented view of 
eventhood/statehood might be: 'It may be true that the eventhood of the 
proposition 'Alex is a tall hoy' is determined by the following proposition, 
but fSl-11 itse(f is a state expression'. But one must realise that it can be 
referred to as a formally-trapped argument. In Chapter 2 we had a critical 
look at formalists' general tendency of seeing a parallel between 
particular lexico-grammatical characteristics and the event-state distinction. 
If we assume, as \Ve did in Chapter 2, that language meaning is its use , then 
it would be reasonable to claim that \Vhen people say that 'be tall' is basically 
a state expression they have to realise that they say so after using it in a 
particular context in \Vhich EPl) like 'now' cannot be part of the meaning of 
the proposition they have in mind. There should be no difference between 
'be tall' labelled as a state and 'be tall' labelled as an event in that they are 
both products of contextualisation~ \vhich means use of language in the broad 
sense of the term. 
Considering the fact that every event has some duration, and that the present 
discussion assumes that \Ve are tied to an existential perspective, we will 
understand that it is quite natural and usual for us to capture eventhood 
primarily in what is called ilnpe~f'ecive aspect (cf. Brinton, 1988: 9). In 
terms of EPEI), imperfective aspect can he typically realised by the present 
progressive and the simple present \Vith be-verb (this does not mean that the 
two grammatical forms inherently realise imperfective aspect; for example, 
the .sentence 'I'm going to London tomorrow' is not imperfective at all, and 
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similarly. the sentence 'I'm finished' has nothing to do with that aspect). 
And now we have to consider whether perfective aspect, as against 
imperfective aspect, can be suitable for EPED. 
The general tendency to conceptualise presentness only as the time-point 
NOW seems to be \Vell reflected in Leech (1971: 3): 
In most cases, the event probably does not take place exactly at the instant 
when it is mentioned: it is subjective rather than objective simultaneity 
that is conveyed. 
What is asserted here is the objectively observable gap in time between event 
time and spe~ch time. We can interpret this as saying that, exactly 
speaking, event time is ahvays the past, if speech time is the present. 
Leech's view of eventhood is totally indifferent to the concept of the 
significant NOW in relation to event detection. It is clear that Leech thinks 
of presentness as the time-point NOW, because the contrast that he has in 
mind between event time and speech time can be exemplified as follows: 'It 
was twenty seconds to eight o'clock when the event occurred, and it was one 
second after that when it \Vas mentioned.' Leech made the comment, quoted 
above, w he~ he referred to sports commentaries as instantaneous use of the 
simple present. The point of his argument is that in sports commentaries 
like: 
[5]-12 Napier passes the ball to Attwater 
the present tense actually designates the pastness of the event semantically. 
Underlying such an "objective" view of time seems to be a taken-for-granted 
idea that it is the time-point A-series that makes the past-present-future 
scheme. It must be recognised that such a stylised view of time can be quite 
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misleading. One great danger is that the present time is likely to be taken as 
almost nonsensically atomistic. Leech argues that the simultaneity one feels 
between event time and speech time in cases like sports commentaries is 
'subjective'. Theoretically, his argument can lead us to a very microscopic 
observation that, for example, the simultaneity one feels between the time the 
commentator starts mentioning the event and the time he finishes with it is 
also subjective, and that, from a physical and "objective" point of view, even 
the mentioning time has good reason to be assumed to consist of the starting 
time (the past) and the ending time (the present). When we think of the 
intrinsically "subjective" nature of the past-present-future scheme of time, as 
we already confirmed in Chapter 3, we will find that such an overly physical 
view of time and tense is not practical, and fails to account for the empirical 
aspect of time and event. 
Our contention is that 1 n some cases grammatical forms realising the 
perfective aspect can be taken as EPED, if they convey temporal immediacy . . 
The sentence f5]-12 will be classified as an EPED if context tells us that it is 
part of the live broadcasting of a ball game. What is important is that, in 
terms of the significant NOW, 1"5.)-12 constitutes the present time for the 
describer (and the described), and making a distinction between the event 
time and the speech time is irrelevant, whereas, in terms of the time-point 
NOW, it is relevant to conceptualise the event time and the speech time as 
two distinct entities. (But empirically there should be no temporal gap 
between the two times; they are felt to be virtually simultaneous because of 
the temporal immediacy het\veen them. To put it another way, there should 
be practically no possihility, from the empirical point of view, that the 
describer ·feels the pastness of the state of affairs he is describing). 
5.2.6.3 Simple past 
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NoW we look into the possibility of the simple past being another candidate 
for EPED. According to Leech (op. cit.: 9), the simple past normally 
indicates an action completed in the definite past, and excludes the present 
moment. This view, again, reflects a rather mechanical view. of the present 
time which tends to conceive of the present as the time-point NOW. 
However, as we observed in the case of sports-commentary type of event 
description realised in the simple present expressing temporal "hotness", 
there must be certain cases in which even the simple past sentences implicates 
· the describer's sense of the significant NOW \Vhich the describer feels is 
made up of the time of the completed event and the time when he is making 
the description. See the follo\ving example: 
[51-13 [A man fired a gun at a young lady.] That guy shot her! 
There are two reasons \V hy r 5 )-13 can be legitimately interpreted as an 
EPED. One is the context; the situation will enable the reader to assume 
that [5]-13 implicates EPD like 'now' or 'just now'. It is reasonable to 
think, from context, that temporal immediacy is embedded in the sentence. 
The second reason concerns the problem of duration. It is true that any 
event has some duration, but it does not follow that EPED inevitably 
requires the describer to focus upon the imperfective aspect of an event. 
'Shooting' is normally punctual (if it is a single shooting with a gun), and if 
we can say 'eating' is durational, then 'shooting' can be thought of as 
"durationless". Practically speaking, the describer will have no time· to 
attend to the ongoingness describable as: 'That guy is now shooting her.' 
Rather, it would be much more natural to focus on the whole of the 
completed action, or the perfective aspect of the state of affairs. The overall 
situation is very similar to the sports commentator's use of the simple 
present. The present tense in sports commentaries might be related to the 
problem of register as a socio-linguistic factor. We could argue, then, that 
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the simple past as in fSI-13 is more practical. non-conventional choice of 
tense and aspect \Vhich materialises EPED. 
EPED resembles \Vhat Joos ( 1964: 132) calls 'contemporary comment', but 
he. pays no attention to the contemporary feature of the simple past as a 
. likelihood. This is prohahly hccause, like Leech, he also believes a bit too 
strongly that there is a parallel between grammatical forms and semantic 
features or meantngs. 
5.2.6.4 Present perfect 
The present perfect can he also used for EPED. Look at the following 
examples: 
('51-14 I have finished my project. 
fS-1-15 I have been living in Edinburgh since last September. 
The sentence [51-14 can be paraphrased as: 'My project is now completed.' 
By saying (5.1-14 the describer must be able to distinguish the significant 
NOW from the ex-NOW, i.e. the past when he \vas working on it. With [5]-
15, the temporal adverb 'since last September' and perhaps the progressive 
help to detect the temporal sequentiality. 'I'm now living in Edinburgh' is 
part of the meaning of (51-15, so that it is an EPED. Note that in sentences 
like: 
(5)-16 I have lived in Edinhurgh all my life. 
no eventhood can be perceived despite the temporal adverb 'all my life'. 
Though sounding paradoxical, \Ve \vould argue that in [5]-16 the temporal 
adverb is asserting an atemporaL therefore, a stative aspect of the describer's 
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life. 
In this section we have focused upon the sentence-based grammatical features 
of EPED. The discussion \VC have. made so far is based upon the assumption 
that contemplating existential perspective helps to clarify the nature of 
narrative discourse as event description. In the next two sections we look 
into the nature of reporting perspective, as against existential perspective. 
5.2.7 Reporting perspective 
In real life there can be two contrastive temporal viewpoints for the 
verbalisation of events. One is the synchronous one, i.e. the existential 
perspective, and the other is the retrospective one, i.e. the reporting 
perspective. (Since it is ontologically legitimate to conceive of eventhood 
only in the light of either the perfective (completed) or the imperfective 
(ongoing) aspect of states of affairs at the speech time, future events would 
be nothing more than quasi-events, not concerned with the actuality of 
dynamic states of affairs.) The present section makes a general observation 
of the reporting perspective. 
One of the. main characteristics of reporting perspective is its temporal 
distance. The temporal distance in reporting perspective concerns the gap 
between event time and speech time. We already observed that, due to 
temporal immediacy, distinguishing between event time and speech time in 
EPED is irrelevant as far as the significant A-series is concerned; it is only 
in the time-point A-series that conceptualising the two times as two distinct 
entities is felt to be relevant. And the crucial point is that even in EPED it 
makes sense to speak of event time and speech time, depending upon the 
circumstances, but it makes no sense to assume that speech time is the 
present, while event time is the past as totally distinct from speech time, i.e. 
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the present. With the imperfective aspect (see 5.2.4), speech time as the 
time-point NOW is included or part of event time, which is then considered 
to be stretching into the past and the future around the time .. point NOW, and 
with the perfective aspect (see 5.2.6), trying to see the. nonsensically 
atomistic temporal gap behveen event time and speech time is to be dismissed 
as empirically unrealistic; the t\vo times are felt to be virtually simultaneous. 
By contrast, in reporting perspective, it is ahvays possible to conceive of 
speech time and event time as two distinct entities with some temporal 
distance between them. This means that the presentness of speech time will 
automatically squeeze out the pastness of event time. The feasibility of 
drawing a distinction bet\veen speech time and event time seems to suggest 
the essentially congenial relation between reporting perspective and the time-
.point A-series. This vie\v \vill be confirmed when we think of, for example, 
the writing of curriculum vitae as one typical case of event description in 
reporting perspective as in: '1970: I finished school'. The time-point. 
orientedness of such writing sounds "objective", and consequently is felt to 
be rather irrelevant to the significant A-series. Normally, the temporal 
distance between event time and speech time enables the reporter to edit the 
events in many different \vays. And the pastness of reporting perspective 
naturally rejects the implication of EPD such as 'now' or 'just now'. 
Instead of the HERE-AND-NOW principle of existential perspective, the 
THERE-AND-THEN principle governs reporting perspective. .In summing 
up, the temporal distance of reporting perspective lacks the dynamicity of 
existential perspective - the real dynamics we are constantly experiencing in 
the 'NEW to OLD logic' recognisable in the sequence of events. In the next 
section we will focus upon some formal characteristics of event description 
in reporting perspective. 
5.2.8 Reporting-perspective event description 
202 
In this section we attempt to make a linguistic/ontological observation of 
reporting-perspective event description (hereafter RPED). The discussion 
will concentrate upon the flexibility of the descriptive stance of RPED 
because of its retrospective nature. The perspectival stance of RPED 
ranges from 'markedly retrospective' to 'mildly retrospective'. The 
difference between the two perspectival. stances does not concern the 
temporal gap or distance behveen event time and speech time; it concerns 
the problem of whether a perspectival stance the reporter takes when 
rendering events is macroscopic (temporally far-sighted) or microscopic 
(temporally near-sighted). One of the important objectives in this section is 
to suggest that the mi ldy retrospective realisation of RPED is closely 
connected with concepts like 'narrative ·time', 'story present', or 'character 
now', which, as we \Vill examine in the next section, is the necessary 
condition for a particular discourse to be reckoned as realising narrativity. 
We start our discussion with markedly retrospective cases of RPED. To 
begin with, the aspectual characteristic of macroscopic RPED is its 
inclination toward perfectivity. Macroscopic RPED is characterised by its 
bird's-eye view of the eventhood of states of affairs. In contrast to EPED's 
standard aspectual choice of itnperjectivity or open-endedness, macroscopic 
RPED has· boundedness as its most remarkable aspectual feature. 
Prototypical examples from a ne\vspaper headine and a historical document: 
[5]-17 Nine die in tanker disaster. 
(5]-18 1346 - David invades England but is captured at Neville's Cross. 
As exemplified in [5]-17 and 18, a macroscopic RPED is typically realised in 
the simple form, and perhaps more importantly, it should sound more or less 
synoptic or summational. As shown in the two examples, the pastness of the 
reported event is not necessarily indicated by the past tense; it is normally 
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guaranteed by some temporal adjuncts which are either explicitly or 
implicitly gi~en. In the case of the newspaper headline, world knowledge 
tells the reader that the reported event happened either the day before or 
earlier that day, and in historical documents, normally dates are explicitly 
given. That the temporal perspective of RPED is a fossilised one _ unlike 
the living perspective of EPED - will be well understood by attending to the 
fact that EPD cannot co-occur with RPEDs like [5]-17 and 18. The two 
examples lack dynamici ty peculiar to existential perspective; which can be 
termed now-renewal impetus (see 5.2.6). This dynamicity is concerned 
with the active and-then logic which makes up our existential expectation that 
the existential NOW \Viii be sooner or later replaced by a new one. In [5]-
17, for example, one cannot perceive any existential impetus as in: 'She is 
(now) \Valking to the door.' In this respect [5]-17 and 18 well illustrate the 
reporting perspective in event description; intrinsically RPED is indifferent 
to the active and-then logic. This is more true with macroscopic RPED than 
with microscopic RPED, as \Ve \vill see later. 
There is a strong parallel between this lack of dynamicity on the sentential 
level and the stagnant, inactive sequence of macroscopic RPEDs. One good 
example can be found in the chronological· table of historical events: 
[5]-19 (a) 1544-5 Henry VIII begins "rough wooing" of Mary by 
invading Scotland. 
(b) 1568 Mary imprisoned by her cousin, Elizabeth I. 
(c) 1587 Mary Queen of Scots executed at Fotheringay Castle. 
The three events are ordered chronologically, but owing to the fossilised 
. perspective the ordering is not "activated". The reader cannot possibly feel 
a succession of existential NOWs in a dynamic way; the events are just 
represented in the order in \Vhich they occurred. This writing order is an 
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expedient chosen for convenience of historical description. This means that 
the temporal distance between the event time and the speech time could have 
made the reporter decide to put the events in some different way more 
clearly indicative of temporal distance. As a way of what is called 
'achronological ordering' 151-19 (b) and {c) might have been rendered: 
'Mary Queen of Scots executed at Fortheringay Castle after being imprisoned 
by her cousin, Elizabeth I'. One might argue that the impression of such 
stagnant sequence of past events will be to some extent weakened by linking 
the events with adverbial phrases that can serve as the sequence-indicator as 
in: 
f5l-20 First, I wrote Chapter 3, and then I wrote Chapter 1. 
It is to be recognised that, though the italicised adjuncts contribute to making 
the sequence appear "active", the dynamicity is a mock one simply because 
the adjuncts themselves sound retrospective, and are not to be used in EPED. 
Moreover, one must note that the mock dynamicity observable ·between the 
two event clauses in [5]-20 is almost entirely dependent upon those sequence-
indicators; if put by themselves, even the mock dynamicity would be lost: 'I 
wrote Chapter 3. I wrote Chapter 1'. 
Now we turn to microscopic RPED. Reporting perspective cannot be 
identical with existential perspective, because the former, unlike the latter, is 
concerned with things in the past. And considering the temporal gap 
between event time and speech time, which tends to give the reporter the 
time to edit the events he is going to describe, the normal, superordinate 
aspectual ·choice of RPED should be perfective as observed in macroscopic 
RPED. But this does not necessarily mean that perfectivity is the inevitable 
choice in RPED. The reporter, if he is inclined to do so, can take a 
temporal stance maximally close to existential perspective when reporting 
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events; he can simulate the temporal immediacy of EPED. So, instead of 
saying: 
[5]-21 I approached the door. I slo\vly opened it. And 1 looked inside 
the room. 
it would be just possible to render the same events as: 
[5]-22 I was (now) approaching the door, and I was (now) slowly 
opening it. I \Vas (now) looking inside the room. 
Compared with the standard reporting stance represented in [5]-21, [5]-22 
can be said to be temporally near-sighted in a marked way. [5]-22 is a past 
version of the live-broadcasting type of discourse. What is observable 
among the event clauses in [51-22 is the mock dynamicity of EPED. The 
'now' in parenthesis is operating as the teinporal-sequentiality indicator, but 
it is to be differentiated from 'now' as an EPD in that it is not existential 
NOW which is absolute and irreplaceable in nature. The 'now' in [5]-22 
could be termed 'reporting now' or 'a reporting-perspective deictic (RPD)'. 
The most noticeable feature of RPD 'now' is its relativity. The RPD 'now' 
in [5]-22 must be distinguished from the absolute and existential now-ness of 
the speech time or the reporting time. The relative nature of RPD 'now' is 
clear in that it is just accidentally set up somewhere in the past, and that, 
when the absolute now-ness of the reporting time is focused upon, its 
relativity \vill be cast off, and the time retrospectively called 'now' will be 
felt to be part of the absolute pastness as viewed· from the absolute 
presentness. 
·Incidentally, the RPD 'now' as the temporal-sequentiality (or event) indicator 
· is not to be exclusively used along with such maximally microscopic 
RPED as [5]-22; it can co-occur with slightly less microscopic RPED like 
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[S] .. 2l, or even with remarkably macroscopic RPED like [5]-19. It is to be 
noted, however, that the more microscopic an RPED is, the more existential 
the RPD 'now' appears. 
Another very important point to be discussed with respect to maximally 
microscopic RPED like ( 5)-22 is that the reporter's perspectival choice has 
an effect of making the reader forget the taken-for-granted distinction 
between speech time and event time. In fSl-22, and to a lesser degree in 
[5]-21, the reporter has attuned his perspective so close to the event time that 
the reader can feel as if the events were occurring before his eyes. One of 
the important effects of such tnock-existential perspective is· that the reader 
can be led to feel the no\v-ness of the event time mainly in the significant A-
series. (It is to be remembered that the temporal immediacy of EPED 
contributes to making the distinction between event ti~e and speech time 
irrelevant (cf. 5.2.6).) As \Vas pointed out earlier, the time-point A-series is 
intimately associated \Vith the objectively measurable concept of time. The 
temporal distance between event time and speech time, if it is measurable by 
clock, as in the writing of curriculum vitae, will tend to induce the reporter 
and the reader to react to the described events in a detached and "objective" 
way. This means that under such circumstances it is difficult for both the 
reporter and the reader to react empathetically to the now-ness of the events, 
taking it in terms of the significant NOW. One would have an impression 
that the now-ness of the execution of Queen Mary, repr~sented as '1587 -
Queen Mary was executed', is too fossilised to be captured in terms of the 
series of the significant NOWs. In this respect, the maximally microscopic 
RPED like fSl-22 may well be called mock EPED or simulated EPED; both 
the reporter and the reader feel they would be able to carry themselves to the 
time and spot of the events a~d see how a significant 'NOW is renewed. by 
another one without being necessarily made a\vare of the time-point NOW, 
i.e. the series of time in the clock sense. 
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5.2.9 The story present 
It is generally agreed that narrati vc has a function of setting ~p a sense of 
presentness in the reader's mind. 'Narratives,' Chatman says (1978: 63), 
'establish a sense of a present moment, narrative NOW, so to sp~ak.' 
Normally, narrative is written in the past tense, but the sequence of events in 
narrative tends to be felt by the reader to be the sequence of the present time 
which is renewed each time a new event occurs in the story world. 
Mendilow (1952: 94) writes: 'Mostly, the past tense in which the events are 
narrated is transposed by the reader into a fictive present. ... ' Such a 
sequence of story NOWs is often referred to as 'narrative time-line', or 
'story time-line'. The concepts such as story present, narrative time or 
narrativity are generally accepted ones in narrative poetics or formal studies 
of narrative discourse, but it must be admitted that they have tended to be 
taken for granted as narrative conventions; little inquiry has been made into 
the nature of those narrative concepts on the linguistic/ontological level. In 
order to elucidate the characteristics we start \Vith looking at what might be 
termed superordinate narrative discourse: 
[5]-23 (a) The door of Henry's lunch-room opened. (b) and two men 
came in. (c) They sat down at the counter. (Hemingway, 'The 
Killers': 368) 
There are two reasons \vhy \VC take this as superordinate narrative discourse: 
one is that the three clauses in [5]-23 are what Labov (1972: 360) calls 
'narrative clauses', \Vhich are in simple past tense representing events in the 
perfective aspect, as temporally bounded; the second reason is that the events 
are arranged chronologically in the clear sequence. Perhaps it might be just 
possible to give the third reason why [5]-23 should be looked upon as a 
canonical form of narrative. That is the fact that some topical unity and a 
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considerable degree of temporal near-sightedness function as a kind of 
narrative tnagnetism which invites the reader to the story world in which 
the dynamics of now-renewal is the norm, just like in the real ~orld. This 
seems crucially important when we remember it is often pointed out that the 
function or convention of narrative fiction is to create a world (cf. Culler, 
1975: 189; Fowles, 1971: 86). Labov (op. cit.: 359) defines narrative as: 
'one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence 
of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred.' 
If we take Labov's definition of narrative as generally acceptable, it would 
be reasonable to classify narrative discourse primarily as RPED. As we 
already confirmed, in RPED it is usually possible to conceive of event time 
and speech time as two distinct entities with some temporal distance between 
them (cf. 5.2.7). But one must bear in mind that in narrative fiction the past 
tense is thought of as a narrative convention, and that the discourse normally 
has no actual, definite past to refer to. The pastness of fictional discourse is, 
as it were, a fake. In fiction no event actually happened, and this "reality" 
of fictional narrative can in many cases work as a helping hand for the 
reader to set himself free from conceiving of the temporal gap or distance 
between event time and speech time in terms of the time-point A-series, i.e. 
the series of objectively measurable, quantitative points of time. One of the 
vitally important implications of this is that the reader can place himself in 
an "as if" situation in \vhich he can easily feel or experience the series of 
story NOWs in terms of the significant A-series. Theoretically, the 'now' 
which can co-occur with, for example, [51-23 (a) as in 'Now the door of 
Henry's lunch-room opened' is an RPD, but the perspectival peculiarity of 
narrative fiction, as mentioned above, would make the reader feel as if it 
were the· absolute 'now', i.e. an EPD. (Incidentally, under such a 
prototypically narrative situation in which temporal immediacy is so high , 
the reader will be able to perceive story NOW even if the temporal adverb 
'then', which normally functions as a past-marker, is explicitly employed.) 
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fhis can be verified if we understand how we empathet.ically experience 
a series of now-ness in [5]-23. When we read [5]-23 (a) we synchronously 
feel that the represented event constitutes a significant N'OW of the story 
world; there is no room for a time-point NOW (for ins~nce, 'at half past 
three on the 23rd of June, 1993') to operate first as a refe~ence time at or 
around which we know a particular state of affairs is golng on. And this 
first NOW is renewed by the second one exhibited in [5]..:23 (b),. which in 
turn will be replaced by [5]-23 (c). It is clearly observable that the three 
perfective event clauses in [5]-23 make a single series of significant NOWs. 
s.2.10 The story present and narrative perspective 
.... ·. 
The main objective in this section is to contemplate the rel~tion between the 
presentness of the story and narrative perspective as a real~·~ation of temporal 
stance. Our discussion will reveal the peculiari·ty of narrative perspective as ... 
the hybrid of mock-existentiality and reporting perspectiv.e .. 
The question we are going to posit in this section is: 'What.i.s· .the co-relation 
between the sense of now-ness the reader feels and the temppral perspective 
.. 
in a particular discourse representing events?' Let us hav.~ ~ closer look at 
[5]-23 in the light of temporal perspective. We pointed 'ou~. that it realises 
some temporal near-sightedness. But how near is it?· .... ·At first ~lush, the 
simple past of the event clauses denoting the clear ·bound~:~-~:ess of eventhood 
will give the reader an impression that [5]-23 is one not~h.h.ig~er in temporal 
distance than a mock-existentiality version that should be t~e past progressive 
as in: 'The door of Henry's lunch-room was now opening}> But it must~ be 
recognised that such maximally microscopic RPED is not J~·9··.oply possibility 
in this case. As we noted earlier in our discussion of[S]~ 13, wh;tn the 
temporariness or durationlessness is contextually detectable ".in the use of a 
particular verbal phrase, the temporal immedi~cy, i.~. the impression of the 
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. contemporaneousness of event time and speech time, will be represented by 
the simple form, as well as by the progressive. Thus, as far as [5]-23 is 
concerned, the three perfective clauses can be considered as realising 
temporal immediacy or mock-existentiality almost as equaiiy as when 
represented in the progressive. In [5]-23, together with the perspectival 
peculiarity of narrative fiction which conventionally makes it irrelevant to 
distinguish between event time and speech time, such a high degree of 
temporal near-sightedness is responsible for the reader feeling as if a 
particular series of significant NOWs were renewed in a synchronous way. 
In short, the reader can be easily brought into the story world. as a spatia-
temporal particular. The simple past form of event clauses realising a 
considerable degree of temporal immediacy and the chronological ordering 
of those clauses in [5]-23 well simulate the active and-then logic of EPED 
(cf. 5.2.8). This seems to be a very important point to consider when we 
contemplate the problem of narrativity or narrative perspective. 
With a view to reflecting upon the problem of narrativity we will turn for 
the moment to some stylistic features of synopses of literary works. As an 
example of synoptic writing we take a passage from The Oxford Companion 
to English Literature summarising Emma by Jane Austen: 
[5]-24 .... Emma's active mind sets to work on schemes for Ha~iet's 
advancement, but her interfering and injudicious attempts lead in · 
the end to considerable mortification. She first prevents Harriet 
from accepting an offer of marriage from Robert Martin, an 
eligible young farmer, as being beneath her. This tampering 
greatly annoys Mr Knightley, the bachelor owner of Don well 
·Abbey, who is Emma's brother-in-law and one of the few people 
able to see that she has faults .... 
Very few would deny that if 151-23 is to be classified as narrative [5]-24 is 
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not narrative. It seems possible to give two reasons for this: one is the 
choice of tense, and the second is the temporal stance in e~ent description. 
The present tense in [5]-24 should be distinguished from the historical 
present, which is often employed in narrative. The present tense in 
summaries is called the 'synoptic present' (Stanzel, 1979: 23). This present 
tense is not concerned with temporally particular situations;· rather, it has a 
generalising function (loc. cit.). According to Stanzel, such generic use of 
the present tense is a marker of 'zero grades of medi~c.y", that is, 'story 
without narrator' (ibid.: 25). It would be argued that.,t~ere is a certain 
parallel between the synoptic present and the present tense in newspaper 
, headlines, as we observed in [5]-17, in that in both cases tit'~ .. present tense is 
e'mployed for abstract writing. Stanzel emphasises the choiye of the present 
· tense as the reason for the lack of mediacy,. but perhaps:·a .. more important 
factor contrib~ting to the generalised. atmosphere .of ··th~.: writing is its 
. -~ . . . "' ·. . 
temporal stance in event description. It is clear that in {5}~24 one cannot . 
feel or experience the dynamicity of the active and-then s~qu~nce of ·events as 
in [5]-23. This is mainly because the writing reaiis.es no temporal 
immediacy \vhich can make th~ reader feel that existentiat"-p.eci.pective is well 
simulated. In [5]-24 it is almost impossibl~ to recognise. any series of 
NOWs. In order for a particular discourse to be labelled ·as a narrative it 
should fundamentally be able· to exhibit a ki~d of mag~~ti~m to draw the 
reader into a world as a spatio-temporal particular. Beirig~ i:n that world 
means being capable of experiencing the now~renewal dynainics through the 
sequence of story events. In this respect the·temporal stance ~n [5]-24 is not 
unlike a maximally macroscopic stance of RPED, thoUgh .the tense is the 
present. As fqr the narratorial mediacy, perhaps the· qui~tessential and the 
most fundamental role of the narrator as the .mediator is~ .. ~h~t of the world 
opener· for the reader. 
. . ' 
Needless to say, no narrative consists of superordinate narrative clauses 
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only; normally the temporal· stance in a particular narrative can range from 
mock EPED to maximally macroscopic RPED. But it would be agreed that 
the skeletal perspective of narrative. intimately associated with the concepts 
like 'narrativity' or 'narrative perspective' is one which is temporaiiy so 
near-sighted as to allow imperfective event clauses to co-ccur with perfective 
event clauses. It must be noted that in synoptic writing like [5]-24 it would 
sound very awkward, in the light of temporal perspective, if an imperfective 
event clause such as: 'She is eating lunch with her father' were inserted 
somewhere in the discourse. This is simply because the progressive clause 
as an event expression prototypically represents a high degree of temporal 
immediacy. 
One might have an impression that the variety of temporal perspective in 
temporal discourse is closely related to the scene-summary distinction well 
exploited by Genette ( 1980). It might be true that there are many aspects in 
common bet\veen them, but Genette's taxonomy of narrative rhythms is a 
product of a rather mechanical attempt to apply the chronos concept of 
duration to narrative discourse on the basis of the contrast between story 
time and narrative time. His taxonomy illustrates possible varieties of 
narrative pacing, analogous to musical concepts like andante or allegro , but 
does not necessarily clarify ho\v the problem of narrative pacing is both · 
ontologically and linguistically related to that of narrativity or narrative 
perspective. 
5.2.11 Existentiality, report, and narrativity 
This section reflects further upon the problem of narrativity iil relation to 
existentiality and report. Our discussion will be spotlighting the intrinsic 
fictionality, and at the same time the discourse-dependent nature, of 
narrati vi ty. 
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5.2.11.1 Existentiality 
When we speak of existential ity, report, and narrativity, we do not 
necessarily mean that it is possible to make a trichotomous distinction among 
these three perspectival phenomena. In order to get a proper understanding 
of what narrative perspective is like, it might be better to attempt a 
dichotomous distinction bet\veen existentiality and the other two. From an 
ontological point of vie\v ~ one should recognise that existential perspective is 
exclusively tied to the notion of presentness, and that it is to be distinguished 
from report/narrativity in that, in principle, the latter can be assumed to be 
concerned solely with the notion of past.ness. Existential perspective i~ 
typically exemplified by sports commentaries (cf. 5.2.6): the most noticeable 
fact about such live-broadcasting type of discourse is the coincidence of event 
time and speech time in real terms. EPED like sports commentaries is by 
no means narrative, because the presentness of the event description is an 
authentic one. The perspectival yoke resulting from the event describer 
being tied to his authentic presentness is an absolute one, so that his 
perspective has to be purely internalised. But this internality is not a 
narrative phenomenon; it is an existential one. In this respect existential 
internality should be ontologically differentiated from narrative concepts like 
'internal pers·pective'. or 'internal focalisation', \Vhich intrinsically belong to 
the report/narrativity side, and \Vhich normally have broader connotations 
such as figurative point of vic\v or conceptual systems (cf. 5.2.2). 
Here, let us make an additional comment on the nature of sports 
commentaries. As exemplified in Leech ( 1971: 3), some might cast doubt on 
the coincidence of event time and speech time in sports commentaries such as 
[5]-12. They might argue that in terms of time-point time, i.e. objectively 
measurable time, event time can precede speech time, and that, assuming that 
the temporal gap het\veen event time and speech time at least in the time-
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point sense is a necessary condition for a particular temporal discourse to be 
classified as narrative, sports commentaries can be a variety of narrative. 
This argument may sound convincing, but is misleading. One might be 
justified in mentioning a temporal gap between event time and speech time 
with respect to perfective event descriptio~s such as [5]-12; it is very likely 
that when the commentator started to describe the event of Napier's passing 
the ball to Attwater, the event ceased to hold. But it will be worth 
contemplating live broadcasting situations like the follo\ving: 
[51-25 They are both outside the ring! The referee is counting. 
[51-25 is a likely commentary in professional \Vrestling. When commentary 
is given in imperfective event clauses such as rs]-25, the simultaneity 
between event time and speech time is the norm; at the time when the event 
holds the speech holds, too. It is to be ackno\vledged that such genuine 
simultaneity in real terms is not congenial to narrative. Summing up, sports 
commentaries are commentaries~ and not narrative. 
5.2.11.2 Report 
Now let us turn to the problern of report and narrativity. The questions we 
posit here are: 'Ho\v are these t\vo related to each other?' 'In what 
respect(s) are they similar or dissimilar to each other?' First, we will 
contemplate ~eport. 
In the light of temporal dirnension in event description, report is concerned 
with the retrospective rendering of events, as against the synchronous one 
concerning existential i ty. If it is legitimate to associate pastness with report 
in event rendering, report can be theoretically guaranteed when pastness is 
confirmable either on the textual or metatextual level. On the textual level, 
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the reporting perspective of the event description will be confirmable if past-
time indicators can be found explicitly." Past-time indicators are either ·. 
lexical or syntactic. On the lexical level they are often realised as temporal 
adjuncts such as 'yesterday', 'one day' 'in 1215'. And when the verbal 
phrase exhibits some duration, often together with for-/in-/until-/by-
temporal adjuncts, reporting perspective · is detectable as in the following 
examples: 
[5]-26 (a) I stayed in Edinburgh for a week. 
(b) I finished the job in an hour. 
(c) I worked until eleven. 
(d) I read The Guardian by nine. 
These durational event clauses denote pastness; the reader will clearly 
perceive some temporal gap between the event time and the speech time. 
They cannot exhibit existential perspective. On the syntactic level, the · 
retrospective nature, i.e. the pastness of the discourse is often detectable 
from the syntactic complexity suggesting the fact that the author used the 
temporal gap between event time and speech time to make a "value 
judgement" in terms of determining where to put the information-focus. 
! 
We already observed that pastness can be realised either by the past tense or 
the present tense. Therefore, the reporting perspective of a particular 
discourse can and should be detected even when such syntactic complexity as 
mentioned above is combined \Vith the present tense like: 
[5]-27 When Lucy \Vakes up, she finds the world is covered with snow. 
There is no temporal modifier in [51-27, but the well-structured arrangement 
of events is indicative of the author's "weight assessment" made before the 
actual rendering of them. Note that the complex structure like [5]-27 is least 
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likely to be employed in EPED. On the metatextual level, on the other 
hand, one will notice that the situation is pragmatic. There are some 
occasions when the pastness of the rendered events is guaranteed by 
metatextual signs. This can be said to be concerned with the notion of 
genre. If a particular discourse is available in the form of a paperback 
entitled SHORT STORIES, for example, the whole situation can 
conventionally work as a metatextual sign indicating the pastness of the 
content. Under such circumstances reporting perspective must be 
acknowledged even in the follo\ving expressions: 
[5]-28 I'm now opening the bottle of wine. And I'm now pouring it 
into the rare goblet. 
It is conventionally accepted that events described in a story are n·ormally 
past ones; the reader is supposed to assume some temporal gap between event 
time and speech time (even in a fictional story). So, if the author renders 
his events as in rs J-28, the temporal perspective realised there is a 
"produced" one.. It is by no means an authentic EPED. It is mock-
existentiality that is represented in [5]-28. This means that, if the author.had 
wanted to, he could have adopted a different perspective, perhaps a more 
distant one which goes like: 'After opening the bottle of wine, I poured it 
into the rare goblet.' 
Now the materialisation of report or reporting perspective can be shown in 







With the general characteristics of existentiality and report that we have 
observed so far in mind~ \Ve go on to narrativity. As art example to be 
reflected upon we take a passage from Anita Brookner's Family and Friends 
(p.51 ): 
f5]-29 (a) She bathes (h) and dresses quietly; (c) then, writing a note for 
Alfred to tell him that she will be back in time for lunch and that 
he is not to worry, (d) she slips out of the door (e) and runs 
lightly down the red-carpeted staircase. 
The first thing to note is that the present tense here is historic present, which 
this work employs as the narrative mode throughout. Reporting perspective 
of t~is discourse is confirmable, first, on the metatextual level. This is a 
novel, and the reader, whether he is genre-conscious or not, is supposed to 
take for granted the pastness of the content. And ~n the textual level also, 
reporting perspective seems to be \Veil represented for two reasons. One is 
the choice of. durational, perfective event clauses, such as 'bathe', 'dress' and 
'write', which can be taken as prototypical grammatical forms for reporting · 
past events. And the second reason is the fact that the author's weight 
assessment is traceable syntactically; compared with the finite forms of the 
verbs in (a), (b), (d) and (e), the participle construction of (c) appears "light" 
in terms of the \Veight of information. This kind of syntactic manipulation 
is alien to the temporally "hot" description of events, i.e. EPED. If one 
looks exclusively at (d), for instance, one might have an impression that it 
sounds like an EPED, since the instantaneity or durationlessness of that 
bounded event expression can theoretically appear in EPED. But the overall 
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reporting atmosphere of the discourse operates as the discoursal inertia to 
· lead one to interpret (d) as reporting. As a conclusion, there is no room for 
doubt about the reporting quality of 1"51-29 in spite of the present tense as a 
grammatical choice. 
Now the reporting perspective of 151-29 IS made clear, but in its 
retrospective nature there is something to be distinguished from the 
following expressions of past events: 
f5]-30 The death of Mozart in 1791. 
[5]-31 I went to the zoo \Vith Daddy yesterday. 
fSl-32 (a) The Abbey church of St. Mary was founded by King David I 
in 1 136 for Cistercian monks. (b) It grew rich and powerful 
under royal patronage (c) but over the centuries suffered 
repeatedly from English harassment, (d) the end co~ing in 1545. 
Both f51-30 and 31 express a single event; the former is nominalised and the 
latter, predicated. And 151-32 consists of four clauses of past events. It is 
not ~ifficult to recognise that in 151-30, 31 and 32 there can be perceived no 
dynamicity of now-rene\val logic; events are expressed just in a fossilised 
way. In [51-.32, some topically connected past events sequentially arranged, 
but it is difficult to perceive now-renewal in the event sequence in a vivid 
way. One would feel that retrospective degree is much higher in [5]-32 
than in [5]-29, \Vhich seems to realise the active and dynamic report. The 
overall impression of temporal near-sightedness in [5]-29, together with the 
clearly observable topical unity, serves as a kind of magnetism to induce the 
reader to set up a "time-line" in his mind. Note that the time-line is not 
created by each individual clause, but by the whole discourse, and that it is a 
series of significant NOWs that concern the time-line. The reader feels as if 
a particular situation is given and being developed before his eyes. This we 
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should call narrativity. Narrativity can be defined as a linguistic realisation 
. of reporting perspective in which the reader can be led to assume that the 
now-renewal logic of EPED is more or less simulated. Narrativity or 
narrative perspective is fictional in that the no\v-ness it represents is a mock 
one, which is to be distinguished from the authentic now-ness in existential 
perspective. 
In many cases, whether a particular discourse can be classified as a narrative 
or not depends upon metatextual signs of various kinds. Generally speaking, . 
if there can be recognised a conventionally accepted sign of some kind, 
which can be practically interpreted as saying, 'I'm going to tell you a story,' 
such as the front cover of a book entitled STORIES FOR CHILDREN, then 
the discourse, which is either spoken or written, ought to be taken as a 
narrative. This may be concerned with the institutionalised aspect of our 
social life. But from a linguistic and ontological point of view, a particular . 
discourse, if it is to be labelled as a narrative, must be a reporting discourse 
which includes narrativity as the basic and skeletal perspective. If a 
particular discourse, despite the metatextual signs suggestive of story-telling, 
includes no narrativity and is actually made up of, say, nominalised event 
description such as [51-30, then the author is institutionally rebellious, and 
the metatextual sign is a disguised one. 
One problem with narrativity is that it is not always easy to·. see whether a 
particular chunk of a reporting discourse realises narrativity or not. This is 
because one. cannot necessarily make clear the borderline beyond which the 
sense of now-ness is replaced by the fossilised sense of then-ness. Getting 
back to [5]-29, it would be reasonable to claim that narrativity is detectable 
even when the simple forms of (a) and (b), for example~ are progressivised 
like: 'She is now bathing. And she is now dressing quietly.' . Although the 
progressive clause is not the superordinate narrative clause, but by using the 
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mock-EPD 'now' in each of the progressive clauses, as shown above, now-
renewal will be perceivable. Rather, we could say that narrativity realised 
by the plot-advancing progressive represents a more vivid now-ness than a 
slightly fossilised one in the simple form. The progressivisation of this kind 
is the extremity of the realisation of now-ness, or mock-EPED. This 
direction is no problem as far as the detection of narrativity is concerned. 
It is the other end of the no\vness-scale that is not necessarily clear enough. 
For example, is [5]-32 a narrative? It is to be agreed that if it is a narrative 
it is one with a remarkably low degree of narrativity. With respect to the 
standard of narrativity it would not be unreasonable to claim that the 
closeness to EPED can be set up as a criterion for a particular discourse to 
be reckoned as realising narrativity. Central to the criterion will be the 
degree of summational flavour and syntactic complexity recognisable in an 
event discourse. The implication of what we have mentioned so far is that at 
one extreme there can be a narrative· including discourse realising a maximal 
level of narrativity which can be called mock-existentiality, and at the other 
extreme there can be a narrative involving discourse realising the highest 
level of reportivity, such as [5]-32, which clearly reminds the reader of the 
gap between event time and speech time. But in many cases a narrative is a 
combined product of different perspectives ranging from strong narrativity 
to strong report. 
5.2.12 Conclusion 
The aim of ·the discussion in 5.2 \Vas twofold. One was to investigate how 
temporal sequentiality, \Vhich is closely connected with eventhood (the 
recognition of change), can be realised linguistically, and the other was to 
look into the relation between perspectival and aspectual choices in event 
description in order to reflect upon the problem of narrative perspective or 
narrativity. Central to our discussion was the notion that context plays the 
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vitally important role in our recognition of the eventhood of linguistically 
realised states of affairs, and that there can be no inherent lexical-
grammatical i terns supposed to be event expressions. With a view to 
clarifying the point of the argument, we set up three perspectival varieties, 
i.e. existential, reportin~, and narrative perspectives. We argued that 
narrative perspective is, mainly from a pragmatic point of view, a variety of 
reporting perspective, and that the temporal immediacy or the temporal 
near-sightedness, which more or less simulates existential-perspective event 
description, contributes to making the reader feel that the narrative discourse 
consists of a sequence of story NOWs. 
In 5.3, with a view to spotlighting the characteristic of narrativity from a 
different angle, we concentrate upon impe.rfective event clauses in narrative 
discourse. Our discussion will clarify: I) that strong narrativity is a typical 
narrative environment in \vhich imperfective event clauses tend to appear; 2) 
that the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics, often employed by 
grammarians and formal semanticists, has a general tendency to fail to 
capture the eventhood of imperfective event clauses, partly because the so-
called "narrative time movement" is conceived of solely in relation to the 
perfective even( clauses, and partly because their approach is theoretically 
based upon· the time-point NOW view of presentness, neglecting the 
presentness in the significant A-series. 
5.3 Imperfective event clauses in narrative discourse 
5.3.1 Eventhood and the framing effect 
Let us begin by looking at the follo\ving hvo examples: 
15)-33 (a) Little Chandler said nothing until the barman returned with 
222 
the two gla~scs: (b) then he touched his friend's glass lightly 
(c) and reciprocated the former toast (d) ue uta b . . 
0 0 
I O Ol rv s egznnzng to 
feel sotnewhat dt.\'tllll.\'toned (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 83) 
(italics are mine) · 
f5]-34 (H~w he had suffered that day,) (a) waiting at the shop door 
unt_al the shop \vas c~pty, (b) standing at the counter (c) and 
trytng to appear at h1s ease while the girl piled ladies' blouses 
before him, (d) ptl_~'ing at the desk (e) and forgetting to take up 
the ~dd penny of h1s change, (f) being called back by the 
cashter, (g) and finally striving to hide his blushes as he left 
the shop by examining the parcel to see if it was securely tied. 
(Joyce, 'A L.ittle Cloud': 90-91). (italics are mine) 
The framing effect of the progressive was already referred to in 5.2.4. The 
progressive sentence in 151-33 can be considered as a typical example 
exhibiting that effect. According to the generally accepted grammatical 
view, when two or more durative situations are related the meaning of the 
progressive is that of simultaneity, synchronisation, or co-existence (cf. Joos, 
1964: 127; Huddleston, 1984: 153; Quirk et al., 1985: 209; Toolan, 1990: 
99-103). There should he no doubt about the eventhood with respect to the 
first three clauses in (51-33; it \Viii be generally agreed that they are 
canonical na~rative clauses the function of which is to advance the plot, or 
move the narrative time fonvard. Compared with those event clauses, (d) 
seems to be unstable in its status. It may be called a 'contemporaneous but 
background event' (cf. Joos, 1964), or a 'progress~ve state' (cf. Caenepeel, 
1989). Whether it is classified as an event or a state, most people will agree 
that (d) does. not contrihute to moving the narrative time forward by 
advancing- the plot. Our contention in this section is that the generally 
accepted view concerning progressives like (d) in [5]-33 is a biased idea 
resulting from a mechanical vie\V of narrative time likely to be taken as a 
mono-dimensional item., and from a restricted view of presentness, taking 
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i. 
for granted the now-ness in the time-point A-series. 
First of all, \Ve must note that the progressives like [51-33 (d), indicative of a 
one-off, temporary state of affairs, may well be taken as a marker of a high 
degree of narrativity of the neighbouring narrative discourse ·(we already 
pointed out that this sort of progressive sentence is least likely to appear in 
synoptic writings like 151-24), and that. the very high degree of temporal 
immediacy or temporal near-sightedness represented in the narrative 
functions as a perspectival yoke because of \vhich some events have to be 
realised in the progressive form. On this point, it could be argued that the 
four clauses in [51-33 all represent marked internality in terms of temporal 
perspective (narrative theorists like Uspensky (1973) may distinguish the 
internality of (d) from the externality of the preceding three clauses, 
claiming that (d) is characterised by what he calls verba sentiendi; but such a 
distinction is not immediately relevant to the point of our argument that the 
distinction between narrativity and non-narrativity is primarily concerned 
with the temporal stance the describer (or the narrator) assumes in event 
description). Setting aside for the moment the problem of whether the 
progressives like [51-33 (d) are a state or not (\ve turn to it in the next 
section), we no\V focus upon \Vhat is happening to narrative time in [5]-33 
(d). What ·can be observed in (51-33, the clausal sequence from (a) to (c) 
demonstrates the active a~d-then logic; in spite of the slightly retrospective 
flavour of the whole discourse, detectable from 'until' in (a) operating as a 
lexical past-~ime indicator (see 5.2.1 I), [51-33 can be said to realise a high 
degree of temporal immediacy \vhich will make the reader feel that the now-
renewal impetus is perceivable at least among the first three clauses. It is 
not diffic~lt for the reader to recognise that each of the first three events 
constitutes a significant NOW in this narrative. But it will be felt that when 
the narrative comes to (d) the series of the significant NOWs is "cut off''; the 
now-renewal seems not operative there. What is worth noting is that, .as far 
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·., as the now-ness of (d) is concerned, the discoursal environment involving (d) 
functions for the reader to set up a particular point of time as NOW around 
which the situation seems to be stretching into the past and the future. What 
seems to occur is, as it \Vere, a kind of atomisation of presentness. From 
our argument of the two facets of presentness it is clear that such presentness 
concerns our sense of quantitative time \vhich makes the time-point A-series. 
As noted in 5.2.4, the time-point NOW is characterised by the fact that what 
comes first is the setting up of a particular point of time as the present, and 
then, it is connected \Vith the situation in \Vhich the NOW is construed 
punctually. 
It is of vital importance to recognise that, in principle, where the time-point 
.,NOW holds, the significant NOW holds, too (see 5.2.4). (There may be a 
few exceptional cases I ike 'It's half past ten no\v' This is an example 
concerning which it is difficult to think up a context in which the presentness . 
can be considered as belonging to the significant A-series; sentences like this 
might be called 'time-point-NOW-proper expressions'.) Then, what makes 
it possible to interpret [5)-33 (d) as constituting a significant NOW? The 
answer to this question seems to lie in our recognition of the possible non-
linear characteristic of the significant NOW, as we discussed in 5.2.5. 
Needless to ·say, f 5 )-33 (d) cannot be counted as moving narrative time 
forward, as long as its presentness is considered in line with a unified series 
of significant NOWs realised in the event sequence from (a) to (c). But it 
will become possible to recognise it as constituting a significant NOW when 
we assume it makes a part of a different series of significant NOWs. As a 
matter of fact, context sho\vs that earlier in that story a number of thought 
events occurred in which the protagonist (Little Chandler) thought very 
highly of his friend (Ignatius Gallaher). Look at the following example: 
[5]-35 That was Ignatius Gallaher all out; and, damn it, you couldn't 
but admire him for that (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 7_9) 
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[S]-35 is about the protagonist'~ feeling toward the friend he was going to 
meet and [5]-33 (d) expresses h1s new feeling towar· d th h , . . . e person e actually 
rnet. If we thrnk of a parttcular ser1es of the significant NOWs in which [S]-
35 and f5]-33 (d) are aligned, it will become reasonable to give an authentic 
status to [5]-33 (d) as an event description which is not backgrounded when it 
is considered in relation to the preceding three clauses in [5]-33. It is to be 
noted that the renewal of now-ness in the series of [5]-35 and [5]-33 (d) does 
not affect that in the series of (a), (b) and (c) in [5]-33, and vice versa. 
Particular attention must be dra\vn to the fact that, even if [5]-33 (d) had 
been rendered like: 
[5]-33 (d)' He was some\vhat disillusioned 
the eventhood should have been likewise detectable. Unlike [5]-33 (d), [5]- . 
33 (d)' has no possibility of being interpreted as an event, according to the 
weB-accepted grammatical views of events and states, but context allows us 
to interpret [5]-33 (d)' as entailing NOW as an indicator of temporal 
sequential i ty. 
In summing up, \Ve \vould argue that the impression of the 
contemporaneousness of r 5]-33 (d) is nothing but a specious one due to the 
perspectival yoke in which it is placed. It can be said to contribute to 
moving narrative time fonvard in a different series of the significant 
NOWs. This suggests that one should not be adamant that 'narrative time' 
or 'story time' be a one-dimensional, linearity-oriented item. The 
eventhood of [ 51-33 (d) or (d)' ought to be unambiguously recognised if they 
are released from the perspectival yoke resulting from the temporal near-
sightedness perceivable overall in [5]-33, and are reproduced in a temporally 
far-sighted perspective such as: 'When he met him, he became disillusioned.' 
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The general situation of rsl-33 can be accounted for as follows, using an 
analogy o~ spatial dimens~ons .. The discoursal sequence from {a) to (c) 
makes, as tt were, a t\vo-dtmenstonal world, where (d) comes in as a three-
dimensional object, say' a spear. Naturally' from the two dimensional point 
. of view, it is virtually impossible to recognise it as a spear; it will be 
perceived as a cross-section. But the point is that the cross-section is not the 
appearance of the spear from the three-dimensional point of view. 
As Brinton points out ( 1988: 247 -8), the characteristic of the progressive 
tends to be discussed in a rather fixed situation, like narrative, presupposing 
a reference time around which the progressivised state of affairs is assumed 
to be expanded. Consequently, the framing effect of the progressive is 
likely to be emphasised as its chief characteristic. But even in narrative 
there are cases where the progressives make a single series of significant 
I NOWs, which move the plot forward as in [5]-34. The ing-forms from (a) 
to (g) in [5]-34 are progressives, and one important thing to note is that the 
parenthesised sentence does not offer an atomic reference time for the 
reading of the following discourse. The relation between them is one 
between a generalised event description and its specifications. 
Therefore, there is no framing effect· perceivable in those progressives. 
Those progressives illustrate the t:larrator's extremely near-sighted temporal 
stance that is maximally aligned with that of the character. So the 
narrativity is maximally high in that discourse except in the parenthesised 
sentence. This can be taken as a typical mock-EPED. By adopting such a 
temporally ."hot" stance the narrator successfully portrays the sensitive 
nature of the protagonist \V ho tends to be annoyed by minute and trivial 
details in ·life. [5]-34 would be considered as a good exampl~ showing that a 
consecutively aligned sequence of the progressives c'an be a series of the 
significant NOWs, i.e. a series of plot-advancing events in narrative 
discourse. 
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, In the next section we have a critical look at the v1·ew that th . e progressives 
like [5]-33 (d) ~re statives, by examining the reference-time approach to 
narrative dynamtcs. 
· 5.3.2 The problem with the reference-time approach to narrative 
In this section \Ve atm at sho\ving that the indiscriminate application of 
reference times to consecutive clauses in narrative is misleading in that it 
fails to distinguish bet\vcen event and non-event clauses, and that it is 
responsible for making an excessively strong image of the linear time-line of 
narrative. The discussion \Viii be a critical remark upon the formal 
semanticists' approach to narrative dynamics. 
As we reviewed in Chapter 2, Reichenbach's reference times are employed 
by grammarians and formal semanticists to account for the "forward 
movement of time" in narrative discourse. Now we reproduce the 
·definition of the reference time \Vhich we gave in 2.1.1: 
The point of reference, i.e. the temporal standpoint from which the 
speaker invites his audience to consider the occurrence of the.event (or 
the obtai.ning of the state) (Taylor, 1977) 
With a view to examining ho\v the concept of reference time is actually 
applied to the analysis of narrative discourse, here we reproduce the system 
postulated by Caenepeel ( 1989: 68-73) (cf. 2.1.3). She advanced the notion 
of 'symmetrical and asymmetrical referential centres (RC)'. According to 
her, a referential centre consists of two intervals, i.e. an asserted (r) and an 
assumed (r') reference time. Her schematisation shows that the so-called 








Example: The train arrived. 
Type: culmination 
(Note: PP means 'preparatory period', designating a period .leading up to the 
change of state, and Cons is 'consequence', designating a period ensuing after 
this change of state. The punctuality of asserted reference .. tirne [r] coincides 
with that of assumed reference time [r'], so that the r~fe~ential centre is 
symmetrical.) 
... 
And in the so-called state clauses RC is asymmetrical. One e~~mple: 
<(. ////////////////// r' ///////////ll/1////)> 
fP.) 
[r] 
Example: He was tired. 
\• 
•• ·,. ·: l .: • 
' .. •, 
; '. 
. (. 
Type: non-contingent states, also referred to simply. as ·stat~s. 
(Note: P means 'point' ( a particular time point), which ·intr~du~es a punctual 
• • • ' t. 
asserted reference time f r·). And the durability ·of r' im'plicates~ ror example, 
that a few minutes before the time point the pr?position· '.He· ~as tired' was 
true, and a ~ew minutes after th~ time p·oint the same:pr~po~ition was still 
. . . . .. · ··: .. 
true, Thus the referential centre ·is asymmetrical.) 
· .. ;· 
The coincidence of the asserted and assumed reference:·;:times in event 
clauses appears to be in parallelwith our obsetvation tltaf~n·event, i.e. a 
temporal clause, constitutes a signific~nt NOW. The: tre·at~ent. of event 




· · understood that the atomistic interval of the asserted reference time can be 
very close to the idea of time-point presentness, i.e. the notion of NOW in 
the time-point A-series. l'hus, it is not difficult to predict what will happen 
if such interval discrepancy het\veen the asserted and assumed reference 
times is adopted as a test to kno\v whether a particular clause is an event or a 
state. For the purpose of our discussion in 5.3, it is very important to note 
that clauses with asymmetrical RC are aut~matically classified as non-events. 
The main reason \vhy Caenepecl labels the progressive as a state is that it 
linguistically behaves in exactly the same way as 'He was tired' given above. 
She says (ibid.: 122): 'a progressive takes as its input a process, and it 
describes this process as ongoing or i'n progress at a particular point of time, 
by compressing its asserted reference time into an atomic interval. 
Sentences encoding a progressive therefore exhibit the aspectual properties 
of a state.' The serious dra\vback of such a formally rigid view of 
eventhood and statehood is that it cannot distinguish an event clause like [5]-
33 (d) from atemporal clauses like the following (assuming that its atemporal 
feature, i.e. the statehood, is contextually verifiable): 
[51-36 John \Vas an American. 
One great factor contributing to the observation that [5]-33 (d) and [5]-36 
behave alike in terms of dynamics is that the fundamental principle of the 
reference-time approach to temporal discourse like .narrative is to identify 
the. temporal feature of a particular sentence or clause only in relation to the 
immediately preceding one. This is a relativistic view of temporal 
dynamics but one must adrnit that it is a markedly microscopic and rigid 
relativism~ The general attitude underlying such a restricted view of 
dynamics might be given an expression like: 'What happens to the narrative 
time in the next clause?' It is not difficult to see that the refere.nce-time 
approach to narrat.ive dynamics fails to capture 'narrative time', 'story time' 
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, or 'plot progression' in a more flexible manner. We observed in Chapter 3 
that time is a matter of relation hehveen events, and that the relation itself is 
the direction of time - the direction from NEW to OLD (see 3.2.2). It is to 
be recognised that this temporal dynamics holds good ·for narrative 
discourse, or story telling, and that it need not be realised only in the 
microscopic discoursal relation bet\veen adjacent clauses. 
The problems with the reference-time approach .to adjacent clauses in 
narrative discourse will he further discussed in the next chapter which 
concentrates upon even! sequencinR on the microscopic an·d macroscopic 
levels in narrative fiction. 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
In 5.3 we focused upon the problem of the so-called framing effect which 
tends to be referred to in relation to imperfective clauses such as the reasons 
why the well-accepted grammatical views fail to recognise the progressives 
in narrative as events. ()ne is that they tend to stick to a rather rigid idea of 
presentness, namely, the time-point NOW type of presentness, and are 1 
normally indifferent to the presentness in the significant A-series. And the 
second reason is that they do not pay enough attention to the problem of 
perspectival restrictions peculiar to narrative perspective. Our discussion in 
5J showed that if is legitimate and reasonable to recognise the eventhood of 
some types of imperfective clauses \Vhich have been traditionally labelled as 
states, or processes. 
From a general point of vie\v, the \Vhole chapter can be taken as accounting 
for what is going on in 5.1.1, \vhere hvo people interpret a particular 
progressive expression differently~ one assumes it to be an event, and the 
other, a state. It is no\v clear that the former commonsensically, assumes 
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that the progressiviscd state of affairs c~nstitutes a significant NOW; he 
conceives of the whole situation as realising temporal sequentiality, that is, an 
event. By contrast, the latter interprets the presentness primarily in the 
time-point A-series, and deliberately pushes into the background the 
recognition of now-ness in the significant A-series. Compared with the 
former, the latter is marked in the \vay he responds. And note that this 
markedness would have heen equally felt if the latter had said, 'No, no, it's a 
process, not an .event'. l"'his seems to suggest that the distinction between 
event and state is more intrinsic and more fundamental than that between 
state and process. 
With our observations of perspectival varieties made in this chapter in mind, 
in Chapter 6 \Ve take a closer look at the ways in which graphological 
sequencing realises story events in narrative fiction. 
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Chapter 6 Event sequencing in narrative fiction 
The aim of this chapter is to make an inquiry into how graphological 
linearity is related to the seq uencc of story events in narrative discourse. 
Based upon the assumption that narrative discourse consists of story-event 
. discourse, \Vhich contributes to the plot progression, and background 
discourse, which has no direct bearing upon the forward movement of the 
plot, our discussion concentrates upon the ways in which textual 
circumstances realise narrative dynamics, which, on the most microscopic 
level, means the and-then relation between two event clauses. This chapter is 
mainly a microscopic study of narrative dynamics, focusing upon the 
discoursal relations bet\veen adjacent clauses, and through the study it will be 
shown that the adjacency-minded approach is not necessarily helpful in , 
detecting the dynamic sequence of story events. Our contention is that the 
proper recognition of narrative dynamics requires a more or less 
macroscopic view of graphological sequence in narrative discourse. With a 
view to investigating the possibilities of macroscopic readings of narrative 
dynamics, in the last part of this chapter (6.5) we attempt a case study of 
Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' . 
6.1 The dynamics of narrative structure 
6.1.1 The dual aspect of narrative 
As a preliminary to accounting for the dynamics of states of affairs tn 
narrative fiction, the present section makes brief reference to the dual aspect 
of narrative. 
It \Viii be generally ackno\vledged that \vhen \Ve speak of narrative we· can 
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refer to two aspects of it. One is that a narrative is a narrative ( story) 
world as a coherently structured, event-oriented entity. And the other is 
that a narrative is a narrative-telling, i.e. discourse. From an ontological 
point of view, these t\vo cannot be separated from each other, just as it is 
impossible to isolate the colour from a red rose. 
Which of the t\vo aspects comes to the surface of one's consciousness may be 
concerned with the psychological principle of focus and periphery, which 
was discussed in 3.5.1. Due to the inherently selective nature of human 
consciousness, one cannot focus upon more than one item at the same time. 
If we apply this cognitive feature of human beings to the situation of 
narrative reading, we will be able to make the following observation. When 
the reader's attention is directly dra\vn to the represented world as a spatia-
temporal particular, the other aspect of narrative as a verbal act will click. 
out of focus and become peripheral in the reader's mind. In such 
circumstances the reader \V ill feel that what is being given to him is the 
narrative \Vorld itself, simply because by attending solely to the represented 
world the language as the medium is likely to appear "transparent" to him. 
On the other hand, \Vhen the reader focuses upon how the narrative world is 
represented, then his primary concern will become more or less a 
metalinguistic one, and the narrative as a represented world will disappear 
Into the background. This does not necessarily mean to say that there are 
two distinct kinds of readers: in fact, it is very likely that one particular 
reader will ~e a\vare of the t\vo aspects of narrative in an oscillatory manner 
in the actual process of reading. 
As mentioned above, hoth narrative-telling and the narrative world 
constitute the "meaning" of narrative. The veracity of this observation will 
be confirmed by reflecting upon the acceptability of such remarks as: 'Then, 




, narrative, A happened first, then B happened, and finally C happened'. One 
will have little difficulty understanding that in the two examples the same 
word 'narrative' is employed \vith hvo different shades of meaning; the 
former can be looked upon as primarily concerned with how the narrative is 
recounted, \Vhile the latter seems to be oriented directly to the represented 
world. 
It is to be borne in mind that, as \Viti be pointed out later, the knowledge of 
the two possible aspects of narrative is a prerequisite for the proper 
understanding of the temporal dynamics of narrative structure. 
6.1.2 The primary characteristic of narrative time 
This section looks into the intrinsic nature of narrative time which is 
primarily concerned \Vith the significant A-series. By looking at Genette's 
theory of 'duration' ( 1980), \Ve \Vill suggest that the concept of duration or 
pacing is more congenial to the time-point time, which is primarily 
quantitative, than to the significant time, \Vhich is primarily qualitative, so 
that the notion of duration or pacing is of secondary importance to the 
recognition of the dynamics of narrative time which is virtually identical 
with story-event sequencing. 
Genette ( 1980: 87 -88), referring to the rhythm or pacing in narrative 
discourse, says: ' ... the speed of a narrative· will be defined by the 
relationship. bet\veen a duration (that of the story, measured· in seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, months, and years) and a length (that of the text, 
measured· in lines and pages)'. With this definition he suggests four possible 
movements: pause, scene, summary, and ellipsis. In addition to these four 
movements, Chatman ( 1978) and some others have suggested another 
possibility in between pause and scene, i.e. stretch (or slow down). With the 
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. formulas 'story time' and 'narrative (or narrative-telling) time' these five 
possibilities will be schematised as follows: 
1. Pause: Story time = 0, narrative continues 
2. Stretch: Narrative ti rne longer than story time 
3. Scene: Narrative time= story time 
4. Summary: Narrative time shorter than story time 
5. Ellipsis: Narrative gap 
The usefulness of this schcmatisation \viii be accounted for by the empirical 
fact that we feel a certain rhythm or pacing in reading narrative; sometimes 
a particular stretch of narrative is felt to be more or less accelerated or 
decelerated, as if it were turned from andante to allegro, and vice versa, in 
musical terms. 
In some cases, however, it happens that the reader cannot tell, for example, 
whether a particular narrative is a scene, stretch or summary. With Joyce's 
'Eveline' Toolan -\vrites ( 1988: 56): 
For example, just ho\V long, in story time, is Eveline's revery? It could 
be anything from a fe\v minutes to several hours: it takes place between 
·early and late evening (\vhen the mail-boat goes). Since we can't be sure 
about the pace of the revery presentation, neither can we be sure as to 
whether the later scene at the quayside is a presentational acceleration or 
deceleration. 
The unce~tainty of the physical length of time \vhich Eveline spent in her 
revery can be seen as an extreme case, but the intrinsic feature of time in 
the significant A-series in \vhich when and how long can be known only in 
a relative manner in the sequence of events is quite commonly observable in 
narrative discourse as in: 
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(6]-1 Sh.e laid the mirror down on the dresser and went over to the 
Wln.dow and looked out. (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 316) 
What this prototypical narrative discourse suggests is that in narrative-world 
time the sequentiality of 'significant events' tends to oversh~dow the other 
sequence of time, i.e. the sequence of 'spurious events' (time points) in which 
the temporal information about when and how long is available in an 
absolute and objective \vay · 'fheoretically, it might be feasible to imagine a 
very time-conscious narrative in which the precise duration of each story 
event is indicated in some \vay or other, but, actually, showing the exact 
length of time of each event or the whole story is not the narrator's main 
concern. The narrator's a\vareness of time seems to be more directly 
concerned with the significant A-series than with the time-point A-series. 
This peculiarity of narrative-\vorld time contrasts markedly with the 
balanced temporality in reality. It is part of world knowledge that when a 
particular event takes place in the real world \Ve can recognise it as an event 
in a significant way ( this implicates the recogniser's "subjective" labelling or 
interpretation by means of verbalisation), and at the same time we can know, 
in an objective manner, exactly when it happened or precisely how long it 
endured. This will be concerned \Vith the problem of perceptibility. From 
experience we kno\v that objective measurability of time or time points 
concerns the perceptual aspect of reality; we feel we can measure the exact 
length of time by, for example, seeing the movement of the hand on the 
watch. Narrative world differs from reality in that the former is a medium-
through, represented world~ in \Vhich \vhat counts is not perceivability but 
conceivability. This is the intrinsic reason why the concept of duration, i.e. 
the length of time, tends to be nebulous in narrative discourse. It could be · 
pointed out that there is a parallelism between th_is problem and the 
vagueness of angle of vision in optical terms in verbal narrative, which we 
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I discussed in 4.2.4. 
In Chapter 3 (see 3 .6) \VC contended that time is just a matter of relation 
between events, and that the relation itself is the direction ·of time _ the 
direction from NEW to ()LD. This implicates that the intrinsic nature of 
time is its sequentiality. Here particular attention must be drawn to the 
ontological difference hchvecn the sequentiality of the significant A-series 
and that of the time-point A-series. Crucial is the fact that the sequentiality 
of the significant-A series is primarily qualitative, whereas that of the time-
point A-series is primarily quantitative. What is meant by qualitative 
sequentiality. is that the significance attached to states of affairs constitutes 
time, i.e. change. Time as the qualitative sequentiality entails duration, 
time in the time-point A-series, but such time-point time is backgrounded, as 
it were, and is not directly relevant to the significant sequence of time. By 
contrast, the quantitative sequentiality of the time-point A-series has no 
direct bearing upon the significance ascribable to substantial states of affairs 
or entities in the world. It is not \Vithout significance, but the significance is 
only the concept 'from NEW to OLD' attached to the sequence of time points 
as abstract phenomena. 'fhis abstract time· primarily concerns the notion of 
duration, \Vhich is characterised by its objective measurability. 
It is to be generally agreed that the dynamics of narrative or narrative 
structure lies in the sequence of events which contributes to the impression of 
the so-called plot progression. And when we refer to the sequence of events 
what we mean to say is not the sequence of spurious events, i.e. the sequence 
of time points, ·but the sequence of substantial events, which constitute 
changes in entities in the fictional \vorld. It could be said that the greatest 
characteristic of the narrative dynamics, which belongs to the significant A-
series, is its "subjectivity" as against the "objectivity" of the event dynamics 
in the time-point A-series. The subjectivity of the significant A-series 
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concerns the fact that it is up to each individual to decide how to verbalise a 
particular event and ho\v and where (temporally) to distinguish it from the 
preceding events or states of affairs. And the objectivity of the time-point 
A-series lies in its nature as "common property"; every one can share a 
particular time point (e.g. October 27th, 1993) and an infinite number of 
events can happen at a particular time. One of the central aims of the 
present chapter is to clarify the intrinsically subjective nature of the event-
sequence of narrative structure, and to argue that attempting to look at the 
narrative dynamics primarily in terms of the time-point A-series tends to end 
up missing the real dynamics of the narrative world. 
The contrast bet\veen the subjective nature of the significant A-series and the 
objective nature of the time-point A-series is touched upon from different 
angles throughout the rest of this chapter. 
6.1.3 The continuity and irreversibility of narrative time 
In this section we are going to stress the ontological fact that narrative time 
is no more discontinuous and reversible than time is in the real world. 
In 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 \Ve made an ontological observation that one cannot think 
of discontinuity or irreversibility of time without making a logical 
contradiction. As confirmed in the last section, time is essentially sequential, 
and this holds whether the time being referred to is a significant one or a 
time-point one. A particular time A is followed by another particular time 
B, and when this occurs, the order is semantically characterised by the 
ontological principle 'from NEW to OLD'. Of vital importance is the fact 
that there is no suspension, no interval, in behveen A and B; the two times 
make a sequence which is continuity itself. Claiming that suspension is 
possible between any two particular times would be almost as absurd as 
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insisting that, when a lump of cheese is cut, the cross-section consists of a 
third entity, which is neither cheese nor nothing-ness. 
One must be reminded of such peculiarities of time \Vhen one contemplates 
narrative time. Narrative time means 'narrative \Vorld time', as mentioned 
before. Obviously, the narrative world simulates the real world in spatia-
temporal terms. This means that the law of time and space in the narrative 
world is the same as the one that governs reality. In the· narrative world 
events occur in chronological order, and time "moves forward" continuously 
without being suspended~ just as it does in the real world ( If a science fiction 
deals with 'suspended time' or 'reversed time', it is just playing. with words; 
one cannot make any good sense out of such impossibilities.) 
Presumably, it is \Vhen one becomes conscious of narrative time after 
reading a particular narrative that sequentiality as the essence of time will be 
fully appreciated. Under ordinary and normal circumstances, when one 
thinks of a particular narrative as a succession of events one will be looking 
at it as a continuous entity, and as long as one focuses upon the continuous 
aspect of narrative structure one \Vill find it nonsensical to refer to narrative 
time suspension. Seeing the continuity of story events means grasping the 
narrative dynamics in and only in the and-then logic. 
Now it is clear that when people say 'The story (narrative) is suspended here' 
or 'The story (narrative) goes back\vard there', they are referring to the 
telling side ~f narrative, \V hether they are aware of it or not. Any reference 
to narrative time suspension ought to be interpreted as saying that a 
particular ·chunk of discourse is ate1nporal , i.e. not directly concerned with 
the plot progression; it must not be taken literally. And the possible meaning 
of backward movement of narrative time is the reversed ordering in the 
recounting of story events. Here again, reversed movement of narrative 
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time does n·ot make any sense in the literal sense of the word. 
6,1.4 Conclusion 
Our discussion in 6.1 elucidated the following peculiarities of narrative. 1) 
The term 'narrativ~' can refer to hvo different aspects, i.e. narrative telling 
and narrative \Vorld, and \vhcn the term is actually employed one of the two 
sides is likely to be spotl ightcd. 2) Narrative time is less concerned with the 
time-point A-series, \vhich is quantitative and "objective", than with the 
significant A-series, \Vhich is qualitative and "subjective". 3) Narrative time 
is continuous and irreversible just as time in reality is, so that expressions 
such as 'narrative time suspension' or 'back\vard movement of narrative 
time' can be misleading and should not be taken literally, since possible 
meanings of such expressions are concerned \Vith narration or story-telling. 
In 6.2, following the discussion in Chapter 5, \Ve summarise the 
methodological problems of formal approaches to narrative discourse which 
tend to fail to describe narrative dynamics in a proper way. 
6.2 Problems with formal approaches to narrative dynamics 
6.2.1 Reference time and simultaneity 
In this sectiqn, by looking into the \Yay in \Vhich the "objective" time in the 
time-point A-series can he highlighted by the application of reference time 
to what we call ilnperfective event clauses (cf. 5.3), we confirm that the 
reference time approach to consecutive (main) clauses in narrative discourse 
is not appropriate for the recognition of narrative dynamics. 
Reichenbachian reference tirnc is frequently employed to explain 
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'narrative time progression' (cf. Partee 1984· Kamp 1981) b · ' , , , ut as we 
argued in 5.3.2, the reference-time approach tends to fail to account for the 
real dynamics of narrative structure. 
The methodological dra\vback of the reference time approach will be clearly 
understood by seeing ho\v narrative time progression is normally assessed in 
the clausal chunk in \vhich a perfective (bounded) event clause is followed by 
an imperfective (unbounded) event clause as in: 
[6]-2 (a) She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bed-rail 
(b) and fell into a revery. (c) There was no longer any 
perturbation visible on her face. (Joyce, 'The Boarding House': 
75) (italics are mine). 
According to Partee's system (1984), the event (a) introduces a new 
reference time ·rl, \vhich \vill be employed for the interpretation of the · 
event (b), which in turn \viii introduce another reference time r2 for the 
reading of (c). But (c) is a so-called stative clause, so that it does not update 
the reference time; it is supposed to surround the current reference time r2. 
This formal, adjacency-minded analysis of narrative discourse claims that 
narrative time does not "move forward" from (b) to (c). Note that the 
impression of narrative time being suspended there can be considered to stem 
from the silnultaneity or conte1nporaneousness of the two states of affairs 
represented by (b) and (c) respectively. It is evident that the reference-time 
approach of this kind assumes that stative clauses like (c) have a framing 
\ 
effect upon event clauses like (b); \Vhat is described in (c) is construed as a 
state or condition of some entity at a particular point of time. As we 
referred to in 5.2.4, the a\vareness of such time points prior to the 
recognition of the possible dynamics of a certain state of affairs illustrates · 
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the fact that the temporal.ity perceived there belongs to the time-point A-
series The most saltent feature of the t1·me pot"nt A · · · . - -senes ts tts 
"objectivity"' as already pointed out; a particular time point is objective 
enough to be shared by many different events. 
It is worth noting that reference time can be fuzzy in its nature. As long as 
one sees that reference times are applied to the dynamic sequence of event 
clauses such as (6.1-2 (a) and (b), the combination of which embodies the and-
then logic in terms of substantial states of affairs, one may feel that reference 
time belongs to the significant A-series. This observation will be verified by 
confirming that it is possible to feel the renewal of story NOW in the 
sequence from (a) to (b). We need to attend to the fact that the presentness 
attached .to the two event clauses has nothing to do with the so-called framing 
effect. For example, the event clause (a) can constitute a story NOW, which 
means that, as far as (a) is concerned, it makes no sense to claim that the 
event described in that clause stretches into past and future. This contrasts 
markedly with the temporal situation in (c). In the reference time system, 
the stative clause (c) cannot constitute a story NOW. Note that the reference 
time r2 starts to look like a time-point when it is applied to (c). One might 
argue that r2 has a flavour of the significant time because it is closely related 
to a significant event (b), but it is necessary to recognise that when it is 
referred to in connection \Vith (c), it behaves as an abstract time point around 
which the state represented by (c) extends to past and future. 
Fortna} sem~nticists such as Partee (1984) or Caenepeel (1989) would claim 
that for the reasons mentioned above narrative time stops at (c), but, as 
argued in 5.3.2, that is because their fundamental principle is to try to 
identify the temporal features of a particular sentence or clause only in 
relation to its immediately preceding one. It is of vital importance to note 
that one need not assume that temporal dynamics in narrative is to be 
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perceived only in the microscopic discoursal relation between adjacent 
(main) clauses. What matters in recognising the eventhood of (c) is that, 
though the presentness of (c) may look like a time-point at first, it can be 
taken as a significant NOW. This means that the whole situation of (c) can 
constitute a story NOW in contrast to the preceding situation which is not 
directly concerned with graphologically preceding clauses (b) and (a). The 
most salient feature of the significant NOW is that such presentness concerns 
the whole situation, and that once the presentness is identified as such it is 
irrelevant to say that the situation extends to past and future in time-point 
terms. In short, as far as the clause [6]-2 (c) is concerned, it is reasonable to 
assume that it entails RPD 'no\v' (cf. 5.2.8) as the temporal-sequentiality 
marker. 
Presumably, one of the most senous drawbacks of the reference time 
system, which tends to go to and fro between the significant time and the 
time-point time, is that it cannot recognise the eventhood of imperfective 
clauses such as (c). The temporal adverb 'no longer' indicative of a change 
will allow us to perceive the eventhood represented by this clause. And the 
eventhood of (c) can be confirmed from context as well. Polly, one of the 
protagonists in the story, revealed her strong agitation here and there before 
[6]-2. One example: 
[6]-3 She cried and thre\v her arms round his neck, saying: 
-0, Bob! Bob! What am I to do? What am I to do at all? (Joyce, 
'The Boarding House': 72) 
As already pointed out, crucial is the semantic and grammatical fact that the 
temporal-sequentiality marker 'no\v' can typically co-occur with [6]-2 
(c) just as in the case of (61-2 (a) and (b), which can be thought of as 
prototypical event clauses in narrative discourse. What is to be noted is that 
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the graphological sequence from [6]-2{b) to (c) does not make an icon of · 
temporal sequence implying 'and then', so that it is necessary to assume that 
the eventhood of [6]-2 (c) belongs to a different dimension of the significant 
A-series from that of [61-2 (a) and (b). 
The problems of formaL adjacency-minded approach to narrative dynamics 
which have been revealed in this section can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, formal approaches tend to assume that the perfective 
(bounded)/imperfective (unbounded) distinction corresponds to the 
ev~nt/state distinction. Such a formal fallacy seems to be well portrayed by 
Moens (1987: 43) who \Vrites: 'Events will be referred to as bounded in that 
they are supposed to start and end at relatively precise points in time. States 
are "unbounded" since - although they seem to extend in time - no reference 
is made to their start and end points'. In our understanding the eventhood of 
a particular state of affairs can be recognised when it is judged to have 
realised the temporal sequentiality, \Vhether it is jor1nally perfective or 
imperfective. 
Secondly, the reference-time approach is not necessarily appropriate for 
detecting narrative dynamics, \Vhich is intrinsically associated with the 
significant A-series, since reference time can find itself congenial to the 
time-point A-series, the "objective" series of time points. This can be known 
in certain narrative circumstances in which application of reference time 
system leads one to recognise sitnultaneity in relation to the so-called 
framing effect. 
Lastly, formal analysts of narrative discourse tend to pay too much attention 
to the graphological sequence on the microscopic level. They are excessively 
concerned with how consecutive (main) clauses behave temporally on the 
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assumption that the iconicity of time movement is to be perceived in adjacent 
clauses. 
6.2.2 The limitations of adjacency-minded approaches 
The focal point of discussion in this section is to argue that formal and 
microscopic approaches to narrative dynamics, which are remarkably 
sensitive to the tem.pora] characteristics of graphologically adjacent (main) 
clauses, are not necessarily appropriate for the recognition of narrative 
dynamics as a succession of events because of the fuzziness of the temporal 
relation between clauses that is quite commonly observable in works of 
narrative fiction. 
Formally, the superordinate narrative discourse (cf. 5.2.10) will be realised 
as in: 
[6]-4 (a) He \Vriggled his toes in the water in his shoes,(b) and got out a 
cigarette from his breast pocket. (c) He lit it (d) and tossed the 
match into the fast \Vater belo\v the logs. (Hemingway, 'Big Two-
Hearted River: II': 354) 
The graphological sequence of the four clauses in [6]-4 can be seen as a 
prototype of narrative structure, i.e. a representation of a succession of 
events; .what can be perceived there is that the four consecutive clauses 
literally wo~k as an icon of narrative time progression. 
It \Viii soon be recognised, ho\vever, that in actual works of narrative fiction, 
jt'too frequently happens that one cannot be sure whether a particular pair 
of adjacent clauses are temporally sequential or not, despite the temporality 
perceivable in either of them. The following example illustrates this: 
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[6]-5 (a) Little Chandler quickened his pace. (b) For the first f · 
his life h~ felt ~imself superior to the people he passed. ~~eF: 
the first ttme hts soul revolted against the dull inelegance of 
Capel Street. (d) There \vas no doubt about it: (e) if you wanted 
to su~ceed you had to go away. (f) You could do nothing in 
Dubhn. (g) As he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked down the 
river towards the lo\ver quays (h) and pitied the poor stunted 
houses. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 79)) 
It will be understood that for the recognition of narrative time progression 
appiying the notion of reference time to the eight clauses one by one starting 
with (a) is not helpful. l'he first three clauses (a), (b) and (c) are what Short 
(1982: 183) calls 'narrative reports'. The trouble with the three clauses is 
that the temporal relation between them is indeterminate. The eventhood of 
each of them seems to be clear enough; they can all co-occur with· the 
temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' (the importance of the temporal-
sequentiality marker 'no\v' as a test to know the eventhood of a particular 
discourse will be emphasised in 6.3). But it is unclear whethe~ the sequence 
of those three event clauses makes an icon of temporal progression or not. 
The situation appears more difficult when the reader goes on to (d), (e) and 
(f) from the first three clauses. The temporal relation between (c) and (d), 
for example, is ambiguous. It seems likely that (d), (e) and (f) are FID (Free 
Indirect Speech), judging from the colloquial flavour recognisable in (d) in 
particular. If so, one possible interpretation is that (d), (e) and (f) are a 
kind of redundancy. Cohn (1978), referring to Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych , points 
out an interesting tendency of the narrator's report to overlap with directly 
quoted thoughts. She calls it 'redundancy'. The following is the excerpt 
quoted: 
f61-6 Then again together \Vith that chain of memories another series 
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passed through his mind - o£ how his illness had d d 
'J progresse an 
~rown worse. There also the further back he looked the more 
hfe there had been. There had been more 0·f wh t d · . . . a was goo tn 
hfe and more of hfe Itself. The two merged together. "Just as 
the pain went on getting worse and worse, so my life grew 
worse and worse," he thought. (Cohn, 1978: 70) (italics are mine) 
In [6]-6 the t\vo italicised parts can be interpreted as the two different modes 
of telli~g of the same event - the former is NR (narrative report) and the 
latter, Tagged Speech (cf. 4.3.3). The important thing to note is that the 
redundant relation between the two different clauses is atemporal; it does not 
constitute an icon of temporal progression in graphological terms. Back to 
[6]-5, if we attend, for instance, to the consecutive relation between (c) and 
(d), which sounds redundant, \Ve will find their sequence is atetnporaL 
When we proceed further and see the graphological sequence from (f) to 
(g), and to (h), \Ve will find it is temporal. 
The ongoing discussion is stressing the drawback of the microscopic view of 
narrative dynamics which tends to be confronted with the uncertainty as to 
whether a particular clause contributes to the plot progression or not. The 
formal mind \Vhich is inclined to pay equal attention to each individual clause 
as a discrete syntactic unit in order to see the temporality of narrative may 
be said to have fallen into undesirable egalitarianism. Their theoretical 
stance will have to recognise that 'narrative time progression', 'narrative 
time suspen~ion' and 'uncertainty about narrative time progression' are equal 
in weight in narrative discourse, since they generally assume that the 
temporal dynamics of narrative is to be assessed by seeing whether the 
relation between a particular main clause and the immediately following one 
realises temporal sequentiality or not. Such a formal attitude might be 
termed microscopic relativism. 
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The formal microscopicism mentioned so far is prone to take a static view of 
narrative. If one adopts microscopic relativism, one will have an impression 
that narrative continually stops, because, as we observed in [6]-5~ it is quite 
common in actual narrative that one cannot tell whether the plot develops or 
not, as long as one sticks to the temporal relation between any two adjacent · 
clauses. The theoretical stance of such formalism will not be able to explain 
the reason why, when one takes a slightly macroscopic view, the plot seems 
to develop from (a) to (g) in (6]-5, despite the ambiguity of the temporal 
sequentiality from (a) to (f). It would be irrelevant here to bring a physical 
point of view and argue that, as a whole, the narrative moves forward in [6]-
5, just as a train can be said to go forward from a macroscopic point of view 
in spite of its halts at many different stations. 
In the next section we are going to claim that the realisation and recognition 
of narrative dynamics as a sequence of story events cannot be fully 
understood without thinking about the pragmatic relation between narrator, 
text, and reader. 
6.2.3 The pragmatic relation between narrator, text, and reader 
That the realisation and recognition of narrative dynamics as a succession of 
story events is concerned not only with semantic and grammatical features of 
discourse but also with a pragmatic cooperation between narrator, text and 
reader will be understood by comparing the following two examples: 
(6]-7 (a) 'The Lord-a-Lord! Why, Tess Durbeyfield, if there isn't thy 
· father riding hwome in a carriage!' 
(b) A young member of the band turned her head at the 
exclamation. (c) She was a fine and handsome girl- not 
handsomer than some others, possibly- (d) but her mobile peony 
mouth and large innocent eyes added eloquence to colour and 
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shape. (e) S~e wore a red ribbon in her hair, (f) and was the only 
one of the whtte company who could boast of such a pronounced 
adornment. (g) As she looked round Durbeyfield was seen 
m?ving along. the road in a chaise belonging to The Pure Drop, 
dnven by a fnzzle-headed brawny damsel with her gown-sleeves 
rolled above her elbows. (Hardy, Tess of the d'Urbervilles: 51) 
[61-8 (a) The Abbey church of St. Mary was founded by King David t 
in 1136 for Cistercian monks. (b) It grew rich and powerful under 
roya! patronage but over the centuries suffered rep~atedly from 
Enghsh harassment, the end coming in 1545. (c) The red 
sandstone ruins show some of the finest stonework in Scotland 
with window tracery, flying buttresses, pinnacles and carved 
figures including on the roof that of a pig playing the bagpipes. 
(d) Tradition tells that the heart of King Robert I (Robert the 
Bruce) is buried within the Abbey. (e) The 16th Commeridator's 
House is now a museum. (f) Open all year, daily. (g) Admission 
charge. (h) Easy disabled access. ( from 'Scottish Borders Mini 
Guide: Melrose') 
. The reader's purpose of reading fiction will vary; some will be keen to know 
about the ideological background of the story, and some will concentrate on 
the temperamental features of the characters. But, in discussing narrative as 
a genre, one very fundame·ntal thing to note is that when someone reads a 
' narrative some pragmatic or institutional factor will require him to take it 
for granted that the narrative as a whole realises a succession of story events, 
i.e. the temporal sequentiality. It is the temporal sequentiality in narrative 
that ·is to be .identified as narrative dynamics. And this essential feature is 
expected to be recognisable irrespective of the possible varieties of clausal 
relations on the consecutive basis. 
Now, when we look at £61-7, we are able to feel that temporal sequentiality is 
realised by the whole of the quoted passage. Microscopically, clauses (c), 
(d), (e) and (f) are to be interpreted as atemporal, as against (a), (b)·and (g), 
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which are te1nporal (The distinction bct\vecn temporal discourse (event 
expressions) and atemporal discourse (non-event expressions) in narrative 
discourse will be argued in connection with the concept of story line in 6.3). 
In terms of the flow of the discourse, four atemporal clauses seem to cut the 
"stream" of the narrative time, but the cutting is a phenomenon on the telling 
side, and not on the narrative-world side. It \vill be understood that as far as 
the event succession in the significant A-series from (a) to (b), and from (b) 
to (g) is concerned, narrative time is sequential. In other words, [ 6]-7 can 
induce the reader to recognise a narrative fonn as an abstract item, \V hich is 
a linguistic realisation of a time sequence in the form of a succesion of 
events. 
When we turn our attention to [6]-8, we find that it is irrelevant to decide 
whether the passage as a whole realises temporal dynamics or not, though 
structurally [6]-8 resembles [6]-7 in that both are made up of the combination 
of temporal and atemporal clauses. With [6]-8, perhaps the most evident 
non-narrative indicator can be observed in the clausal sequence from (f) to 
(h). The primary intention of each of the three clauses is to give practical 
information to the reader. and such practicality should be least relevant to 
narrative or story-telling. With the practical-orientedness as the distinctive 
feature, the whole passage will be judged to be informative. When we look 
at [6]-8 more specifically, we see that, as far as the first two clauses (a) and 
(b) are concerned, they are considered to designate a succession <?f events. 
But one will feel, from the overall practicality of the passage as observed 
above, that there is no prag1natic reason to take the temporal chunk of 
discourse as the dominant note in this passage. The temporal adverb 'now' in 
the clause (e) may be taken as a temporal-sequentiality marker implying the 
even~hood (change) of the situation, but the reader will not feel that the 
clause (e) constitutes a dynamic story-line together with (a) and (b). It will 
be acknowledged that (6]-8 as a whole lacks a pragmatic and metatextual sign 
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which says to the reader, 'I am going to tell you a story'. The writer has no 
intention of conveying temporal dynamics in 161-8. 
The main reason why adjacency-minded formal approaches to narrative 
discourse cannot grasp narrative dynamics properly is that, if one applies the 
reference-time analysis to the two passages [61-7 and [6]-8 on the basis of 
consecutive clauses one cannot make reference to the distinctive features :of 
either of them, since all one can mention \vill be the alteration of 'temporal 
progression' and 'temporal suspension' for both of them. 
In 6.4, as a way of explicating ho\v narrative dynamics can be perceived 
beyond semantic and grammatical features of each clause as a discrete 
syntactic unit, we will postulate /STORY LINE/ as an abstract and mental 
construct. 
6.2.4 Subordinate clauses and S/T presentation 
It must be admitted that formal analysts have traditionally concentrated upon 
the temporal characteristics of main clauses excluding srr presentation in 
narrative discourse. Consequently, the eventhood of subordinate clauses and 
speech forms has been little studied. In this section we point out the 
problem of the reference-time approach to story events detectable In 
syntactically hypotactic clauses and speech/thought presentation. 
That checking the update of reference times on the main clause basis is not 
necessarily_ helpful as a way of detecting story events properly can be 
ack.nowl~dged by taking into account the fact that application of reference 
times to narrative discourse concerns 'interval semantics' originally 
postulated by Taylor (1977) and extended by Dowty (1979), in which it is of 
central importance to determine the truth-value of a sentence (proposition) 
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with respect to the interval of ti1nc (ti1ne-point time). We reproduce 
Dowty's schematisation, \vhich was given in 2.1.3: 
(a) A sentence a is a stative iff it follows frorn the truth of a at an interval 
of I that a is true at all subintervals of I (e.g. 'John \Vas ill from 2 to 
4'). 
(b) A sentence a is an activity iff it follo\vs frorn the truth of a at an 
interval I that a is true of all subintervals of I do\vn to a certain limit 
in size (e.g. 'John played in the tncado\v from 2 to 4'). 
(c) A sentence a is an accomplishtnent/achievcment iff it follo\vs from the 
truth of a at an interval I th~t a is false at all subintervals of I (e.g. 'I 
listened to a Beethoven piano sonata from 2 to 2:30'). 
This schematisation of the three aspcctual types in connection with the notion 
of the truth of a sentence concerning a time interval deals \Vith propositions 
which can be assumed to be assertive with respect to the indication of the 
presence or absence of dynamicity of a particular state of affairs. Naturally, 
this system is not concerned with the assessment of the possible eventhood 
detectable in hypotactic clauses such as: 
[6 j-9 Before he went hack to the front they \Vent into the Duomo and 
prayed. (Hemingway, 'A Very Short Story': 301) (italics are mine) 
. [6]-10 After the ar1nistice they agreed he should go home to get a job 
so .they might be married. (Heming\vay, 'A Very Short Story': 
301) (italics are mine) 
From the reader's point of view it is possible and reasonable to construct 
story ev.ents out of the italicised discourse in the two examples given above, 
though neither of the two hypotactic clauses is assertive as a propositi~n. As 
discussed in 5.2.11, the parataxis/hypotaxis choice made by the narrator is 
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suggestive of "weight assessment" that the narrator performed before the 
actual recounting. It is up to the reader to shake off the perspectival 
peculiarities attached to the encoded product and appreciate story events that 
are grammatically immanent. In 6.4 we deal \Vith the combination of main 
and subordinate clauses, such as 161-9 and l 0, as a possible form \vhich 
realises /STORY LINE/. 
In 4.3.1 we observed that speech/thought presentation can be a substantial 
part of a particular narrative. The insignificance of applying reference times 
to speech/t~ought sentences or clauses as discrete syntactic units which 
represent story events will be recognised by looking at the following 
example: 
[6]-11 'I wish he would go home. I never get to bed before three 
o'clock. What kind of hour is that to go to bed?' 
'He stays up because he likes it.' 
'He is lonely. I'm not lonely. I have a wife waiting in bed for me'. 
( Hemingway, 'A Clean Well-lighted Place': 383) 
This is a prototypical example of non-tagged speech (see 4.3.2). It is clear 
that quotation marks function as speech boundaries which implicates the 
narrator's presence as the event describer saying 'He said'. But considering 
that speech presentation is a showing of the narrative \Vorld, it could be 
claimed that even each individual sound in speech presentation contributes to 
the update of. reference time. This means that there is no good reason to 
conceive of each sentence as a discrete event unit. In terms of story-event 
construction by the reader, it could be argued that it is in speech/ thought 
presentatio.n that a macroscopic view which will unify more than one single 
clause or sentence as an event unit seems to be most reasonable. The 
problem of event unification will be discussed in 6.5. 
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2 5 Conclusion. 6 •• 
The aim of our discussion in 6.2 \vas to point out the theoretically 
undesirable aspects of consecutivity-oriented, formal approaches to narrative 
dynamics. The time focused upon in formal systems is the time-point time, 
which is not congenial to narrative time, which is intrinsically not 
quantitative but qualitative. Our contention is that time-point time is of 
secondary importance for the proper recognition of story events, which are 
to be detected primarily upon the basis of time in the significant A-series. 
The essential relation between the recognition of story events and the 
significant time will be further referred to in 6.3. 
6.3 Events and non-events in narrative discourse 
6.3.1 The "historical" function of context 
The vital core of the present thesis is to argue that it is misleading to try to 
· see a strong parallel between the temporal boundedness/unboundedness and 
the event/state distinction, since the problem of temporal boundaries has 
traditionally been discussed only in the framework of objective, quantitative 
time, which we call time in the time-point A-series. 
In this section we clarify the possible criteria for a particular narrative 
discourse to be classified as a story event or not, on the assumption that, as 
we suggested .in 6.1.2, the eventhood of a particular state of affairs is most 
clearly recognisable when in the axis of time the significance attached to the 
state of affairs can be found distinct from that previously attached to it. The 
significance being referred to is the significance perceivable as a change in a 
particular state of affairs, and the recognition of the change is possible only 
in a relative manner in a particular series of story events. 
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As repeatedly stressed in this thesis, the cvcnthood of a particular state of 
affairs is to be perceived when it is judged to have realised temporal 
sequentiality, whether it is formally perfective (bounded) or imperfective 
(unbounded). For the moment we concentrate upon a particular narrative 
situation in which imperfective (unbounded) clauses are sequentially 
arranged. The point of argument is that it is generally difficult to detect 
eventhood in imperfective (unbounded) clauses \Vithout a context which helps 
the reader to take them in a historical perspective. 
Consider the following discourse: 
[6]-12 (a) There were only two Americans stopping at the hotel. (b) 
They did not know any of the people they passed on the stairs 
on their way to and from their room. (c) The room was on the 
second floor facing the sea. (Heming,vay, 'Cat in the Rain': 
314) 
.This is the opening discourse of the short story. Our claim is that as far as 
this narrative situation is concerned none of these three clauses can be 
reckoned as a story event. Let us focus upon the clause (a). In judging the 
presence or absence of the eventhood of (a), the most important thing is not 
to fall into the ontological fallacy. One must realise that it is misleading to 
rely on world knowledge and insist that the significance of (a) can be 
contrasted in a relative manner with a possible series of significance 
historically attached to the hotel, so that the eventhood of (a) as a 
representation of a change can be observed. If a fictional fact is available, 
and one can confirm that there were, say, 1000 Japanese tourists staying at 
the hotel immediately before (a) holds, then one might be ~ble to detect the 
eventhood implied in (a); a possible event description one is likely to make 
will be: 'There was a drastic decrease in the number of guests at the hotel'. 
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But crucial is the fact that, with respect to the hotel, there is no such context 
or history given in that particular narrative. One has to be practical rather 
than ontologic(\l in order to recognise story events properly. 
When we ask whether it is feasible to use the temporal-sequentiality marker 
'now' for (a), the answer must be negative. If the significance attached to (a) 
can be evaluated in contrast to a particular historical background of the 
hotel, then 'now' as the marker of a time sequence \vill be applicable; then 
the whole situation represented in (a) will constitute the presentness of the 
hotel in a significant way. That will be suggestive of the eventhood of the 
imperfective clause. But the actual narrative circumstances in which (a) is 
placed do not allow RPD 'now' (either significant or time-point) to co-occur 
with (a). 
The same goes for (b) and (c). There is no context or historical background 
for them, out of which the reader would in a contrastive manner squeeze 
out RPD 'now' (again, either significant or time-point) applicable to them. 
Here, some might argue that the use of 'now' as a temporal adverb can be 
optional with (a), if not with (b) or (c). Note that what underlies such 
thinking is a kind of cop.textualisation based upon world knowledge. 
Ontologically, no-one will doubt the eventhood of someone's stay at a hotel, 
simply because staying or stopping at a hotel is nornzally temporary. World 
knowledge will lull one into perceiving a change (or an event) in that 
situation, i.e. a change from not staying to staying at the hotel (from ,...,p to 
P). This sort of taken-for-granted contextualisation is so deep-ingrained in 
the way we understand the world that we have difficulty recognising it as 
such. Those who insist that the temporal adverb 'no\v' can be used in [6]-12 
(a) will argue against using 'now' for [6]-12 (c) 'The room was on the 
second floor facing the sea'. One must realise that the judgement of whether 
257 
or not 'now' is acceptable for the two clauses in question is deeply associated 
with the way world knowledge operates as a form of contextualisation on the 
reader's part. When someone says that 'now' cannot co-occur with (c) due 
to the unrestricted meaning of the clause, he is actually trying to take the 
meaning of it in a specific but conventionalised context in which it is 
impossible to think of a change of any kind, such as the transplantation of 
the room from somewhere else. 
My argument is as follows. One could claim the ontological eventhood of 
(a) by assuming that RPD 'now' is applicable to (a), but that is one's own 
contextualisation employing world knowledge, and it is not directly 
concerned with the actual narrative context in which (a) is rendered. As 
will be discussed in 6.2.3, story events ought to be story-line events. This 
means that story events are to be recognised in the now-renewal scheme in a 
narrative context directly available to the reader. From the viewpoint of 
story-telling as a process of narratorial contextualisation, l6]-12 (a), despite 
the applicability of the temporal adverb 'now' in ontological or grammatical 
·terms, has no good reason to be taken as a story event (or a story-line event), 
since [6]-12 (a) is nothing more than the situation or the state of the narrative 
world when it is initiated; it would be unreasonable in terms of nar~ation or 
narrative circumstances to insist that (a) can be captured in the active and-
then logic concerned with the renewal of story NOW. 
It will be of utmost importance to note that bringing too much reality into 
narrative world is irrelevant, particularly in terms of story event detection. 
In reality, as far as we ourselves and our immediate surroundings are 
concerned, we can normally see things in a historical scope; we know the 
past and the present of a particular state of affairs. This could be the main 
reason why it is in many cases possible to apply the temporal-sequentiality 
marker 'now' (the event-marker 'now') to imperfective, unbounded 
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clauses as 1 n: 
(6.1-13 John is now in hospital. 
The point is that in (6)-13 the speaker takes John's situation in a dynamic 
sequence of past and present. As \Viii be discussed in 6.3.3, such dynamic 
sequentiality is comparable to story line in narrative, in which story events 
are to be recognised as forming a succession of events in the active and-then 
logic. 
Our argument tn the present section irnplicates that any imperfective, 
unbounded discourse can be construed as an event description, if it is feasible 
to assess the discourse in a historical scope. But the so-called 'eternal truth 
expressions' cannot possibly suggest any present-past contrast, so that it is 
virtually impossible to see the eventhood in them. One exarnple: 
[6]-14 God is just. 
As far as the moral fibre of God is concerned, it is irrelevant to contextualise 
any past as distinguishable from the present. No context is available \Vith 
repect to the . moral history of God. Therefore, (6)-14 cannot possibly 
constitute the significant NOW for God. 
We come back to 'Cat in the Rain' later again in the next section, in order .to 
think practically and realistically about the problem of story events. 
6.3.2 Roundedness vs. unboundedness 
The present thesis is going to maintain that it is misleading and futile to 
. . 
become overly sensitive to sentence-grammar or very mtcroscoptc 
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discourse-grammar and try to consider the problem of narrative dynamics 
only by looking at each individual clause or adjacent clauses \Vithout paying 
enough attention to narrative fonn, a manifestation of discourse inertia in 
' 
which and only in which the dynamicity of narrative as an active sequence of 
story events is to be perceived in an authentic \vay. We turn to the problem 
of narrative f~rm in relation to the probletn of story line in the next secti~.fl' 
in which our discussion will be a markedly context-oriented one. ' 
.. ' 
As a preliminary to our context-bound talk in the next section, this se.ction 
will be devoted to a rather decontextualised, general discussion of temporal 
boundedness and unboundedness in order to think about the problem ~f th~·: 
autonomy of eventhood. 
A decontextualised discussion of whether a particular discourse is an event 
description or not may sound unfair, considering the intuitively 
acknowledgeable fact that change or event is a relative phenomenon. The 
relative nature of event is clear in that one can recognise a change in some 
item when it is possible to refer to the transition from --P to P in logical 
terms. 
Our argument in the present section is that the eventhood of a temporally-
bounded discourse tends to be perceived in an intrinsically context-free and 
autonomous way due to the distinctness of temporal demarcation which is 
easily recognisable in the occurrence-oriented flavour of the discourse, 
whereas the eventhood of a temporally unbounded discourse is likely to 
depend upon the "historical" function of context \Vhich enables one to 
appreciate the significance of the time during \vhich the discourse holds in 
contrast to the significance previously or historically attached to an item or 
items represented by the discourse. 
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Compare the following examples: 
[6]-15 (a) John died in 1983. 
(b) Fiona played tennis this rnorning. 
(c) Dick wrote a letter. 
[6]-16 (a) John was a British citizen. 
(b) Scot was in the garden. 
(c) Kate was angry. 
According to Vendler ( 1967), [6]-.15 (a) is an achievement, (b), an activity, 
and (c), an accomplishment, but it \V ill be recognised that such semantic 
distinctions do not count very much as far as the detectability of the 
transition from "'p to P in the three clauses is concerned. The three clauses 
are similar to each other in that one can feel the presence of the dynamicity 
represented by the verbal predicate in sharp contrast \Vith the absence of it at 
the preceding phase of time. For instance, \vith (a) one can set up some 
indefinite .time point that must have virtually served as the turning-point at 
·which 'being alive' ( "'P) ceased to hold and 'being dead' (P) began to hold. 
T~e dynamic situation in (a) induces one to recognise a change (event) as 
vividly as if one would recognise the clear-cut contrast between light and 
shadow. The same can be said \vith respect to (b) and (c). The dynamicity 
of the verbal predicates in the two clauses naturally invites one to assume that 
there must have been some time points at \vhich 'played tennis' and 'writing a 
letter' began and terminated respectively. 
One very important implication of the ongoing discussion is that, though it is 
inappropriate, as we observed in Chapter 2, to assume there is a strong 
parallelism between form and meaning, there are certain structural 
patternings whose formal features seem to invite one to mentally 
contextualise them in a fixed way in a so-called decontextualised situation. 
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It will be agreed that the formal characteristics of [6)-15 (c), for example, 
induce the reader to take it as an event, even if it is given by itself without 
anY contextual help. Put differently, dynamic clauses such as [6]-15 can 
stand on their own as event expressions without being contrasted with a 
particular context, in relation to which to confirm the eventhood of those 
clauses. 
Compared with [6]-15, the outstanding feature of the three clauses in [6]-16 
is their lack of autonotny as event expressions. The three clauses in [6]-16 
are so-called statives. World knowledge may direct one to take it that (a) is 
tess temporary than (b), which is in turn less temporary than (c). But one 
must notice that such a commonsensical way of thought presupposes the fact 
that those three clauses were actually used in a certain (perhaps mental) 
context. With respect to duration, it is always possible to think of specific 
situations in which the order of temporariness in the three clauses will be 
reversed. Take [6]-16 (a) for instance. If John's immediately available 
context indicates that he was an American citizen until the day before, but 
·now he was British, then (a) implicates the temporal sequentiality or 
temporal boundary at least on one side. With such contextual help, one will 
. have no difficulty pointing out the eventhood which is hidden in the apparent 
sy~tactic stru~ture. In that case, one would be able to construct an event 
expression: 'John obtained British citizenship'. But the actual situation of 
[6]-16 is that the three clauses are just given without any context which 
would help one to make sure that the eventhood is implicated. In short, 
because of the formal features, statives such as the three clauses in· [6]-16, 
when given by themselves, tend to direct the reader to contextualise them 
primarily in the state situations. 
Here also one must be careful not to fall into the ontological fallacy. Some 
might argue that if the temporal sequentiality works as the index of the 
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eventhood of a particular state of affairs. then clauses like l6]-16 (a) are 
definitely event expressions regardless of \vhether context is available or not, 
because, even if John was a British citizen frorn the very beginning, that 
situation can be temporally contrasted with the situation before his birth. 
This might be true ontologically, but it is not a practical vie\v of event or 
change. It would not be counterintuitive to say that when John was a British 
citizen throughout his life, that is a non-event, a stable condition of John. 
6.3.3 Discoursal environments 
In this section, by discussing the problem of discoursal envir(nunents \Ve 
point out that the recognition of story events requires taking discoursal 
situations into account. With a vie\v to cl ucidating the very important 
narrative fact that recognising the dynamicity of event succession requires 
more or less macroscopic views of discourse, \Ve quote a rather long passage 
that immediately follows [ 6]-12: 
[6]-17 (a) It also faced the public garden and the war monument. (b) 
There ·were big palms and green benches in the public garden. 
(c) In the good weather there was always an artist with his easel. 
(d) Artists liked the way the palms grew and the bright colours of 
of .the hotels facing the gardens and the sea. (e) Italians came 
from a long way off to look up at the war monument. (f) It was 
made of bronze and glistened in the rain. (g) It was raining. 
(h) The rain dripped from the palm trees. (i) Water stood in 
pools on the gravel paths. U) The sea broke in a long line in the 
rain and slipped back do\vn the beach to come up and break again 
in a long line in the rain. (k) The motor cars are gone from the 
square by the war monument. (I) Across the square in the 
doorway of the cafe a waiter stood looking out at the empty 
square. 
(m) The Ameri~an wife stood at the window looking out. (n) 
Outside right under their window a cat was crouched under one 
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of the dripping green tables. (o) The cat was trying to make 
herself s? ,com~act that she would not be dripped on. 
. (p) I m gotng down and get that kitty,' the American wife 
sat d. 
(q) 'I'll do it,' her husband offered from the bed. 
(r) 'No, I'll get it. The poor kitty out trying to keep dry 
under a table.' 
(s) The husband went on reading, lying propped up with the 
two pillows at the foot of the bed. 
(t) 'Don't get wet,' he said. 
(u) The wife went downstairs and the hotel owner stood up 
and bowed to her as she passed the office. ( v) His desk was at 
the far end of the office. (w) He was an old man and very tall. 
(x) '11 piove,' the wife said (Heming\vay, 'Cat in the Rain': 314-
5) 
The immediate purpose of quoting this long passage is to argue that a story 
event is identifiable as such when the active environment or the and-then 
dynamics is judged to be at work in the discourse, and that it is the active 
. environment that is most directly responsible for the reader's recognition of 
narrative form, i.e. event sequencing in the framework of active and-then 
logic, and that in order to understand narrative dynamics properly one has to 
pay enough attention to discoursal environ1nents, instead of just attending to 
semantic and aspectual features of each individual clause or sentence. 
In the light of narrative dynamics, [6]-17 can be divided into two parts. The 
turning-point is (p). The criterion for the distinction is the presence of 
discoursal activity. The overall impression of the first part from (a) to ( o) 
is that it does not realise any active sequence of story events. 
Macroscopically, the first part as a whole appears to function as a stative 
discourse. We have to pay particular attention to (p), which, together with 
the ensuing clause ( q), serves as a kind of magnetism to induce the reader to 
264 
set up an image of time-line in his rnind. This fiction entitled 'Cat in the 
Rain' starts ·with [6]-12, but it will be acknowledged that the narrative does 
not become activated until it comes to (p ). It is at (p) that now-renewal 
impetus (cf. 5.2.6) begins to be perceivable. A clause like (p), which can be 
considered to work as a starter of the active sequencing of story events might 
be called story-line inchoative. It could be argued that in order for a 
particular discourse to be classified as a narrative, it must realise an active 
sequence of events with the story-line inchoati ve as the inceptor. Our 
contention is that it is story-line events starting \Vith the story-line inchoative 
that are most intimately associated with the reader's story-event construction 
which will directly concern the reader's recognition of narrative fonn as the 
abstract, mental concept of and-then dynan1ics of narrative discourse. 
Now we attempt to take a close look at the first part of [6]-17. The 
discourse from (a) to (o), though sounding inactive or stative as a whole, 
includes some "event" clauses. As a matter of fact, from an aspectual, and 
sentence-grammar point of view, only (a), (b), (c), (d) and the first half of 
·(f) might be genuinely labelled as states or statives~ and all the others seem to 
be more or less indicative of some. kind of dynamics. For example, (e) will 
·be classified as 'culmination' (Moens, 1987). As \Ve pointed out in the 
preceding section, dynamic clauses like (e), if decontextualised, can stand on 
their own as event expressions. So, when one focuses upon the semantic 
and grammatical feature of (e) in a decontextualiscd way, one will find it is 
difficult not to recognise the eventhood represented by the expression. 
But it must be admitted that the eventhood of (e) is not felt to be as vivid and 
active as that of (p) and (q). Ontologically speaki~g, there might be no 
legitimate reason to differentiate (e), (h), (i) or U) from the event clauses 
.from (p) to (u), as far as the aspectual value attached to individual clauses is 
concerned. But it is to be noted that the clauses from (a) to (o) are nothing 
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but fragmentary visual pieces of infonnation \vhich do not contribute to the 
impression of the plot progression; no t\vo clauses, whether consecutive or 
not, can be considered to make an active sequence in temporal terms which 
may enable the reader to feel that no\v-rene\val impetus is at \vork. 
Presumably, the irrelevance of referring to the temporal relation between 
the 15 clauses from (a) to ( o) is the main reason \vhy one \vill feel that a kind 
of temporal stagnation seems to be operating as the dominant note in that 
discoursal environment. 
To put it another way, no single clause in the first part has an immediately 
available context behind it. Take (g) 'It \Vas raining' for instance. 
Ontologically, there should be no doubt about the eventhood implicated by 
this imperfective, progressive clause; it is part of \Vorld knowledge to assume 
that at some indefinite time in the past the rainfall must have started. But as 
far as this narrative situation is concerned, there is no good reason why one 
has to take the meaning of this clause in a historic span, since (g) is the 
situation or condition of the narrative \Vorld when it is initiated, and no 
·context is available which will convince the reader that (g) represents a 
changed situation in this narrative circumstance. (If \Ve say that this 
narrative world is initiated at (a) in [61-12, and at the same time that (p) 
works as the story-line inchoative, it may sound slightly confusing, but in 
terms of narrative time, which is supposed to be a simulation of time in 
reality, one could say that narrative time is already there at (6]-12 (a) 'There 
were only two Americans stopping at the hotel'. But the time is not a 
dynamic one which is known in a relative manner by the change· of 
significance in states of affairs. This will be understood if one considers 
reality in which the time we experience does not always have story-like, and-
then dynamics. Therefore, it would be too strong to say that narrative time 
stops from (a) to (o); the point is that the time there represents no story 
dynamics.) 
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It might be feasible to claim that such temporal stagnation as the dominant 
note permeates each clause in the first part, and as a result, the reader has 
difficulty perceiving the eventhood of (e), (g), (h) or (m), which otherwise 
might have been perceived more vividly. How discoursal environments 
make a clause or sentence look different in terms of the dynamicity it 
represents will be appreciated by comparing (I) and (m) with the italicised 
expression in the following discourse: 
[6]-18 - Derevaun Seraun! Derevaun Seraun! 
She stood up in a sudden impulse of terror. Escape! She must 
escape! Frank would save her. He would give her life, perhaps 
love, too. But she wanted to live. Why should she be unhappy 
She had a right to happiness. Frank would take her in his arms, 
fold her in his arms. He \Vould save her. 
* * * * * * 
She stood a1nong the swaying crowd in tlze station at the North 
Wall. He held her hand and she knew that he was speaking to her, 
saying something about the passage over and over again. (Joyce, 
'Eveline': 41-42) (italics are mine) 
Note that from an aspectual point of view, (l) and (m) in [6]-17 and the 
italicised clause in [6]-18 can be interpreted as sharing the same 
characteristic; in formal terms the aspectual type of the verbal predicate, 
using the same lexis 'stand', will be classified as process or activity. But the 
italicised clause in [6]-18 is greatly different from (l) and (m) in [6]-17 in 
that, unlike the latter, which may well be taken as part of background 
discourse, the former implicates one of the most significant events in the 
story. This is simply because the italicised clause in L 6]-18 can be 
legitimately counted as a story-line event. By the time the narrative has 
come to the clause, it has already given Eveline's history, telling the reader 
that she was in her room before getting to the North Wall. This explains the 
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reason why it is acceptable to interpret the italicised clause as entailing the 
temporal-sequentiality marker (the event-marker) 'now'. By contrast, in the 
case of (l) and (m) in [6]-17' one wiil not be justified in assuming that they 
entail the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now', because they are not given in 
a historic scope. 
This contrastive observation of the same verbal predicates in different 
discoursal environments seems to be suggestive of the very notable fact that 
whether or not a particular discourse is interpreted as representing a story 
event is not to be determined solely by the inherent formal characteristics of 
the discourse. It is worth noting that story events are primarily narrative 
phenomena, and are not necessarily to be discussed from a purely ontological 
or grammatical viewpoint on the sentence-grammar basis. 
6.3.4 Story-line events and background discourse 
Following our observations we made in the last section, we now could argue 
· that narrative dynamics is stro.ngly tied to the image of story line, and that 
event expressions which are judged to contribute to the impression of the 
story line constitute story events, which are to be recognised in the active 
and-then dynamics. Story events are story-line events, and the expression~ 
which realise story-line events can be construed as entailing the temporal-
sequentiality marker (the event marker) 'now'. 
By contrast, the discourse which cannot be interpreted as contributing to the 
plot progression might be termed background discourse. The story line is a 
prerequisite for a particular discourse to be identified as a narrative, but in 
many cases a narrative consists of the story-line events and the background 
discourse. 
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Now back to [6 j-17' the distinction between the story-line events and the 
background discourse can be explained as follows. 
In [6]-17, the discourse from (a) to (o) constitutes a background discourse, 
which is not directly concerned with the narrative dynamics. The 
dynamicity which some of the fifteen clauses from (a) to (o) are assumed to 
represent on their own is made immanent by the overall inactivity of the 
sequential relations between the clauses, which can be said to be working as 
the predominant atmosphere permeating them. 
The story line in [ 6]-17 is initiated by the story-line inchoative (p ). The 
story line, consisting of a succession of story events, is continuous as a 
m~ntal construct that is created in the reader's mind, but graphologically it 
can be made discontinous by the background discourse located between story 
(story-line) events. The clauses (v) and (w) make the background discourse 
on the story line identifiable in the discourse from (p) to (x). On the story 
line the discoursal environment is active, and narrative time is captured in 
·the and-then dynamics. Therefore, it is irrelevant to say that narrative time 
stops at the background discourse graphologically inserted on the story line . 
. Such insertion, which reflects the narrator's choice in textualisation, is a 
phenomenon on the telling side. A reasonable way of expressing this would 
be that the background discourse inserted on the story line does not 
contribute to the plot progression, just as it does not when it is located off the 
story line. In Bonheim's system of 'narrative modes' (cf. 1.2.2), for 
example, narrative time seems to be conceived of as something capable of 
stopping as well as moving (see Figure 1.3 (p.22)). Almost the same view 
can be observed in Moens (1987: 92) when he says that time does not move 
forward with static clauses in narrative discourse (cf. 2.3.3). It must be 
recognised that such a stop-and-go type of analysis of time in narrative can 
result from the failure to make an ontological distinction between time in the 
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represented world as a simulation of the real world and the Gcnettian 
concept of pacing in narrative-telling. 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
our discussion in 6.3 can be sumtnarised as follows. Generally speaking, 
whether a particular discourse represents a story event or not can be 
determined by the availability of context \vhich enables the reader to grasp 
the· state of affairs represented by the discourse in historical contrast with the 
situation in which it did not hold. Compared vvith bounded discourse, 
unbounded discourse tends to depend on context if it is to be counted as 
representing a story event. Because of its aspectual characteristics, bounded 
discourse tends to exhibit the eventhood by itself, and this is the reason why 
in many cases the eventhood is easily perceivable \Vhen a narrative starts \Vith 
a bounded clause with no preceding text. 
In judging whether a particular discourse can be interpreted as representing 
·a story event or not, it is useless and futile to stick to sentence grammar and 
try to look at each individual clause or adjacent clauses without paying 
enough attention to the function of discoursal environments. It is \V hen the 
discoursal environment is felt to be active that the story line can be set up as 
a mental construct. The image of the story line is intimately associated with 
the reader's recognition of and-then dynamics of narrative. The story line is 
made up of a succession of events. And it is those events which constitute 
story events. That is, story events are story-line events. 
Assun;ting that temporal dynamics is the essential characteristic of narrative 
discourse, one could say that narrative discourse is made up of both story-
line events and the background discourse representing no temporal dynamics. 
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6.4 Story line and clause boundaries 
6.4.1 The abstract nature of story line 
We already referred to the concept of 'narrative form' in 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, 
and introduced the term 'story line' in the last section. These two terms are 
virtually identical with each other, though sounding different. 'Story line' 
would sound more concrete than 'narrative form', since 'line' in 'story line' 
is felt to be a visual metaphor of narrative dynamics. Hereafter we employ 
'story line' to refer to the abstract, mental concept of and-then dynamics of 
narrative discourse. 
The main purpose of the present section is to confirm the abstract nature of 
story line as a mental construct that is created in the reader's mind in the 
process of reading narrative, and to stress its pragmatic aspect as a product 
of cooperation between narrator, text, and reader. 
· As pointed out in the last section, story line consists of story-line events. If 
verbalised, the abstract nature of story line \vill be expressed as: ' Story 
Event 1 happened, and then Story Event 2 happened .... n'. Now we might 
be able to postulate a formula as follows. When in a particular narrative 
discourse two event expressions can be identified as story-line events, they 
realise /STORY LINE/. 
Let us return to [6]-17 for the moment to look into the relative aspect of 
/STORY LINE/. That the realisation of /STORY LINE/ takes at least two 
temporally sequential events can be understood by reflecting upon the 
.reading process of (p) "'I'm going down and get that kitty," the American 
wife said' and (q) ' "No, I'll get it," her husband offered from the ~ed'. The 
intrinsic relativity of /STORY LINE! is clear in that at the time when the 
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reader comes to (p) he \vould not be ready yet to take it as a story-line event~ 
it is only when he goes on to (q) with the eventhood of (p) in mind, and 
envisages an ensuing event, feeling the no\v-rene\val impetus is at work that a 
"line image" will be set up in his mind. Only then \vill the reader recognise 
that a dynamic story world is opened before his eyes. As far as (61-17 is 
concerned, the reader \Viii have to proceed to (q) in order to feel that 
/STORY LINE/ at the most microscopic level is materialised in this 
narrative. 
Needless to say, the impression of such dynamicity in narrative discourse is 
entirely due to textualisation, or grarnmaticalisation in the broad sense of the 
term. But it is to be pointed out that a pragmatic elerncnt is also involved in 
the reader's recognition of /STORY LINE/. As discussed in 6.2.3, narrative 
dynamics is not only a grammatical and semantic, but also a pragmatic 
phenomenon. It would be justifiable to argue that /STORY LINE/ is a 
product of mutual cooperation between narrator, text, and reader. Both 
grammatically and semantically, a chart entitled History of Scotland may 
·represent a succession of events, but there is no pragmatic reason to perceive 
/STORY LINE/ at work there. From an institutional point of view, it is the 
narrator's obligation to materialise /STORY LINE/ in some way or other in 
the encoding process, even if doing so is not his main interest in writing a 
fictional narrative. If the narrator conforms to the institutional norm and 
textualises story-line events, this will elicit the reader's cooperative 
behaviour; the reader will recognise /STORY LINE/ rnaterialised by the 
story-line events. 
The central aim of 6.4 is to make an inquiry into the way in which story-line 
events are textualised in narrative discourse mainly on the microscopic basis. 
Particular attention will be drawn to clause boundaries as indices of whether 
the plot progresses or not. Our discussion spotlights more specific 
272 
aspects of story-line events and background discourse, and at the same time 
is a preliminary to 6.5, in which the problem or 'event unification' is to be 
brought into focus. 
6.4.2 Consecutive story-line events - prototypes 
The following examples illustrate the 1nost prototypical story-line events 
which are graphologically consecutive: 
[6]-19 (a) Another woman, very little, with cropped black hair, a red 
face and a big mouth, came fonvard (b) and took the man by 
the arm. (Spark, The Prilne of Miss Jean Brodie: 33) 
[6]-20 (a) A carriage was heard. (b) He \vas on the move immediately. 
(A us ten, E1n1na: 318) 
In these examples the consecutively arranged story-line events (a) and (b) 
literally work as an icon of the time sequence. [6]-19 and 20 can be 
reckoned as prototypical examples of story-line events realising /STORY 
LINE/. 
The prototypical sequence of story-line events can be also observed in the 
syntactic combination of main and subordinate clauses. Look at the 
following examples: 
[6]-21 (a) So when the approach of Mrs Deborah was proclailned through 
the street, (b) all the inhabitants ran trembling into their houses, 
each matron dreading lest the visit should fall to her lot (Fielding, 
Tom Jones: 62) (italics are mine) 
[6]-22 (a) THE next morning as early as it was decent, Jones attended 
at Mrs Fitzpatrick's door, (b) where he was answered that the lady 
was not at home. (Fielding, To1n Jones: 620) (italics are mine) 
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(61 -23 (a) .... and aft~r he had ~aid her his proper respects, (b) was 
dcstred to Sit do\vn. (Ftelding Tonl /(J/le\·· 613) c·t 1. . ) · · . . , 1 a 1cs are tntne 
[6]-24 (a) The company \Vere .hardly \Veil settled, (b) before the arrival 
of the peer lately nzentzoned caused a ji·esh disturbance and a 
repetit~on of cerenzonials. (Fielding, Tonz Jones: 618) (italics 
are mtne) 
[6]-25 (a) ... and being directed to the house, (b) he gave one gentle rap 
at the door. (Fielding, Ton1 Jones: 611) (italics arc tnine) 
The noticeable difference between main clauses and subordinate clauses is 
that the latter, unlike the former, lack assertion as propositions. This \Viii be 
understood if one sees that none of the italicised .parts in the above examples 
can make a formally proper answer to the question: What happened? 
Therefore, it could be said that one cannot perceive the "equal partnership" 
as story-line events in the combination of (a) and (b) in (61-21-25. This 
syntactic situation mainly concerns the narrator's perspectival choice, or 
value judgement in terms of determining \Vhere to put the information-focus 
·in rendering narrative, as observed in 5.2.11. It \vould be reasonable to 
claim that the examples of story-line events frotn [.61-21 to 25 ex hi bit a 
higher level of retrospective degree for the indices of the narrator's \veight 
assessment than those in [6]-19 and 20. This suggests that in the five 
examples from [6]-21 to 25 temporal-sequentiality is less vividly felt in the 
subordinate clauses than in the main clauses. But it is to be maintained that 
the seven examples from [6]-J 9 to 25 have good reason to be counted as 
prototypes of story-line events in that the reader can feel that /STORY 
LINEJ is materialised by graphologically adjacent event expressions. 
6.4.3 Consecutive story-line events - non-prototypes 
In narrative discourse there are so many cases in \Vhich, when vie\ved 
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mechanically, a particular chunk of discourse seems to consist of an event 
clause and non-event, background clauses \Vhich do not contribute to the plot 
progression, but a careful inspection of the clausal relations will lead one to 
interpret it as representing one particular event. Consider the following 
examples: 
[6]-26 (a) She then proceeded to commend the honour and spirit with 
which Jenny had acted. (b) She said, she could not help agreeing 
with her brother, that there was some merit in the sincerity of her 
confession, and in her integrity to her lover: that she had always 
thought her a very good girl, and doubted not but she had been 
seduced by some rascal, who had been infinitely more to blame 
than herself, and very probably had prevailed. with her by a 
promise of marriage, or some treacherous proceedings. 
(c) This behaviour of Mrs Bridget greatly surprised Mrs 
Deborah ... (Fielding, Totn Jones: 71) 
[6]-27 (a) Moments of their secret life together burst like stars upon his 
memory. (b) A heliotrope envelope was lying beside his 
breakfast-cup and he was caressing it with his hand. Birds were 
twittering in the ivy and the sunny web of the curtain was 
shimmering along the floor: he could not eat for happiness. 
They were standing on the crowded platform and he was placing 
a ticket inside the warm palm of her glove. He was standing 
with her in the cold, looking in through a grated window at a 
man making bottles in a roaring furnace. It was very cold. Her 
face, fragrant in the cold air, was quite close to his; and suddenly 
she called out to the man at the furnace: 
-Is that fire hot, sir? 
But the man could not hear her with the noise of the furnace. It 
was just as well. He might have answered rudely. 
(c) A wave of yet more tender joy escaped from his heart and 
went coursing in warm flood along his arteries. (Joyce, 'The 
Dead': 244) 
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A common discoursal characteristic shared by 161-26 and 27 is that the 
relation between (a) and (b) in both examples is that between a summational 
event description and its specified version \Vhich has a flavour of detailed 
unfolding of content. One could see a parallel between the two examples 
cited above and redundancy discussed in 6.2.2. It should be clear that in (6 j-
26 and 27 attempting to check \vhether there is temporal sequentiality 
between (a) and each of the clauses in (b) is meaningless and irre.levant. It 
might be feasible to argue that (a) and (b) in each of the two examples reflect 
·two different levels of perspectival choices made by the narrator in temporal 
terms. The lack of temporal immediacy detectable in the synoptic tone of (a) 
in each of them can contrast with a high level of temporal immediacy 
recognisable throughout (b). 
With [6]-26, (a) can be classified as N~SA, which exhibits a fossilised 
perspective suggestive of a certain degree of temporal distance, whereas, the 
scenic flavour of (b) seems to be accentuated by what might be looked upon 
as a gradual shift in speech form from tagged speech (Indirect Speech) to 
·non-tagged speech (Free Indirect Speech). The syntactic contrast behveen 
the matrix clause and the embedded clause, \Vhich serves as the index of 
Indirect Speech, seems to be traceable up to a certain point; the conjunction 
'that' which combines the reporting clause with the reported clause appears 
twice. But the main-subordinate contrast on the syntactic level is felt to be 
somewhat loosened when the narrative comes to 'and doubted not but she had 
been seduced by some rascal' in the middle of (b); the reader might have an 
impression that from that part on the discourse has gained a more "free" tone 
as a speech presentation. The borderline between Indirect Speech and Free 
Indirect Speech is not necessarily clear, but there is no room for doubt about 
a high degree of temporal immediacy permeating [6]-26 (b). 
With [27], (a) can be labelled as NRTA, which, as \veil as [26]-(a), designates 
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a certain degree of temporal distance. By contrast, a plethora of 
progressives in (b), construed as exarnples of mock EPED (cf. 5.2.11 ), can 
be considered to indicate that the temporal perspective is strongly attuned to 
that of the character in the story \Vorl d. A possi blc i nterprctation of 
narrative modes from line-1 'A heliotrope envelope was lying ... ' to line-1 0 
' ... she called out to the man at the furnace' is Free Indirect Thought, except 
'he could not eat for happiness' it:1 line-4, \Vhich \Vill be NRT A. And lines-
12 and 13 'But the man could not hear her. .. He might have answered rudely' 
might be read as Free Direct Thought. In contrast with a high degree of 
temporal distance in (a), the scenic speech presentation in L6]-27 (b) is 
characterised by its remarkably high level of temporal immediacy. 
The reason why [6]-26 and 27 can be categorised under the rubric of 
'consecutive story-line events' is that a justifiable \vay of seeing them is that 
(a) and (b) as a chunk of event description adjoins (c), \vhich , together \Vith 
(a) and (b), constitutes story-line events which materialise /STORY LINE/. 
(Microscopically, it may be possible to refer to the plurality of events in (b) 
'in each example, but that would make little sense from the viewpoint which 
encompasses (a), (b) and (c) in the frame\vork of the main /STORY LINE/. 
We discuss the problem of embedded or secondary /STORY LINE/ in 6.4.6.) 
The contrast between (a) and (b) in [6]-26 and 27 is closely associated with 
the problem of 'event unification', which will be highlighted in 6.5. It could 
be argued that (a) in each of the two examples is a condensed representation 
of a story event, whereas (b) is its specified, more space-consuming 
presentation. In actual works of fictional narrative it is quite easy to find a 
contrast of this kind employed by the narrator. What we intend to do in 6.5 
is to contemplate the reader's role in making such a contrast. 
If one can term the discoursal relation between (a) and (b) in (6.1-26 and 27 
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as specification, the following example might be classified as inclusion: 
l6]-28 (a)Eig~t year~ before he had seen his friend off at the North Wall 
and wzshed hun godspeed. Gallaher had got on. you could tell 
that at once by his travelled air, his well-cut tweed suit, and 
fearless accent. Few fellows had talents like his and fewer still 
could remain unspoiled by such success. Gallaher's heart was in 
the right place and he had deserved to win. It was so1nething to 
have a friend like that. 
(b) Little Chandler's thoughts ever since lunch-time had been of 
his meeting with Gallaher, of Gallaher's invitation and of the 
great city London where Gallaher lived. (He was called Little 
Chandler ... and when he smiled you caught a glimpse of a row 
childish white teeth) 
(c) As he sat at his desk in the King's Inns he thought what 
changes those eight years had brought. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 
76) (italics are mine). 
In [6]-28, it can be assumed that (b) (except the parenthesised part which can 
be thought of as a background discourse, as we will discuss later) and (c) 
constitute story-line events, since the two sentences, both of \vhich are ~RT A 
(Narrative Report of Thought Act), represent different topics of thought. 
· What is worth noting is the discoursal relation between (a) and (b). In this 
story one can ·observe a great many examples showing the protagonist Little 
Chandler's idiolectal or dialectal distinctiveness. According to Boyle ( 1969: 
85-86), the expressions in italics can be taken as indices of Little Chandler's 
cliche-ridden language, which is felt to be of idiolectal value. If so, it is very 
likely that (a) is classifiable as non-tagged speech (Free Indirect Thought). 
Assuming that (a) is FIT, one could interpret (b) as a generalised or 
temporally condensed narrative report of a thought event, and (a) as its 
content, though the order of recounting unifying discourse and unifiable 
discourse in [6]-28 differs from that in [6]-26 and 27. 
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Then, (a) in [6j-28 might be counted as just another example of 
specification, but one could refer to a peculiarity of its nature by pointing 
out the possibility that (a) might be nothing more than a part of the possible 
content of the unifying discourse (b), since in (a) one cannot find any 
allusion to Chandler's thought of Gallaher's invitation or of the great city 
London, which is recognisable in (b). 
It is to be stressed that, in terms of discoursal circumstances in which (a) and 
(b) are located, checking to see the temporal sequentialty or plot progression 
between the clauses in (a) is irrelevant, and that labelling (b) as a background 
discourse because it does not move the plot forward in relation to the 
graphologically preceding clause is unreasonable and misleading. For the 
proper recognition of narrative dynamics, a unifying view which takes (a) 
and (b) as representing one single event would be most acceptable. 
Sometimes there are cases in which a particular event expression can be best 
thought of as a paraphrase of the preceding event expression. Look at the 
following example: 
[6]-29 (a) As he passed Lenehan took off his cap (b) and, after about ten 
seconds, Corley returned a salute to the air. (c) This he did by 
raising his hand vaguely and pensively changing the angle of 
position of his hat. 
(d) Lenehan walked as far as the Shelbourne Hotel where he 
halted and waited.(Joyce, 'Two Gallants': 60) (italics are mine) 
Evidently, the chunk of discourse from (a) to (d) in [6]-29 .makes a sequence 
of story-line events, but one should attend to the absence of the plot 
progression from (b) to (c). Con~idering the discoursal relation between the 
two clauses, one will understand that (c) is not to be reckoned as a 
background discourse for the apparent reason that it does not extend the 
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story line. One plausible interpretation is that (c) is a specified version of 
(b), but the very stnall quantitative gap between the l\vo clauses would most 
naturally lead one to take (c) as a paraphrase of (b). It is of vital 
importance to know that where paraphrasing is identifiable, as in the case of 
[6]-29, applying the criterion for determining \Vhether it is a story-line event 
or a background discourse is irrelevant. In (61-29, \vhat counts is to unify 
(b) and (c) as one event, and try to see the graphologically consecutive 
story-line events from (a) to (b)/(c), and then to (d). 
Lastly, we make brief reference to the so-called sbnultaneous discourse. 
The clause (a) in [6]-29 can be singled. out as a typical example showing 
sitnultaneous events. [6]-29 (a) can be d~vided into two parts as in: 
[6]-29' (a) As he passed (a)' Lenehan took off his cap. 
In terms of time-point time, there is no doubt about the simultaneity of (a) 
and (a)'; the event of Lenehan's passing the t\vo people (Corley and a 
woman) and the event of his taking off his cap occurred at the same time. 
This is the reason why there is no discoursal realisation of the plot 
. progression from (a) to (a)'. But it is not legitimate to assume (a)' to be a 
background discourse in relation to (a), since both (a) and (a)' can be 
connected with [6]-29 (b) in the and-then dynamics. As we shall see in the 
next section, if either of any two clauses is a background discourse, it cannot 
possibly be linked in the and-then dynamics with the event clause that follows 
them. (Our discussion concerning [6]-29 (a) does not necessarily presuppose 
that (a) and (a)' enjoy equal status as event expressions. The simultaneity in 
the sense of the time-point time and the main-subordinate syntactic contrast 
between the two clauses will induce one to amalgamate the two events into 
one centred around the eventhood represented in the main clause.) 
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6.4.4 N on-consecutivity 
In the present section we look into some typical cases in which story-line 
events are made graphologically discontinous by background discourse 
coming in between them. First, look at the following e~ample: 
[6]-30 (a) The door of the room now flew open, (b) and, after pushing 
in her hoop sideways before her, (c) entered Lady Bellaston, 
(d) who having first made a very low courtesy to Mrs Fitzpatrick, 
(e) and as low a one to Mr Jones, (f) was ushered to the upper end 
of the room. 
(g) We tnention these tninute nzatters for the sake of sotne 
country ladies of our acquaintance, who think it contrary to the 
rules of tnodesty to bend their knees to a tnan. 
(h) The company were hardly well settled, (i) before the arrival 
of the peer lately mentioned caused a fresh disturbance and a 
repetition of ceremonials. (Fielding, To1n Jones: 618) (italics are 
mine) 
The clause (g) in [6]-30 can be classified as 'commentary' (cf. Chatman, 
1978: 220-52). The non-dynamic nature of (g) as a background discourse is 
clear that when viewed in the graphological sequence with (f), (g) does not 
contribute to the forward movement of the plot, and when viewed in relation 
to the ensuing discourse (h) and (i) (or (i) and (h)), (g) is not temporally 
connected with them, either. This is mainly because the present tense in (g) 
functions as a linguistic marker of the narrator's generalisation, alien to the 
spatio-temporal particularity of the narrative circumstances. 
What Chatman (loc.cit.) calls 'description of setting', 'identification of 
character', 'definition of character' and 'commentary' are in many cases 
classifiable as background discourse. The opening discourse of Hemingway's 
'Cat in the Rain', which we discussed in [6]-12 and 17, is a good example of 
281 
description of setting An amalgam of identification of character and 
definition of character is well illustrated in the second paragraph of Joyce's 
'A Little Cloud': 
[6]-31 (a) Little Chandler's thoughts ever since lunch-time had been of 
meeting with Gallaher, of Gallaher's invitation and great city 
of London where Gallaher lived. (b) He was called Little 
Chandler because, though he was but slightly under the average 
stature, he gave one the idea of being a little 1nan. His hands 
were white and small, his frame was fragile, his voice was quiet 
and his manners were refined. He took the greatest care of his 
fair silken hair and moustache and used perfume discreetly on 
his handkerchief. the half-moons of his nails were perfect and 
when he stniled you caught a glimpse of a row of childish white 
teeth. 
(c) As he sat at his desk in the King's Inns he thought what 
changes those eight years had brought. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 
76) (italics are mine) 
The italicised discourse (b) in [6]-31 can be observed as a graphological 
intervention between the story-line events made up of (a) and. (c). The main 
discoursal function of background discourse like (b) in the example cited 
above can be said to offer a profile of the narrated world in the non-dynamic 
dimension. 
6.4.5 Unbounded story-line events 
The discussion in this section is a confirmation of our observation 
that story events do not have to be verbalised in perfective or bounded 
clauses. 
With a view to shedding light o~ the possible eventhood detectable 1n 
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temporally unbounded· clauses we single out a passage from Joyce's 'A Little 
Cloud', and look into narrative dynamics. 
In investigating clause boundaries which are assumed to be directly 
concerned with the sequence of story-line events we have so far concentrated 
upon the combinations of the so-called perfective, or bounded clauses or 
sentences. Here in the present section we look at a narrative situation in 
which a particular clause, on the consecutive basis, is not classifiable as any 
of specification, inclusion, paraphrase, simultaneity or background 
discourse, but can be interpreted as constituting story-line events by 
combining with a graphologically distant event expression. Consider the 
following example: 
[6]-32 (a) He emerged from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns 
a neat modest figure, (b) and walked swiftly down Henrietta 
Street. (c) The golden sunset was waning and the air had grown 
sharp. A horde of grimy children populated the street. They 
stood or ran in the roadway or crawled up the steps before the 
gaping doors or squatted like mice upon the thresholds. (d) 
Little Chandler gave them no thought. (e) He picked his w,ay 
deftly through all that minute vermin-like life and under 
the shadow of the gaunt spectral mansions in which the old 
nobility of Dublin had roistered. (f) No mernory of the 
past touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy. 
(g) (He had never been in Corless's but he knew the value of the 
name ... and at times a sound of low fugitive laughter made him 
tremble like a leaf.) · 
(h) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (Joyce, 'A Little 
Cloud': 77-78) (italics are mine) 
The overall narrative structure of [ 6]-32 may be classified as non-
consecutive encoding of story-line events (cf. 6.4.4), since the parenthesised 
discourse (g), which is actually a 16-line paragraph, can be looked upon as a 
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background discourse. What is clear about the dynamicity of [6]-32 is that 
the clauses (a), (b), and (h) constitute story-line events in that their discoursal 
relations can be captured in the and-then dynamics. The chunk of discouse 
(c) will be a background discourse if it is a description of .setting by the 
narrator, but if the phraseological choices such as 'A horde of grimy 
children' or 'squatted like mice' can be thought of as reflecting the 
character's perceiving act, then it will be an internal event occurring at the 
same time with (b). With (d), it would be feasible to refer to its simultaneity 
with (b), and a reasonable reading of (e) is that it is a paraphrase or a 
specified version of (b). 
The discourse which needs special attention is (f). It may be possible to 
make reference to (f)'s partial simultaneity with (b) ,(d), or (e), but the 
unbounded aspectual feature of (f) seems to suggest that (f) is more durative 
than (b), (d) or (e). And this is the reason why (f) looks like a stative. One 
will understand that the simultaneity observable in (e) and (f) is not to be 
discussed in parallel \vith the "genuine" simultaneity we referred to in [6]-
29'. If (f) is seen .only in its relation to (e), it may look like a background 
discourse, since one cannot observe any and-then dynamics between them. 
But, as already discussed (cf. 5.3.1, 6.2.1), if contextual help is available and 
it is possible .to look at an imperfective discourse like (f) in a historical 
scope, then one can interpret the discourse as representing an event. The 
eventhood of (f) is contextually evident, since the state of affairs represented 
by the discourse constitutes a significant NOW, in contrast with the narrative 
circumstances about twenty lines back: 
[6]-33 (a) He watched the scene and thought of life; (b) and (as always 
happened when he thought of life} he became sad. (Joyce, 'A 
Little Cloud': 77) (italics are mine) 
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It would be reasonable to argue that, when one looks back at [6]-33 (b) from 
the standpoint of [6]-32 (f), [6]-33 (b) will be available: as a context 
concerning the protagonist's emotive aspects in this story. It is this 
contrastive perspective in temporal terms that enables one to. perceive the 
eventhood of [6]-32 (f). It is unclear exactly when Little Chandler's 
depressed feeling turned into a euphoric one, as confirmable from [6]-32 
(f). This is because, unlike [6]-33 (b), of which the in~h~ative aspect 
indicates in a relative manner the time when the state of affairs .began to hold 
in contrast with other events, [6]-32 (f) is unbounded in its temporal scope. 
The aspectual feature of [6]-32 (f) is due to the narrator's perspectival choice 
in recounting narrative, and because of the aspectual feature [6]-32 (f) does 
not make a sequence of story-line events with the immediately preceding 
event expression (e). This means that the graphological sequence from (e) to 
(f) is not concerned with the renewal of the significant NOW. In other 
words, the significant NOW attached to (f) in [6]-32 belongs ·,to a different . 
dimension from that attached to (e). 
·,, \ 
A predictable question with respect to the dimensional difference of the 
significant NOW mentioned above will be: How is it possible that [6]-32 (f), 
which is supposed to belong to a different series of significant NOWs from 
, [6]-32 (a), (b), (h), makes a series of the significant NOW wl~h [6]-33 (b), 
which can be considered to make a sequence of story-line events with [6]-32 
(a), (b), (h)? 
A possible answer to the question will be as follows. World knowledge tells 
us that any event has its inchoative moment. This means that, if seen from a 
perspectivally-situated viewpoint, every event has its ince.ption of the 
significant NOW. What is to be noted is that one can grasp .ev~ry event one 
can know in a single series of the significant NOW, if and only if o~e pays 
attention to the inchoative moment, for the temporal location of the 
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inchoative moment of a particular event is relatively identifiable in contrast 
with the preceding and the ensuing events, even if the objectively measurable 
time-point time (e.g. 5:35 p.m.) is not available. The inchoative moments of 
events are naturally sequential (unless they are simultaneous), thus constitute 
a series, which is coherent enough to be called as such (see 5.2.5). This will 
explain the reason why [6]-33 (b) can be grasped in the swne series of the 
significant NOW in which [6]-33 (a) and [6j-32 (a), (b), (h) find themselves 
in a sequential manner; one can see the and-then dynamics operating in that 
sequence. 
The second point to be noted is that the significant NOW can linger, just as 
events can be durative. In this respect, one could point out the possibility 
that Little Chandler's significant NOW of being sad, which began to hold at 
[6]-33 (b), lingered up to ~he time when [6]-32 (a) began to hold. If so, it is 
to be acknowledged that the protagonist's presentness of being sad and his 
presentness of emerging from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns 
belong to different dimensions of the significant NOW, since the two NOWs 
cannot be captured in the and-then dynamics. As we argued in 5.2.5, the 
si~nificant A-series is characterised by its possible multipicity. 
This is the reason why [6]-32 (f), which is a lingering significant NOW, 
cannot make a sequence of story-line events with (e) or (h); (f) belongs to· a 
different dimension of the significant NOW from (e) and (h). The 
eventhood of (f) is to be recognised in a particular series of the significant 
NOW in which the lingering NOW of Little Chandler's being sad, which is 
commonsensically predictable from 'he became sad' in [6]-33 (b), must have 
been succeeded at some indefinite time in the story world by 'he became 
very happy'. 
As already pointed out, the aspectual feature of [6]-32 (f) is due to the 
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narrator's perspectival choice. lt is one of the central aims of 6.5 to discuss 
hoW such perspectival choices made by the narrator in textualisation can be 
related to /STORY LINE/, which might be said to have a general tendency to 
reject the multiplicity of NOWs in different A-series in favour of a linear-
oriented succession of story events. Here it \Viii suffice to say that /STORY 
LINE/ is closely associated \Vith the construction of story events on the 
reader's part and that in the process of building them, the reader is likely to 
shake off the perspectival features originally encoded in the narrative text, 
and attempt to make a coherent sequence of story-line events focusing upon 
the inchoative aspect of the events. 
6.4.6 Anachronies and story-line events 
According to Genette ( 1980: 48), types of discrepancy between the 
chronological order and the told order of events in narrative are 
'anachronies'. In this section, in terms of detecting narrative dynamics we 
look into two kinds of anachronies, i.e. those which can be construed as 
background discourse, and those which may \Veil be thought of as embedded 
or secondary story-line events. 
Anachronies consist of t\VO types of subcategories: 'analepses' and 
'prolepses' (loc. cit.). We concentrate upon analepses, which are in the 
· Western tradition far more common in narrative fiction than prolepses. The 
following discourse may \vell be taken as including a typical example of an 
analepsis as a background discourse: 
[6]-34 (a) No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of 
a present joy. 
(b) He had never been in Corless's but he kne\v the value of the 
name. He kne\V that people went there after the theatre to eat 
oysters and drink liqueurs; and he had heard that the waiters 
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there spoke French and German. Walking swiftly by at night 
he ~ad seen cabs drawn up before the door and richly dressed 
ladtes, e~corted by cavaliers, alight and enter quickly. They 
wore notsy dresses and many wraps. Their faces were 
powde~ed and they caught up their dresses, when they touched 
eart~, ltk~ alarmed Atalantas. He had always passed without 
turntng hts head to look. It was his habit to walk swiftly in the 
street ev.en by day and whenever he found himself in the city 
late at. ntght he hurried on his way apprehensively and excitedly. 
Somettmes, ho\vever, he courted the causes of his fear. He chose 
the darkest and narrowest streets and, as he walked forward, the 
silence that was spread about his footsteps troubled him, the 
wandering silent figures troubled him; and at times a sound of 
fugitive laughter made him tremble like a leaf. 
(c) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (Joyce, 'Little 
Cloud': 77-78) 
The excerpt cited above corresponds to (f), (g) and (h) in [6]-32. In [6]-34 
one will have little difficulty perceiving the analeptic nature of (b) in 
comparison with (a) and (c), \vhich concern the story NOW. The main 
topical items in (b) are the iterative or habitual experiences the protagonist 
underwent in the past. The discoursal environment throughout the whole 
discourse of (b) is inactive; there is hardly any and-then dynamics working 
between the clauses. It is just possible to see the and-then logic at work in 
Iine-6 'alight and enter quickly' and in lines-8-9 'they caught up their 
dre.sses, when they touched the earth, like alarmed Atalantas', but the 
inactivity permeating (b) as a whole virtually kills the dynamics, so that the 
reader will find it difficult to take them as story-line events in the active and-
then framework. In short, 16)-34 (b) does not include any story-line events 
that materialise /STORY LINE/. 
In the same story, however, one can find an example of an analepsis which 
may have good reason to be called 'embedded or secondary story-line 
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events': 
[6]-35 ~a) ~ittle Chandler sat in the room off the hall, holding a child 
In hts arms. (b) To save money they kept no servant but Annie's 
young sister ~onica came for an hour or so in th~ morning and 
an hour or so In the evening to help. (c) But Monica had gone 
home long ago. (d) It was a quarter to nine. (e) 1 Little 
Chandler had come home late for tea, (e) 2 and, moreover, he 
had forgotten to bring Annie home the parcel of coffee from 
Bewley's. (e) 3 Of course she was in a bad humour (e) 4 and 
gave him short answers. (e)S She said she would do without 
any tea (c) 6 but when it came near the time at which the shop 
at the corner closed ( e )7 she decided to go out herself for a 
quarter of a pound of tea and two pounds of sugar. (e) 8 She 
put the sleeping child deftly in his arms (e) 9 and said: 
- Here. D<;>n't waken him. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 90) 
The clause (a) in [6]-34 represents the story NOW, when Little Chandler 
came home after meeting his friend at Corless's. Thus, the clause (a) 
implicates eventhood. The ensuing three clauses (b), (c) and (d) will be 
labelled as the background discourse; they will presumably be the 
'descriptions of setting'. The clause (c) may be construed as an analepsis, 
but, just like f6l-34 (b), it should be a background discourse, since it has 
nothing to do with the narrative dynamics, or the plot progression. 
But when one comes to a cluster of clauses of (e), one will find a different 
narrative situation going on. What is noticeable is that the active and-then 
logic seems to be detectable throughout (e); one will have the impression that 
the discoursal environment is geared to the active mode. Viewed more 
specifically, the clauses (e) 1 and 2 do not constitute story-line events, since 
they are 'simultaneous events'; this means that both of them respectively 
makes a sequence of story-line events with (e) 3. The relation between (e) 4 
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and 5 is ambiguous; they represent either sequentiality or redundancy. But 
the clausal relation between the four clauses from (e) 6 is sequential, thus 
constituting story-line events. It would be justifiable to argue that the 
analeptic discourse like [6]-35 (e), which seems to contribute to the plot 
progression on its own, can be termed e1nbedded story-line events which 
materialise the embedded /STORY LINE/. 
It is Rimmon-Kenan (1983 :51) who distinguishes between 'character-
motivated anachronies' and 'narrator-motivated anachronies'. When a 
particular anachrony can be anchored to the character, it is filtered through 
the character's own thinking. In that case, it is a thought event, so that it 
should be counted as a part of the main story-line events. In 6.4.3, we 
looked at an example ([6]-27) showing the contrast between the. unifying 
discourse and the unifiable discourse (specification). That is a godd example 
of a character-motivated anachrony. Let us reproduce the discourse that can 
be interpreted as an example of embedded story-line events: 
[6]-27 It was very cold. Her face, fragrant in the cold air, was quite 
close to his; (a) and suddenly she called out to the man at the 
furnace: 
- Is that fire hot, sir? 
(b) But the man could not hear her with the noise of the 
furnace. (Joyce, 'The Dead': 244) 
The considerably high level of temporal immediacy in this di~course 
(between (a) and (b)) will make one feel the narrative dynamics well 
operating. This chunk of discourse can be reckoned as embedded story-line 
.events, but one must note that these embedded story-line events belong to the 
main story-line events, since they are a product of the character's thinking. 
According to our analysis, the embedded story-line events in [6]-27 are to be 
differentiated from those in [6]-35 in that , on a macroscopic level, the 
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former can be considered to be a part of the ma·1n story 1· t h - tne even s, w ereas 
the latter ought to be reckoned as a background discourse in its relation to 
the framing narrative. l'he reader, ho\vever, may have an impression that 
('6)-27 does not contribute to the plot progression on the main·story-line any 
more than (6)-35 does (in Genettian terms, it may be felt that both [6]-27 and 
[6]-35 are a 'pause', though the concept of his 'pause' is not necessarily clear 
from the vie\vpoint of narrative-discourse analysis). If the reader has such 
an impression, that is perhaps because the embedded story-line events 
naturally have their O\Vn topical unity as a succession of events, seemingly 
distinguishable from that in the main story-line events. The point to be 
noted is that the character's thought is a verbal (thought) event, and that ·the 
peculiarity of such a verbal event is that it can be a framing narrative 
referring to other events of the hypotactic level; verbal events can refer to 
some other physical or verbal events. From the reader's point of view, 
such double-layered eventhood or event description peculiar to verbal events 
might be responsible for the impression of the plot being suspended at 
discoursal chunks like 161-27, \vhich should logically be interpreted as a 
representation of main story-line events because of the character's 
involvement as an agent performing a cognitive act. This is a kind of false 
impression that is created in the reader's mind when, with a particular 
topical unity of the main story-line events in mind, he comes to the 
character's thought event \Vhich, as a unifiable discourse as against a 
frequently adjoining unifying discourse, exhibits a topical unity as a 
succession of events (often as analepsis) on the hypotactic level. Anyway, 
as a constituent of the tnain story-line events on a macroscopic level the 
character-motivated anachronies such as [6]-27 may well be distinguished 
from the narrator-motivated anachronies such as [6]-35, which can be 
assumed to be outside the main story-line events. 
6.4. 7 Ambiguities in graphological sequencing 
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In the preceding sections in 6.4 we have examined clause relations on the 
consecutive basis in order to see whether or not a particular clause makes a 
sequence of story-line events with an ensuing clause (or clauses). We have 
postulated some criteria for distinguishing story-line ·events from 
background discourse. But, as we pointed out in 6.2.2, in actual works of 
fiction it is not uncommon that one cannot decide whether a particular pair 
of adjacent clauses are temporally sequential or not. ln this section we 
contemplate the problem of sequential ambiguities by taking up two typical 
cases. First, consider the follo\ving example: 
[6]-36 (a) On the train from Padua to Milan they quarreiied about her 
not being \Villing to come home at once. (b) When they had 
to say good-bye, in the station at Milan, (c) they kissed good-bye, 
(d) but \Vere not finished with the quarrel. (e) He felt sick about 
saying good-bye like that. 
(f) He went to A1nerica on a boat frotn Genoa. (g) Luz went 
hack to Pordenone to open a hospital. (Hemingway, 'A Very 
Short Story': 301-2) (italics are mine) 
In terms of narrative dynamics, it is clear that the clauses (a), (c), (e), 
constitute story-line events. (The subordinate clause (b), unlike [6]-21 (a), 
does not make story-line events with the main clause (c); this main-
subordinate combination can be interpreted as an example of 'simultaneity'. 
The clause (d) may \Veil be labelled as a background discourse). The 
sequential ambiguity lies between (f) and (g). The temporal relation between 
the two clauses is susceptible to two readings. The first interpretation is that 
(f) is followed by (g); the second possibility is that they are "simultaneous" 
(in the broad sense of the term). 
But the point is that in no case is it likely that either (f) or (g) is a 
background . discourse, despite the sequential ambiguity exhibited by the 
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graphological relation between the two clauses Th · · 1 • e reason 1s main y an 
aspectual one; both (t) and (g) are bounded clauses, which are normally 
characterised by their autonomy of eventhood (cf. 6.3.2). And in this 
narrative situation context helps the reader to recognise that (f) and (g) both 
contribute to the narrative dynamics, i.e. the plot progression, for, even if 
the two clauses represent contemporaneous events, they respectively 
constitute story-line events \Vith the clause (e), for example. 
The sequential ambiguity tends to be most conspicuous when the narrative 
discourse comes to unbounded clauses. Look at the following example: 
[6]-37 (a) Under cover of her silence he pressed her arm closely to his 
side; (b) and, as they stood at the hotel door, (c) he felt that they 
had escaped from home and friends and run away together with 
wild and radiant hearts to a new adventure. 
(d) An old tnan was dozing in a great hooded chair in the hall. 
(e) He lit a candle in the office (f) and went before them to the 
stairs. (Joyce, 'l,he Dead': 246) (italics are mine) 
In this excerpt, the clauses (a), (b)/(c), (e), and (f) are story-line events ((b) 
and (c) are simultaneous). With (d), there are two possible readings. One is 
that it is a background discourse. Ontologically, it might be possible to 
squeeze out the eventhood from this clause, since it entails the inchoative 
moment, namely, the moment of the inception of a change when the old man 
began to doze. But (d) is nothing but a state which already holds when the 
story NOW, which is being continuously renewed, comes to (c); no 
contextual help is available \Vhich will convince the reader that the old man 
in (d) has a story behind him (e.g. he \Vorked until nine o'clock, and then 
began to doze). If such context is available in this story, then one might be 
able to refer to the implicated eventhood of (d). As repeatedly claimed in 
the present thesis, story events are story-line events, and they are less 
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ontological than narrative phenomena, products of story-telling 
circumstances. 'Therefore, if one focuses upon the availability of context in · 
deciding whether the clause (d) can be a story-line event or not, one will 
have to say that it is a background discourse, and not a story-line event. 
But the other possible interpretation must be also referred to. It would be 
difficult to deny the likelihood that (d) is an internal event, i.e. the 
character's perceiving act, if it is reasonable to assume that (b)/( c) operate as 
a 'window opener' (Fehr, 1938; Brinton, 1980), and that (d) is the focalised 
discourse. In that case, one could take it that a matrix clause representing the 
character's cognition (e.g. 'he saw' or 'he recognised') is implicated in (d). 
Assuming that (d) is an internal event, one would be able to claim that in [6]-
3 7 the clauses (a), (b)/(c), (d), (e) and (f) all contribute to the narrative 
dynamics, making a sequence of story-line events. 
~t seems that in reading narrative thi~ sort of ambiguity is an inevitable 
accompaniment. 
Before putting an end to the discussion concerning [6]-37, we attempt an 
additional comment on (d) particularly in its relation to the ensuing event 
descriptions (e) and (f). If we suppose that internal eventhood is irrelevant 
with respect to (d), it should be evident that (d) does not make a sequence of 
story-line events with any of the other clauses in [6]-37. Focusing upon the 
clausal sequence from (d) to (e) to {f), we see that in a relative sense the 
story-line inchoative is (e), and not (d). But it might be of disco1:1rsal 
interest to note that it is feasible to point out an elided event as a hidden 
story-line event between (d) and (e), which goes like: 'He woke up'. This 
seems to show an ontological fact that world knowledge can contribute quite 
explicitly to the fleshing out of the story events, which need not be made 
explicit by the narrator. 
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6.4.8 Conclusion 
The presupposition of our discussion on 6.4 was that story events are story-
line events, \Vhich are primarily narrative-telling phenomena, so that it is not 
legitimate to attempt to identify the narrative dynamics without considering 
the discoursal circumstances in which a particular clause or sentence is 
placed. With this presupposition in mind, we attempted to stipulate the 
discoursal criteria for making a distinction between story-line events and 
background discourse; the former can be assumed to materialise /STORY 
LINE/ as an abstract concept of narrative dynamics, whereas the latter 
cannot. 
By concentrating upon the clausal relations on the consecutive basis, we made 
it clear that narrative dynamics cannot be captured by merely looking at the 
discoursal relation between t\vo adjacent clauses. The significant implication 
of our observation in 6.4 is that there are many cases in which a reasonable 
way of viewing a cluster of clauses is to unify them as one event expression, 
and that the narrator sometimes seems to suggest the possibility of event 
unification by the co-ordination of the unifying discourse and the unifiable 
discourse. 
In 6.5 we focus our attention on the possibility of event unification by the 
reader, and by doing so \Ve contemplate the way in which perspectival 
choices originally encoded in the text by the narrator are concerned with 
/STORY lJNE/. By taking up Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' as a text , we 
attempt a case study looking into the possibility of a macroscopic 
appreciation of narrative dynarnics. 
6.5 The reader's role in story-event recognition 
6.5.1 The reader's aspectual adjustment 
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In 6.4 we investigated the ways in which narratt·ve dy · · 1. d · namtcs ts textua tse tn 
the form of story-line events, as distinguishable from background discourse. 
One noticeable aspect of narrative discourse, which we observed in the 
discussion we have made so far, is that story-line events are not necessarily 
encoded in the form of prototypical, canonical narrative clauses, which are 
bounded or perfective in terms of aspect. In some cases, the so-called 
stative clauses can be assumed to implicate eventhood, as we have seen in a 
few examples (cf. 5.3.1; 6.2.1; 6.4.5), and this seems natural and. normal in 
narrative discourse, which in many cases adopts a high degree of temporal 
immediacy as a necessary temporal perspective which helps the reader to feel 
the renewal of story NOW as the narrative goes along. 
Our discussion in 6.3.2 clarified an ontological fact that it is not the 
unbounded but the bounded form that prototypically and autonomously 
designates the change from --P to P. In this respect it could be said that it is 
the bounded form that authentically realises the icon of the eventhood, and 
that, when an event is given an expression in the unbounded form, one has to 
u·ndergo the process of confirming the entailed but only covertly perceivable 
moment of change from --P to P, so that he can identify the eventhood. This 
process might be termed aspectual adjustment. Put differently, recognising 
the eventhood of a particular state of affairs encoded in the so-called stative 
form will require one to be inchoative-oriented. And what makes 
aspectual adjustment possible, or \vhat induces one to be inchoative-oriented, 
when coming across apparent statives, is the availability of context with 
which one can look at the state of affairs in a historical span. 
Now, when we apply this to the reading process of narrative, a reasonable 
assumption would be that, \vhen a story-line event is textualised in the 
bounded form as a perspectival choice made by the narrator, the reader does 
not need aspectual adjustment to see the eventhood, but if the narrator 
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employs the unbounded form for which context is available, the reader will 
have to go thro~gh aspectual adjustment as a mental process to recognise that 
the form contnbutes to /STORY LINE/. It is worth noting that aspectual 
adjustment, which is performed on the sentential/clausal· basis to see 
eventhood in imperfective/unbounded expressions, can be looked upon as a 
necessary process for the construction of story-line events on the reader's 
part. 
In the next section, by attempting to build story-line events of Joyce's 'A 
Little Cloud', we look tnore specifically at the relation between narrative 
perspective and /STORY LINE/. 
6.5.2 A presentation of story events in Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' 
'A Little Cloud' is one of the fifteen short stories in James Joyce's 
Dubliners. This story can be divided into three parts in terms of content. 
For convenience of reference \Ve calf them PART 1, PART 2, and PART 3 
respectively (see Appendix). The protagonist is a thirty-two-year-old 
Oubliner called Little Chandler, \Vho is apparently a scrivener in the legal 
line. Little Chandler is a \Vould-be poet of sensitive and delicate nature. 
Now we attempt to present the story-line events on· a considerably 
generalised level. The following is a representation of story-line events 
showing aspectual adjustment, and at the ·same time perspectival manipulation 
(seep. 295) as an index of a macroscopic view of story-line events. 
<PART 1 (lines 1-144)> 
(a) At King's Inns Little Chandler thinks of his friend Ignatius Gallaher, 
who is a successful journalist on the London Press, and of his own life, (b) 
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and becomes depressed, feeling shackled to his fate. (c) He finishes his job, 
(d) and then he heads for Corless's, where he is going to meet Gallaher. (e) 
On his way to Corless's a euphoric feeling seizes him; he expects that his 
meeting with Gallaher will open bright future perspectives for him. 
<PART 2 (lines 145-424)> 
(f) At Corless's Little Chandler meets Gallaher and begins to talk to him. (g) 
While talking to his friend Little Chandler feels disillusioned with him; he 
observes in his friend vulgarity of a certain kind which he had not noticed 
before. (h) Little Chandler sees in Gallaher's patronising manner the 
injustice of the fate he is faced with; he strongly laments the lack of courage 
and opportunity to sho\v his talent. (i) When their topic of conversation 
comes to the prospect of Gallaher's marriage Little Chandler experiences a 
serious clash of opinion \Vith him; the clash makes Little Chandler aware of 
the grim reality of his married life. 
<PART 3 (lines 425-544)> 
U) After coming home from Corless's, Little Chandler takes care of his 
child, holding him in his arms. (k) While doing so, he begins to be lost in 
the reverie about his loveless life with his wife Annie. (I) Then, in a 
shattered mood, he begins to read Byron's poems, (m) and he is impressed 
with the melancholy tone. (n) And then his child wakes up and begins to 
cry. (o) He tries desperately to hush it but in vain. {p) Then Annie comes 
home, (q) and she vehemently attacks him for his failure to look after the 
child properly. (r) This brings tears to ·Little Chandler's eyes. 
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Presumably' the most noticeable stylistic factor contributing to the 
generalised flavour of the story-event presentation shown above will be its 
'synoptic present' (cf. 5.2 1 0). The peculiarity of th t. 1· e synop tc present tes 
primarily in the lack of immediacy in temporal perspective. Because of this, 
the reader will normally find it difficult to feel the now-renewal impetus at 
work in the sequence of event expressions. That is to say, the impression of 
the renewal of story NOW is irrelevant in the writing/reading of highly 
generalised story-line events as exemplified above; the reader will feel that 
what is presented there is a comparatively neutralised accumulation or 
sequence of events in terms of perspectival choice. 
Let us pay attention to PART 1 (e) and PART 2 (g) for the moment. These 
two are the examples of aspectual adjustment. The original narrative 
discourse that can be construed as corresponding most immediately to PART 
I (e) ( the first half of (e)), and PART 2 (g) are respectively 'for his mind 
was· full of a present joy' (line 57), and 'He was beginning to feel somewhat 
disillusioned' (lines 232-3). As already clarified, unbounded event 
expressions tend to reflect a remarkably high degree of temporal immediacy 
that can be referred to as mock EPED ( cf. 5.2.11 ). In this respect, the two 
originally encoded clauses well illustrate perspectival situatedness; they are 
suggestive of the narrative situation in which the narrator was tightly bound 
to the story NOW in recounting them. But it is to be recognised from 
context that the t\vo unbounded clauses are not states but events in the story, 
and that, when the aspectual values attached to the original clauses are shaken 
off, it is justifiable to construct the corresponding bounded clauses as 
prototypical event expressions, which can be located in the literal and-then 
sequence of event clauses. This kind of elimination of aspectual choices 
encoded in the original discourse concerns (4)' in Figure 4.3 which indicates 
the reader's interpretative act in reading narrative. It would be feasible to 
argue that the presentation of the story-line events in PART 1 (e) and 
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PART 2 (g) is an example of the reader's justifiable interpretation of 
the original discourse to identify /STORY LINE/. In short, PART 1 (e) 
and PART 2 (g) are a manifestation of aspectual adjustment (i.e. the shaking-
off of the original aspectual values encoded in unbounded sentences/clauses) 
in the recognition of story-line events. 
Of great importance is the fact that the shaking-off of the perspectival values 
originally textualised in narrative has two facets. As we have discussed so 
far, one is mainly concerned with aspectual adjustment, which is necessary 
for the identification of story events on the discoursally microscopic (or 
sentential/clausal) level. And the other might be termed perspectival 
1nanipulation, which \vill lead one to go in the direction of event unification 
as a way of reading narrative dynamics. Unlike aspectual adjustment, 
perspectival manipulation is concerned with the reader's macroscopic 
recognition of story events. In other words, pers·pectival manipulation 
means the reader's attempt to unify sentences or clauses to see story events 
on a more or less generalised level. This unifying process can be called 
event unification,. which is realised by perspectival manipulation on the 
reader's part. One will easily recognise that most of the clauses in the 
story-event presentation in this section are examples of event unification by 
means of perspectival manipulation. In the next section we attempt to 
explicate the mechanism of event unification, and by doing so we spotlight 
the elasticity of perspectival manipulation by the reader. 
6.5.3 Event unification by perspectival manipulation 
Both aspectual adjustment and perspectival manipulation are intimately 
associated with a kind of distancing orientation in viewing story events, since 
they are mental activities trying to get rid of the perspectival qualities 
(normally designating temporal near-sightedness concerned with the story 
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NOW) encoded in the original discourse. Our argument in this section is 
that it is the distancing orientation in perspectival manipulation that is 
particularly responsible for unified, thus macroscopic views of story-line 
events, and that the distancing orientation in that respect is virtually identical 
with generalisation or abstraction of the original discourse. 
The main purpose of this section is to look into the way in which the reader 
performs perspectival manipulation in his own way in recognising narrative 
dynamics, but, as already pointed out in 6.4, it frequently happens that the 
narrator himself shows a model of perspectival manipulation in the actual 
recounting of narrative discourse. The following is a good example from 'A 
Little Cloud': 
[61-38 (a) As he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked down the river 
towards the lower quays (b) and pitied the poor stunted houses. 
(c) They seemed to him a band of tramps, huddled together along 
the river-banks, their old coats covered with dust and soot, 
stupefied by the panorama of sunset and waiting for the first chill 
of night to bid them arise, shake themselves and begone. (lines 
1 03-9). 
In this passage (c) can most naturally be interpreted as a more specific 
version of (b). Therefore, the discoursal relation between (b) and (c) is that 
of unifying discourse and unifiable discourse. In terms of perspectival 
affinity and distance, one might be able to say that unifying discourse is 
concerned with perspectival distance, and unifiable discourse, with 
perspectival affinity. The clause (b) can be thought of as· a discoursal 
product of the narrator's perspectival manipulation. 
The most striking feature of perspectival manipulation is that, by performing 
it, one can go in the direction of minimising the number of the sequential 
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borderlines between events. To put it another way, generalisation by 
perspectival manipulation is oriented toward macroscopic sequencing of 
story events. How macroscopic the sequence can be depends upon the . 
degree of perspectival manipulation one performs. 
Now we return to the example of the story-line events shown in the last 
section, and look at the elasticity of perspectival manipulation by the reader. 
An example of mild macro~icism will be found in PART 1 (c) 'He 
finishes his job'. This event expression covers the following three story-line 
events in the original discourse: 
[61-39 (a) When his hour had struck (b) he stood up (c) and took leave 
of his desk and of his fellow clerks punctiliously. (lines 45-6). 
It would be acceptable that if PART 1 (c) is a unifying discourse, [6]-39 can 
be interpreted as the unifiable discourse. One important implication of this 
is that the discoursal presentation of story-line events in the origi'nal 
discourse is absolutely necessary for'the reader to recognise /STORY LINE/, 
but the reader does not have to be tied to the original recounting to feel or 
construct /STORY LINE/ in his own way. As two examples of strong 
macroscopicism we consider PART 1 (d) and (e). PART 1 (d) 'and then 
heads for Corless's, where he is going to meet Gallaher' can extensively 
cover the following story-line events: 
[61-40 (a) He emerged from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns ... 
and walked swiftly down Henrietta Street. (lines 46-8) 
(b) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (line 77) 
(c) Little Chandler quickened his pace. (line 98) 
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(d) As he crossed Grattan Bridge .... (line 103) 
A far more extensive discourse will be covered by PART 1 (e) 'On his way 
to Corless's a euphoric feeling seizes him; he expects that hi~ meeting with 
Gallaher will open bright future perspectives for him': 
[6.)-41 (a) No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of 
a present joy. (lines 56-7) 
(b) Ignatius Gallaher on the London· Press!. .. Thomas Malone 
Chandler, or better still: T. Malone Chandler. He would speak 
to Gallaher about it (lines 77-139) 
The original discourse considered to correspond to P.A.RT 1 (e) consists 
mostly of Little Chandler's euphoric reverie about Gallaher and himself. 
[6]-41 (b) contains [6]-38 as a part of it. The overall tone of [6]-38 is Little 
Chandler's strong hatred of the streets and the people in Dublin, so that [6]-
38 may appear to have no direct bearing upon th~ protagonist's happy 
feelings, but it would be reasonable to say that such strong sensations 
emanated from his ·elated feelings which he only temporarily enjoyed while 
travelling to Corless's. Thus, PART 1 (e) can be counted as a way of 
performing perspectival manipulation which generalises a long stretch of 
event expressions ([61-41 (a) and (b)) into one story-line event. 
That both PART 1 (d) and (e) extensively cover the original discourse 
naturally implies that the strong overlapping of the story time is conceivable 
between the two. A question that might arise here will be: How such 
overlapping events can be arranged sequentially as in 'PART 1 (d) and then 
(e)'? A possible answer to the question will be that by means of aspectual 
adjustment one can become inchoative-minded and infer from context that, 
as far as PART I (d) and (e) are concerned, the time when the protagonist 
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started to head for Corless's must have preceded the time when he started to 
become euphoric. It could be argued that as a rule d. t · · t t• , , ts anctng orten a ton 
goes toward capturing things in bounded forms, rather than in unbounded 
forms. 
6.5.4 Event unification in speech/thought presentation 
Our contention tn this section is that the detection of eventhood in S!f 
presentation can be performed most elastically; it tends to be determined by 
what the reader thinks is a 1neaningjul speech unit in graphological terms. 
Presumably one's metalinguistic consciousness \vill be at the lowest level 
when one tries to see the sequence of story-line events in srr presentation, 
since clause boundaries in srr presentation are not as meaningful as those in 
NR (Narrative Report). The reason can be explained as follows. As a 
showing of the story world, the utterance of even one sound can contribute 
to the "update" of the story-world time, as far as srr presentation is 
concerned. This is .where Sff presentation markedly differs from NR. For 
example, when a discourse 'The door opened and John came in' is given as 
NR, it would be normal and meaningful to take it that· two events are. 
mentioned there, attending to the clause boundary between 'opened' and 
'and', whereas, if the discourse is presented as a character's speech, paying. 
attention to the clause boundary is not very significant, at least in the light of 
story-line events in the framing narrative. 
As we argued in 4.3, the narrator's perceptibility as the event cogniser in 
non-tagged speech is more implicit than in tagged speech, but this does not 
mean that the narrator is totally imperceptible in non-tagged speech; it is 
legitimate to assume that the narrator as the event cogniser is always 
implicated even in non-tagged speech. But it is an immanent phenomenon, so 
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that it could be said that the reader is given ·d bl const era e amount of freedom 
in assessing what event occurred in what speech unit. 
With srr presentation, the most relevant semant'tc a d t' · b n pragma 1c ttem to e 
considered in identifying the eventhood will be the ··11 t. ' ( f . 1 ocu 1onary act c . 
Austtn, 1962; Searle, 1969). It would be of vital importance to try to 
identify what the character did with a particular speech. In the case of 
tagged speech, the narrator tends to invite the reader to take a certain length 
. of speech as a discrete, meaningful speech unit (or event unit), by attaching 
tags (or reporting clauses). The narrator's invitation of this kind is quite 
arbitrary. One example from 'A Little Cloud': 
[61-42 (a) - I hope you'll spend an evening with us, he said, before you 
go. My wife will be delighted to meet you. We can have a 
little music and -
(b) Thanks awfully, old chap, said Ignatius Gallaher, I'm sorry 
we didn't meet earlier. But I must leave to-morrow night. (lines 
328-33). 
Syntactically, [6]-42 (a) consists of three sentences, and (b), of two sentences, 
but the narrator induces the reader to take (a) and (b) as discrete speech 
events. It is worth noting that the tag employed in each discourse sounds 
highly generalised, so that it has very little communicative value as a 
conveyer of what happened. This is where the reader should come in as an 
event detector. One plausible event-interpretation will be that in [6]-42 (a) 
Little Chandler invited Gallaher to his home, and in (b) Gallaher declined it. 
But, taking context into account, one would interpret the eventhood of (b) in 
a different way and claim that Gallaher showed a patronising attitude toward 
his old friend. Or a more elastic view of story-line events would unite (a) 
and (b) into one speech event and claim that a sort of imbalance between 
demand and supply was revealed. With respect to Sff presentation in 'A 
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Little Cloud'' a very macroscopic recognition of a story-line event is shown 
in PART 2 {i), for example. Little Chandler's serious clash of opinion with 
Gallaher concerning the prospect of Gallaher's marriage may well be 
considered to cover the following discourse: 
[61-43 -.Who knows? he said, as they lifted their glasses ... - Must get a 
b1t stale, I should think, he said. (lines 382-424). 
This is just another example which shows that one can take a very elastic 
view in deciding ·what chunk of discourse is unifiable as a meaningful story-
line event. 
It will soon be recognised that if 'event unification' is performed on the 
maximum level a whole narrative can be taken as representing a single story 
event. Rimmon-Kenan ( 1983: 15) suggests the possibility by saying: ' ... a 
vast number of events may be subsumed under a single event label (e.g. 'The 
Fall of the Roman Empire')'. With Joyce's 'A Little Cloud', which we have 
been discussing as our case-study material, a reasonable presentation of the 
story event on the maximum level would be: 'A would-be poet becomes 
disillusioned with life' 
In the _present chapter we have argued that story events are story-line events 
(cf. 6.3.5). The point of our argument is that the concept of story event(s) is 
intrinsically a relative one, depending upon discoursal environments in which 
a particular event expression appears in relation to other ones. Here a 
question that will arise is: How is it that the notion that story events are 
story-line events is compatible with the notion that a whole narrative can be 
interpreted as a telling of one single story event? We will be able to answer 
this question as follows. In principle, the concept 'story events' makes sense 
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when events are viewed in a p t. 1 · · ar tcu ar serzes as a coherent enttty. 
Therefore, the recognition of one single event is not the authentic 
recognition ?f story (story-line) events. But one important thing to note is 
that such event recognition presupposes decoding story events· as a series on 
the microscopic level. Differently put, such maximally-macroscopic event 
recognition is characterised by the confirmability or retrievability of story-
line events as mini events from which to construct the single ·story event. It 
is in this respect that the description of a single story event is to be 
distinguished from one-event descriptions such as 'John laughed' (provided 
that the event expression is not a unifying one as against unifiable ones). 
Consequently, we could claim that the description of a single story event as a 
form of maximal event unification is a variety of story (or story-line) event 
description. 
6.5.5 Conclusion 
In 6.5 we postulated the two important concepts closely associated with the 
recognition of narrative dynamics, i.e. aspectual adjustment and perspectival 
manipulation. The common characteristic shared by these two is that both 
are concerned with the distancing orientation in viewing story-line events, 
which means getting rid of the originally encoded perspectival values, which 
tend to designate temporal near-sightedness peculiar to narrative perspective. 
Aspectual adjustment concerns the mental process of the reader trying to see 
eventhood in unbounded sentences/clauses- when they can be looked upon in a 
historic span in a narrative discourse And perspectival manipulation is 
directly related to event unification by generalisation or abstraction of story-
line events detectable on the discoursally microscopic {i.e. sentential/clausal) 
level. Perspectival manipulation means minimising the number of sequential 
borderlines between event expressions in narrative discourse. Perspectival 
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manipulation can be performed by the reader, as well as by the narrator. 
Perspectival manipulation makes it possible for the reader to take an elastic 
and macroscopic view of narrative dynamics without having to be tied to the 
textual circumstances in the original discourse, which may invite the reader 
to read story-line events literally and rather metalinguistically on the 
microscopic level. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The main aim of the present thesis is to elucidate the mechanism of narrative 
dynamics from the perspective of the ordinary reader. The. term 'narrative 
dynamics' is primarily concerned with 'story event' and 'narrative time', as 
mentioned in Introduction. What I tried to do as I wrote this thesis was to 
remind myself of how narrative dynamics can be recognised by the ordinary 
reader of narrative fiction who is not formally trained, and who does not 
necessarily intend to analyse literary works for the sake of analysis. This 
means that the overall tone of the discussion is critical of unduly formal 
views of narrative entities'. One of the most fundamental points of 
argument in the present thesis is that unduly formal views of narrative 
entities do not always accord with the intuitions of the ordinary reader. 
One good example is the story-discourse scheme postulated by Chatman 
(1978). Such a dualistic view of the structure of narrative, obviously 
influenced by the formal concepts of narrative posited by Russian formalists 
early in the twentieth century, can be counterintuitive simply because such a 
dual scheme automatically implies that discourse (narrative text) is something 
to be differentiated from story. Very few would deny that an ordinary 
reader, when coming across a narrative discourse, will think it is a story. 
But this does not suggest, as argued in Chapter 4, that the monistic view 
adamantly amalgamating story with discourse is what the ordinary 
reader adopts as an ideological stance in recognising the structure of 
narrative. 
Assuming a commonsensical view of narrative dynamics means that one does 
not fall into the formal (grammatical) or ontological fallacy.. When a 
formal analyst argues that in a temporal discourse 'John went out of the 
room. The room \vas quite messy' narrative time stops in the second clause 
because it is grammatically labelled as a stative, and if he conceives of the 
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stopp~ge of narrative time in the literal sense of the term, he can be said to 
be caught in a formal trap. Such a formal analyst may be c~mpared to 
someone who claims that, when looking at a painting portraying a ball, time 
stops or "freezes" there; he fails to notice that what is· stationary or 
motionless is not the world entity, i.e. the scene of people, dressed up for the 
party, dancing in a lively and cheerful way, but the form or medium which 
represents it. An ordinary viewer intuitively knows that time is there in the 
represented world, and might feel as if he were hearing the shuffling of the 
dancers' feet. As for the ontological fallacy, it would be possible to point 
out the danger of forcing out eventhood from static discoursal environments 
in narrative, which are not directly concerned with the description of plot 
progression, i.e. the realisation of /STORY LINE/. One would be falling 
into the ontological trap if one claims that the opening discourse of Joyce's 
'A Painful Case': 'Mr James· Duffy lived in Chapelizod because he wished to 
live as far as possible from the city of which he was a citizen ... ' describes an 
event, assuming that living somewhere entails an inceptive moment, i.e. a 
change from not living to starting to live . As argued in Chapter 6, such an 
ontological view of .eventhood is not necessarily helpful in identifying story 
events (story-line events) which are not so much ontological as narrative 
phenomena. 
The general point of argument in the preceding chapters was to stress 
the importance of not clinging to a rigid idea that a particular 
linguistic form has a particular structural meaning (e.g. the treatment of 
'progressive states' by Caenepeel (1989)). But this does not suggest that in 
the representation/recognition of narrative dynamics the relation between 
form and meaning ( eventhood, for example) is quite arbitrary. In Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 we argued that it ought to be of socio-linguistic interest to note 
that narrative form as a linguistic representation of a story world has some 
institutionalised aspects. That is to say, a story world (an event-oriented 
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world) is expected to be verbalised prototypically by using a particular 
linguistic form of event description called 'narrative clauses' (Labov, 1972). 
Such a relationship between linguistic form and meaning that one normally 
expects to be realised in the representation of a story world may well be said 
to be a conventional aspect of narrative writing/reading, but what we 
attempted to stress in our discussion throughout the thesis was that story-
event description /recognition is not solely concerned with sentence-based 
linguistic units. In a sense, as the story-event describer and cogniser both 
the author/narrator and the reader are bound up with the formal features of 
narrative discourse, and at the same time can be independent of them. The 
reader's independence of the original encoding of story events is discussed 
in Chapter 6 under the rubric of 'event unification'. The discussion in that 
chapter is intended to shed light on the mechanism in which the original 
encoding· as a formal realisation of a story world becomes "transparent" to 
the reader, who, as an independent story~event cogniser, can attempt to 
materialise /STORY LINE/ in his own way from a more or less macroscopic 
point of view. As . pointed out in Chapter 6, the reader's active role as the 
story-event detector has a lot to do with his freedom to shake off the 
perspectival values attached to the original encoding by the narrator. We 
attempt to clarify that it is by the reader's perspectival adjustment that 
what has traditionally been labelled as 'non-event discourse' by formal 
analysts can be taken as a description representing a story event. 
<Implications of this thesis - a future prospect of research> 
Emphasising the importance of taking an elastic view of the relationship 
between formal features of narrative and story-event recognition was one of 
the most important points of argument in this thesis. We argued against the 
linguistically microscopic view of eventhood in narrative discourse, which 
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tends to identify story events mainly on the bas1·s f t b o sen ence-grammar y 
looking upon each clause or sentence as a syntactically discrete unit, and by 
assuming that there is a correlation between the formal discreteness and the 
event-state distinction. Specifically speaking, we discussed ·some cases in 
which discoursal environments can make the reader recognise story 
dynamics (or story eventhood) in clauses which have traditionally been 
classified as statives (or temporally unbounded clauses). An important 
implication of the discussion was that perfectivity or temporal boundedness 
represented by a clause or a sentence is not the necessary condition for a 
reader to recognise or detect narrative dynamics in it. The importance of 
discoursal environments in recognising narrative dynamics was also stressed 
by showing some cases in which perfective clauses which would be taken as 
representing eventhood in a "decontextualised" situation have virtually 
nothing to do with story-event sequencing. And in Chapter 6 we discussed 
another aspect of the elastic appreciation of narrative dynamics by shedding 
light on the active role of the reader as a story-event detector on the 
macroscopic level. 
What I have done in the present thesis seems to have some suggestions 
concerning the direction in which I might go in the future when I attempt 
further research into narrative dynamics as a continuation of this thesis. 
One possible direction is to look into event sequencing in narrative on a 
highly microscopic level of words and phrases. This thesis dealt wi~h 
clauses or sentences as the most microscopic linguistic items describing story 
events. As far as narration is concerned, clausal representation of events is 
characterised by its assertive flavour emanating from its propositional 
quality; the reader would be able to perceive eventhood in an explicit way, 
since a clause in narrative circumstances can be a prototypical linguistic form 
conveying actions and happenings in the story world. I assume, from a 
theoretical point of view, that it might be possible to detect eventhood 
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(change of state) on a highly implicit level by attending to the way in which 
words and phrases are employed. There is a likelihood that a context-
oriented view of individual words and phrases may help the reader to scoop 
up discoursally hidden story events. Trying to detect story events by 
looking at grammatically small units such as words and phrases may sound 
extremely microscopic, but it presupposes a significantly macroscopic view 
of narrative discourse in that the recognition of eventhood built in individual 
words requires the reader to re-evaluate them in the whole context of the 
discourse. From a stylistic point of view, it might be possible to research 
into the literary effect of story-event description on the structurally implicit 
level, as compared with that on the structurally explicit level. 
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The text: James Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' in Dubliners (London: Grafton, 
1977' pp. 76-94) 
Note: 'A Little Cloud' can be divided into three parts in terms of content: in 
this thesis they are called 'PART 1' (lines 1-144), 'PART 2' (lines 145-424), 
and 'PART 3' (lines 425-544) respectively, for convenience of analysis. 
Every fifth line of the text is· numbered for convenience of subsequent 
reference. 
A Little Cloud 
~------------·--------------
BlcBT yean bdOre be had leal his &iend oi£ at the North 
. wall. aM. wUbed ~- .. phpeed.. Ga11aber bad got oa. 
· You ~ td1 that ~-~by liD. ttnelled air, his welkut 
•' tweed suit,-' aDd --·~I PeW fd1ows had talents 
s. ·Jib·bls.&Dd &nru .an~--in unspoiled by sucll 
.uae& Gf!lbber'a bean ,..lD·~ right·place and be had 
duciwd to win. It was tomlthing to ha~ a friend like 
~L . 
Liule Oandler's choagha m:r since luocb-cimc bad 
1 o .. ber:a o(hb mceti"' wida GatJaher, o£ ~llaber'a invitation 
. ~-.d o£the pat city~~ GtDsbt% lived. He 1vu 
·~caW LiaJc Ovndkr bee~-. JhcM.P be was bat slighdy 
~ ..  cba. nenae statUre. he ...,. ooe tbe idea of being a 
litdc maD. His hmdt were white aod smalL his frame ·was· 
15 £agile. his ~ was quiet md his manners were refined. 
He took the greatac care of his &ir silken hair and mous-
cachc md med petfume ditaediy on his bandkerchie£ 
1'be IWf..mooos of his nails were perfect aod when he 
ani1ed you aught a glimpse cia row of child;~ white 
2Q.u:eth. 
· .· AJ he sat at his desk in the King's Inns be thought 
. what changes tbo.e eight yean had brought. The friend 
whom he bad known UDder a shabby and necesaitous guise 
bid become • bdlllant 6pn Oil the Loodon Press. He 
25 turned oCtal &om hit tiraome writing to gaze out of the 
o6ice window. The glow of a late autumn StmJet covered 
. the grass plots and walks. It cut a shower of kindly golden 
dlUt on the untidy nurses and decrepit old men who 
drowsed on the benches; it flickerea upon all the moving 
30 figures-on the children who ~ ~ along the 
gravd p2ths and on everyone who passed through the 
gardens. He watched the scene and thought of life; and (as 
always happened when he thought of life) be became sad. 
A gende mdancholy took possession of him. He fdt how 
35 ~ess it was to struggle agairut fortune, thls being the 
burden of wisdom which the ages had bequeathed to him. 
·He remembered the books of poetry upon his shelves a~ 
home. He had bought them in his bachdor days and IIWlY 
an evening, as lie sat in the little room off the hall, he had 
40 been tempted to take one down from the bookshelf and 
re2d out something to his wife. But shyness had always 
hdd him. back; and so the boob had remained on their 
shdves. At times he repe2ted lines to himself and this 
consoled him. 1 
45 ·when his hour had struck he stood up and took leave of 
his desk and ofhis fellow-clerks punctiliously. He emerged 
from under the feU<W arch of the King's Inns, a neat modest 
figure, and walked swiftly down Henrietta Street. The 
golden sunset W2S waning and the air had grown sharp. A 
50 horde of grimy children populated the street. They stood 
or ran in the roadway or craw:led up the steps before .the 
gaping doors or: sqt12tted like mice upon the thresholds. 
Little Chandler gave them no thought. He picked his way 
deftly through all th2t minute vermin-like life md mtdcr 
55 the shadow of the S2unt spectral mansions in which the old 
nobility of Dublin had roistered. No memory of the put 
touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy. 
He lud never been in Corless's but he knew the value 
of the name. He knew t:hat people went there after the 
60 theatre to eat oysten and drink liqueun; and he had heard 
that the waiten there spoke Ptench and German. Walking 
swiftly by at night be bad seen abs drawn up before the 
door and richly dressed ladies, escorted by cavalien, alight 
~ enter quickly. They wore noisy dresses and nuny 
65 wraps. Their bees were powdered and they Qught up ~eir 
dresses, when they touched earth, like ahrmed Atalanw. 
He bad always passed without turning his head to look. 
It was his habit to walk swiftly in the street even by day 
and whenever he found himself in the city late at night 
70 he hurried on his way apprehensively and excitedly. Some-
times, however, he courted the causes of his fear. He chose 
the darkest and narrowest streea and, as he walked boldly 
forwud, the silence that was spread about his footsteps 
troubled him, the W2Ildering silent figures troubled him; . 
75 md at times a sound of low fUgitive laughter ID2de him 
tremble like a 1~ 
He turned to the right towards Capel Street. Ignatius 
Gallaher on the London~~ Who would have thought 
it possible eight yean before? Still. .now that he reviewed 
80 the past. Little Chandler could remember many signs of 
future ~tness in his friend. People used to say that 
Ignatius Gallaher wu wild. Of course, he did mix with a 
rakish set of fellows at that time, drank freely and bor-
rowed ·money oo all sides. In the end he had got mixed up 
85 in tOme shady af&ir, tome money tranSaction: at least, that 
was one version of his flight. But nobody denied him 
talent. There was always a certain • • • something in 
Ignatius Ga1laher th2t imp~ you in spite of yound£ 
Even when .he ~ out at dhows and at his wits' c;nd (or 
90 money he kept up a bold &ce. Little Chandler remembered 
(and the remembrmce brought a slight flush of pride to his 
cheek} one of Ignatius Gallaher's sayings when he was in a 
tight comer: 
-Half time, now, boys, he used to say light-heartedly. 
95 Where's my considering ap? 
· That was Igt12tius Gillaher all out; an~ damn it, you 
couldn't but admire him for it. 
. Li.ttl~ Chandler quickened his pace. For the fint time 
m lW life he fdt hinudf superior to the people be passed. 
100 For the first time his soul revolted against the dull inde-. 
gance of Capel Street. There was no doubt about it: if you 
wanted to succeed you had to go away. You could do 
· nothing in Dublin. !u he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked 
. down the river towar<h the lower quays and pitied the poor 
105 stunted houses. They seemed to him a band of tramps, 
. huddled together along the river-banks, their old coats 
covered with dust and soot, stupefied by the panoram2 of 
swuet and waiting for the fint chill of night to bid them 
uise, shake themselves and begone. He wondered whether 
110 he could write a poem to express his idea. Permps Gallaher 
might be ab!\! to get it into some J,.ondon paper for him. 
Could he write something original? He Wa$ not sure wlut 
idea he wished to express but the thought that a poetic 
moment had touched him took life within him like an 
115 infant hope. He stepped onward bravdy. 
Every step brought him nearer to London, farther from 
his own sober inartistic life. A light began to tremble on the 
horizoo of his mind. He was not so old- thirty-two. His 
temperan:tent might be said to be just at the point of ma-
120 turity. There were 10 many cllifermt moods and imp res-
. si~ that be wished to express in verse. He fdt them within 
him. He tried to weigh his soul to see if it was a poet's soul. 
Melancholy was the dominant note ofhis temperamen~ he 
thought, but it was a melancholy tempered by recurrences 
125 of &ith and resignation and simple joy. If he could give 
expressioo to it in a book of poems per~ps men would 
listen. He would never be popular: he saw that. He could 
not sway the crowd but he might appeU to a little circle of 
kindred minds. The English critics, perhaps, would recog-
130 nize him as one of the Celtic school by reason of the melan-
choly tone of his poems; besides th2t, he would put in ~lu­
sions. He began to invent sentences and phnses from the 
notices which his book would get. Mr Charulln lw tht gift 
of tllrj ~ graciful va~ . ... A wisiful sdMss pav~s tht~ 
135 p«ms . ... T~ Ctltic nott. It was a pity his name was not 
more Irish-looking. Perhaps it would be better to insert 
his mother's name before the surname: Thonus Malone 
Chandler. or better still: T. M~one C~ndler. He would 
s~ to C¥laher about it. 
140 He punucd his revery so ardently that he passed his 
street and lud to tum back. & he arne neu Corless's his 
former agit2tion began, to overnuster him and he lWted 
before the door in indecision. Finally he opened the door 
and entered. 
145 The light and noise of the bar held him at the doorway 
for a few moments. He looked about him, but lW sight was 
confused by the shining of nw1y red and green wine-glasses. 
The bar seemed to him to be full of people and he fdt that 
the people were observing him curiously. He glanced· 
150 quickly to right and left (frowning slightly to nuke his 
errand appear serious), but when his sight d~red a little he 
saw that nobody had turned to look at him: and there, sure 
en9ugh, was Ignatius Gallaher leaning with his back 
against the counter and his feet planted far apart. 
155 -Hallo, Tommy, old hero, here you are! What is it to 
be? What will you luve? I'm taking whisky: better stuff 
than we get across the water. Soda? Lithia? No mineral? 
I'm the ume. Spoils the Ravoiu .... Here, garfOn; bring us · 
two halves of malt whisky,· like a good fellow •..• Well, 
160 and how have you been pulling along since I saw you last? 
De2r God, how old we're gettingl Do you see any signS 
of aging in me-eh, what? A little grey and thin on the 
top-wlut? 
Ignatius Gallaher took off his hat and displayed a large 
165 closely cropped he2d. His face was heavy, pale and clean-
sh~ven. His eyes, which were of bluish sl~te-colour, re-
lieved his unhalthy pallor and shone out plainly above the 
vivid orange tie he wore. Between these rival f~tures the 
lip1 ~ppeued very long and shapeles1 and colourless. He 
170 bent his head and felt with two sympathetic fingen the 
thin luir at the crown. Little Chandler shook his h~d 
as. a deni2l. Ig112tius G21laher put oo his h.2t again. 
-It pulls you down, he said, Press life. Always hurry and 
scurry, looking for copy md sometimes not finding it: 
175 and then, always to have something new in your stuff. 
l 
·j Damn proofs and printers, I say, for a few days. I'm deuced 
l glad, I can tell yo~ to get back to the old country. Does a 
fellow good. a bit of a holiday. I fed a ton better since 
I landed 0 0 ju_ dirty . agam m OQ[ Dublin. . . . Here you are, 
180 Tommy. Water? Say when. . 
. little Chandler allowed his w":.~. to be very much 
diluted. ~, 
-You doo' t know what's good for you, my boy, said 
Ignatius Gallaher. I drink mine neat. 
185 -1 drink ~err little as a rule, said Little Chandler 
modestly. An odd half-one or sow~ I meet my of the 
old aowd: that's all. 
-Ah, well, said Ignatius Gallaher, cheerfully, here's to 
us and to old times and old acquaintance. 
190 They clinked glasses and dnnk the toast. 
. -1 ~ some of the old gang to-<lay, Jaid Igmtius 
Gallaher. O'lhra seems to be in a bad way. What's he 
doing? 
-Nothing. said Little Chandler. He's gone to the 
195 dogs. 
-But Hogan has a good sit, hasn't he? 
-Yes; he' J in the Land Commission. 
-I met him one night in London and he seemed to be 
very flush. ••• Poor O'Han I Boose. I suppose? 
200 -Other things, too, said little Chandler shortly. 
Ignatius Gallaher laughed. 
-Tommy, he said, I sec you b2ven't changed an atom. 
You're the very same serious penon that used to lecture 
me on Sunday mornings when I had ~ sore head and a fur 
205 on my tongue. You'd want to knock about a bit in the 
world. Have you never been anyw~ even for a trip? 
- fve been to ~ Isle of Man, ~d Little Clwtdler. 
Iptius Ga1laber laughed. 
-The Isle of Mm! be said.. Go to London or Puis: 
210 Paris, for choice. That'd do you good. 
-Have you seen Paris? 






-And is it really so beautiful as they say? asked Little 
215 Chandler. 
He sipped a little of his drink while Ignatius Gallaher 
finished his boldly. 
-Beautiful? said ~tius Gallaher, pausing on the word· 
and on the flavour ~fhis drink. It's not JO beautiful, you 
220 know. Of course, it is beautiful. ..• But it's the life a[ 
Paris; dut' • the thing. ~ .there's no city like Paris £x 
gaiety, movement, excitement.... · · 
Little Chandler finished his whisky and, after some 
trouble, sucteeded in catching the barman's eye. He 
225 ordered the same again. 
-I've been to the Moulin Rouge, Ignatius Ga1hher 
continued when the ba.nnm had removed their glasses, 
and I've ·been to all the Bohemian cafes. Hot stuffl Not 
for~ pious·chap like you, Tommy. 
230 . Little Chandler said nothing until the barman returned 
wid{ the two glasses: then he touched his friend's glass lighdy 
and reciprocated the former toast. He was beginning to fed 
somewhat disillusioned. Gallaher's accent and way of ex-
pressing himself did not please him. There was something 
235 vulgar in his friend which he had not observed before. But 
perhaps it w~ only the result of living in London amid tbe 
bustle and comp:tition of the Press. The old peno!W chum 
was still chere under this new gaudy manner. And. after 
all, ~ bad lived, be bad seen the ·wocld. little 
240 Oundler looked at his friend envioasly. 
-Everything in Puis is gay, said Ignatius Gallaher. 
They believe in enjoying life-and don't you think they're 
right 1 If you want to enjtv youne1f properly yoa must go 
to Puis. And, mind you. they've a great feeling £Or the 
245 Irish ~ When they ~ I was from Ireland ~ 
were ready to eat me, man.. 
Little Chandler took four or five sips from his glass. 
- T dl me. be said, is it true that Paris is so ..• immon1 
as they say? 
250 Ignatius Gallaher~ a catholic gesture with his right 
arm.. 





spicy bits in Paris. Go to one of the s-- J ·-ts' L-1'- r: • ...,..._ _ , UXlCll oa.us, IO[ 
uutance. J. nat s livdy, if you like, when the cocottu begin 
255 to let themselves loose. You know wlut they are, I sup-
pose? 
. -rve beud of them, said Little Chandler. 
Ignatius Gallaher drank off his whisky and shook his 
bod. 
260 ·-~be said, you may say wlut you like. There's no 
woman like the Parisienne-for style, for go. · 
-Then it is an immoral city, said Little Chandler, with 
timid insistence-! mem, compared with London or 
Dublin? 
265 -Lon<lonl said Ignatius Gallaher. It's six of one and 
half-<l-dozcn of the other. You ask Hogan, my boy. I 
showed him a bit about London when he W2.5 over there. 
He'd open your q,e. ... I say, Tommy, don't tru.ke punch 
·of that whisky: liquor up. 
270 -No, ~y •••• 
-0, come on, another one won't do you any harm. 
· What is it? The same again, I suppose? 
-Well ..• all right. 
- Franfois, the same again. ••• Will you smoke, Tommy? 
275 Igt12tius Gallaher produced his cigar-ase. The twt? 
friends lit their cigan and puffed at. them in silence WlW 
their drinks were terVed. 
-I'll tell you my opinion, said Ignatius Gallaher, emerg-
ing after some time from the douds of smoke in which be 
280 had taken refuge, it's a rum world. Talk of immorality!_ 
· I've heard of cases-what am I saying?-l've known them: . 
cases of ... immorality •... 
Ignatius Gallaher puffed thOughtfully at his cigar and 
then, in a aim historian's tone, he proceeded to sketc~ fo~ 
285 his friend some pictures of the corruption which W2S rife 
abroad. He summarized the vices of many apitlls and 
seemed inclined to awud the palm to Berlin. Some things 
he could not vouch for (his friends b2d told him}, but of 







290 r~nk nor c~ste. He rcve41ed many of the secrets of religiow 
~ouses ~n the Con~nent and described some of the prac-
bces which were fashionable in high society and ended by 
telling, with deails, a story about an English duchess-
a story which he bew to be true. little. Chandler was 
295 astonished. 
-Ah, well, said Ignatius Gallaher, here we are in old 
jog-along Dublin whe~e nothing is known of such things. 
-How doll you must find it, said Little Chandler, dter 
all tbe other places you've seen I 
300 -Well, said Ignatius Gallaher, it's a rdaxation to come 
over here, you know. And, after all. it's the old country, 
as they say, isn't it? You can't help having a certain feeling 
for it. That's human nature. . . . But tell me something 
about yound£ Hogan told me you had . . . wted the 
305 joys of connubial bliss. Two yean ago, wam't it? 
little Chandler blushed and smiled. 
-Yes.. he said. I was mairied last May twelve months. 
-I hope it's not too late in the <hy to offer my best 
wishes, said Ignatius Gallaher. I didn't know your address 
310 or r d have done so at the time. 
He extended his band, which Litde Chandler took. 
-Well. Tommy, he said, I wish you and youn every 
joy in 1ifC, old chap, and tons of money' and may you never 
die till I shoot you. And that's the wish of a sincere &;end, 
315 an old friend. You know that? 
-I know that, said Little Chandler. 
-Any youngsters? said Ignatius Gallaher. 
Little Chandler blushed again. 
-We have one child, he said. 
320 -Son or daughter? 
-A little boy. . . 
Ignatius Gallaher sbpped his friend sonorously on the 
back. 
-Bravo, he said, I wouldn't doubt you, Tommy. 
325 Little Chandler smiled, looked c~y at .his glass 
and bic his lower lip with three childishly white front 
teeth. 
-1 hope you11 spend an evening with US. he said, before 
you go back. My wife will be ddigbted co meet you. We 
330 can have a little music and-
. -Thanh a~, old chap, said Ignatius Gallaher, 
rm sorry we didn t meet earlier. But I must leave to-
morrow night. 
-To-night, perh2ps , .. ? 
335 . -I'm awfully sorry, old man. You see rm over here 
with another fellow, clevet young chap be is too, and ~e 
arranged to go to a little card-party. Only fOr that .•• 
-0, in that ase .... 
. -But who knows? said Ignatius Gallaher considerately. 
340 Next yeu I may take a little skip over here now that I've 
broken the ice. It's only a pleasure deferred. 
-Very well, said Little Chandler, the next time you 
. come we must have an evening together. That's agreed 
· no~. im't it? 
345 -.-Y~ that's agreed, said Ignatius ~U:aher. Next yeu if 
I come, parok J'lwnMur. 
-And to clinch the bargain, said Little Chandler, we'll 
just have one more now. 
Ignatius Gallaher took out a large gold watch and 
350 looked at it.· 
-Is it to be the last? he said. Beame you know, I have 
an a.p. 
-0, re'· positivdy, said Little Cbmdler. 
-Very well, then. said Ignatius Gallaher, let us have 
355 another one as a tk« 1111 doruis-that's good vemacular for 
a small whisky, I believe. 
Little Chandler ordered the drinks. Tbe blush which 
360 
had risen to his face a few moments before was esbblishing 
itself. A trifle made him blush at any time: and now h~ fd~ 
warm and excited. 11uee snull whiskies had gone to his 
head and G~laher's strong cigar had confused ~is mind, 
foe he was a delicate and abstinent penon. The adventure 
of meeting Gallaher after eight years, of finding himself 
with Gallaher in Corleu's surrowtded by lights and noise, 
1 ., 
.·~ 
365 of listening to ,G2.lliher' s stories and of sharing for a brief 
space Gallaher s v-2gnnt md triumphant life, up~t the 
equipoise of his sensitive nature. He fdt acutdy the con-
tnst between his own life and his friend's, and it seemed 
to him unjwt. ~lbher was his inferior in birth and 
370 educa~on .. He was sure that he could do something better 
.t~an h1s fnend had ever done, or could ever do, !omething 
h1gher than mere uwdry journalism if he only got the 
chance. What was it that stood in his way? His ~for-
. tunate timidity! He wished to vindicate himself in some 
375 way, to assert his nunhood. He saw behind Gallaher's 
refusal of his inviution. Gallaher was only patronizing him 
by his friencllinm just as he was patronizing Ireland by 
his visit. 
The barll12n brought their drinks. Little Chandler 
380 pushed one glass towards his friend and too~ up the other 
boldly. 
-Who knows? he ~id, as they lifted their glasses. When 
you come . next year 1 may have the pleasure of wishing 
long life and h2ppiness to. Mr and Mrs lgnatiw Gallaher. 
385 Ignatius Gallaher in the act of drinking dosc=d one eye 
expressively over .the rim of his gl~. When he had drunk 
he snucked ~is lips decisively, Set down his glass md S2id: 
-No blooming feu of that. my boy. I'm going to have 
. my fling first and see a bit of life and. tbe world before I 
390 put my he2d in the sack- if I ever do. 
-Some cby you will, said Little Chandler calmly. 
Ignatius Gallaher turned his orange tie and slate-blue 
eyes full upon his friend. 
-you think so? he said. 
395 -You'll put your head ·in the sack. repeated Little 
Clwl<ller stoudy, like everyone dse if you can ~ ~ 
girl. 
He lud slightly emphmsed his tooe and be W2S awue 
that he lud betnyed himself; but, though the colour .had 
400 heightened in his chee~ he did not flinch from his friend's . 
g~u. Ignatius Gallaher watched him for a few moments 
and then said: 
-If ever it occurs, you may bet your bottom dollar 
there'll be no mooning and spooning about it. I mean to 
405 marry money. She'll h.ave a good fat account at the bank or 
she won't do for me. 
Little Chandler shook his bead. 
-Why, man alive, said Ignatius Gallaher, vehemendy, 
do you know what it is? I've only to say the word and 
410 to-morrow I an have the woman and the ash. You· 
don't believe it? Wdl, I know it. There are hmtdreds_: 
what am I ~ying?-thousands of rich~ and jews, 
rotten with money, that'd only be too glad. . . . You 
wait a while, my boy. See if I doa't play.my ards pro-
415 perly. When I go about a thing I mean business, I tell you. 
You just wait. 
He tossed his glass to his mouth. finished his drink and 
laughed loudly. Then be looked thoughtfully before him 
md said in a calmer tooe: 
420 -l;Jut rm in no hany. They ~Can wait. I don't &ncy 
tying m)'Jdf up to one woman, you know. 
He imit2ted with his mouth the act of wting and nude 
I wry face. 
-Must get a bit sale. I should think, he said. 
4 25 Little Olandler sat in the room off the hall, holding a 
child in his arms. To save money they kept no servant 
but Annie's young sister Monica came for an hour or so 
in tbe morning md an hour or 10 in the evening to bdp. 
But Mooia had gooe home long ~· It was a quarter to 
430 nine. Little Ot.andler bad come home late £Or tea and, 
moreover, be had forgotten to bring Annie home the pared 
oC coffee &om Bewley's. Of COUDC she was in a lnd 
hamoar and ~ve him short answers. She ~d she would 
do without my tea but when it came neu the time at which 
4 35 tbe shop at the comer dosed she decided to go out herself 
fix a quaner of a pound oftes and two pounds of sugu. 
She pat tbe sleeping child deftly in his anm and said: 
-Here. Don't "WUen him. 
A little lamp with a white china shade stood upon the 
440 table and its light fell over a photograph which was en-
dosed in. a £rune of awn pled horn. It was Annie's photo-
~ph.l:l~e Clundler looked at it, pausing at the thin tight 
lips. She wore the pale blue summer blouse which he lud 
brought her home as a pnxnt one Saturday. It had cost him 
445 ~ and dev~penc:e; but what an agony of nervoumess 
It had cost him! How be had suffered that day, waiting at 
the shop door until the shop was empty, standing at the 
coun~ and trying to appear at his ease while the gill piled 
bdies' blouses before him, paying at the desk and forgetting 
450 to take up the odd penny ofhis change, being called back by 
the ashier, and, finally, striving ~ hide his blushes as be 
left the ~hop by examining the pared to see ifit was securdy 
tied. When he brought the blouse home Annie kissed him 
and said it was very pretty and stylish; but when she heud 
455 the price she threw the blouse on the table and said it was a 
. regular swindle to charge ten and elevenpcnce for that. At 
6nt she wanted to take it back but when she tried it on she 
was delighted with it, especially with the make of the sl~ 
and kissed him and said be was very good to think of her. 
460 Hml. .. 
He looked coldly into the ey~ of the photograph and 
they answered coldly. CerWnly cbey were pretty and cbe 
: &ce itself was pretty. But he found something mean in it. 
! Why was it so unconscious and lady-like? The composure 
465 of the eyes irritated him. They repelled him and defied 
! him: there was no passion in them, no rapture. He thought 
of wb2t Gallaher bad said about rich J~ Those dark 
Oriental eyes, he thought. how fUll they are of passioo. 
of voluptuous longing! ..• Why bad he married the eyes 
470 in the photograph? 
He aught himself up at the question and glanced ner-
vously round the room. He found something mean 1n the 
pretty furniture which he had bought for hi$ house on the 
hire sy1tem. Annie lud chosen it hc:ndf and it reminded 
475 him of her. It toO was prim and pretty. A dull rescntu¥nt 
against his life awoke within him. Could he not escape 
&om his little house? Was it too late for him to try to live 
bnvdy like Gallaher? Could he go to London? There 
~ the furniture still to be paid for. If he could only 
480 wnte a book and get it published, that might o~ the way 
for him. r-
A volume of Byron's poems lay before him on the uble. 
He opened it autiously with his left lund lest he should 
waken the child and began to read the fint poem in the 
485 book: . 
HusMJ art tht winds .uul still till tvtning gloom, 
Not t'tn a aphyr warukrs through t~ grovt, 
Whilst I rttum to view my Margartt' s tomb 
Atul sastltr flowm on tht Just I lovt. 
490 He paused. He fdt the rhythm of the vene about him in 
tbe room. How melancholy it was! Could he, too, write 
.like that, express the melancholy ofhis soul in verse? There 
were so many things he W2Dted to describe: his sensation of 
a few houn before on Grattan Bridge, for example. If he 
495 could get back again into that mood. ... 
The child awoke and began to cry. He turned from the 
page and tried to hush it: but it ~ould not be hushed. He 
began to rock it to and fro in his arms but its wailing cry 
grew keener. He rocked it &ster while his eyes began to 
500 read tbe JeCOnd stanza: 
Wtthin tltiJ rumow «U rtdints htr cl4y, 
'I1ult cLry whm MJa ••• 
It wu useless. He couldn't read. He couldn't do any-
thing. The wailing of tbe child pierced the drum of his eu. 
505 It was usd~ useless! He wu a prisoner for life. His arms 
t:rembled with anger :md ruddenly bending to the child's 
&ce he shouted: 
-Stop I 
The child stopped for an instan~ bad a spurn of fright 
510 and began to saem\. He jumped up from his chair and 
walked lwtily up and down tbe room with the child in his 
arms. It began to sob piteously, losing its br~th for four oc 
five secondJ, md then bursting out anew. The thin walls of 





515 sobbed n1ore convulsively. He looked at the contracted and 
quivering face of the child and began to be alarmed. He 
counted seven sob~ without a brc,\c hetwC<."n th("m :md 
(·;;u~~.ht the child to l:i<. brcaH in frir.!11. I( it. died! ... 
The door wa:; burst l.""l"'en and a .young wom:l..n r::m in, 
520 panting. 
-What is it? What is it? she cried. 
The child, bearing its mother's voice, broke out into a 
paroxysm of sobbing. . 
-It's nothing, Annie ... it's nothing .... He began to 
525 cry ... 
She Aung her parcels on the floor :md snatched the child 
from rum. 
-What have you done to him? she cried, glaring into 
his face. 
530 Little Chandler sustained for one moment the gaze of 
. her eyes and his heart closed together as. he met the hatred 
in them. He began to stammer: 
-It's nothing .... He ... he began to cry .... I couldn't · 
... I didn't do anything .... What? 
535 Giving no heed to him she begm to walk up and down 
the room, cbsping the child tightly in her arms and mur-
munng: 
..:...My little man! My little m.mnie! Was 'ou frightened, 
love? ••• There now, love! There now! .•• Umhabaun! 
540 Mam.m.a's little lamb of the world! ... There now! 
Little Chmdler felt his checks suffused with slwne and 
he stood back: out of ~e lamplight. He listened while the 
paroxysm of the child's sobbing grew less and less; and 
tears of remorse started. to his eyes. 
